

ASSENT AND ARGUMENT

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J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA
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BRAD INWOOD AND JAAP MANSFELD (EDS.)

ASSENT AND ARGUMENT



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STUDIES IN CICERO'S *ACADEMIC BOOKS*

Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Hellenisticum
(Utrecht, August 21-25, 1995)

EDITED BY

BRAD INWOOD AND JAAP MANSFELD



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PREFACE

The seventh Symposium Hellenisticum was held in The Netherlands at Utrecht University, August 21-25, 1995 under the generous sponsorship of the Department of Philosophy. The ten papers presented here are revised versions of the drafts distributed to the participants in advance and discussed at the meetings. The final versions bear the signs of this discussion and of reflection and revision over the months following the conference.

The participants at the Symposium were: Antonina Alberti, Keimpe Algra, James Allen, Julia Annas, Han Baltussen, Susanne Bobzien, Jacques Brunschwig, Myles Burnyeat, Irma Croese, Tiziano Dorandi, Dorothea Frede, John Glucker, Woldemar Görler, Miriam Griffin, David Hahm, James Hankinson, Brad Inwood, Anna Maria Ioppolo, Mieke Koenen, André Laks, Carlos Lévy, Jaap Mansfeld, Mario Mignucci, David Runia, Malcolm Schofield, Piet Schrijvers, David Sedley, Gisela Striker, and Teun Tieleman. Jonathan Barnes was unable to attend in person, but his paper was presented and discussed in his absence.

Financial support for the Symposium came from the home Universities of the participants, from various pots in Utrecht University, from the De Vogel Foundation, and from NWO (Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research). The organizers of the Symposium wish to acknowledge the generous assistance without which this conference could not have been held.

One of our tasks was to impose, as best we could, some measure of standardization on the varieties of conventions used by the contributors. In this area we may not have been entirely successful, for instance as to the references to ancient authors (but throughout we use *Ac. I* for the first book of the last edition of the *Academica*, and *Luc.* for the second book of the first edition). Those to modern authors are given in the form name plus year; the bibliographies are to be found at the end of each paper. Quotations in Latin are not italicized, apart from single words or words deserving special emphasis. Further, the majority of our contributors quoting Greek words and phrases do so using the Greek alphabet, while others prefer to transliterate; here as a rule we have not bothered to interfere. The indexes do not strive at completeness, but pick out the

major terms and the more sustained discussions of passages, especially in Cicero. Most welcome help in proof-reading and in preparing the index locorum was given by Henri van de Laar. That the final camera-ready version proved to be at the cutting edge of the art is due once again to the expertise of Ms. Gonni Runia-Deenick.

Brad Inwood and Jaap Mansfeld
Toronto/Utrecht, March 1997

INTRODUCTION

Cicero is central to the study of Hellenistic philosophy, and this is especially true for epistemology. His evidence is crucial for our understanding of the debates between Academics and Stoics which extended from the early confrontation between Zeno and Arcesilaus to Cicero's own lifetime. Moreover, his so-called Academic books were extremely influential in the development of epistemology in later centuries, in later antiquity and in the early modern period; Cicero's treatment of the discussions between Stoics and Academics, and of their arguments, has given us much of the basic language of debate, 'probable', 'verisimilitude', 'assent', and 'comprehension' among other terms. But perhaps most important is the fact that Cicero was himself a follower of the Academy, that is to say a philosopher who personally grappled with central questions about the possibility of knowledge which had remained excitingly (perhaps even chaotically) open for those who followed the path of Plato.

The 'Academic books' as we have them are the principal surviving record of his endeavour; they were written in dialogue form, in two or three different versions, and are now sadly incomplete. The challenges which these works pose to philosophers and historians of philosophy are formidable. Hence it seemed particularly worthwhile to focus scholarly and philosophical attention on these works, in the hope that recent advances in the understanding of Cicero's philosophical activity and of Hellenistic thought generally might yield significant progress. The contributors approach the 'Academic books' from all angles and have, we think, justified this hope, though it should be pointed out that, as is only to be expected in scholarly discussion, they in no way agree among themselves on all points of interpretation. The reader is, so to speak invited to join in the discussion.

Cicero's 'Academic books' are important philosophically as well as historically. The papers published here show with considerable force that these two ways of being important cannot readily be separated. Miriam Griffin's historical and literary analysis of the works clarifies the process of composition, the nature of the works, the titles, and their place in Cicero's busy professional life.

Woldemar Görler investigates the roles of Cicero as author and as character in the dialogues, and attempts to pinpoint his personal philosophical position in the debates of his school. The history of the Academic movement is also the focus of papers by John Glucker and Tiziano Dorandi. Glucker sifts through Cicero's views on Socrates, founder of the Academic style of philosophical doubt, ranging beyond the 'Academic books' to the rest of Cicero's corpus. Dorandi coordinates recent developments in our understanding of the history of the Academy with the evidence of Cicero and shows that although he is not a 'professional' philosopher he has much to tell us about the history of his school.

The 'Academic books' give us a good deal of evidence about branches of philosophy other than epistemology, and two of these areas are explored in papers by Keimpe Algra (who shows that Cicero used the famous *Carneadea divisio* in a variety of dialectical ways to serve his own sceptical purposes) and by Jonathan Barnes (who examines the logical and dialectical topics with which Cicero deals, in particular the sceptical challenge to logic posed by the so-called liar paradox). James Hankinson's paper is a contribution both to understanding the Academic debate between Philo of Larissa and Antiochus and to its long-term impact on ancient epistemology. Galen, the heir to a great deal of later Platonic and Stoic philosophy, advanced a naturalized foundation for human knowledge which in part rested on the work done by earlier Academics. James Allen and Gisela Striker take us further into the debate among Carneades and his successors. It is hard to pin down the philosophical stance of Carneades, who never wrote and was interpreted in strikingly different ways by his immediate pupils. Allen advances the debate by building on the insight that even on matters of epistemology Carneades argued for positions he did not hold. Striker focusses more on Philo of Larissa and argues that the position he eventually adopted on the nature and possibility of knowledge was novel and intelligent (anticipating some versions of fallibilism), but no longer particularly sceptical. Myles Burnyeat concludes the volume with a compelling account of the arguments which drove the Academic debate between the days of Antipater and Carneades and the time of Philo. This, he argues, was the seminal period for probabilism, during which it developed from being a dialectical ploy used by Academics in the debate

against dogmatism to an epistemological position they were prepared to endorse.

The affiliations of the contributors at the time of the Symposium were: Miriam Griffin: Somerville College, Oxford; Woldemar Görlner: Universität des Saarlandes; John Glucker: Tel-Aviv University; Tiziano Dorandi: CNRS, Paris; Keimpe Algra: Universiteit Utrecht; Jonathan Barnes: Université de Genève; James Hankinson: University of Texas at Austin; James Allen: University of Pittsburgh; Gisela Striker: Harvard University; Myles Burnyeat: Robinson College, Cambridge.

THE COMPOSITION OF THE *ACADEMICA*

MOTIVES AND VERSIONS

M. GRIFFIN

I. *Introduction*

Studying Cicero's *Academica* even from the historical point of view quickly leads to ἐποχή. The evidence for the various stages of composition and the reasons for them is confusing and conflicting, and Cicero's inconsistencies cast doubt at times on his sincerity.

There are, however, some facts available about the chronological order in which Cicero composed and altered the work and about the reasons he gave, sincerely or insincerely, for these activities. Although appeal will also be made in what follows to other passages too long or too diffuse to be listed, the texts assembled in Appendix A contain the central facts we possess about the composition, copying and dissemination of the *Academica* in its various versions and about the titles Cicero intended for the various versions of the work; they also give Cicero's statements of the intended relation of the *Academica* to his other works of the period, and his account of his reasons for writing the work, in terms of his personal and political life.¹

These facts are derived from Cicero's letters and from his philosophical works. However, the most important evidence by far is provided by the letters to Atticus, and these unfortunately show a gap from the end of November 46 to 6 March 45, thus making it difficult for fix when he started composing his last series of philosophical works. Scholars² fall back on inferences from the *Orator*, apparently published towards the end of 46,³ in which Cicero talks of writing 'graviora et maiora', *Orat.* 148 (T22). The phrase can be taken to indicate plans for philosophical works in particular, if we compare, for example, 'res tam gravas tamque praeclaras' in *N.D.*

¹ They will be cited with the T number assigned them in Appendix A, below pp. 28-32.

² Reid (1885) 29 n. 6, followed by Bringmann (1971) 91.

³ *Att.* XII.6a.2, *Fam.* VI.7.4. See Bringmann (1971) 41.

I.7. Indeed Bringmann has seen, in the end of the *Orator*, a clear indication of Cicero's preoccupation with the themes of the *Academica* in particular, for Cicero speaks there (237) of his adherence to the *simillimum veri* and his licence to change his mind on the topic he has been discussing.⁴ It is important to remember, however, that Cicero was there trying to be tactful to Brutus, whose views on oratory he knew he had just been contradicting, and that he therefore had every reason to emphasize how tentative they were.

The inferences made from the *Orator* illustrate the kind of hopeful surmise that inevitably characterizes the investigation of Cicero's plans and intentions. It is therefore appropriate to proceed with a series of questions and problems treated *in utramque partem*. It will occasionally be possible to propose something πιθανόν or *probabile*, but even the *verisimile* is usually unattainable.

II. *Why did Cicero decide to write the Academica in the first place?*

This question needs to be pursued from three directions: as a search for Cicero's intellectual reasons for writing on such a topic (this involves considering its relation to his other works of the period); secondly, as a search for his personal reasons; and finally, as a search for possible political reasons.

II.1 *The intellectual reasons*

A suggestion sometimes made is that the *Academica* was part of a large project, in which the opening work was to be the *Hortensius*, which has the character of a protreptic to philosophy.⁵ The evidence for this view consists in a passage of *N.D.* I.9 (T25), where Cicero, in his apologia for the philosophical works that were appearing with such rapidity in 45, speaks of a decision to handle the whole of philosophy and all its interconnected parts. This is regarded by Bringmann⁶ as a more explicit version of what had already been adumbrated at *Orat.* 148 (T22) nearly a year before. He points out that still later in *Div.* I.1-3, Cicero, when listing his philosophical works, first describes a group written in 45/4, a group

⁴ Bringmann (1971) 88-9.

⁵ Philippson (1939) 1123; Bringmann (1971) 90-1.

⁶ See note above.

which he clearly feels hang together as a project to open the pathways of the noblest learning ('optimae artes') to his fellow citizens. This group of works,⁷ to be completed by the current one and *De Fato*, he clearly separates from the other philosophical works which he goes on to list (the political and rhetorical works, the consolation, the *Cato* and *Laelius*), although some of them were written about the same time.

Against this conception of a series planned in advance stands the testimony of *Fin.* I.2 (T24), which is closer in time to the inception of the *Academica* itself. Here, as Hirzel notes, Cicero points to the success of the *Hortensius* as leading him to embark on other works: 'Qui liber, cum et tibi [Bruto] probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi...'⁸ Though with *plura* he is principally speaking of the present work *De Finibus*, what he says may also be meant to apply to the first edition of the *Academica*, for they were both apparently composed between March and May of 45.⁹

Turning from the direct testimony to the literary argument, the idea of unity gains support from the fact that certain literary devices appear designed to integrate at least the *Catulus* and the *Lucullus* with the *Hortensius*. As Hirzel pointed out, not only are the speakers the same, but they retain their characters.¹⁰ Thus Hortensius, who in the protreptic championed oratory and attacked philosophy, gave (according to *Luc.* 10) only a superficial account of Antiochus' doctrine in the *Catulus*, and, at the end of the *Lucullus*, is still ironic about philosophy; Lucullus, who defended history in the *Hortensius* (fr. 11 Grilli (1962)) is still acting as a historian in the *Lucullus*, using his excellent memory to recall a discourse of Antiochus. There is also a clear connection of place, since each of the

⁷ I.e. the *Hortensius*, *Academica*, *De Finibus*, *Disputationes Tusculanae*, *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*.

⁸ Hirzel (1895) 504. Gucker (1978) 411 n. 40 contests the point but does not argue the case.

⁹ *Att.* XII.12.2 (T3) is our first indication of the composition of *De Finibus*; *Att.* XII.23.2 (T4), where Cicero asks Atticus for information about the philosophical embassy of 155 BC., is probably our first hint of the *Academica* where the names of the consuls requested in the letter appear at *Luc.* 137 (but see the arguments against the connection in Gucker (1978) 411-2 n. 40). *Att.* XII.44.4 (T6) shows the completion of the *Academica*; *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8) of *De Finibus*. See Bringmann (1971) 92-3.

¹⁰ Hirzel (1895) 506-8. The idea that Balbus was also a speaker in the *Hortensius* is no longer held, being based on the erroneous introduction of his name into some of the fragments, Reid (1885) 31.

three dialogues is set in a villa belonging to one of the three venerable speakers, the *Hortensius* in a villa of Lucullus, the *Catulus* in his own villa, and the *Lucullus* in a villa of Hortensius; and there is a certain unity of time, with the *Hortensius* set in the late sixties and the other two on two successive days (*Luc.*) in 62/1. It seems hard to deny that the *Hortensius*, *Catulus* and *Lucullus* form a trilogy and were planned from the start to form one.

For Bringmann the trilogy itself was intended to serve as an introduction to a whole cycle of dialogues with the same speakers. For Cicero at the end of the dialogue, *Luc.* 147 (T23), looks forward to later discussions by the same speakers, in which these same men will examine the differences of opinion of the major dogmatic sects on physics and ethics.¹¹ The predicted topics might well seem to point to *De Natura Deorum* and to *De Finibus*. Moreover, Lucullus replies to Cicero's invitation, 'We will meet more frequently, and particularly at our villas at Tusculum to investigate such questions as we think fit'. At least the primary reference must be to Lucullus' villa at Tusculum where the 'Stoic' discussions in Books III-IV of *De Finibus* are set,¹² though Reid may also be right to see here a hint of the *Tusculan Disputations* and possibly of *De Divinatione*, all of which are set in Cicero's villa at Tusculum.¹³ The idea of using the same speakers, according to Bringmann, was only given up by Cicero when he changed the speakers in the *Academica*.

The principal objection to Bringmann's conception, however, is the fact that Cicero, at the very time when he was composing the first edition of the *Academica* featuring Hortensius, Catulus and Lucullus, was already engaged in writing *De Finibus*, using a different set of dead aristocrats as speakers: namely L. Manlius Torquatus, C. Valerius Triarius, M. Porcius Cato, M. Pupius Piso.¹⁴ Indeed the *Torquatus* (Book I or Books I-II) was already finished when according to *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8) he was adding eulogistic prooemia to the *Catulus* and *Lucullus*—that is before he decided to change the original speakers in the *Academica*. Then again, even if *De Finibus*

¹¹ Bringmann (1971) 111, 137 n. 87.

¹² Though the dramatic date of 52 BC is ten years after that of the trilogy, when Lucullus was dead and the villa was in the possession of Lucullus' son (*Fin.* III.7-8).

¹³ Reid (1885) 347 n. 29.

¹⁴ The permitted living participants, as always, are Cicero, members of his family, and Atticus.

can plausibly be said to have fulfilled the prediction at the end of the dialogue, *Luc.* 147 (T23), to judge by the kind of ethical disagreements which have already been outlined by Lucullus in 129-41, the same can hardly be claimed for *De Natura Deorum*. To fulfil that prediction, Cicero should have embarked right away on a comprehensive treatise covering the sort of topics that Lucullus has already outlined in 117-26, especially as the link between the two passages is made absolutely clear by the reference at 147 to future enquiries 'de obscuritate naturae', which picks up the characterization at 122 of the topics 'de natura rerum' as 'occultata et circumfusa tenebris'. Yet *De Natura Deorum* actually covers only a very limited area of physics, excluding such topics in Lucullus' outline as the fundamental nature of matter, the existence of void, the position of the earth in the universe, and the nature of the human body and mind. Indeed the retrospective list in *De Divinatione*, where Cicero regards *De Natura Deorum*, along with the later *De Divinatione* and *De Fato*, as covering 'tota haec quaestio' (*Div.* II.3), makes it hard to believe that these works were designed to fulfil the original project outlined in *Lucullus*.

Can firmer conclusions be drawn from the argument from subject matter? The notion that Cicero planned *Academica* as part of a large series is often supported by the idea that it serves a recognizable function, or functions, as part of such a planned series. Two possible functions have been suggested:

(i). The end of the *Lucullus* prepared the way for a discussion of physics and ethics on Academic principles, where the contradictory arguments of the dogmatic schools would be presented and no decision would be reached, or at most a decision on the *probabile*. The *Academica* can thus be seen as setting the aporetic tone for the whole cycle of major works.¹⁵

In support one can adduce the description of *De Finibus* given in *Div.* II.2, where the work is said to treat the subject 'in such a way that the conflicting views of the different philosophers might be known', as well as the *aporia* in which that work ends (V.95-6). There is also the isosthenic structure of *De Divinatione* itself, a work which can be seen as 'an exercise in the opposition of arguments'

¹⁵ Hirzel (1895) 135-8, Steinmetz (1989) 17 ff.

where the philosophical arguments for and against divination, based on historical experience and sceptical reason respectively, both attract sympathy.¹⁶ Again, there is the slight suggestion of *probabile* at the end of *De Natura Deorum*,¹⁷ and the fact that in that work (*N.D.* I.11-3), Cicero explicitly connects the *Academica*'s defence of the method of discovering truth by arguing 'contra omnis et pro omnibus' with the doxographical method of exposition now being applied to the subject in hand. However, there is also an objection that can be raised against this suggestion, namely that Cicero clearly includes in the series of late works grouped together in the second book of *De Divinatione*, the *Tusculan Disputations*, which can hardly be regarded as anything but a dogmatic work. Though Bringmann tries to argue that the treatise nonetheless fits the spirit of the *Academica* in not presenting the doctrines it favours as the properties of any one school,¹⁸ Cicero's use of the verbs *aperuerunt* ('made plain') and *docet* ('teaches') in his own description of the work in *Div.* II.2 makes its dogmatic character clear. The fact that Cicero went on to write other dogmatic ethical works¹⁹ is also suggestive.

(ii). Whether or not function (i) is plausible, it can be held that, in Cicero's grand plan, the *Academica* represents the λογική branch of philosophy.²⁰ This is suggested by the specification of physics and ethics as the two remaining areas of discussion out of three in *Luc.* 147 (T23). It is also supported by *N.D.* I.9 (T25), where Cicero gives his aim as treating 'all of philosophy' and 'all of its parts and members' and 'all its questions', for no other obvious candidate for the *pars rationalis* suggests itself.²¹

¹⁶ The interpretation advanced by Schofield (1986), esp. 55-61.

¹⁷ III.40: 'mihi Balbi [disputatio] ad veritatis similitudinem videretur esse propensior'.

¹⁸ Bringmann (1971) 138-9, 157, 169-70. Görler (1995) 89-84 brings out well how the deprecation of rational criticism and the encouragement of compliance in his disciple are combined with the defence of rational counter-argument in the *Tusculan Disputations*. Steinmetz (1989) 18 contrasts the critical dialectic of some works in the series and the character of others as *medicina animi*.

¹⁹ Besides the *De Senectute* mentioned *Div.* II.3, he wrote *De Amicitia* and *De Officiis*.

²⁰ Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1020-1.

²¹ Also compatible is *Div.* II.4 where Cicero gives as his aim that of leaving 'nullum philosophiae locum' unavailable in Latin.

However, it may not be right to attribute to Cicero *the author* views expressed by Cicero *the speaker* in *Luc.* 147 (T23).²² After all, the speaker suggests that the branch of logic be discussed first, that of ethics last, while the author did not in fact reserve writing his ethical work for last, but was already working on *De Finibus* coincidentally with the *Academica*. Moreover, the *De Natura Deorum*, as argued above, does not answer to the physical branch of philosophy as outlined in *Lucullus*.

Both of these suggested functions for the *Academica*, moreover, run up against the major obstacle that Cicero's later descriptions of the work do not characterize it as a discussion of the basis of knowledge. Rather they stress its *patrocinium* (championship) of a particular philosophical system.²³ Cicero in fact tells us that it was read as a statement of his own views (*N.D.* I.6, 11-2, *Div.* II.1). His own clearest statement is in the *Tusculan Disputations* II.4, where Cicero describes the purpose of the *Academici libri* as a defence of the Academy, his preferred system of philosophy, and a sequel to his defence of philosophy in general in the *Hortensius*.

A plausible conclusion to draw from all these considerations would be that Cicero in the summer of 46 planned only the trilogy *Hortensius*, *Catulus*, *Lucullus*, in which the main function of the latter two books would be to answer the obvious question which would occur to readers of the *Hortensius*: which school did Cicero himself favour?²⁴ For *Luc.* 61 shows that Cicero had not made it clear in that earlier work what system he himself followed, no doubt because, as *Lucullus* is made to hint here, it could have weakened the effectiveness of the case for philosophy which he was pleading there. The *Academica* also enabled Cicero to demonstrate his prowess in writing technical philosophy in Latin, after the popular exposition of the *Hortensius*.²⁵ It was the success of the *Hortensius*, which was

²² For a discussion on the need to separate the author and speaker in general, see Görler in this volume, pp. 36-57.

²³ Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1020.

²⁴ Those scholars who believe that Cicero had recently reconverted to scepticism from an Antiochian position might want to add that he wrote as a recent convert to expound his rediscovered creed. However, I do not find the arguments for an Antiochian phase convincing, (Görler (1995); Griffin (1995) 335 n. 42) and the end of the *Orator* proclaiming his adherence to scepticism does not read like the zealous testimony of a convert.

²⁵ Atticus was clearly very concerned about this, *Att.* XII.52 (T7), and tried to help, XIII.21.3 (T21): see Lévy (1992) 183-5.

published perhaps in winter 46/5 but almost certainly by March of 45, that made Cicero decide that the trilogy would be accompanied by more works, notably *De Finibus*. Indeed the first letter about that work, *Att.* XII.12.2 (T3), contains a tribute to the success of the *Hortensius* in Cicero's remark about the pressure he is now under from his contemporaries to include them in philosophical works. For, as Bringmann acutely surmised,²⁶ it would have been precisely the *Hortensius* that made them realize that Cicero had now switched from using older speakers (as in *De Re Publica* and *De Oratore*) to using his contemporaries. Perhaps it was also after the success of that first dialogue that Cicero started to present the method expounded in the *Academica* as the approach he would take in the rest of the cycle.²⁷ However, the exchange between the speakers Cicero and Lucullus towards the end of the *Lucullus*, 147 (T23), should not be taken too literally to herald a specific programme of work which Cicero the author already had clearly in mind and which would either exemplify, each and every one, the aporetic method celebrated in the *Academica*, or cover the three branches of philosophy in their entirety.

II.2. *The personal reasons*

How does the choice of topic and speakers reflect Cicero's personal life and mood at the time? While Cicero was working on the first version of the *Academica*, Caesar had won the Civil War: the news of the victory at Munda arrived in Rome on 20 April 45.²⁸ Cicero's daughter Tullia had died in mid-February of 45. In the final version of the *Academica* and elsewhere,²⁹ he gives as his reasons for turning to philosophical writing his need to find, in the new political situation of Caesar's Dictatorship, an honourable activity useful to his country to replace active public service, and his need to find solace after the death of his daughter.

One might argue from the speakers, that the original trilogy of *Hortensius*, *Catulus*, *Lucullus* was an exercise in nostalgia, through which Cicero paid tribute to the old breed of *Optimates*, there

²⁶ Bringmann (1971) 92.

²⁷ *Luc.* 147, *N.D.* I.11-2 and (at least of *De Finibus*), *Div.* II.2 (see p. 6 above).

²⁸ Cass. Dio XLIII.42.3.

²⁹ *Ac.* I.11, *N.D.* I.7, and see the passages in Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1016-9.

depicted as his old friends and social equals,³⁰ and recalled his old political role. In fact, the sense of loss could have been intensified between the *Hortensius* and the other two books by the loss of Tullia in February of 45. One of his friends tried to console him for the death of Tullia by pointing to 'Catulus and those days'.³¹ Lévy has grounds for describing the *Catulus* and *Hortensius* together as a *laudatio funebris* for the Republican époque.³²

This view gains support from the fact that it is with the trilogy that Cicero began to publish³³ dialogues in the Aristotelian mode using contemporary speakers including himself, rather than dialogues in the Heracleidean mode using speakers from the more remote past, as he had done in *De Re Publica* and *De Oratore*.³⁴ Cicero chose to present himself in discussion with the leading senators of the period of his youth, and he eventually took the opportunity to prefix to the books eulogies of Catulus and Lucullus,³⁵ the *homines nobilissimi* against whom he had clearly measured himself as a leader of the senate since his consulship.³⁶ It would have added to the effect that the dialogues were set just before the death of Catulus (below, p. 10). In these eulogies and in the asides during the dialogues, Cicero celebrated, not only their cultural achievements, but their political achievements and their political interaction with himself. Thus Cicero and Lucullus are shown playing forensic roles opposite each other (*Luc.* 63, 64); Lucullus is made to mention Cicero's political triumph of BCE 63 (*Luc.* 63); while the teasing about the tribunate (*Luc.* 13, cf. 72, 144) shows them sharing good Optimate attitudes. It is not just a joke when Cicero describes himself as 'semper...studiosus nobilitatis' in *Luc.* 125.

Some doubt about the idea that nostalgia was so important, however, is raised by the fact that Cicero did not persevere in using that

³⁰ For how idealized this was, see *Att.* V.2.2 of 51 on the thrill of a visit from his neighbour Hortensius at his Cumaean villa.

³¹ *Fam.* IX.15.13. See Reid (1885) 40.

³² Lévy (1992) 635.

³³ For *De Legibus*, written in the late fifties BCE, Cicero had used contemporary speakers but the work was never published.

³⁴ These works are termed Heracleidean in *Att.* XIII.19.3 (T16). The description of *De Oratore* in *Fam.* I.9.23 as Aristotelian refers to Aristotle's broad conception of oratory, not to the form of the dialogue.

³⁵ *Att.* XIII.32.2 (T8), 'nova prohoemia sunt addita, quibus eorum uterque laudatur'.

³⁶ *Att.* I.13.2. See also the other passages on Catulus, a particular hero of Cicero's, in Reid (1885) 39-40.

generation but selected speakers from among the contemporaries of his own generation for the two revisions of *Academica*.³⁷ Of course, that does not rule out nostalgia being his original motive, which later came to seem less important to him, but it is not necessary to assume that it was ever his only or principal motive, because there is an explanation of the change to contemporary speakers that fits all three versions. For what both his first and his later choices have in common is that they ensured that he could speak himself, and as a consular on terms of equality with the others. This last would have been particularly important to him in the first two editions, where the other speakers, first Hortensius, Catulus and Lucullus, then Cato and Brutus, were *nobilissimi*.³⁸ Indeed its importance from the start may account for Cicero's choice of dramatic date for the first edition: he could only just manage to appear alongside Catulus as an ex-consul by choosing the dramatic date of BCE 62/1, since he was consul in 63 and Catulus died in the autumn of 61. That it was concern for his own role that provided the prime motive for changing to contemporary speakers, or at least for persevering with that decision in his later revisions, is suggested by the way in which Cicero rejected Atticus' idea that he use Cotta as the sceptical Academic speaker opposing Varro, *Att.* XIII.19.3 (T16). The difficulty for Cicero here was that Cotta died in 74/3, so that Cicero could only have appeared alongside him as a junior senator, not as the ex-consul he actually appeared as in all three versions. In fact, in *De Natura Deorum*, set about three years before Cotta died, Cicero *is* virtually a κωφὸν πρόσωπον, just what he says would become in the *Academica*, if Atticus' suggestion were followed.³⁹

On this view of his motive, moreover, Cicero's choice of topic can be plausibly related to his decision to use contemporary speakers. For in the *Academica* he intended, not only to declare his own philosophical direction in public for the first time, as we have said, but to do so in his own voice.⁴⁰ Moreover, in using a difficult topic

³⁷ On the two revisions see below pp. 14-16 ff.

³⁸ By any criterion of the term *nobilis* all five qualified for they were all descendants of consuls. Whatever Varro's own pretensions to descent from the consular Terentii Varrones (*Servius ad Aen.* IX.743), Cicero did not accept the claim, *Att.* XIII.13.1-2 (T 12).

³⁹ Reid (1885) 34 rightly saw that the objection could not be to two sceptical speakers, as two had appeared in the *Catulus*.

⁴⁰ In *Luc.* 64-5, Cicero represents himself and Lucullus as two orators on

to display in practice his credentials as a technical philosopher, he was supporting his new role as educator of his own and the younger generation.⁴¹ This emphasis on self-presentation is already to be seen in the works of 46, the *Brutus* and *Orator*, where Cicero is concerned to describe his own education and to celebrate his own successes, in order to lend authority to his judgments and advice.

It also fits with the emphasis on himself that in the first edition of the *Academica*, certainly in the *Lucullus*⁴² and probably also in the *Catulus* (see below, p. 17), Cicero actually used an event of his own youth as a jumping off place for his philosophical discussions. This was the old dispute of Philo and Antiochus, an event of his youth which he had not written about in all these years. In 88 Cicero had heard Philo deliver the lectures which became the Roman books,⁴³ and in 79 he had heard Antiochus at Athens after that philosopher's conversion to dogmatism in the nineties.⁴⁴ The speakers in the first edition seem to have been chosen with this dispute in mind: what Catulus was made to report as his father's reaction (*Luc.* 12, 18) to the Roman books could be fact, or at least a plausible fiction,⁴⁵ while Lucullus had heard Antiochus' hostile reaction to the Roman books at Alexandria.

However, it must be admitted that the actual revisionist views of Philo seem to have been of little philosophical interest to Cicero even in the first edition. For in what survives of that edition, namely the *Lucullus*, although there are clear indications that a critique of Philo's views in the Roman books had been given by Catulus (*Luc.* 11, 12, 18), the Antiochian critique of those views is expressly excluded from the account of the discussions at Alexandria: 'But we must pass over the part of the disputation that was directed against Philo' (*Luc.* 12). It is Antiochus' attack on his more extreme opponents, Arcesilaus and Carneades, that Lucullus will expound. Indeed, in what follows, Philo is consistently represented as the champion of the sceptical Academy (*Luc.* 17),⁴⁶ and Cicero

opposite sides of a case and announces that he will first defend his own reputation—just as he does in speeches like the *Pro Sulla*.

⁴¹ *N.D.* I.8, *Div.* II.4 fin., *Off.* I.1.4.

⁴² *Luc.* 11, 12, 18.

⁴³ *Ac.* I.13, cf. *Luc.* 11-12, *Brut.* 306.

⁴⁴ *Brut.* 315.

⁴⁵ Reid (1885) 42, 59-60 thinks the chronology impossible, but he overlooks the clear implication of *Ac.* I.13 that the Roman books were delivered as the lectures in Rome which Cicero heard in 88 (*Brut.* 308).

⁴⁶ Cf. *ND* 1.17 'ab eodem Philone nihil scire didicistis'.

explicitly says that the sceptical views he expounds are the views of Philo—clearly then his pre-Roman views (*Luc.* 69)⁴⁷. With the change of speakers in the final version, the treatment of Philo's innovations may have been attenuated or even dropped,⁴⁸ though the Roman books are mentioned in passing by Cicero as a prelude to his invitation to Varro to expound Antiochus' views (*Ac.* I.13). Most suggestive is the fact that Cicero, in his dedicatory letter to Varro, *Fam.* IX.8, says that he himself has assumed the 'partes Philonis', given that in what survives of that edition Cicero is invited to speak 'as a supporter of the innovation of Arcesilaus' and then argues for the continuity of scepticism in the Academy from Plato on (*Ac.* I.43-6). The fragments too of the *Academica Posteriora* show not a trace of Philo's Roman views.⁴⁹

II.3. *Possible political reasons*

Does the decision to write the *Academica* reflect the political situation in a more specific way? In particular, was it a work of political opposition to Caesar the Dictator, as has been suggested by Carlos Lévy in his exhaustive study of the work?⁵⁰

It is certainly true, as Lévy argues, that in *N.D.* I.7 Cicero connects the introduction of one-man rule, necessitated by the state of the Republic, with the production of his philosophical works, and that in *Off.* I.26 he associates Caesar's desire for *principatus* with *temeritas* and *error opinionis*. This last could suggest that the reason why Cicero now wished to make a case in public for his Academic scepticism (which may well have held his loyalty continuously from youth), was precisely because it could serve as a plea for free speech and opinion against authoritarianism and dogmatism. Such is the argument of Lévy.

On the other hand, the passage of *De Officiis* in itself need not suggest that Caesar has erred by sceptical Academic standards in particular, for *temeritas* and *error* are attacked by dogmatic

⁴⁷ See Lévy (1992) 196.

⁴⁸ Glucker (1978) 414-5.

⁴⁹ There is no reason to think, with Plasberg (1922) that Cicero went as far as the Philonian innovations in Book I of the final edition, when he continued the history of the Academy from where Varro left off; Reid (1885) 168 had more plausibly suggested that he ended with Antiochus' invention of the 'Old Academy'.

⁵⁰ Lévy (1992) 121-4, 630-5.

philosophers as well. Thus in the last version of the *Academica* itself Varro describes Zeno as having set apart from virtue and wisdom 'errorem...et temeritatem et ignorantiam et opinionem et suspitionem' (*Ac.* I.42).

Moreover, Lévy himself thinks that the Roman ambience actually encouraged Philo's move towards greater dogmatism and Cicero's liking for consensus vs. sectarian bickering. It seems hard to reconcile this view with the idea that Cicero saw in Arcesilean scepticism the spirit of the Roman Republic. Indeed other scholars have pointed to the consensual and harmonious development of the Roman Republican constitution presented in Cicero's *De Re Publica*, in contrast to the adversarial one in Polybius.⁵¹

It is worth noting that Cicero also finds a more, rather than less, dogmatic treatment appropriate to the discussion of Roman political matters: in *De Legibus* he actually sends the New Academy away and adopts the Stoic view of natural law (I.39).⁵²

In these later years, it was the Stoic Cato who was for Cicero the great hero of the resistance to autocracy, as he was to be for opponents of tyranny under the Principate. Before the *Academica*, Cicero had already written in 46 the *Paradoxa Stoicorum* and the *Cato*, both of which expressed his admiration for Cato, the latter indeed celebrating him as a martyr to liberty. And in *Fam.* IX.17.2, written in August or September of 46 to Papirius Paetus, Cicero contrasts his own decision to survive and to accept favours from the Dictator with the attitude of a real 'vir fortis et philosophus' who would *not* regard staying alive as 'pulcherrimum', a clear allusion to Cato's opposition and suicide.⁵³

Finally, one can point out that, though Cicero did become more hostile to Caesar after 46, his own conduct to the Dictator remained accommodating and tactful throughout the period when he was writing and revising the *Academica*. As regards writing in particular, in May, shortly before the first edition was finished, he was drafting a letter of advice to Caesar (*Att.* XII.40), and later in the month, after the first version was sent to Atticus, he was despairing at finding anything to say which would be sufficiently tactful yet

⁵¹ Ferrary (1984), Lintott (1996) 80-4.

⁵² This is partly explained by the view Cicero expresses later in *De Divinatione* that it is statesmen, not philosophers, who are properly consulted about political ideas, philosophers being appropriate experts on ethics (II.10-2).

⁵³ Graff (1963) 134 n. 28.

not pure flattery (*Att.* XIII.27). On 29 June, after he had finished the final version of the *Academica*, he was sending copies of his *Pro Ligario* to Caesar through his associates Oppius and Balbus (*Att.* XIII.19.2), and in August 45, after Varro had received the final version, Cicero was still writing tactful letters to Caesar about the latter's *Anticato*, protesting (too much) to Atticus that he was writing as an equal to an equal (*Att.* XIII.51). As late as December 45, he was going to collaborate as an augur, saying 'anything for a quiet life' (*Att.* XIII.42.3). It is unlikely that Cicero was penning the *Academica* as a recognizable work of sedition. The self-control (or cowardice) he showed throughout this period, and even for some time after Caesar's death,⁵⁴ partly accounts for the violence of his eventual attacks on Caesar, notably in *De Officiis*.

III. *Why did Cicero alter his original plan for the work?*

III.1. *The first change*

The reason given in the *Letters to Atticus* for changing the speakers of the first edition is that the initial speakers, Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius, were inappropriate to the difficult philosophical subject matter.⁵⁵ This is plausible enough, since *Inv.* I.20 shows that Cicero from his earliest years had been acutely sensitive of the need for appropriateness of speaker to subject matter. The idea that this was Cicero's real reason is also supported by the defensiveness of the prooemium which was added to the *Lucullus* (*Luc.* 7). It is also a measure of Cicero's dissatisfaction with the original speakers that, as *Att.* XIII.16 (T14) reveals, Cicero had replaced them with the learned Cato and Brutus even before Atticus urged him to find a role for Varro in a dialogue.

The fact that in *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), where Cicero first mentions changing the speakers, he says that he will make it up to Catulus and Lucullus elsewhere, presumably by using them in some other work; may make us wonder if he was seriously dissatisfied with them. However, just before in this same letter, Cicero calls Catulus

⁵⁴ Long (1995) 222-3 discussing the unwritten dialogue on Caesar's murder and the Cicero's anxieties concerning the lost *De Gloria* in the context of his fear of Antony's displeasure.

⁵⁵ *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T 11), XIII.16.1 (T 14), XIII.19.5 (T 16).

and Lucullus 'nullo modo philologi', which makes it likely that his promise to make amends to them means using them in a less scholarly and less technical work altogether.

III.2. *The second change*

Within two days of replacing Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius with Cato and Brutus, Cicero changed the speakers again in favour of Varro. His account in his letters indicates that the change from Cato and Brutus to Varro was made because of pressure from Atticus to gratify Varro's desire to be included in a work by Cicero.⁵⁶ That Cicero was really responding to such pressure is suggested by the way in which he flatters Atticus by crediting him with finding the solution to the problem of inappropriate speakers. Thus he speaks in the first letter to Atticus about this, *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), and even later in XIII.19.5 (T16), as if he were were transferring the work directly from Catulus and Lucullus to Varro.⁵⁷ Yet, in between these two letters, he had written another in which he revealed that he had already found a solution in the change to Cato and Brutus.⁵⁸

Yet a doubt arises as to whether the request from Atticus is sufficient to explain the change. For Cicero himself tells us that he also changed the format from two books to four and improved the structure ('meliora, multa detracta'), adding more topics ('grandiores') but making the argument more concise ('breviora').⁵⁹ It can be argued that these changes must have been made precisely at this time and especially for the Varro edition because, Cicero tells us that, for the first change, he just moved 'eosdem illos sermones' from the first speakers to Cato and Brutus.⁶⁰ Is it likely then that Atticus' insistence on Cicero's employment of Varro as a speaker is the whole explanation for the creation of the final version?

There is indeed an answer to this objection, namely that these further changes were merely consequential. Cicero does not in

⁵⁶ *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), XIII.13.1 (T12), XIII.16 (T14).

⁵⁷ Cf. also *Att.* XIII.13.1 (T12).

⁵⁸ *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14): 'simul ac veni ad villam eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli. ecce tuae litterae de Varrone'.

⁵⁹ *Att.* XIII.13 (T12).

⁶⁰ *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14). For fuller discussion of the implications of the phrase 'eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli', see below pp. 20-3.

fact mention them until the second letter about Varro, *Att.* XIII.13.1 (T12), and he clearly made them because he was afraid of Varro's high standards. He also hoped to soften Varro's displeasure, which he had real reason to fear. One of the points that worries him and that he repeatedly hints at and promises to convey orally to Atticus⁶¹ is undoubtedly the one he eventually makes explicit à propos of using special expensive paper for the Varro edition, 'I often seem to see his face as he complains that my case is more amply argued in this work than his, which you will certainly find to be untrue...' *Att.* XIII.25.3 (T19). Moreover, Cicero's awareness that Atticus will know that the case put last is usually the strongest⁶² comes out in the awkward way in which Cicero earlier hints at the point: 'His (i.e. Varro's) role is such that I have *not succeeded* in making my own case appear the stronger. For Antiochus' arguments are very persuasive and I have set them out faithfully; they have the acuteness of their originator with my elegance of style...'.⁶³ Cicero sought to appease Varro by offering him a work over which he had clearly taken a great deal of trouble.

IV. *Problems in reconstructing the earlier versions*

A great deal of ingenious scholarly labour has gone into such reconstructions, to which it would be impossible to do justice and to which it would be unprofitable to add. I shall therefore limit myself to addressing a few problems concerning the first edition that have attracted only minor attention and to treating the question of the Cato and Brutus version, which does not seem to have aroused the scholarly curiosity it deserves.

IV.1. *The lost Catulus*

The known facts are quickly rehearsed:

It was entitled the *Catulus*, *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8), Quintil. III.6.64).

The setting was in a villa of Catulus on the Bay of Naples, probably the one at Cumae (*Luc.* 9, 80).⁶⁴

⁶¹ *Att.* XIII.18.2 (T15), XIII.19.5 (T16), XIII.22.1 (T18).

⁶² Cf. *Att.* II.3.3 in 60 BCE.

⁶³ *Att.* XIII.19.5 (T16).

⁶⁴ At *Luc.* 80: 'Ego Catuli Cumanum ex hoc loco cerno et e regione video,

Cicero composed the work at Astura on the sea (*Att.* XII.19.1) and the 'duo magna συντάγματα' of the first edition were finished there in mid-May, *Att.* XII.44 (T6).

The dramatic date is BCE 62 or first half of 61,⁶⁵ after the exposure of the Catilinarian conspiracy in the autumn of Cicero's consulship in 63 (*Luc.* 62) and just before the death of Catulus (*Att.* I.16.5, I.20.3).

The completed version was prefaced by an opening eulogy of Catulus, *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8).

The speakers included Catulus (*Luc.* 11, 12, 18), Hortensius (*Luc.* 10, 28), Cicero (*Luc.* 13, 22, 79). Lucullus was present (*Luc.* 9). Though Reid and Lévy do not think he spoke,⁶⁶ the allusion in *Luc.* 10 to a promise made by Lucullus during the discussion the day before, must indicate that in the *Catulus* Lucullus at least uttered a promise to report what he had heard Antiochus say, perhaps at the end of the dialogue.⁶⁷

Catulus adduced his father's arguments against those of Philo in the Roman books: he apparently said that Philo lied in denying that the Academy had ever held the sceptical position usually ascribed to Arcesilaus and Carneades (*Luc.* 18, cf. 12). Some of his arguments were the same as Antiochus used against Philo in the *Sosus* (*Luc.* 12); Hortensius gave a non-technical discussion of Antiochus' point of view (*Luc.* 10, cf. 28); Cicero argued for the sceptical position (*Luc.* 61-3), citing the views of pre-Socratic philosophers in support (*Luc.* 13-4, 72); he also attacked the reliability of the senses, more than his subject demanded ('non necessario loco'

Pompeianum non cerno...', the *Pompeianum* mentioned is usually taken to be a second Campanian villa, otherwise unattested, belonging to Catulus, but D'Arms (1970), 188-9 suggests that the speaker Cicero is referring to his own villa at Pompeii, already mentioned at *Luc.* 9. This would be a harsh but not impossible reading of the Latin. In any case, scholars who assume that both villas belonged to Catulus (e.g. Reid (1885) 46; Plasberg (1922) x; Lévy (1992) 155-6) favour the *Cumanum* as the setting of the *Catulus*, presumably because it was much nearer to Bauli where the *Lucullus* is set: its location thus accords better with the report in *Luc.* 9 that the three speakers had arrived early in the day, after travelling from one to the other, and done so deliberately in order to make it possible for two of them to reach their own villas, Lucullus' *Neapolitanum* and Cicero's *Pompeianum*, later that day. The implication seems to be that the journey to Bauli from Catulus' villa was short and the journey that lay ahead of Cicero was long.

⁶⁵ Bringmann (1971) 113.

⁶⁶ Reid (1885) 46; Lévy (1992) 192 n. 33.

⁶⁷ The view of so Plasberg (1922) xiii; Philippon (1939) 1131. Glucker (1978) 419 seems to envisage a substantial role for Lucullus.

Luc. 79), and introduced new Latin equivalents for Greek technical terms (*Luc.* 17).

Certain inferences can be drawn from these facts:

1. The dialogue may well have had no dedication, since the title, the added eulogistic prooemium, and the dramatic date all suggest that nothing was allowed to detract from the celebration of Catulus, and he, being dead, could not serve as the dedicatee of his eponymous work as Brutus does in the *Brutus*.

2. What the title does suggest, by analogy with the linked dialogue entitled the *Hortensius*, is that Catulus was regarded as one of the two main speakers (the other, we may surmise, was Cicero). For the description of the *Hortensius* given in *Fin.* I.2, 'that book in which I defended and praised philosophy when it had been bitterly attacked by Hortensius',⁶⁸ is only intelligible if Hortensius and Cicero were the two main speakers, given that we know from the fragments that Lucullus and Catulus were also participants.⁶⁹ Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the title of the next dialogue in the series also indicated one of the principal speakers.⁷⁰

3. Concerning the order of speakers, the setting might seem to offer a clue, but in fact leads to uncertain conclusions. The common pattern in Cicero's dialogues is that a senior statesman is visited at home by relatives or friends, particularly younger ones. This happens in *De Republica*, *De Legibus* (though Atticus is, of course, not younger than Cicero), *De Oratore*, *Brutus*, *De Finibus*, *De Natura Deorum*, *De Divinatione*, *De Senectute*, and *De Amicitia* (both the dialogue of the dramatic present and the reported dialogue). In most cases, the man visited is cajoled into making a speech, as happens to Scipio in *De Republica*, to Cicero in *De Legibus*, to Crassus in *De Oratore*, to Cicero in the *Brutus*, to the Elder Cato in *De Senectute*, and to Q. Mucius Scaevola and, as he reports, to Laelius in *De Amicitia*. This might lead to the inference that Catulus, after the opening civilities, became the opening speaker in the *Catulus*.

⁶⁸ 'eo libro quo philosophia a nobis defensa et collaudata est, cum esset accusata et vituperata ab Hortensio'.

⁶⁹ *Hort.* frs. 11 (Lucullus) and 21 (Catulus) Grilli (1962). Cf. also *Luc.* 61 where Lucullus says that Cicero shook Hortensius by his argument in the *Hortensius*.

⁷⁰ No support for the conclusion that Catulus was one of the two main speakers can, however, be deduced from the setting in Catulus' villa, as the *Hortensius* itself was set in a villa of Lucullus while the *Lucullus* is set in a villa of Hortensius, who only plays a minor role in the dialogue.

However, the exceptions to this pattern have implications for this case. Thus in *De Finibus* I, set in Cicero's villa, Cicero is invited by the younger Torquatus and by Triarius to speak, but after briefly stating his objections to Epicureanism, he then reserves his main speech for Book II. In *De Natura Deorum*, set in Cotta's house, Velleius the Epicurean is persuaded by Cotta to speak first (I.17) because, as Cotta explicitly says (I.57), he always gives the negative speech and in fact cannot make a positive one. In *De Divinatione*, set in Cicero's villa, Quintus brings up the topic for discussion à propos of *De Natura Deorum* and speaks first (I.8-11).

In all of these cases, the man in whose villa the dialogue is set is upholding the sceptical Academic position by refutation. In fact, in *De Natura Deorum*, Cicero has Cotta expressly mark the connection between his philosophical scepticism and the order of speaking. This might lead us to believe that Catulus spoke last, not first. However, Cicero also explicitly marks the order of speakers in *De Natura Deorum* as exceptional, by making the opening speaker apologise for having spoken when he should have been listening (II.56). Moreover, in the *Catulus*, Cicero was available for this role of speaking destructively at the end. There is also another point special to the *Catulus*, which might point to the eponymous hero speaking first. Since it is clear that Catulus discussed his father's view of Philo's Roman books (*Luc.* 11, 12, 18), it is natural to surmise that this was the lead-in to the dialogue, just as Lucullus starts the dialogue proper in the *Lucullus* by recalling the discussion of Antiochus and Heraclitus (*Luc.* 11). Cicero similarly uses historical incidents to start off *De Re Publica* or *De Oratore*, where they also serve to celebrate the great men he admired. So here, a historical opening would have served as a commemoration of the elder Catulus who was to die in the Sullan proscriptions soon after his criticism of Philo. It would also have helped to boost the philosophical credentials of the younger Catulus as speaker, which had presumably been defended already in the prooemium, for his recounting of the episode involving his father would have made it absolutely clear that behind the younger Catulus is the elder. In fact the end of the *Lucullus* (148) implies that Catulus had actually restricted himself to a report of his father's views in the *Catulus*, since he is now asked to say what he himself thinks, and he says that he is coming back to the view of his father. (The implication that, in the interval, he thought otherwise is a delicate compliment

to the eloquence of Lucullus to which he has paid tribute in § 63.)⁷¹

On balance, then there is much to be said for Reid's view that Catulus delivered the first major speech and Cicero the last. Hortensius will then have spoken in the middle of the dialogue. Reid could be right that the challenge of Hortensius, alluded to in *Luc.* 28, is omitted from Varro's exposition in the final edition (unless it was in the later books) because he, unlike Hortensius, was speaking first.⁷² In the *Catulus* then Hortensius will have given a general defence of Antiochus' position, perhaps stressing history as Varro is made to do in the final edition and leaving the more abstruse material to be covered later by Lucullus (*Luc.* 10). Lucullus closed the *Catulus* with a promise to speak later.

IV.2. *The intermediate version: existence and speakers*

Cicero only mentions this version once in writing to Atticus on 26 June, *Att.* XIII.16 (T14), where, having explained the inappropriateness of the speakers in the first edition, Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius, he says, 'simul ac veni ad villam eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutonem transtuli' ('as soon as I arrived at my villa I transferred these same conversations to Cato and Brutus'). Though the lifespan of this version was only two or three days, from 21 to 23 June, when Cicero received Atticus' letter and decided to change the speakers again⁷³, the verb *transfero*, which he uses here for the conversion process, is the same verb he uses in writing to Atticus of the later change to the Varronian version, *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), and must mark some action rather than a vague plan or idea. Moreover, his use of *transtuli*, the perfect tense of that verb, is precisely the form he uses to mark the realisation of the final version. It follows that the intermediate version too must have firmly taken shape, at least in thought if not in writing.⁷⁴

⁷¹ The urbanity of the dialogue relies partly on the tributes the speakers pay to each other. So Hortensius at *Luc.* 61 is said to have been shaken by Cicero's arguments in the *Hortensius*, and Cicero admits at 64 that Lucullus' authority had been influencing him until Catulus interposed his.

⁷² Reid (1885) 42-6. The point about *Luc.* 28 is made on p. 44.

⁷³ *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), XIII.13.1 (T12).

⁷⁴ Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1038 speak of the advice from Atticus arriving 'während der Arbeit an dieser zweiten Fassung', which is the minimum that can be inferred from the evidence. Glucker (1978) 409 n. 39 suggests that Cicero only 'toyed with the idea of substituting Brutus and Cato',

As to the roles assigned the different speakers, all we have that can possibly count as direct evidence is the order of names in *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14), 'primo fuit Catuli, Luculli, Hortensi;...eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli'. It is, however, also relevant that in XIII.25.3 (T19) he speaks of Brutus as a possible alternative to Varro, 'est enim is quoque Antiochius'.⁷⁵

What inferences can we draw from this meagre information? When Cicero says in *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14) that Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius were replaced by Cato and Brutus, it seems natural to expect that the order of names reflects the facts of the replacements. But how can two speakers replace three?

Hirzel inferred from the order that Cato and Brutus replaced the first two named, because Catulus and Lucullus were the main speakers in the first version: the role of Hortensius, he thought, was eliminated.⁷⁶ The use of Brutus to replace Lucullus accords with Cicero's later allusion to him as the natural alternative to Varro in expounding the views of Antiochus, *Att.* XIII.25.3 (T19), while the elimination of Hortensius is perfectly plausible as he had had his day in the dialogue named after him and his speech in the *Catulus* was expendable, being a popular account of Antiochus' philosophy which anticipated the thorough account by Lucullus in the second dialogue (*Luc.* 10). Cato will presumably have been answered by Cicero in the first book, and Brutus by Cicero in the second. The problem in this reconstruction is the role of Cato. How could he have replaced Catulus who was a sceptical Academic with Cato who could hardly have been depicted as other than the dogmatic Stoic that he was? Hirzel suggested that the *Catulus* as a whole was

an idea, however, which he has to support by dating *Att.* XIII.16 (T14) before XIII.12 (T11): the traditional order, however, makes very good sense in psychological terms (pp. 15-6 above, 26-7 below).

⁷⁵ In XIII.13.1 (T12) and XIII.18 (T15) he infers from what Atticus has said, that Varro might be envious of Brutus' use by Cicero as a *speaker*, in which role he had already appeared in the *Brutus*. The phrase at *Att.* XIII.18.2: 'multo Hortensium minus aut eos qui de re publica loquuntur' makes it clear that Cicero is not thinking here of Brutus' role as *dedicatee* in *De Finibus*, as Shackleton-Bailey on XIII.13.1 (T12) suggests, though it is perhaps a sign of Varro's attitude. Varro wrote on the subject of *De Finibus* soon after. At *Ac.* I.12, Cicero plays on Varro's attitude to Brutus in urging him to follow the example of Brutus and write philosophy in Latin, a passage which incidentally makes clear that Brutus, with his adherence to Antiochus' sect and commitment to rendering Greek philosophy in Latin, would be the obvious alternative to Varro as the Antiochian speaker in this dialogue.

⁷⁶ Hirzel (1895) 513 n. 2.

more popular and less learned than the *Lucullus*, and that the speaker Catulus in particular had concentrated on the history of philosophy. This was a role he thought that Cato could assume.⁷⁷

Reid, while ignoring the order of names in *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14), also concluded from *Att.* XIII.25.3 (T19) that Brutus replaced Lucullus. Unlike Hirzel, however, he suggested that Cato assumed the role of Hortensius as the defender of Antiochus in the *Catulus* and presented a general dogmatist view 'such as any cultivated man might sustain who had not definitely committed himself to sceptical principles'.⁷⁸ In this case the Stoic Cato would simply have acted as a defender of certain knowledge against Cicero (who presumably absorbed Catulus' role). Some support for this view can be found in the parallel drawn at *Luc.* 28 between the demand made by Hortensius in the *Catulus* and that made by the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus who challenged Carneades to admit at least the one piece of certain knowledge that one could not know anything for certain. Even Hortensius' argument in the *Catulus* then may have had affinities with Stoic argument. Then again, it is clear that Antiochus' attack from the dogmatic point of view on the Philonian innovations was made in a dialogue named after Sosus, in which Sosus, a Stoic philosopher, was presumably a speaker and a defender of dogmatism, perhaps delivering a refutation of ἀκαταληψία, as Glucker suggested.⁷⁹ Moreover, in the second book of the first edition, Lucullus makes a lot of the similarities between Antiochus' position and Stoic epistemology.⁸⁰

Lévy, who, like Reid, ignores the order of names in *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14), believes that it was Cato who replaced Lucullus, Brutus who replaced Hortensius, and Cicero who replaced Catulus.⁸¹ Though he is right to say that Lucullus' speech, in contrast to Varro's, affirms a rigid Stoic orthodoxy on the validity of the senses and the criterion of truth,⁸² that would not rule out the replacement of Lucullus by Brutus whose affinities to Stoicism were and are still

⁷⁷ Hirzel (1895) 509-10 n. 4.

⁷⁸ Reid (1885) 46.

⁷⁹ Glucker (1978) 418-9: 'After all, even if Antiochus' views were not identical on all points with those of his Stoic masters (and in some areas, like that of moral philosophy, we know that they were not), his arguments against ἀκαταληψία most probably were'.

⁸⁰ As Lévy (1992) 187 rightly points out (though in aid of his own idea that Cato took over the role of Lucullus).

⁸¹ Lévy (1992) 191.

⁸² Lévy (1992) 187.

remarked.⁸³ In fact Lévy's solution, though ingenious, is highly problematic because it would mean that Cicero made of Brutus, who believed in Antiochian philosophy, a less serious expounder of it than Cato, who was a confirmed Stoic.

Another solution would be to accept the obvious inferences from *Att.* XIII.16.1 and XIII.25.3, i.e. that Cato was substituted for Catulus and Brutus for Lucullus. While Brutus obviously replaced Lucullus as the serious expounder of Antiochian philosophy, Cato could have taken over Catulus' role as a critic of recent dogmatic developments in the Academy (now notably Antiochus), but from the dogmatic, not the sceptical point of view, thus making a replacement for Hortensius unnecessary. In particular, Cato could have argued, at greater length and with more emphasis than Cicero does in *Luc.* 113 ff., that Antiochus' account of the historical relationship between the Academy and the Stoa was erroneous and that the Academy had failed to take the decisive step in formulating a criterion of truth that guaranteed the certainty of knowledge.⁸⁴ He could then have presented the Stoa as a more consistent and whole-hearted advocate of certain knowledge, defending the Stoic criterion of knowledge rather along the lines of the preserved speech of Lucullus. He could perhaps, with some irony, have given Antiochus some credit for taking over the Stoic criterion. Cicero would have replied in favour of scepticism.

If ever there was a case for practicing ἐποχή, these alternative reconstructions would seem to require it. Indeed it might seem an objection to all of them, except possibly Reid's, that the alterations in the parts of the speakers from the first edition go beyond what is suggested by Cicero's phrase 'eisdem illos sermones', *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14). Yet, as will emerge, it may be necessary to make this assumption for other reasons.

IV.3. *The significance of the intermediate version*

1. First, *the title*, for which the evidence will be discussed in Appendix B below. It will be shown there that there is no evidence that Cicero had chosen an overall title for the first edition, which

⁸³ Plu., *Brut.* 2.1-2, *Cic.* 4.1. See Moles (1987) 64; Pelling (1989) 222-7.

⁸⁴ Cf. the way the Stoic Balbus insists in *N.D.* I.16 that Antiochus was wrong to minimize the difference between Stoic and Peripatetic ethics (which Antiochus had adopted).

he refers to as the *Catulus* and *Lucullus* in *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8). However, with the change to the intermediate version, it was no longer feasible to name the books after the speakers, for *Cato* and *Brutus* were already titles of Ciceronian works. Therefore the eventual overall title *Academici Libri* may have arisen with the intermediate version.

2. As regards *physical setting*, it is likely that the maritime scene was kept, for it had been brought into close relationship with the subject matter of the dialogue in the first edition. There the sea was used to illustrate the deceptiveness and feebleness of sense perception,⁸⁵ and Cicero was able to construct an urbane and effective ending based on a pun on weighing anchor and eliminating assent (*Luc.* 148). Moreover, Cicero retained the maritime setting in the final version which started at Varro's villa at Cumae and moved to the nearby Lucrine lake for Book III (fr. 13 Reid). There too he made much play of the sea in demonstrating the unreliability of the senses (frs. 3 and 7 Reid from Bk. II) and apparently in other ways (fr. 13 Reid from Book III again). For the intermediate version, there were several possibilities. Brutus was a neighbour of Cicero's at Cumae by 46 (*Brut.* 300), while Cato, after the death of Lucullus in 56 or 55, became the trustee of his property for his son. The property will have included Lucullus' Neapolitan villa, which may have been the villa where Brutus stayed in 44 (*Att.* XVI.1.1): Cicero sailed to it from his Puteolanum in 44 (*Att.* XIV.20).⁸⁶ If Cicero did cling to the maritime setting throughout his revision of the dialogue, it is a tribute to his intellectual integrity that he gave up as inaccurate the use of the nautical term 'inhibitio' for the Greek ἐποχή—a suggestion made by Atticus, which he had at first welcomed and had adopted for the final version, *Att.* XIII.21.3 (T21).

3. *The historical setting.* The incident of the Philonian books served to introduce the philosophical discussion in the *Catulus* and *Lucullus*, but already in the second dialogue Philo's revisions were excluded from the substantive discussion, as in the final version (above, pp. 12-3, 17). This makes it likely that, with the removal of Catulus whose presence as a speaker gave the incident its specific relevance, Cicero took the opportunity to remove it altogether or to mention it only in passing. If the 'Cato' had a historical lead-in, an

⁸⁵ E.g. *Luc.* 80-1, 105 with the discussion by Lévy (1992) 157-9.

⁸⁶ D'Arms (1970) 178, 184-6.

obvious candidate would be the philosophers' embassy of 155 BCE in which Cicero had already shown so much interest in *De Republica*. What better introduction than to have the first speaker, Cato, recall the reaction of his great grandfather to the philosophical embassy of 155, when he protested about the evil effects on the Roman youth of the lectures given by the philosophers, of whom Carneades was the most popular and the most subversive of Roman values?⁸⁷ Cicero had mentioned the episode in the first edition, but this would have marked an improvement, for its mention in *Luc.* 137 required Cicero to contrive a link with Lucullus' ancestor. Moreover, Cicero could now have used more of the information that his letter *Att.* XII.23.2 (T4) must have elicited from his antiquarian friend. In the Varronian version, the incident of the Roman books seems to have been all but omitted again, (above, pp. 11-2), the elaborate exordium with the account of Varro's achievements and interest in philosophy being more appropriate to a dramatic date contemporary with composition.

4. As regards *structure*, a significant change necessarily occurred in the intermediate version, when the number of parties to the discussion was reduced. Since Cicero mentions only Cato and Brutus as replacing Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius, the interplay of three speakers in the first version must have been replaced in each of the two books of the intermediate version by a virtual duel between a dogmatist and Cicero the sceptic. That is already the pattern in the *Lucullus*, where Hortensius and Catulus only make incidental remarks at the beginning and end of the major speeches, but it clearly was not the case in the *Catulus*, where Hortensius gave a reasonably substantial, if popular, account of Antiochus' philosophy between the opposing sceptical speeches of Catulus and Cicero.⁸⁸ Therefore, despite the phrase 'eosdem illos sermones' of *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14), which could be taken to indicate a simple renaming of speakers, this intermediate version must have marked a substantial advance in the direction of the format adopted

⁸⁷ Plu., *Cato Mai.* 22; Cic., *Rep.* III.6. The appeal to Elder Cato would have enhanced the verisimilitude of the dialogue, for Cato was in the habit of using his severe ancestor as a *domesticum exemplum* (*Mur.* 66).

⁸⁸ *Luc.* 10: 'feci plus quam vellem, totam enim rem Lucullo integram servatam oportuit'. The intervention by Lucullus (above, p. 17) at the end of the *Catulus* is more comparable to the role of Atticus in the Varronian version and of the incidental speakers in the *Catulus*.

in the final version, where Varro and Cicero confronted each other, with Atticus making only incidental remarks.⁸⁹

Except for the division into four books, then, the intermediate version may have anticipated the final version in several important respects. This may explain why Cicero was able to transform the former into the latter so quickly. The idea of recasting to the Varronian version is first heard of on 23 June, *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11), and the dedicatory letter to Varro was only sent to Atticus just before 12 July, *Att.* XIII.25.3 (T19). But that does not mean that the recasting itself took three weeks,⁹⁰ for Cicero went on doubting the wisdom of his choice, and so delayed writing the dedicatory letter. In fact the work on the Varronian conversion appears to have been done in five days, between the 23 and the 28 of June, *Att.* XIII.18 (T15), XIII.19.3 (T16). Cicero probably sent it to Rome on 28 June to be copied, for it had already been sent by the time *Att.* XIII.21a.1 (T17) was written on 30 June or 1 July. It may even have been done more quickly, for on 24 June, *Att.* XIII.13.1-2 (T12) Cicero seems to be passing final judgment on this version and passing on to pastures new.⁹¹

By contrast, the intermediate version, though done quickly at Arpinum on 21-2 June, *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14), could have been in gestation for some time. For Cicero was disquieted from the first with the unsuitability of his speakers, and we may imagine that he was already thinking about its transformation, at least from the time when he added the new prooemia, sometime before the end of May, *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8). There is therefore a serious possibility that the most of the rethinking for the *Academica Posteriora* (or

⁸⁹ Cicero describes Atticus as 'added to the dialogue as a third in *Att.* XIII.14.1 (T14), and in *Att.* XIII.19.3 (T16) he writes 'I have given Varro the arguments admirably assembled by Antiochus ... I reply to those myself. You make a third in our conversation.' The implication seems to be that Atticus did not expound a position himself in the dialogue but served, as he does in the surviving part of Book I, as part of the setting. This is the position adopted by Reid (1885) 50 and defended against other suggestions by Lévy (1992) 139-40 n. 58. Atticus was clearly pleased to be included, *Att.* XIII.22.1 (T18), but Cicero's indication there that he expected his friend to be reluctant fits with the incidental roles he gives Atticus in *De Legibus* and *Fin.* V. Everything we know about Atticus suggests that he avoided the limelight and would not want to be portrayed differently.

⁹⁰ As is argued by Glucker (1978) 415. Lévy (1992) 131 and Powell (1995) xv n. 4 cite *Att.* XIII.18 (T15) to show that the final edition was finished by 28 June.

⁹¹ *Att.* XIII.13.2 (T12): 'Nunc autem ἀπορῶ quo me vertam. volo Dolabellae valde desideranti;'.

Academici Libri, as Appendix B below suggests it was actually called) was already done for the Cato-Brutus version.

Even after the rapid adjustment to the Varronian version, Cicero went on hankering after the Cato-Brutus version. That is why, after two letters to Atticus about the Varronian transfer, he wrote coyly 'I think reflection is called for, though the names are already in; but they can be cancelled or altered', *Att.* XIII.14.1 (T13), revealing in a letter of the next day for the first time the story of the earlier transfer, XIII.16 (T14)—a gentle hint that Cicero could be spared the anxieties he was suffering about Varro if Atticus saw the superior merits of that plan. Indeed, after he had written his letter of dedication to Varro, he was still wistfully offering to Atticus, XIII.25.3 (T19), the safer option: 'But I repeat again, it will be at your peril. Therefore if you feel any misgivings, let us transfer to Brutus, as he too follows Antiochus'. He ends with a remark that will serve as an end to this tortuous discussion, 'How fickle the Academy, how true to character, always chopping and changing.'

Appendix A

Academica: Chronology of composition and publication

BCE 45

Mid-February Tullia died at Cicero's villa at Tusculum.

7 March Cicero at Astura.

T1 *Att.* XII.13.1 (SB 250): litteris non difficilior utor quam si domi essem. ardor tamen ille idem urget et manet, non mehercule indulgente me sed tamen repugnante.

8 March

T2 *Att.* XII.14.3 (SB 251): quin etiam feci, quod profecto ante me nemo, ut ipse me per litteras consolaretur. quem librum ad te mittam, si descripserint librarii. adfirmo tibi nullam consolationem esse talem. totos dies scribo, non quo proficiam quid sed tantisper impediatur [...].

16 March

T3 *Att.* XII.12.2 (SB 259): de Epicuro, ut voles: etsi μεθαρμοῖσμαι in posterum genus hoc personarum. incredibile est quam ea quidam requirant. ad antiquos igitur; ἀνεμέσητον γάρ.

19 March

T4 *Att.* XII.23.2 (SB 262): et ut scias me ita dolere ut non iaceam: quibus consulibus Carneades et ea legatio Romam venerit scriptum est in tuo annali. haec nunc quaero, quae causa fuerit—de Oropo, opinor, sed certum nescio; et, si ita est, quae controversiae. praeterea, qui eo tempore nobilis Epicureus fuerit Athenisque praefuerit hortis, qui etiam Athenis πολιτικοί fuerint illustres. quae te etiam ex Apollodori puto posse invenire.

24 March

T5 *Att.* XII.28.2 (SB 267): quod me ipse per litteras consolatus sum, non paenitet me quantum profecerim. maiorem minui, dolorem nec potui nec, si possem, vellem.

April Cicero with Atticus at his Nomentanum, so no letters to him.

13 May

T6 *Att.* XII.44.4 (SB 285): ego hic duo magna συντάγματα absolvi; nullo enim alio modo a miseria quasi aberrare possum.

16 May Cicero left Astura and went briefly to Lanuvium, then to Tusculum.

21 May

T7 *Att.* XII.52.3 (SB 294): de lingua Latina securi es animi. dices †qui alia quae scribis†. ἀπόγραφα sunt, minore labore fiunt; verba tantum adfero, quibus abundo.

29 May

T8 *Att. XIII.32.3* (SB 305): Torquatus Romae est. misi ut tibi daretur. Catulum et Lucullum, ut opinor, antea. his libris nova prohoemia sunt ad-dita, quibus eorum uterque laudatur. eas litteras volo habeas, et sunt quaedam alia. et quod ad te <de> decem legatis scripsi parum intellexi<sti> [...] Postu-mium autem, cuius statuam in Isthmo meminisse te dicis, Aulum nesciebam fuisse. is autem est qui <consul> cum <L.> Lucullo fuit [...] (cf. *Luc.* 137).

31 May

T9 *Att. XII.6.2* (SB 306): sed, quaeso, qui ex ista acuta et gravi refertur ad τέλος?

5 June

T10 *Att. XIII.5* (SB 312): misi tibi Torquatium.

21-2 June Cicero left Tusculum and went to his estate at Arpinum. There he transferred the discussions in the *Academica* from Catulus, Lucullus and Hortensius to Cato and Brutus and then received a letter from Atticus about Varro (see below, *Att. XIII.16.1* (T14)).

23 June

T11 *Att. XIII.12.3* (SB 320): quod ad me de Varrone scribis, scis me antea orationes aut aliquid id genus solitum scribere ut Varronem nusquam possem intextere. postea autem quam haec coepi φιλολογώτερα, iam Varro mihi denuntiaverat magnam sane et gravem προσφώνησιν. biennium praeteriit cum ille Καλλιπίδης adsiduo cursu cubitum nullum processerit. ego autem me parabam ad id quod ille mihi misisset ut 'αὐτῷ τῷ μέτρῳ καὶ λώϊον', si modo potuissem; nam hoc etiam Hesiodus ascribit 'αἶ κε δύνῃαι'. nunc illam περὶ Τελῶν σύνταξιν sane mihi probatam Bruto, ut tibi placuit, despondimus, idque tu eum non nolle mihi scripsisti. ergo illam 'Ακαδημικήν, in qua homines nobiles illi quidem sed nullo modo philologi nimis acute loquuntur, ad Varronem transferamus. etenim sunt Antiochia, quae iste valde probat. Catulo et Lucullo alibi reponemus, ita tamen si tu hoc probas; deque eo mihi rescribas velim.

24 June

T12 *Att. XIII.13.1-2* (SB 321): commotus tuis litteris, quod ad me de Varrone scripseras, totam Academiam ab hominibus nobilissimis abstuli, transtuli ad nostrum sodalem et et duobus libris contuli in quattuor. grandiores sunt omnino quam erant illi, sed tamen multa detracta. tu autem mihi pervelim scribas qui intellexeris illum velle; illud vero utique scire cupio quem intellexeris ab eo ζηλοτυπεῖσθαι, nisi forte Brutum. id hercle restabat! sed tamen scire pervelim. libri quidem ita exierunt, nisi forte me communis φιλανθία decipit, ut in tali genere ne apud Graecos quidem simile quicquam. tu illam iacturam feres aequo animo quod illa quae habes de Academicis frustra descripta sunt. multo tamen haec erunt splendida, breviora, meliora.

Nunc autem ἀπορῶ quo me vertam. volo Dolabellae valde desideranti; non reperio quid, et simul αἰδέομαι Τρώας, neque, si aliud quid, potero μέμψιν effugere. aut cessandum igitur aut aliquid excogitandum.

25 June

T13 *Att. XIII.14.1 (SB 322):* illud etiam atque etiam consideres velim, placeatne tibi mitti ad Varronem quod scripsimus. etsi etiam ad te aliquid pertinet; nam scito te ei dialogo adiunctum esse tertium. opinor igitur consideremus. etsi nomina iam facta sunt; sed vel induci vel mutari possunt.

26 June

T14 *Att. XIII.16.1 (SB 323):* pedem e villa adhuc egressi non sumus; ita magnos et adsiduos imbris habebamus. illam Ἀκαδημικὴν σύνταξιν totam ad Varronem traduximus. primo fuit Catuli, Luculli, Hortensi; deinde quia παρὰ τὸ πρέπον videbatur, quod erat hominibus nota non illa quidem ἀπαιδευσία sed in his rebus ἀτριψία, simul ac veni ad villam eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli. ecce tuae litterae de Varrone. nemini visa est aptior Antiochia ratio. sed tamen velim scribas ad me, primum placeatne tibi aliquid ad illum, deinde, si placebit, hocne potissimum.

28 June

T15 *Att. XIII.18 (SB 325):* ego interea admonitu tuo perfecti sane argutulos libros ad Varronem, sed tamen exspecto quid ad ea quae scripsi ad te: primum qui intellexeris eum desiderare a me, cum ipse homo πολυγρφώτατος numquam me lacessisset; deinde quem ζηλοτυπεῖν <intellexeris. quod si non Brutum,> multo Hortensium minus aut eos qui de re publica loquuntur. plane hoc mihi explices velim in primis, maneatne in sententia ut mittam ad eum quae scripsi an nihil necesse putes. sed haec coram.

29 June

T16 *Att. XIII.19.3-5 (SB 326):* In Varrone ista causa me non moveret, ne viderer φιλένδοξος. sic enim constitueram, neminem includere in dialogos eorum qui viverent; sed quia <scripseras> et desiderari a Varrone et magni illum aestimare, eos confeci, et absolvi nescio quam bene, sed ita accurate ut nihil posset supra, Academicam omnem quaestionem libris quattuor. in eis quae erant contra ἀκαταληψίαν praeclare collecta ab Antiocho Varroni dedi. ad ea ipse respondeo; tu es tertius in sermone nostro. si Cottam et Varronem fecissem inter se disputantis, ut a te proximis litteris admoneor, meum κωφὸν πρόσωπον esset. hoc in antiquis personis suaviter fit, ut et Heraclides in multis et nos in sex de re publica libris fecimus. sunt etiam de oratore nostri tres mihi vehementer probati. in eis quoque eae personae sunt ut mihi tacendum fuerit. Crassus enim loquitur, Antonius, Catulus senex, C. Iulius, frater Catuli, Cotta, Sulpicius. puero me hic sermo inducitur, ut nullae esse possent partes meae. quae autem his temporibus scripsi Ἀριστοτέλειον morem habent, in quo ita sermo inducitur ceterorum ut penes ipsum sit principatus. ita confeci quinque libros περὶ Τελῶν ut Epicurea L. Torquato, Stoica M. Catoni, περιπατητικά M. Pisoni darem. ἀζηλοτύπητον id fore putaram quod omnes illi decesserant. Haec Academica, ut scis, †cum† Catulo, Lucullo, Hortensio contuleram. sane in personas non cadebant; erant enim λογικώτερα quam ut illi de iis somniasse umquam viderentur. itaque ut legi tuas de Varrone, tamquam ἔρμαιον adripui. aptius esse nihil potuit ad id philosophiae genus, quo ille maxime mihi delectari videtur, eaeque partes ut non sim consecutus ut superior mea causa videatur. sunt enim vehementer πιθανὰ Antiochia; quae diligenter a me expressa acumen habent Antiochi, nitorem

orationis nostrum, si modo is est aliquis in nobis. sed tu dandosne putes hos libros Varroni etiam atque etiam videbis. mihi quaedam occurrunt; sed ea coram.

30 June/1 July

T17 Att. XIII.21a.1 (SB 327): rectumne existimas cuiquam <ante quam> Bruto, cui te auctore προσφωνῶ? scripsit enim Balbus ad me se a te quintum de finibus librum descripsisse; in quo non sane multa mutavi, sed tamen quaedam. tu autem commode feceris si reliquos continueris, ne et ἀδιόρθωτα habet Balbus et ἔωλα Brutus. sed haec hactenus, ne videar περὶ μικρὰ σπουδάζειν. etsi nunc quidem maxima mihi sunt haec. quid es enim aliud?

Varroni quidem quae scripsi te auctore ita propere mittere ut iam Romam miserim describenda. ea si voles, statim habebis.

4(?) July

T18 Att. XIII.22.1 (SB329): De Varrone non sine causa quid tibi placeat tam diligenter exquiro. occurrunt mihi quaedam. sed ea coram. te autem ἀσμεναίτατα intexo, faciamque id crebrius. proximis enim tuis litteris primum te id non nolle cognovi.

6/7 July

Cicero travelled to Tusculum from Arpinum.

10 July

Att. XIII.23-4 (SB 331-2) expresses anxiety about presenting the *Academica* to Varro.

12 July

T19 Att. XIII.25.3 (SB 333): Sed quid est tandem quod perhorrescas quia tuo periculo iubeam libros dari Varroni? etiam nunc si dubitas, fac ut sciamus. nihil est enim elegantius. volo Varronem, praesertim cum ille desideret; sed est, ut scis, 'δεινὸς ἀνὴρ· τάχα κεν καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιόφωτο'. ita mihi saepe occurrit vultus esse querentis fortasse vel hoc, meas partis in iis libris copiosius defensas esse quam suas, quod mehercule non esse intelleges, si quando in Epirum veneris. [...] sed tamen ego non despero probatum iri Varroni et id, quoniam impensam fecimus in macrocolla, facile patior teneri. sed etiam atque etiam dico, tuo periculo fiet. qua re si addubitas, ad Brutum transeamus; est enim is quoque Antiochius. o Academiam volaticam et sui similem! modo huc, modo illuc. sed quaeso, epistula mea ad Varronem valdene tibi placuit? male mi sit si umquam quicquam tam enitar.

28(?) July

T20 Att. XIII.44.2 (SB 336): Tu tamen ausus es Varroni dare! exspecto quid iudicet. quando autem perleget?

25 August

Cicero returned to Astura.

27 August

T21 Att. XIII.21.3 (SB 351): Nunc, ad rem ut redeam., 'inhibere' illud tuum, quod valde mihi adriserat, vehementer displicet. est enim verbum totum nauticum. quamquam id quidem sciebam, sed arbitrabar sustineri remos cum inhibere essent remiges iussi. id non esse eius modi didici heri

cum ad villam nostram navis appelleretur. non enim sustinent sed alio modo remigant. id ab ἐποχῇ remotissimum est. qua re facies ut ita sit in libro quam ad modum fuit. dices hoc idem Varroni, si forte mutavit. nec est melius quicquam quam ut Lucilius: 'sustineas currum ut bonus saepe agitator equosque.' semperque Carneades προβολὴν pugilis et retentionem aurigae similem facit ἐποχῇ. inhibito autem remigum motum habet et vehementiorem quidem remigationis navem convertentis ad puppim.

Passages in published works relevant to Cicero's plans

July-Sept. 46

T22 *Orat.* 148: quae quidem me antea in iudicia atque in curiam deducebant, nunc oblectant domi; nec vero talibus modo rebus qualis hic liber continet, sed multo etiam gravioribus et maioribus; quae si erunt perfectae, profecto forensibus nostris rebus etiam domesticae litterae respondebunt.

Mar.-May 45

T23 *Luc.* 147: posthac tamen cum haec quaeremus, potius de dissensionibus tantis summorum virorum disseramus, de obscuritate naturae deque errore toto philosophorum (qui de bonis contrariisque rebus tanto opere discrepant...), quam de oculorum sensuumque reliquorum mendaciis et de sorite aut pseudomeno, quas plagas ipsi contra se Stoici texuerunt.

Mar.-May 45

T24 *Fin.* I.2: Qui liber [*Hortensius*], cum et tibi [Bruto] probatus videretur et iis, quos ego posse iudicare arbitrarer, plura suscepi [...].

mid-Aug. 45

T25 *N.D.* I.9: me...ad totam philosophiam pertractandam dedissem. Omnes autem eius partes atque omnia membra tum facillume noscuntur cum totae quaestiones scribendo explicantur; est enim admirabilis quaedam continuatio seriesque rerum, ut alia nexa et omnes inter se aptae conligataeque videantur.

Appendix B

The title or titles of the work in its various versions

Cicero's first attested reference to the work is to 'illam 'Ακαδημικὴν (*scil. σύνταξιν*) in *Att.* XIII.12.3 (T11) of June 45, referring to the first edition now being transferred to Varro. The same expression is used in *Att.* XIII.16.1 (T14). Like 'tota Academia', used in XIII.13.1 (T12) of the first edition, and 'Academica quaestio', used in XIII.19.3 (T16) of the Varro edition, the expression is clearly not a title but a brief description or nickname.

However, in the same letter as that in which we find 'Academia', we find 'illa quae habes de Academicis', XIII.13.1 (T12) and, later in the month of June, we find 'haec Academica', both expressions used of the first edition, XIII.19.5 (T16). Certainly the latter is a neuter plural and could be read as parallel to 'Stoica', 'Epicurea', 'περιπατητικά', which occur shortly before, and indeed, as Plasberg (1922) x pointed out, to 'Antiochia' two sentences later: that is, *Academica* could be translated as 'this Academic material', or as Plasberg puts it, 'non libros dicit sed res'. Shackleton Bailey (1966), however, translates it as 'this treatise on the Academy', and it was on these two passages and on the expression in *Off.* II.8 'in Academicis nostris' and the phrase 'in Academicis' in *Tim.* 1, that Reid (1885) 37 built the theory that the work at all stages was intended by Cicero to be known as *Academica* (neuter plural), a view immortalized in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*.

There are objections that can be brought against this view:

a) There is no clear evidence that the first edition had an overall title. Cicero refers to the two books of that edition as *Catulus* and *Lucullus* in *Att.* XIII.32.3 (T8), a letter which predates those mentioned above, and all his references to an overall title coincide with his revision of the dialogue. The first edition is referred to by Quintilian as the *Catulus* and the *Lucullus*, and Plutarch, who only mentions the second book, calls it the *Lucullus*.⁹² But this is not a serious objection against Reid's view, because in that same letter, Cicero speaks of the first book (or first two books) of *De Finibus* as 'Torquatus'. By analogy, there could have been an additional title to cover the two books *Catulus* and *Lucullus* together. In any case, since the intermediate edition could certainly not have used for its two books the titles *Cato* and *Brutus*, as these were titles of Ciceronian works already, it is likely that, at least at this point, Cicero adopted an overall title.

b) It is a more serious objection to Reid's view that Cicero regularly speaks later of the final edition as 'Academici libri' in 45 (*Tusc.* II.4; *N.D.* I.11); and in 44 (*Div.* II.1); again in 44 he speaks in a letter (*Att.* XVI.6.4) of 'in Academico tertio [libro]' and of 'Academicos [libros]'. This is also what Augustine calls the work (*C.D.* VI.2: 'in libris Academicis', cf. II.7.17 and III.20.45: 'Academicos'), and Lactantius says 'in Academico tertio' (*Inst.* VI.24) while his other references are compatible with this interpretation, as was noted by Plasberg (1922) x in contrast to Reid (1885) 38, who says Lactantius

⁹² Quintil. III.6.64; Plu., *Luc.* 42. Plutarch had no reason to mention the *Catulus* in a life of Lucullus.

calls it '*Academica*' the rest of the time: '*Academica*' followed by the pronoun '*quam*' at *Inst.* III.14.3 is clearly the school.

c) In fact, evidence for '*Academica*' as a title is slippery. Of the three passages on which Reid relies, '*in Academicis nostris*' of *Off.* II.8 could be an abbreviated form of '*in Academicis libris nostris*' and '*in Academicis*' of *Tim.* I can similarly be construed as '*in Academicis libris*'. In Cicero's letter *Att.* XIII.13.1 (T12) '*de Academicis*' in the phrase '*illa quae habes de Academicis*' could conceivably be an abbreviation of '*de Academicis libris*', or refer to '*Academici*' (Academic philosophers), or, if neuter plural, be a description of the subject matter rather than a title. The clearest evidence for the neuter plural is *Att.* XIII.19.5 (T16) where, as has been said above, it is no more a title than '*Epicurea*' is a title of *De Finibus* I.

A possible conclusion then would be this: Cicero could have called the first edition *Catulus* and *Lucullus*, with the overall title undecided (so Philippon (1939) 1129; Powell (1995) xv). This style of title could not be used when the speakers became Cato and Brutus, nor could it be used when Varro and Cicero became the speakers, if only because there were now four books. The final edition was called *Academici libri* as Plasberg (1922) x suggested, and as is accepted by Powell (1995) xv.

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CICERO'S PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE IN THE *LUCULLUS*

W. GÖRLER

Introduction

The above title is ambiguous. In a sense, Cicero's philosophical position in the *Lucullus* is identical with that reported and defended by 'Cicero', the character in the dialogue: Academic scepticism as taught and practised by Arcesilaus and Carneades. But Cicero is hardly ever just a spokesman for a given doctrine nor is he a simple translator; he takes great pride in 'applying his own *iudicium*' throughout (*Fin.* I.6). So even where, on the whole, he subscribes to the tenets he is reporting, his personal views may differ in emphasis and in details, and we should be able to detect such personal deviations. It is the aim of this paper to point to 'unorthodox' elements and judgments of this kind in the *Lucullus* and thus to contribute to a clearer idea of what may be called Cicero's personal brand of scepticism. This is not an easy task. Cicero's 'Academic books' are our principal source of information on Academic scepticism; so every attempt to single out personal comments and 'un-Academic' ingredients risks becoming circular.

I

Before embarking on his speech, Cicero makes it clear that he will speak out of sincere conviction, not just take up a role¹ (*Luc.* 65-6): 'It

¹ Contrast *Rep.* III.7 f. (Philus speaking) 'praeclaram vero causam ad me deferitis, cum me improbitatis patrocinium suscipere vultis'; *N.D.* III.51 (Cotta, Academic sceptic) 'verum dicentibus facile cedam'; III.95 (Cotta) 'ego vero et opto redargui me ... et facile me a te vinci posse certo scio'; *Tusc.* III.46 'cupio refelli: quid enim laboro, nisi ut veritas in omni quaestione explicetur?' (for further passages see Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1096 f.). Note that Cicero's antagonist, the dogmatic Lucullus, is anxious not to be wholly identified with his task within the dialogue (*Luc.* 10): 'non laboro, quam valde ea, quae dico probaturus sim ... dicam enim nec mea nec ea, in quibus, si non fuerint, non vinci me malim quam vincere'. In so saying he does not simply insist that he is a spokesman (as was suggested in the discussion in Utrecht). Personal judgement lies behind Lucullus remark: after the previous day's discussion he

is not from combativeness or ostentation that I choose Academic scepticism over all other schools; I would love to discover something that just resembles knowledge'; 'but just as I feel it is the most wonderful thing to see the truth, so I think it is shameful in the extreme to approve falsehoods as true'.² So far, Cicero is perfectly in line with Arcesilaus and his followers. A personal statement ensues (66): 'And yet, I am not the sort of person who never approves of anything false, never gives assent, never holds opinions. But here we are dealing with the wise man, and I for one am a great opinion-holder, since I am not a wise man.'

Cicero thereupon, in a fine simile taken from sea-faring, prides himself on the breadth and openness of his thought. He then reminds his readers once more: 'But it is not my own person we are dealing with, it is the wise man' (66). Nonetheless he goes on telling of his own experiences and his own attitude: 'When persuasive impressions³ strike me, now and then I do give my assent. Yet I do not perceive (καταλαμβάνω)⁴ as I do not think anything can be perceived (i.e., apprehended in such a way that there can be no doubt at all as to its truth)'. This qualification is all-important. That nothing can be perceived (πάντα εἶναι ἀκατάληπτα) is the one basic tenet of scepticism; so Cicero had good reason to make it clear that he, though being a *magnus opinator*, still keeps unwaveringly to the principle of general ἀκατάληψία. Thus the preceding avowal is effectively counterbalanced: Cicero is prone to approval and to assent, indeed he even seems to take some pride in 'opining' on a

is no longer absolutely convinced that Antiochus is right and now displays some sympathy for the opposite view. Calling Antiochus' *sententia* 'true in the highest degree' (*verissima, ibid.*) is weaker than calling it simply 'true': all superlatives make their adjectives 'relative'.

² Translations from *Lucullus*, in this chapter, largely follow Rackham (1933).

³ *Visa* = φαντασίαι. The other common translation is 'presentation'.

⁴ Note that 'nec percipio tamen' is not on a level with the preceding avowals of unorthodox laxity (*approbo, assentior, opinor, erro* etc.). A strict Academic sceptic was expected not to give his approval etc., and this was thought to be possible, if difficult; it is in our power to 'withhold' assent and thus not to opine. In 'giving in' to some impressions Cicero *decides* to do so. But he does not decide 'not to perceive': no sane person would or could. 'Nec percipio tamen' is to be read as a description of a regrettable fact. Thus Cicero merely reports his own inevitable epistemic limitations; but when he deals with his yielding to persuasive impressions and his consequent opining, then he passes judgement on himself: 'I know, all this is possibly false, I do not pretend any of my attempts to approach the truth is a perception (κατάληψις) in the strong sense.'

grand scale. But being firm about the tenet *nihil posse percipi* he is unerringly aware that all his 'opinions' may be false.

We shall find just the same compromise at the end of the *Lucullus*. But, puzzlingly, what is here 'confessed' by Cicero as his personal attitude will reappear there as the typical conduct of the wise man, and moreover we shall be told that Carneades himself (according to the speaker Catulus) held this view. Why does Cicero, here, stress that he is not a sage? What are we to make of his personal statement? In Hellenistic philosophy, the wise man figures largely as the exponent of the right and orthodox attitude, whereas all those who have not (yet) attained wisdom are conceived of as wrong-doers, varying at best in degree.⁵ To hold 'opinions', according to Arcesilaus and other orthodox members of the school, is seriously wrong (*Luc.* 77). And yet, reading Cicero's portrayal of his wide and unimpeded 'opining', we hardly get the impression this should be taken as a confession of wrong-doing, as a warning to others: 'Look at me, I have turned out unable to keep the rules, so I am not a *sapiens*—you try to do better ...'. On the contrary, the passage reads rather like an appeal to do just what Cicero does: yield to impressions and 'opine'. We shall have to come back to section 66 later on.

Another key passage where a personal note is struck is *Luc.* 98. Cicero has finished the first major part of his discourse: he has proved that nothing can be 'perceived'. Next, he will expound Carneades' doctrine of probability. In the main, the part preceding 98 is 'destructive' in that any hope of ever attaining reliable knowledge is done away with; what is to follow may be labeled 'constructive' in that some sort of second-class cognition (the 'probable', *πιθανόν*) is introduced. Not unexpectedly Cicero feels more at ease in the second section, and that is what he makes clear at the very point of transition (98b): 'But to leave all those stinging repartees and the whole of the tortuous class of argument and to display our real position ...'. It is almost a sigh of relief: the most difficult, and

⁵ For a similar opposition of *sapiens* to ordinary people compare *Tusc.* IV.58 'suspitor te non tam de sapiente quam de te ipso quaerere: illum enim putas omni perturbatione liberum esse, te vis ...'; *ibid.* 59 'simulas enim quaerere te de sapiente, quaeris autem fortasse de te'; *ibid.* 63 (Cicero about his *Consolationis liber*) 'quem in medio—non enim sapientes eramus—maerore et dolore conscripsimus'; Sen., *Ben.* II.18.4 'admoneam necesse est non loqui me de sapientibus ... sed de imperfectis hominibus'; *ibid.* V.25.3 'life would be easier among sapientes'; *Ep. Mor.* 116.4-5. See further Reid (1885) on *Luc.* 66.

for that matter the most invidious part of what he had to expound is by now over. If figure-skating is not too far-fetched a metaphor for a Roman *consularis*, one might say Cicero feels as if he has fulfilled the 'compulsory' dialectical performance, and the rest will be 'free' argumentation. Cicero's own metaphor is taken from difficult terrain: the preceding arguments are likened to a thicket of thorny shrubs where one cannot proceed but cautiously and slowly, in difficult windings and turns. The simile is taken up again in 112: Cicero has relapsed into problems of dialectics, but from now on, he promises, he will 'roam happily and freely in a much wider field'.⁶ There will be more to be said about 112, but let us have a closer look at 98b first.

Two questions arise:

1. What is actually meant by 'isti aculei et tortuosum genus disputandi'? It has been argued that the simile fits perfectly what precedes immediately, i.e. the logical puzzles exposed in 91-8a, whereas other parts of what Cicero has said, so far, are by no means difficult nor technical and 'thorny', e.g. all the poetry in 89-90. Admittedly the actual metaphors employed seem to be influenced by the directly preceding dialectical argumentation. But it is also the case that all the arguments leading up to the conclusion that there can be no knowledge whatsoever may be called difficult and 'thorny'. So after all it is more plausible that Cicero in 98 takes his leave from the whole (as we have called it) 'destructive' part of his speech. It is tempting, and it is basically correct, to give an alternative label to the first main section (66b-98a) as 'Arcesilean', the second (98b-115) as 'Carneadean'. Arcesilaus was the first Academic to deny that anything can be 'perceived', and it is Carneades who introduced an elaborate system of 'probable' *φαντασίσαι*; so it does not seem a mere coincidence that their respective names figure prominent in the very beginnings of the sections (66b 'sapientis autem hanc censet Arcesilas vim esse maximam ...', 98b 'explicata tota Carneadis sententia'). Yet there is quite a bit of overlapping: Arcesilaus already taught that some 'impressions' were

⁶ There are similar transitions from a dialectical 'prelude' to a less constrained type of argumentation in the *Tusculans*: III.22, 'haec sic dicuntur a Stoicis concludunturque contortius; sed latius aliquando dicenda sunt et diffusius'; IV.33, '... quoniam tamquam ex scrupulosis cotibus enavigavit oratio ... nunc vela ... expectamus et cursum' (cf. IV.9); V.76, '... ut iam a laqueis Stoicorum ... recedamus'. Compare also *De orat.* III.124 'in hoc ... tanto immensoque campo cum liceat oratori vagari libere ...' (cf. III.108).

more 'reasonable' (εὐλογος) and thereby more probable than others, and Carneades subscribed to general ἀκαταληψία no less than his predecessor. So 'tota Carneadis sententia' may well be read as 'the rest of Carneades' opinion as well', as suggested by Malcolm Schofield and others. This does not, however, detract from the fact that 66b-98a and 98b-115 are the first two major parts of Cicero's speech, differing in focus as mentioned.⁷

II

Cicero uses the plural of the first person: 'ut relinquamus ostendamusque qui simus'. As to the first verb the plural is clearly 'rhetorical': Cicero comments on the arrangement of his speech and no one else could be responsible for this. For stylistic reasons it is easiest to see the other verbs as closely parallel, and in fact we may read the rest of the sentence as: 'let me make it clear what is my real opinion'. On the other hand, what Cicero is about to explain is not just his personal attitude but the sceptical Academy's doctrine on 'probable' impressions. So, are we to understand: 'we, the sceptical Academics'? This reading is supported by the next sentence (98 fin.): Cicero is anxious to make it clear that what follows is not invented by himself but the 'official' doctrine of the Academy, and to establish this, by documentary evidence, as it were, he explicitly quotes his source (a very rare case in Cicero's books):⁸ Clitomachus, *On the Withholding of Assent*, book I. But then again, looking at *Luc.* 112 where the idea of leaving 'thorny' narrowness is taken up, the more personal interpretation seems preferable. In fact both readings are compatible, and we may paraphrase: '... let me tell you what aspect of our (the Academics') doctrine I am particularly fond of ...'.

⁷ Ruch (1969), esp. 320 f., takes the first main part (66b-98a) as a 'refutation' of the dogmatic's objections, the second one (98b-115) as the 'confirmation' of the sceptic's own view. This is quite misleading, as the first part is a series of arguments to prove that nothing can be perceived and the second one covers only a special aspect of the sceptic attitude; equally misleading is Bächli in the (otherwise very helpful) synopsis at Schäublin (1995) lxxix, on 98b-115: 'Keiner These ist zuzustimmen'.

⁸ There is a verbatim quotation from another Clitomachean book in *Luc.* 102 ('... scripsit his fere verbis'). For Cicero's scarce explicit quotations see Görler (1989) 253-6.

In 98b-110 Cicero exposes the basic tenets of Carneadean probabilism, which was a response to the Stoics' objection that the sceptics, without ever 'assenting', would be condemned to total inactivity (ἀπραξία). As has been remarked, this part is 'positive' and 'constructive'; nonetheless most of the terminology is highly technical, and 111 is not only a relapse into dialectics but also a thematic aberration: Antiochus had objected to Philo, Cicero reports, that it was contradictory to assume the existence of false impressions and to hold that these, in some cases, might not differ from true ones. Despite appearances, this is not a mere squabble; the issue is crucial to both dogmatists and sceptics. But the objection should have been answered in the first part of Cicero's discourse (as it is ἀκαταληψία that is at stake); it has no bearing on the question of 'probable' or 'improbable' impressions. So Cicero, in 112, rightly stops short and once more changes his note: 'But even now I feel I am arguing on much too restricted a line. There is such a wide field where my argumentation might expatiate freely and happily, why do we drive it into narrow defiles and into the briary thickets of Stoic argumentation?' 'Even now' points back to 98b: Cicero has relapsed into a type of argumentation he had promised to leave. We have already noted that Cicero is fond of the similes employed here.⁹ Obviously he is preparing for a more personal line of argument, and this is confirmed in 115 where Cicero goes back to the neutral and objective key: 'But let us no longer discuss my own person, let us concentrate on the sage as he is the real topic of our enquiry'. So whatever arguments and statements there are between the two sentences we expect to have a personal tinge: they should *not* concern the wise man but Cicero himself.

Section (112-5) is full of surprises. First, our expectations are deceived: there is no 'roaming around in a wide field', no unconstrained arguing, loosened up by manifold examples such as Cicero employs in the *Tusculans* and elsewhere; on the contrary: the level of argumentation gets even more tight and theoretical. We come to realize that it had not been so much a more relaxed style Cicero had announced as unorthodox argumentation.

Cicero wishes he could speak to a Peripatetic instead of a Stoic—then matters would be much easier. There is a faintly similar wish and a similar fiction in *Leg.* I.53 f.: 'If I could function as an

⁹ See above pp. 38-9.

arbitrator between the Old Academy and the Stoa, Cicero feels, I would be able to settle their controversy on the supreme goal, the differences being either just verbal ones (as Carneades and Antiochus thought) or minimal'—in short: Cicero wants to do away with excessively subtle distinctions.¹⁰ Just so, here he would like to get rid of certain restrictions and complications in epistemological matters. Why would Cicero prefer to talk to a Peripatetic? Being a 'plain-minded man', a Peripatetic would set up a less exacting definition of what may be 'perceived': 'an impression originating from a true object', and he would not insist on this 'weighty' additional condition¹¹ 'of such a kind as it could not conceivably be if it originated from a false one'. Here we rub our eyes. What Cicero would like to get rid of is no less than the famous third condition of the Stoic definition of the καταληπτική φαντασία. And his readers cannot fail to remember that in the first part of his discourse (77) he had stressed the importance of this very third clause.

In *Luc.* 77 Cicero feigns a dialogue between Zeno the Stoic and Arcesilaus which is represented as having given birth to the long-lasting epistemological debate of the two schools. First, the opponents agreed that only those 'impressions' (φαντασῖαι) could be 'perceived' (in the technical sense, i.e. recognized as true with perfect reliability) that were (1) 'impressed from a real object' (*ex eo quod esset*) and (2) 'in conformity with its real characteristics' (*sicut esset*). Arcesilaus was not yet satisfied, as there might be false impressions indistinguishable ones in outer appearance from the true. And so the two scholars agreed a third clause should be added to the definition of 'impressions capable of being perceived' (καταληπτικαὶ φαντασῖαι): they must be of such character as they could not conceivably have if they had originated from a non-

¹⁰ Compare *Tusc.* V.120 'quorum controversiam solebat tamquam honorarius arbiter iudicare Carneades; nam cum, quaecumque bona Peripateticis eadem Stoicis commoda viderentur neque tamen Peripatetici plus tribuerent divitiis bonae valetudini ... quam Stoici, causam esse dissidendi negabat'. In *Fin.* II.39 Cicero is willing to follow Carneades' example: 'quantum potero minuat contentiones omnesque simplices sententias ... omnino a philosophia semovendas putabo ...'.

¹¹ The mss. have '... qui ... diceret ... neque adhaerere illam magnam accessionem', 'without saying that that weighty addition is inherent'. That reads slightly awkward: *Accessio* ('supplement') should be logically in line with what precedes, i.e. a requirement formulated by the philosopher. But as it stands *accessio* is a quality inherent to the thing defined. Reid's conjecture 'neque adhibere' (on which see his comment) is fairly cogent.

existing thing. And it was this 'third clause' that soon turned out to be the central issue: Arcesilaus and his followers denied that the condition could ever be met, the Stoics insisted that some *φαντασίαι* were of such unequivocal clarity and 'evidence' (*perspicuitas*, *ἐνάργεια*) that error could be safely excluded. In *Luc.* 77 Cicero winds up: 'This is the one and only point of divergence, up to this day'.¹²

Reading this, no one would suspect that Cicero did not approve of the third clause: He seems to back it without any restriction—and he has to: it *is* the very base of Academic scepticism: the Academics never denied that conditions 1 and 2 can be met and indeed are often met, and that there are true 'impressions'. So far, there is no need for sceptical doubts whatsoever. It is quite possible that the Stoics, originally, formulated just these two conditions and were happy with it. The real problem may indeed have been pointed to first by Arcesilaus: How do we ever *know* whether conditions 1 and 2 are fulfilled? Maybe when wording the two clauses the Stoics had naively assumed that we are able to check the reliability of our perceptions. In fact, if we were able to do this, all epistemological problems would be solved. Unfortunately we are not. To check the truth-value of our *φαντασίαι*, we would have to be aware of the real things as well as of the 'impressions' and then compare the two. The Stoics may have held, as was suggested to me by Malcolm Schofield, that 'if 1 and 2 are satisfied, we *do* know real things, and know them directly'.¹³ Arcesilaus, then, may

¹² Compare *Luc.* 83, 'omnis pugna de quarto (capite) est (i.e. the Academics' affirmation) nullum esse visum verum a sensu profectum, cui non appositum sit visum aliud, quod ab eo nihil intersit quodque percipi non possit'.

¹³ See also Long and Sedley (1987) 1.239 (on 39 B 2-3, ps.Plu. *Plac.* 900E = Aët. IV.12.3 Diels; no parallel for this ch. in Stobaeus): 'The texts do not imply that impressions are internal pictures or images, so that what we perceive is images of objects. Rather, like light, impressions are the illuminations of, or means of our observing, actual things' (my italics); cp. Aët. IV.12.2, 'just as light reveals itself and its cause'. But note that the light metaphor is not truly analogous: impressions are caused by the real thing, being the 'impressor'; light is not caused by the things it is to reveal. Note further that what may be 'grasped' (*καταλαμβάνειν*) according to the Stoics is primarily *φαντασίαι/visa* (see e.g. Zeno's answer in *Luc.* 77), and that memory is a 'treasure of impressions' (S.E., *M.* VII.373). So it is perhaps safer to say that impressions 'point to' their 'impressors', a meaning *ἐνδεικνόναι* (Aët. IV.12.1) may well have, and that the real things are known to us by immediate inference; that is clearly what Cicero has in mind in *Ac.* I.41 'visa, quae propriam quandam haberent *declarationem* earum rerum, quae viderentur'.

have insisted that we had to make do with φαντασῖαι alone, the real things being out of our reach. Otherwise, why restrict ourselves to speaking of φαντασῖαι and not consider the real things directly?

So the logical status of the third criterion is somewhat complicated: it is not a two-term relation between the real object and the 'impression' (as is the case with conditions 1 and 2), but a three-term relation. The epistemological 'subject' comes in: we (the subject) must be sure that the φαντασῖα is a true representation of its object.¹⁴ And as the subject cannot perceive the object itself the guarantee required must be somehow inherent in those 'impressions' which fulfil the condition. In other words these φαντασῖαι must be distinguished by a certain unmistakable quality. The Stoics pointed to the 'clearness' and evidence (ἐνάργεια) of some impressions; the Academics objected that no clarity could ever be found which would make error impossible. I cannot pursue this point here.¹⁵ But it should have become clear that the 'weighty addition' questioned by Cicero is the true nucleus of the epistemological debate: giving up the requirement 'tale, quale falsum esse non possit' is tantamount to giving up Academic scepticism altogether.

As has been seen, Cicero is well aware of this and in fact he does *not* renounce the third clause (*Luc.* 113 fin., see below). And yet, here, we are left with the impression that he thinks of it as an irritating, unnecessary burden and that he feels uncomfortable about it.¹⁶ What are we to make of Cicero's wish? Let us read on

¹⁴ That is why I find it difficult to accept what Gisela Striker (this volume, p. 266) calls the 'weaker interpretation' of that highly disputed 'addition': '... the third clause makes explicit what is already implied by the second, namely that the cognitive impression will represent its object with such precision and accuracy that it could not come from any other thing.' Zeno may have thought that every φαντασῖα which represented its object correctly would automatically be clear and accurate; in a way, this is indeed implied by the second clause ('in conformity with its real characteristics'). But why should he have said so in the form of a third *condition*? A clarification of what has been stated already is not an additional clause. A new condition makes sense only as answering the question how we are to *know* whether or not condition 1 and 2 are met, and this question was not put by the Stoics but by Arcesilaus.

¹⁵ For details see Görler (1994) 800 and 865.

¹⁶ This is not an isolated slip: see *Fin.* V.76, 'nihil ... est aliud, quam ob rem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quicquam posse percipi nisi tale, quale falsum esse non possit. itaque haec cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane'.

(112b): 'Arguing with a Peripatetic there would not be much of a disagreement: I would say that nothing can be 'perceived', he would answer that the wise man, then, would succumb sometimes to 'opinions'—to which I would not object, as not even Carneades vehemently combatted this conclusion.' Here it becomes clearer what Cicero is driving at: it is 'freedom of opinion' that is at stake. A 'simple-minded' Peripatetic would grant it generously to the *sapiens*—the Stoics do not, and that is what scandalizes Cicero, as he will elaborate later on.

In the next section (113) the Stoics are contrasted once again with more sympathetic philosophers, such as Aristotle and Theophrastus, 'or even' Xenocrates and Polemo: the Stoics are clearly 'lower in rank'.¹⁷ Nonetheless Cicero wordlessly accepts their third condition of what can be 'perceived': 'tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit', 'a true impression of such a kind that it could not possibly be false'; then he goes on: 'Consequently (*itaque*), of course (*nimirum*) I shall give my assent to things not really known [or: unknowable], that is, I shall hold opinions' (let us remark that such behaviour is by no means a 'matter of course' for a sceptic); 'and this I am granted by the Peripatetics and by the Old Academy, but your school denies it to me ...'. Cicero finally names Antiochus, being the chief exponent of dogmatism in our dialogue.

Now, all this is a remarkable shift of stress, not to say a distortion of doxographical facts. There is a strange omission. How about Cicero's own school? Arcesilaus, to be sure, sided with the Stoics and uncompromisingly disapproved of holding unfounded 'opinions' (*Luc.* 66, 77). It is hardly by accident that he is not even mentioned in our passage. Carneades, it is true, seems to have been ready to make concessions (*Luc.* 59, 67, 78, 108, 148), and accordingly he is said, here, 'not to have fought too vehemently' against assent and 'opinion'. But from all the passages mentioned it is pretty clear that Carneades, if at all, approved of 'opinion' only as an expedient for human action.¹⁸ In *Luc.* 113 the tenor is virtually reversed.¹⁹

The rest of the section is no less puzzling. Cicero addresses Antiochus (who, as is well-known, pretended to renew the Old, i.e.

¹⁷ The actual wording is uncertain but the general meaning is beyond doubt.

¹⁸ For details see Görler (1994) 859 f., 869-973.

¹⁹ Note that in *Luc.* 78 and 108 Cicero unmistakably prefers the Clitomachean interpretation of Carneades (see below p. 56).

pre-sceptical Academy and the Older Peripatos): 'Did ever a member of the Old Academy or a Peripatetic hold that the only thing that can be perceived is a true impression of such a sort that there could not be a false one of the same sort, or that a wise man never holds an opinion? No one, I assure you.' This is a dazzling piece of argumentation. Both Cicero and Antiochus considered themselves Academics, and as they differed in epistemology it would not be surprising if one of them disputed the other's claim of orthodoxy. But that is not what happens. Cicero puts up with the fact that Antiochus wishes to be an 'old' (non-sceptical) Academic and does not here try to win him over to his sceptical ('new') way of Academic thought. Instead, he reminds Antiochus of the history and of the doctrine of his own school: no ancient Academic ever cared for the two tenets in question ('id solum percipi posse ...; sapientem nihil opinari'). What Cicero does not say is that these very propositions are key-stones of his own brand of Academic philosophy, although they have been introduced as such shortly before. It is worthwhile to have a look back to *Luc.* 77: 'That it is possible for a human being to hold no opinions, and not only that it is possible but that it is the duty of the wise man, had not only never been distinctly formulated but had never even been stated by any of his predecessors; but Arcesilaus deemed this view both true and also honourable and worthy of a wise man.' The facts are the same: it was a new idea and a new postulate that the wise man should not 'opine'. But—quite contrary to *Luc.* 113—in *Luc.* 77 there is no polemical tinge whatsoever: the new idea is praised as 'true' and 'worthy of the *sapiens*'. In the light of *Luc.* 77 it is at best a half-truth that 'no one before Zeno' had ever stressed the tenets in question; if we are to believe Cicero's fictitious dialogue, it was Arcesilaus who pushed Zeno to formulate them. That Arcesilaus is not even named in 113 may be seen as indicative that Cicero has no great devotion to the more radical type of Academic scepticism.

And yet Cicero does not disavow its fundamental doctrines (113 *fin.*): 'I nevertheless (i.e. despite their late discovery by an inferior philosopher) think both tenets true, and I do not say so just to suit the occasion, but I do sincerely approve of them.' Well, Cicero has to, after what he has expounded in the first part of his speech; all the same, here (113 *fin.*) he sounds rather subdued, and it will be seen that in fact he does *not* adhere uncompromisingly to the idea that the sage will never 'opine' (148, see below pp. 54-5).

Section 114 should be read as being closely connected with what precedes. The reasoning may be paraphrased as follows: 'Although I have my doubts as to the Academic origin of those two tenets you uphold so strongly, I shall overcome my misgivings and concede to you that they are true; what I cannot concede is that you, given your high standards for knowledge, erect a thoroughly dogmatic system, claiming to 'know' every little detail; this is sheer arrogance.' Not incidentally, some of the verbs employed have strong autocratic connotations (114): 'You who forbid me to assent to what I do not know for certain ... you arrogate for yourself ('tibi adrogas') the ability to set out a system of philosophical doctrine, to unfold a complete natural science, to figure out how to behave and to establish firmly what has ultimately to be aimed at and what has to be avoided ...'.

This is brilliant rhetoric. The presumptions of Antiochus and the Stoics are effectively contrasted with the much more modest claims of the Sceptics. There may well be historical truth in it. In the long debate between Stoics/dogmatists and Academics/sceptics it was, from the very beginning, a central issue whether or not the wise man should and could refrain from assent and opinion. That the wise man must not opine is one of the two basic propositions leading up to total 'abstention' (ἐποχή), the other one being 'nihil est quod percipi possit'. An uncompromising sceptic had to accept them both, and so come to the inevitable conclusion that he should never give his 'assent' to any impression whatsoever (*Luc.* 78, 'illud certe opinione et perceptione sublata sequitur: omnium adsensio-num retentio'). But, notoriously, the Academics, faced with the argument of ἀπραξία, had to look for a compromise and to somehow get out of total ἐποχή. This meant they had to choose between the horns of a dilemma: they had either to admit that at least some things may be 'grasped' ('perceived') and so to abandon the tenet of general ἀκαταληψία, or to approve of 'opinions'. In the end, they opted for the latter, albeit with great hesitation and with some terminological camouflage. For the Stoics (and their *adstipulator* Antiochus (*Luc.* 67)) it was easy enough to keep unerringly to the tenet 'sapientem numquam opinari' as they were convinced that a good number of 'impressions' could be 'perceived', and they may have boasted of keeping unerringly to this noble maxim. Considering the highly elaborate Stoic system, the Academics must have thought this pharisaical in the extreme.

The keynote of *Luc.* 115 is 'arrogance vs. modesty'; it is held through the rest of the section: 'Is it not rather arrogant ('vereor ne subadroganter facias') to recommend your own philosophical system? I know, you are firmly convinced it is true and indeed that it is the only true system ... Is it then we that are shameless who are anxious not to err, or is it you that are arrogant (*adrogantes*) who have persuaded yourselves that you alone know everything?' (See also 126, 'impudenter, non solum adroganter'). Lucullus, the dogmatist, had blamed his opponents for their queer doctrine, irreconcilable with common sense; he had likened the sceptics to riotous citizens (13) and accused them of 'upsetting a well-established system of philosophy' (14) and 'covering clear matters with darkness' (16); in his *peroratio* (61) he had summed up: '... a philosophy that confounds the true with the false, robs us of judgment, despoils us of the power of approval, deprives us of all our senses ...'. Cicero, in 115, as it were, now turns the tables upon Lucullus: It is not we, the sceptics, whose doctrine gives offence to common sense and common feelings—what is much more scandalous is the presumption and the self-righteousness of the Stoics. The retort is repeated towards the end of the discourse (144): 'Why does Lucullus bring him into disfavour (*invidia*)? What most people think much more 'invidious' are the Stoic paradoxes (see also *Luc.* 105, about the sceptics' doctrine of 'probables': '... sint sane falsa, invidiosa non sunt', 126 'cur rapior in invidiam?').

The last part of 115 is a dialectical high-light. Cicero makes the dogmatist, blamed for excessive self-righteousness, try an excuse: 'It is not I who pretend to know everything, I am saying it is the sage.' But this gets him into a trap, for it was he who had tried to recommend and to explain the Stoic doctrine, so Cicero is in his right to ask: 'What are we to think of this—wisdom being unfolded by a man that is not wise?' Again, this line of argument is taken up in the end of Cicero's speech. Lucullus had argued (22) there could be neither crafts nor arts if nothing could be 'perceived'; 'probable' views he was not willing to accept as a substitute. Now, the Stoics' doctrine was open to an analogous objection: 'Knowledge' (in the technical sense, *scientia*, ἐπιστήμη), they taught, was a privilege of the sage. So Cicero can retort (146): 'Zeuxis, Phidias, and Polyclitus were excellent artists but they hardly met the standards of the Stoic sage, that is to say: they 'knew' nothing at all. How would they accept this?' To be sure, this is rhetoric, and Lucullus would not

have failed to answer (had he been given an occasion) that his school after all did grant 'perceptions' to ordinary people and a fortiori to artists.

But it is not our aim to arbitrate that long-lasting controversy. We are interested in Cicero's personal stance, and in this respect the rest of the story is rather telling. Our artists, Cicero fancies, when taught the proper (philosophical) meaning of 'knowledge' would soon calm down and would no longer be angry with either of us 'after it had been explained to them that we do away with a thing that nowhere exists, but leave to them what is sufficient' (146). This is nearly Cicero's last sentence within his speech proper. It is clearly ironical in character: one should not quarrel about words as long as there is agreement in substance; it does not matter much how to call what a good artist must have at his disposition: be it 'knowledge' or a set of 'perceptions' or 'probable views'. Amazingly, Cicero's final remark fits both sides. He had mentioned the Stoic notion of a 'knowledge', reserved to the sage but unavailable to ordinary people. And as the Stoics were not sure whether, so far, there had been a wise man at all, in a way 'knowledge' (as they defined it) may be said to be 'nowhere'. If this were explained to the artists they would cease to be angry with the Stoics. 'And they would not feel any resentment either against us (*scil.*, the Academic sceptics) after they had learnt that we do away with a thing that nowhere exists anyway but leave what is sufficient for them'. What is 'left' is perception in the case of the Stoics, 'probable views' with the Academics: both schools 'leave' what is sufficient for arts, crafts, and everyday action. The specific terms are faded out, and that is hardly accidental: Cicero, here, does not want to point to the controversial issues any longer, here the stress is on what both sides have in common. There are more instances elsewhere in the *Lucullus* where the differences seem to be played down, on which more later.

Let us go back to *Luc.* 112-5 and try to sum up:

1. Cicero shows himself unhappy about technically complicated reasoning; he wishes he could argue with a more 'plain-minded' opponent.
2. He does not seem willing to 'fight' with great tenacity for the maxim of total ἀκαταληψία.
3. He seems unhappy that Zeno (sic!) had added the notorious third clause to the definition of what can be 'perceived'; such

fierce standards for 'knowledge' he deems basically un-Academic.

4. Nonetheless, somewhat grudgingly, he accepts the Stoic definition in its entirety.²⁰

5. What upsets him is that the Stoics themselves do not comply with the standards they have forced upon other people; their system is highly speculative, and yet they pretend to know more than everybody else; the Academics are much more modest.—Note that the Stoics are not urged to practise total 'abstention' (ἐποχή) of approval and judgment: it is only their presumptuous claim to unerring 'knowledge' that is attacked and derided. There are no objections at all as to 'opinions'; indeed, sections 112-5 amount to an indirect plea for 'freedom of opinion'. And note again that Arcesilaus is not even mentioned—there is a different story and a different tone in 77.

III

So far, we have confined ourselves to those passages of Cicero's speech which are unequivocally marked as personal statements. We shall be on less firm ground when looking for personal insertions elsewhere.

First, a brief look on the third part of Cicero's discourse (*Luc.* 116-46). It might be entitled 'Philosophical disagreements'. Its principal aim is not to furnish doxographical information but to demonstrate that in matters philosophical no reasonable decision can be made: all arguments for a given doctrine are 'counter-balanced', as it were, by arguments advocating the opposite view. This is a traditional Academic method of arguing, taken over, it seems, from Pyrrhonian scepticism.²¹ The point about *diaphonia* is prepared for

²⁰ Philo of Larisa, in his *Roman books*, tried to do away with the third clause (*Luc.* 18; for details see Görler (1994) 922-6); so it is tempting to assume that Cicero was influenced by his master when he voiced his misgivings about the Stoics' overly demanding definition. It should, however, be remembered that Cicero in the *Lucullus* after all keeps to the third clause; moreover, the innovations of the *Roman books* are explicitly left out of consideration by Lucullus (12) and it is hardly credible that Cicero, in his discourse in the *Lucullus* should exploit these books without explicitly mentioning them.

²¹ This is not contradicted by D.L. IV.28 = 68 D Long and Sedley (1987), on Arcesilaus: πρῶτος ἐπισχὼν τὰς ἀποφάσεις διὰ τὰς ἐναντιότητας τῶν λόγων. πρῶτος δὲ καὶ εἰς ἑκάτερον ἐπεχέρησε: what Diogenes has in mind here is changes

in 115 (on which see above) where Cicero tells his Antiochean (and for that matter, Stoic) opponent that he is at a loss to see why he should opt for Stoicism of all schools. There is no need here to dwell on details; I only want to point to some passages in which Cicero, discussing both sides, does *not* end up with perfect equilibrium (as Carneades inevitably would) but expresses sympathy for one or other view, albeit in cautious terms.²² The argumentation is threefold: physics (116-28), ethics (129-41), dialectic (142-6).

In *Luc.* 119 a personal preference for the Stoic cosmology (as opposed to the Peripatetic one) may be detected. Having reported the Stoic view ('mundum esse sapientem, habere mentem quae et se et ipsum fabricata sit et omnia moderetur moveat regat ...'), Cicero concludes: 'all that may well be true ('sint ista vera'), nevertheless I deny that it can be 'comprehended' and 'perceived'. That is not a revocation of the preceding concession: it is simply the qualification an Academic *had* to make. And note that Cicero, subsequently, does not accept Aristotle's view as equally plausible, he only stands on his right to some doubts. (There is a strong emotional tone in 126: 'I scorn the 'destiny' of the Stoics, which, they tell us, holds the universe together'. Just this is Cicero's view in *De fato*.) The next statement is confusing: 'I do not even deem that this world was built on a divine plan'; this seems to contradict the preference expressed in 119, but then he adds: 'and yet it may be so' (compare 119 'sint ista vera'). All in all, what Cicero says on physics, comes near an illustration of Academic ἐποχή.

Things are different in ethics.²³ Cicero is deeply impressed by the two Stoic tenets that 'virtue is the only good' and that 'the happy life is guaranteed by virtue alone'. So he 'is eager to follow the

within the Academy. On the highly controversial issue whether or not Academic scepticism has been in part influenced by Pyrrho and his early followers see Görler (1994) 744 f., 797, 812-5.

²² Glucker (1995) 131 has counted two cases of a view being mentioned as *veri similis*, eight mentions of a *probabilis* view. Not surprisingly, these are largely the same philosophical positions Cicero approves of as 'most probable' in his other books (see Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1101). His criterion is not rationally founded or statistical probability but rather subjective 'conviction', which is itself mostly based on the consideration: 'if not so, undesirable consequences will ensue'. Consider, for example, *Luc.* 134 f.: 'unless the happy life is guaranteed either by virtue alone or predominantly by virtue, virtue is overthrown'; see further Görler (1974) 128 f., Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1106 f. (This line of thought is not exclusively Ciceronian: see e.g. Chrysippus in *Plu.*, *S.R.* 1040D = *SVF* 3.157; *Lucr.* IV.508).

²³ On sections 129-41 see Algra, this volume pp. 107-39.

Stoics' (132: 'cupio sequi Stoicos'). *Cupio* here indicates a strong personal conviction.²⁴ Next, he is inclined to follow Antiochus, as he fears (134) 'that Zeno assigns more to virtue than nature allows'; but it is with some regret that he feels so: 'He seems a god who deemed that virtue lacks nothing; Antiochus is a puny mortal, as he thinks that many things besides virtue are some of them dear to man and some even necessary'. The pros and cons are discussed at some length, and in the end there seems to be equilibrium between the competing views. This does not, however, disquiet Cicero greatly, as both are apt to give virtue her rank (134 ad fin.; see also 139 'I am not easily torn from the doctrine of Polemo and the Peripatetics and Antiochus', an almost passionate confession). On the other hand, Cicero is very clear in expressing his disapproval of the ethical views of Epicurus and Aristippus (139): '... virtue calls me back ... she declares that those are the feelings of brute cattle, and she links the human being with god.' Here, a middle line is soon rejected and seems out of the question (139 ad fin.): 'truth herself and the weight of right reason would meet me with the reproach: 'What? When the essence of morality is to scorn pleasure, will you couple morality with pleasure, like a human being with a beast?' And yet Cicero does not pretend to be *certain* that only those philosophers are right who rank virtue first and foremost: he is not deaf to the arguments and to the temptations of the materialists and hedonists (141).

So, whatever personal preferences may be detected in the doxographical part of Cicero's discourse are 'opinions' at best. They are few in number—but that should not surprise in a section primarily aimed at the demonstration that no preferences at all can be found and no opinions whatsoever can be reasonably held.

IV

There is common ground in Stoicism and Scepticism, see e.g. *Luc.* 101: '... our pronouncement against the senses does not differ from

²⁴ On a weaker interpretation *cupio* might be read as 'indefinite', the first-person singular being almost synonymous with 'someone' (on this use see Nutting (1924); Leumann, Hofmann and Szantyr (1965) 419, e.g. *Tusc.* II.28 'rogo hoc idem Epicurum' ... (ample and useful comments in Kühner (1835), ad loc.

that of the Stoics, who say that many things are false and widely different from how they appear to the senses.' But the consequences drawn from this, notoriously, differ with the two schools, and these differences are the central issue of *Lucullus*. Nonetheless, now and then the divergencies seem to be strangely played down. In *Luc.* 8, Cicero's preface, we read, 'There is no difference between ourselves and those who think that they have positive knowledge except that they have no doubt that their tenets are true, whereas we hold many doctrines as probable, which we can easily act upon but can scarcely advance as certain'; in *Luc.* 105: 'whereas you speak of things as being 'perceived' and 'grasped', we describe the same things—provided they are probables—as 'appearing'' (compare *Off.* II.7 'as other people call things 'certain' or 'uncertain', just so we, following another line of thinking, call things 'probable' or 'improbable'). To be sure, the disparity of views is not passed over nor concealed, it is indeed spelt out. But the stress clearly is on what both sides have in common. The passage quoted from *Luc.* 105 may be read as if the difference was a mere verbal and terminological one: 'ea quae vos dicitis, eadem nos dicimus'. It is only that we call the same things by different technical terms ...²⁵ Cicero argues on a similar line in *De finibus*, book 4, presumably following Antiochus; for example, in *Fin.* IV.23: 'Does it really make a difference whether you call wealth and health 'goods' or 'preferred things', as long as he who calls them 'goods' holds them just as high in esteem as he who labels them 'preferred'?' More instances might be adduced.²⁶ It is a typically Ciceronian feature, to be seen as in line with Cicero's (not altogether jocular) ambition to 'arbitrate' between the schools and so to simplify philosophical issues. There is also a considerable persuasive element in it: 'Look, we do agree in substance—why quarrel about words?' It is hard to imagine that Arcesilaus or Carneades ever minimized terminological subtleties to win over their opponents.

There is one more recurrent motif which I think is entirely Ciceronian. Cicero, repeatedly, boasts of the 'liberty' he is enjoying as an Academic: *Luc.* 8 '... we are more free and unhampered in

²⁵ There is more stress on the difference in *Luc.* 141, enhanced by the accumulation of synonyms for what the dogmatic does.

²⁶ See the chapter 'Non rerum sed verborum discordia' in Görler (1974) 198-205. Cp. Gawlick and Görler (1994) 1043 on the *Tusculans*: '... das Motiv vom Konsens im Wesentlichen und Dissens im Unwesentlichen ..., welches das ganze Werk durchzieht.'

that we possess our power of judgement uncurtailed'; 120 'quanti libertas ipsa aestimanda est?', *Tusc.* V.33, 'soli sumus liberi ...'. As far as I see there is no Greek equivalent to the notion that an Academic is 'free' and the idea is not obviously congenial to them. Walter Burkert, in his well-known article on Cicero²⁷ had become aware of this and commented: 'Bei Karneades dürfte die 'Freiheit' einen grundsätzlicheren Sinn gehabt haben: er bekämpft in der Theorie aufs schärfste die stoische Lehre von der Notwendigkeit im Weltgeschehen.' But this will not do: freedom of will is an altogether different issue. When Cicero speaks of his *libertas* as an Academic, there may be three different meanings. The first can hardly be what he has in mind: that he has been granted some sort of 'dispensation' by Carneades, so that he is not rigidly tied to incessant ἐποχή. The second meaning is more plausible: Cicero does not feel tied to any particular doctrine or school: *Leg.* I.36, 'tua libertas disserendi'; *Tusc.* V.33; *Off.* III.20, 'nobis ... nostra Academia magnam licentiam dat ...'; *Tusc.* IV.7, 'iudicia libera ... nullis legibus adstricti'. Now, non-allegiance of the kind may lead up to a consistent sceptical attitude: he who feels free to reject any single doctrine may reject them all—and then persevere in total ἐποχή. From *Luc.* 66 (and many other passages) it is clear that this is not the *libertas* Cicero is thinking of either. He does not feel free in any 'negative' sense ('not in bondage'²⁸). Rather—and this is the third sense—it is in positive terms that he conceives of his Academic 'freedom': he feels free to opine and to speculate on a grand scale about great schemes. Every reader of Cicero's philosophical books knows what themes he has in mind: God, the immortality of the soul, freedom of action, the high rank of virtue, human perfection.

V

Let us finally turn to the end of the dialogue. When Cicero has ended his discourse a short informal conversation ensues: Lucullus looks forward to further discussions, Hortensius ends with a pun; it is left to Catulus to comment on what Cicero has said and to sum up (148): 'I am returning to my father's view ... that is to say

²⁷ Burkert (1965), esp. 192.

²⁸ Definition of meaning 1 in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, 4th edition, 1951.

that nothing can be perceived, but that the wise man will assent to things not perceived and so will hold opinions: with the qualification, to be sure, that he will be aware it is an opinion and that there is nothing that can be comprehended and perceived' (the following sentence, unfortunately, is mutilated in the manuscripts and unintelligible as it stands, but there can be no doubt as to the general meaning of what Catulus wants to say).²⁹ Thereupon Cicero: 'So I have your view, and it is not a negligible one' ('*nec eam admodum aspernor*'). This does not sound like whole-hearted

²⁹ '†per† epochen illam omnium rerum conprobans †illi alteri† sententiae nihil esse quod percipi possit vehementer adsentior'. *Per* may be emended to *quare* (Manutius) or *ergo* (Schäublin), but more difficulties remain. There is some contradiction between the (immediately preceding) admission that 'the sage will assent to things not perceived and so opine' and the 'approval' of general *ἐποχή*; therefore it is tempting to accept Madvig's conjecture *non probans* (Davies: *improbans*). Yet *comprobans* may well be sound: 'epochen illam' seems to point back to an earlier passage, and 104 is a good candidate: 'dupliciter dici adsensus sustinere sapientem, uno modo, cum hoc intellegatur, omnino eum rei nulli adsentiri, altero ...'. The first (stronger) sense of 'withholding' is characterized by 'not assenting to anything at all', the second (weaker) meaning allows of exceptions (yielding to 'probable' impressions). Just as in 104 both meanings are accepted by Cicero ('alterum placere ..., alterum tenere ...'); commentators will be right in referring the verbs to 'theory' and 'practice', respectively), just so Catulus in 148 may subscribe to both general *ἐποχή* and to accepting probable opinions. True, in 104 what is granted with the weaker meaning of *ἐποχή* is explicitly not called 'assent' but 'approval' (*approbare*) or 'following probability' (*sequi probabilitatem*). But then, elsewhere and generally, the terminology is not at all that rigid: as *ἐποχή* is used in a narrower (stronger) and in a wider (weaker) sense, so seems to be 'assent'—how else could Carneades, keeping unerringly to general ἀκαταληψία, teach 'sometimes' that the sage will give his 'assent' to what cannot be perceived (*Luc.* 67, cp. 148)? Note further that Sextus, too, now and then, makes the Academics 'assent' (συγκατατίθεσθαι) to 'probable' impressions. Moreover, we should not give too much weight to technicalities in 148: Catulus' use of epistemological verbs seems somewhat excessive (within 6 lines *putare, adsentiri, percipere, opinari, existumare, intellegere, opinari, scire, comprehendere, percipere, comprobare, vehementer adsentiri*), and as he and his author are approaching the end of the dialogue there may well be a jocular element in it; e.g. there is hardly a technically different meaning between 'epochen *comprobans*' and 'sententiae ... *adsentior*', nor between '*sciat ... nihil esse quod comprehendi ... possit*' and 'sententiae nihil esse quod percipi possit *vehementer adsentior*'. The real difficulty lies with 'illi alteri sententiae' which should mark an opposition to what precedes ('epoche illa omnium rerum'). But it does not, both views being the 'stronger' and more orthodox ones. Schäublin (1995) brackets 'nihil esse quod percipi possit' and refers 'altera sententia' to the second meaning of *ἐποχή* in 104 (see also Schäublin (1993) 163 f.). On the other hand 'illi alteri sententiae' can hardly stand without any further explanation, and it is not easily seen how a nonsensical gloss could have supplanted a correct explanation.

and unqualified assent. Is it assent at all? Is Cicero ironical?³⁰ It is crucial to know what to make of Cicero's last statement, all the more so as he has now stepped out of his rôle as a spokesman. But there is no agreement and the discussion is likely to go on. My own suggestion is that Cicero is serious here and this is, I think, borne out by his personal confession in *Luc.* 66: 'magnus ... sum opinor, ... adsentior; nec percipio tamen, nihil enim arbitror posse percipi'. It is largely the same epistemological stance: there is no wrong in 'opining' as long as one is aware that certainty can never be achieved. And yet there is one remarkable difference: in 66 Cicero speaks of himself, not being a *sapiens*, indeed as opposed to the sage; Catulus holds that the wise man will succumb to opinion. His father had told him this was Carneades' view; from Cicero's discourse we know that this was indeed so—but only one of two current interpretations of the master's doctrine, that of Metrodorus of Stratonicea and of Philo of Larisa (*Luc.* 59, 67, 112); Clitomachus, on the other side, denied that Carneades ever made such concession (*Luc.* 78, 104, 108). Within his speech, Cicero had favoured the more rigid Clitomachean interpretation (*Luc.* 78, 108). Now, if he is serious he is accepting the Metrodorean one, and so has gone a step further. This may be why his approval is somewhat reserved.

But this is not of great importance, and it would be misleading to state as a final result that Cicero's personal stance is somewhere between the Clitomachean and the Metrodorean interpretation of their common master. Cicero's 'opining' is of a different character (*Luc.* 66): '... the way in which I steer my thinking is not by that tiny star, the Cynosure, ... but by Helice and the resplendent Septentriones, that is by these theories of wider aspect, not fined down and over-subtilized; the result is that I roam and wander more widely ...'. There is great pride in these words. Cicero's justification is, of course, that he is unerringly aware of what he is doing (*Luc.* 66, 148); and as has been seen this type of justification may in fact have been accepted by Carneades and others. And yet we may wonder whether Carneades (be it the 'Clitomachean' or

³⁰ Note that in *Luc.* 123 Cicero 'admits' by the same formula ('non aspernor') what he will have thought rather unlikely, i.e. that there may be antipodes, 'qui adversis vestigiis stent contra nostra vestigia'. The litotes is polite and urbane. It fits in with Cicero's frequent deprecation of *pertinacia* (on which see Reid on *Ac.* I.41, (1885) 156 f.); see also above p. 48 on (Stoic) arrogance and on *invidia*.

the 'Metrodorean' one) would have approved of the radiant objects of Cicero's opinions and have been pleased with his personal version of sceptical speculation.³¹

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³¹ The above has greatly profited by Malcolm Schofield's and other participants' criticisms and suggestions; I am also indebted to Malcolm Schofield and to Brad Inwood for improving my English.

SOCRATES IN THE ACADEMIC BOOKS AND OTHER CICERONIAN WORKS

J. GLUCKER

I. *Introduction and apology*

The remains of Cicero's Academic books which have reached us are about many things. Cicero himself, in the list of his previous philosophical works at *Div.* II.1-3, describes the purpose of these books: '...quod genus philosophandi minime adrogans maximeque et constans et elegans arbitraremur, quattuor Academicis libris ostendimus' (1). This may imply that passages like the imaginary σοφῶν κρίσις summed up by Augustine from a lost part of one of these books¹ may not be the only example of comparisons between the Academy and its two serious rivals, the Stoics and the Epicureans.² But 'Lucullus's' story at *Luc.* 11-2 and other references to the same episode and its consequences make it clear that the historical background to these books is what I once called 'The Sosus Affair', the controversy between Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon which began in Alexandria in 87 and must have ended before Philo's death in 84-3 BCE.³ Whatever the precise sources of the various parts of the Academic books which reached us may have been,⁴

¹ Aug. *C. Acad.* III.7.15 (Augustinus loquitur): Plasberg (1922) 22-4. Augustine introduces his 'fable' with the words 'est in libris Ciceronis quos in huius causae patrocinium scripsit locus quidam' etc. His *patrocinium* most probably echoes Cic. *N.D.* I.11, which follows on a mention of 'quattuor Academici libri', and may, in its turn, echo 'patrocinium Academiae' of *Luc.* 17. Both *patrocinium* and *causa* appear at *Fin.* II.67, in a different context. The combination of these two forensic terms is, in any case, quite natural both for Cicero and for Augustine.

² Another possible candidate is *Luc.* 99-105, where Epicurus and Antiochus, as well as the Stoics, are compared to the sceptical Academics. But this is still part of the argument against Antiochus—and the Stoics—criterion, and in defense of Carneades' *probabile*. *Luc.* 128-41 is probably more to the point: the *Carneadea divisio* and the *Chrysippea divisio* are used in order to show that none of the τέλη offered by the various philosophers and sects is open to the *adsensio* (συγκατάθεσις) given it by 'Lucullus' (141): but the emphasis is again on the argument with the Lucullus of the dialogue.

³ See Glucker (1978) 13-97, 391-423.

⁴ See Glucker (1978) 391-423. More recently Lévy (1992) 181-204 has suggested that the source of *all* parts of the Academic books, in *all* their versions,

it is clear that this controversy looms behind them, and that Cicero—even if his intention was ‘merely’ (as in the sentence from the *De Divinatione* just cited) to show the superiority of the sceptical Academy to other schools—used the literature of this controversy as materials for this work. The controversy had a theoretical and a practical aspect, but these were really two sides of the same coin: the ‘scepticism’ of the Academy as against the ‘dogmatism’ of Antiochus; and the claim of each of the two αἰρέσεις—the ‘sceptical’ Academy of Arcesilaus, Carneades and Philo, Plato’s official successors, and Antiochus’ reconstructed (but private) ‘Old Academy’—to be the true spiritual heir to Plato’s philosophy. Much depended here, in an ‘inheritance dispute’ between ‘dogmatics’ and ‘sceptics’ on the right to the ‘trade-mark’ ‘Academic’, on whether one could show that Plato ‘reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam’ which only needed a few Stoic ‘corrections’ (*Luc.* 15; *Ac.* I.17 ff., 35-42), or whether, like his successors in the (‘sceptical’) Academy, he was also a ‘sceptical’ philosopher (*Ac.* I.46, *Luc.* 74).⁵ It is no accident that Plato’s name appears in the remains of the Academic books mainly in such ‘heretical’ (in the original sense) and ‘hereditary’ contexts.⁶

was Antiochus’ *Sosus*—on which see Glucker (1996a), esp. 219.

⁵ Both the theoretical and the practical aspects of the controversy, and the relations between them, are treated extensively in Glucker (1978) 13-97. Annas (1992) 43 n. 1 refers to another chapter of this study, but ignores—for reasons unknown to me—the first chapter, much of which deals precisely with the question of ‘Plato the sceptic’. Her discussion of ‘Socrates and scepticism’ (*ibid.* 44-61) does refer to *some* passages of Cicero (without looking too closely at their possible sources in the various traditions), and confronts them with select examples of the Socrates of some ‘Socratic’ dialogues of Plato, as Arcesilaus *might* have read them, and as *we* read them. My methods on both of these points will differ from hers.

⁶ Some *placita* are ascribed to Plato at *Luc.* 118, 123, 124, 142. The whole issue of such and similar *placita* ascribed to Plato in other philosophical works of Cicero, where his declared position is that of the sceptical Academy, should be studied in detail. Here, suffice it to note that at *Ac.* 1.46—a general ‘sceptical’ statement about Plato’s works (whose source is most probably Philo’s answer to Antiochus’ *Sosus*: see n. 4 and context)—we are told: ‘...cuius in libris *nihil* affirmatur et in utramque partem *multa* dicuntur’: not *everything* is said in *utramque partem* (in Annas’ terminology—see last n.—*ad hominem*); but *nothing*—even statements ‘volunteered’ by Socrates—*affirmatur*. At *Ac.* I.16 (our passage 5a below), we are told about Socrates’ practice ‘ut nihil affirmet ipse refellet alios’, which may mean two separate types of action; but at *Ac.* I.17 (our passage 5b), the early Academics are described as those who ‘illam autem Socraticam de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt’, where this is clearly one action. Stoic συγκατάθεσις is rendered (*Luc.* 37) by *adsensio atque adprobatio*, and, by implication

Unlike Plato, Socrates founded no school, and everyone familiar with philosophy at the time of Cicero still knew—as we shall soon see—that Plato's dialogues were not the only sources concerned with Socrates. Not even Plato's and Xenophon's dialogues combined: there were other Socratic and Socratic schools, and some of their writings were still available. Not everyone who is a follower, in one sense or another, of Socrates, is necessarily an heir to Plato and can claim *possessio* of the Academy. Yet disputes about the 'dogmatic' *vs.* 'sceptical' character of Socrates' philosophy do make their appearances in the Academic books and in some other works of Cicero, and it appears that here, too—with some puzzling exceptions—the two Academic traditions were at loggerheads. These different attitudes to Socrates, and the possible reasons behind them, will constitute the main problem of this article. First, some general and methodological remarks.

The late Gregory Vlastos' book on Socrates was published in 1991, that by Mario Montuori in 1992. No two books dealing with the same subject could be more different. Vlastos bases his reconstruction of the historical Athenian philosopher Socrates on the distinction he draws between the Socrates of the early Platonic dialogues (his SOCRATES_E) and the Socrates of the middle Platonic dialogues (his SOCRATES_M), and he finds that most of the views which are (according to his selection of testimonia) ascribed consistently to Socrates in Aristotle and Xenophon agree with his selection of views expressed by SOCRATES_E. Hence, the Platonic SOCRATES_E is—more or less—the historical Socrates, and all one has to do now is see how various statements made by this personage can be fitted together to form one sort of philosophy. One should, of course, beware of irony (it is, after all, in Vlastos' title), but one can get round that as well, by analyzing a few ancient statements about Socratic irony, and some modern views of irony. Vlastos does not ask the question: how can one tell which statements—or *whether any statements at all*—made by the 'Socrates' of this or that dialogue, speaking in different contexts to different *dramatis personae*, (even in places where one could claim that no

(*ibid.* 141) by the verbs *adscisco adsentior adprobo*. The verb *adfirmo* (*Luc.* 8, 14, 87 bis, 128 bis) consistently describes giving one's 'consent', not to sense-perceptions (which is the main sense of *συγκατάθεσις*), but to an abstract statement or a philosophical view. I have not, so far, found a Greek equivalent. What matters is that it appears that one can ascribe to Plato, or his Socrates, the expression of positive views, as long as they are not accompanied by *adfirmatio*.

irony is employed), could be taken to represent the views of the historical Socrates? Several recent works on the Platonic dialogue as drama have made it more difficult than ever to evade this issue. The reader who is unfamiliar with the long history of the Socratic problem—or with the more recent tendency of some obstinate readers to take the dialogue form seriously—may feel that a satisfactory solution has, at last, been reached, and all that is left to future students is some more work on details.⁷

Montuori's book (with all its shortcomings in the selection and presentation of the materials) is a lesson in humility. It contains articles and parts of books by many authors and in a number of languages dealing with the problem of the historical Socrates, published between 1736 and 1986. They represent most of the solutions one has heard or thought of,⁸ and quite a few of which most people may never have heard. That Montuori himself has come up, in a special section at the end of his collection, with something positive of his own 'towards a holistic solution of the problem', may or may not be part of the *πάθει μάθος* of this study. What the book as a whole should teach us—this, at least, is one of the things I felt while reading it through—is that, perhaps, we have not examined these various 'materials' long enough and thoroughly enough in our laboratory.

Not that one can be all that sanguine about reaching beyond our various sources to anything like a full image of Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, 'wie er eigentlich gewesen.' It is not just that Xenophon's Socrates behaves very differently from Plato's: in Plato's dialogues—as could be expected in dramas set in different modes and keys—the Socrates of, say, *Euthyphro* acts very differently from the Socrateses of various parts of *Gorgias*—not to mention the 'gentle Socrates, meek and mild' of *Timaeus-Critias*. But unless we know, for example, what Socrates' contemporaries and near-contemporaries could mean by *εἰρωνεία*—not just what Cicero and Quintilian

⁷ This is, of course, not a review of Vlastos (1991), or an attempt to deal with all or most of the issues the author raises. I only refer in gross outlines to his main solution of the problem of the historical Socrates.

⁸ A solution to the problem of the sources which is not entirely unlike that of Vlastos—early Plato whenever confirmed by Xenophon and Aristotle (who should be sidestepped where they appear to contradict him)—was offered in Maier (1913)—although the few short excerpts from Maier's work included in Montuori's book are insufficient to represent his view in full. Like most anthologies, Montuori's collection should be used as an *εὐρετήριο*.

(not to mention Mae West) thought of a word derived from it—we may not even read properly some of the few messages left for us from authors nearer him in age and manners of expression.

What later generations believed about Socrates' εἰρωνεία, or his alleged *confessio ignorantiae*, may be of interest only from the point of view of their own *Sokratesbild*—unless (to imitate a phrase from another Classical discipline) we can show that some of their testimonies are *recentiores non deteriores*. The traditions about Socrates are many and various, and there is a large measure of 'contamination'—as could only be expected where traditions are not merely copied by scribes, but passed on by rhetors, philosophers and other educated people from one kind of source and preoccupation, and from one generation, to another—and especially where such traditions are not only about a man's philosophical views (which he never put to writing anyway), but also about his character. Before we can even hope to have anything like a stemma—which, in all probability, will end up looking more like the combination of a number of smaller stemmata and a lot of 'open transmission' and 'contamination,' as in the case of the New Testament—we should attempt to classify some of the smaller and more compact groups of testimonia we wish to investigate, for some characteristic or characteristics they may share.

In principle, passages from sources like Cicero which treat Socrates mainly from the angle of the controversy between 'sceptics' and 'dogmatists' in the Academy, should at first sight provide us with such a group. But even here a concept like irony breaks in, and in order to see what it may have meant to Cicero's sources, one should examine it more thoroughly in some of the earlier Greek sources.⁹ Here, we shall have no time for an extensive examination of the early history of such a concept, and will merely try to understand it in the context of our Ciceronian passages: even that, in itself, may not always be all that simple.¹⁰

⁹ I have attempted a preliminary examination of some such sources in a paper on 'Some ancient views of Socratic irony', which I do not yet consider fit for publication.

¹⁰ It is for such reasons that I shall not enter into lengthy discussions, on the main issue of this article, with Long (1988), esp. 156-60 ('Socrates in the Academy of Polemo and Arcesilaus'). Long may be right in thinking that Arcesilaus was the first ('Arcesilaus primus' of *De Orat.* III.67—our passage 7 below) to regard Socrates as a sceptic *tout court*. Even on this point, 'hoc maxime arripuit' suggests that others before him had already regarded Socrates as a 'part-sceptic,' and Arcesilaus simply took his scepticism to be 'the whole of

Our examination of the Ciceronian passages in itself will involve us in issues like the relation, in the eyes of Cicero and his various sources, between Socrates, Plato's dialogues and other Socratic writers. Here as well, we shall only be able to touch on some of these issues. As I have already hinted, much of the area of 'Cicero's Plato' is as yet uncharted. In order to start charting such areas in detail, it is not enough to draw rough boundaries: one needs to fill them with the various items which one finds inside each territory. To be concrete: it is not enough to draw in 'global' outlines the image of Socrates, or of Plato and Socrates, in this or that philosophical stream at one period or another. Images may change, and details of the same image may differ even in presentations of what may appear to be the same image, emanating from the same 'school of thought', in two or more different passages—even, as we shall see, in passages appearing in the same work. Much depends on an exact interpretation of the terminology used in the different passages—and in the case of Latin (as some readers have probably sensed even at this stage), we are not even always certain of the meaning of a concept and/or the Greek behind it. On such a lubricious ground, every word counts: and Cicero's words are in Latin, with a Greek background.

Nor should one forget that most of Cicero's works used here are dialogues, and that, without having Plato's artistry, Cicero still took the dialogue form seriously. It should therefore be of some consequence to note in each case who is the speaker in the dialogue and what his philosophical credentials and affiliations may be.

All these reflections lead me to my apology, which would have been unnecessary if it were generally acknowledged that in ancient philosophy, just as in any other proper field of investigation,

Socrates'. Our evidence is not all that plentiful here. But I doubt whether, as Long claims, Arcesilaus first became a sceptic because of 'rerum obscuritas' mentioned at *Ac.* I.44. Even there, that obscurity is already connected with Socrates, Anaxagoras, Empedocles and others. *De Orat.* III.67— which, as we shall see in our comments on passage 7 below, is derived from a sceptical Academic source—makes it clear that he reached his conclusion, after having studied with Polemo, 'ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis'. *Ac.* I.44 does not deny that, and 'rebus obscuritas' is mentioned mainly in contrast to the accusations of 'pertinacia aut studium vincendi'. Similar expressions can be found in Cicero's description of the controversy between Arcesilaus and Zeno at *Luc.* 76-7. The historicity of this episode is doubtful, but what is emphasized—as against accusations like that at *Luc.* 13-5—is that Arcesilaus was dealing honestly with genuine philosophical problems, just like Zeno. The ancestry of a philosophical view is of no import in such contexts.

the results of one's enquiry are strictly conditioned by the amount of careful ground-work and 'laboratory tests' conducted on one's basic materials. Our basic materials, in this field, are ancient Greek and Latin texts, not always easy to understand even to those who read the ancient languages fluently and are familiar with the ever-changing philosophical terminology. These texts often—almost always—express ideas and modes of thought which may, in a small measure, be similar to ours (because we stand in their tradition), but are never anything like the same as ours. Our laboratory instruments are the philological and historical methods of analysis devised, tested and elaborated by scholars over the centuries. Discussions and speculations concerning the 'philosophical import' of what the ancient texts say are only as valid as the philological and historical ground-work they are based on—and much of what one calls today 'philosophical interest' or 'philosophical relevance' may depend on the particular philosophical αἵρεσις to which a present-day scholar may be affiliated. If we want the study of ancient philosophy to be anything like scientific, we must do our laboratory work properly and repeatedly, distancing ourselves as far as possible from our contemporary attitudes and modes of thought. This is difficult enough as it is, since we still express ourselves in a modern language, with all the mediaeval and modern intellectual luggage which the modern language carries with it. But if—as has been the fashion for so long—we are also required, even while we test our ancient materials themselves, to make our laboratory-work 'accessible' to 'the Greekless/Philosophical/Modern Reader'—that is, to conduct even the basic experiments on the ancient texts in translation and transliteration, shedding even at this initial and crucial stage as much of the philological and historical 'technicalities' as would cause the slightest difficulty to the philological and historical layman—we put the very foundation of our investigations in jeopardy. At least our basic materials should be tested as closely as possible to their natural conditions and natural habitat. A modern philosopher may, if he so wishes, treat Jowett or Ross as his starting-point for what may turn out to be an exciting and highly rewarding adventure in contemporary thought: but unless he has studied the ancient texts closely in the original, realizing that the history of philosophy is not the same as 'systematic' or 'original' philosophy and not a part of it, he should not call what he has done Plato or Aristotle.

What follows is a series of basic tests on a number of passages of Cicero, which I treat as materials for attempting to understand the attitudes to Socrates among a limited circle of philosophers in the last three centuries BCE. The passages are examined in some philological and historical detail, and compared with each other (by no means exhaustively: there is no such thing in scholarship). Whatever results may be obtained are partial and temporary, as is the case with any scientific experiment: all the more reason to require that the technicalities of these experiments should be laid bare before other workers in similar laboratories who should correct and improve some of these results. Those who wish for general philosophical illumination, or philosophically significant results, in an 'accessible' form, would be well advised to keep clear of such laboratory tests—not because they are not clever enough: I am sure that some of them are far cleverer than the present author; but because they have not been trained in the methods of work of this particular laboratory. Whether advanced study and research in ancient philosophy should, as a rule, be allowed to be carried out without demanding as a precondition the ability (at the very minimum) to *follow* detailed investigations of our basic materials—this is a question on which I have expressed my views elsewhere.¹¹ Here I only wish to explain the unconventional form of the present article and to justify it: my reasons for adopting such a form are no mere whim or conceit, but a deep concern for the basic procedures of research in ancient philosophy.

II.1. *Socratic 'ignorance' as irony*

a. *pro*

1. Cic., *De Orat.* II.269-70 (Caesar loquitur)

'Urbana etiam dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur ac sentias, non illo genere, de quo ante dixi, cum contraria dicas, ut Lamiae Crassus, sed cum toto genere orationis severe ludas, cum aliter sentias ac loquere; ut noster Scaevola Septumuleio illi Anagnino, cui pro C. Gracchi capite erat aurum repensum, roganti, ut se in Asiam

¹¹ See e.g. Glucker (1986), esp. 433-6 (the author is not responsible for misprints left in that article), and Glucker (1988b) (the author *is* responsible for a few misprints).

praefectum duceret: 'quid tibi vis', inquit, 'insane? tanta malorum civium est multitudo, ut tibi ego hoc confirmem, si Romae manseris, paucis annis ad maximas pecunias esse venturum'. *hoc in genere Fannius in Annalibus suis Africanum hunc Aemilium dicit fuisse et eum Graeco verbo appellat εἰρωνία*; sed uti ei ferunt qui melius haec norunt, Socraten opinor in hac εἰρωνείᾳ dissimulantiaque longe lepore et humanitate omnibus praestitisse. genus est *perelegans* et cum gravitate salsum cumque oratoriis dictionibus tum urbanis sermonibus accomodatum'.

Comment. Crassus (*De Orat.* II.262) called Lamia *pulchellus* and *disertus*, meaning the opposite. Later, Cicero (II.272) calls this form 'dissimulatio, cum honesto verbo vitiosa res appellatur'. Emphasis on *verbum*. Quintilian (IX.2.44-6) already knows that this is εἰρωνεία as a *tropus*, while the more extended one is a schema, or even a behaviour sustained through life. This is probably why, in our next two passages, only the example of Africanus is repeated.

On 'ei ferunt qui melius haec norunt', the latest commentary writes:¹² 'dissimulatio eruditionis': leçon par exemple.' But this may be too simple. 'Caesar' is no philosopher. He is even sceptical about the value of manuals *de ridiculis* (II.217-28), although it is clear that the author, Cicero, is using existing materials. By making his 'Caesar' refer here to 'people who know such things better', he may wish to hint to his reader that this description of Socratic irony is derived from the rhetorical tradition and lays no claim to explaining the philosophical aspects of Socratic irony. See further below, section II.2.

2a. Cic., *Brut.* 292 (Atticus loquitur)

'Ego, inquit, ironiam illam quam in Socrate dicunt fuisse, qua ille in Platonis et Xenophontis et Aeschini libris utitur, facetam et elegantem puto. Est enim et minime inepti hominis et eiusdem etiam faceti, cum de sapientia disceptetur, hanc sibi ipsum detrachere, eis tribuere inludentem, qui eam sibi adrogant, ut apud Platonem Socrates in caelum effert laudibus Protagoram Hippia Prodicum Gorgiam ceteros, se autem omnium rerum inscium fingit et rudem. Decet hoc nescio quo modo illum, nec Epicuro, qui id reprehendit, assentior'.

2b. Cic., *Brut.* 299 (Cicero loquitur)

Quare εἰρωνία me, *ne si Africanus quidem fuit, ut ait in historia sua C. Fannius*, existimari velim.

¹² Leeman & al. (1989) 302-6, esp. 305.

Vt voles, inquit Atticus. Ego enim non alienum a me putabam, quod et in Africano fuisset et in Socrate.

Comments. 1. Note that the speaker who ascribes εἰρωνεία to Socrates is 'Atticus'. 'Cicero', in his response, cites Africanus and seems to ignore Socrates, while 'Atticus' then refers to both. The *Brutus* dates from the beginning of 46 BCE. In this work 'Cicero' speaks to 'Brutus' of 'vestra ... vetus Academia' (149), of Antiochus as 'veteris Academiae ... philosophus' (315), and of 'illa vetus Academia et eius heres Aristus' (332); while Philo is simply 'princeps Academiae' (306). In the *Orator* (237-8), written a few months later, Cicero already expresses himself in terms as typical of the sceptical Academy as we find in his later philosophical works. Can one conclude that, even by the time of the *Brutus*, Cicero already refused to take Socrates' confessions of ignorance as mere irony?

2. Note that 'Atticus' cites not only Plato, but also Xenophon and Aeschines as sources. On Xenophon, see Vlastos (1991) 30-1. Our sources for fragments of Aeschines—see Giannantoni (1990) 2.593-629—are Demetrius *De Elocutione*, Priscian, Athenaeus, Aelius Aristides, Philostratus—and Cicero, who at *Inv.* I.51-3 quotes a long passage (about a page of print) of Aeschines' *Aspasia* (fr. VI A70 Giannantoni). The combination 'Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines' is mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (fr. VI A28 G.), Maximus of Tyre (twice, fr. VI A31 G.), and Longinus (fr. VI A34 G., combined with Antisthenes), while 'Plato and Aeschines' are conjoined by Demetrius (fr. VI A32 G.). Cicero's 'Atticus' may be using a Greek source—but would he still mention authors no longer available?

3. The Epicurean sources are marginal to our discussion.¹³

3. Cic., Luc. 15 (Lucullus loquitur)

'Quorum e numero tollendus est et Plato et Socrates, alter quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos nominibus differentes re congruentes, a quibus Stoici ipsi verbis

¹³ 'Atticus' words, 'ego quidem ... assentior' are quoted by Usener (1887) 173 as fr. 231. Usener compares Plu., *Adv. Col.* 1117D, where the ἀλαζονεία of Socrates is related to his claim that he knows nothing and is still searching for the truth. Much of the remains of Philodemus' *περὶ κακιῶν* (ed. Jensen (1911)) is concerned with ἀλαζονεία, which, in cols. xxi-xxii, is expressly ascribed to Socrates. The connection between the Aristotelian passages cited in comm. 3 below and the Epicurean tradition deserves to be investigated. One notes that in Plutarch, Colotes does accuse Socrates of ἀλαζονεία, but not for his irony, which is never mentioned in this work. For Colotes, Socrates' ἀλαζονεία consists in not practicing what he preaches. He probably ascribed to Socrates positive doctrines: see n. 30 below. It is Plutarch who 'reminds' him that Socrates did not teach anything positive, but merely searched for the truth. Had Epicurus not yet pronounced his verdict against Socrates' εἰρωνεία when he taught the young Colotes at Lampsacus? Kleve (1983) has not been available to me; since this is a side-issue in this article, I have not waited until I could read it.

magis quam sententiis dissenserunt,—Socrates autem *de se ipse detrahens in disputatione plus tribuebat* is quos volebat refellere; ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea *dissimulatione* quam Graeci εἰρωνείαν vocant: *quam ait etiam in Africano fuisse Fannius*, idque propterea vitiosum in illo non putandum quod idem fuerit in Socrate’.

Comments. 1. Note the ‘slight’ difference. In the *Brutus* passage we have ‘... cum *de sapientia* disceptetur, *hanc sibi ipsum detrahere, eis tribuere* inludentem, qui *eam* sibi adrogant’. This is echoed by Quintilian (IX.2.46) where ‘Socrates ideo dictus εἰρων, agens imperitum, ut admirator aliorum tamquam sapientium’. In our passage, nothing is said about attributing *wisdom* to his interlocutors: we have merely ‘plus tribuebat’—but with the additions ‘in disputatione’ and ‘quos volebat refellere’. The irony is no longer a rhetorical way of speaking or behaving towards pretentious people, but more specifically a dialectical strategy. ‘Varro’ in *Ac.* I.16 (our passage 5a) uses a similar expression: ‘ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios’—but his context is completely different, and is more suitable to ‘Cicero’'s sceptical Academic position, as expressed briefly in our next passage. On this problem, in its place.

2. ‘Lucullus’'s expression ‘cum aliud diceret atque sentiret’ may sound innocent enough, merely echoing the rhetorical description of εἰρωνεία in *De Orat.* II.269-70 (our passage 1), ‘cum alia dicuntur ac sentias’ and ‘cum aliter sentias ac loquere’. But is it? In the present context, the expressions ‘in disputatione’ and ‘quos volebat refellere’ would make most readers take it for granted that Socrates did have his own *sententia*, and that he expressed views which were not his (implying that he did have other views) merely for the sake of refuting the other side. ‘Lucullus’, after all, wants to remove both Plato and Socrates from the list of those (‘quorum e numero’) proffered by the sceptical Academics (*Luc.* 14) as ‘prefigurations’ of their own scepticism—that is, he wants to establish that both of them were ‘dogmatics’. If Socrates’ professions of ignorance were merely a strategy in disputes with others, one can at least make a case for some positive views of Socrates. But why bother? After all, the dispute between ‘Antiochians’ and ‘Philonians’ is about Plato’s, not Socrates’, legacy; and ‘Varro’ in *Ac.* I.16 (our passage 5a) is prepared to admit that Socrates was sincere as to these professions of ignorance. As long as he can save Plato from the charge of scepticism. Note that, both ‘Cicero’ the sceptic and ‘Varro’ and ‘Lucullus’ the ‘Antiochians’ admit, at least, that there is some difference between Socrates and Plato—although in our next passage, it is far from clear whether ‘Cicero’ regards Plato as other than a ‘Socratic sceptic’.

3. The problem hinted at by ‘vitiosum ... non putandum’ is interesting, but should not detain us for too long here. That εἰρωνεία was not a virtue, since it is one of the extremes in the triad ἀλαζονεία—ἀλήθεια—εἰρωνεία, was noted by Arist., *E.N.* II.7.1108a19-23 and IV.7.1127b22-32. Aristotle himself, *Rh.* III.18.1419b3-9, tries—with some confusion between triads—to soften the effect of this. Aspasius, *In E.N.* 54.15-28 and 124.27-31 Heilbut,

makes greater efforts to save either Socrates or εἰρωνεία. At 54.18-19 he writes: δοκεῖ δέ τισι μὴ εἶναι κακία ἢ εἰρωνεία· τὸν γὰρ Σωκράτην εἴρωνά φασιν γενέσθαι. This is exactly 'Lucullus's argument concerning Africanus, but at an earlier stage: applied to Socrates himself. Did Cicero's source already know any of Aspasius' τινες?

b. *Contra*

4. Cic., *Luc.* 74 (Cicero loquitur)

'Et ab his aiebat [Lucullus: *Luc.* 15] removendum Socratem et Platonem. cur? an de ullis certius possum dicere? vixisse cum iis equidem videor, ita multi sermones perscripti sunt e quibus dubitari non possit quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse; excepit unum tantum, scire se nihil se scire, nihil amplius. quid dicam de Platone, qui certe tam multis libris haec persecutus non esset nisi probavisset; ironiam enim alterius, perpetuam praesertim, nulla fuit ratio persequi'.

Comments. 1. Note the sceptical 'Cicero' speaking of 'certius ... dicere', and 'dubitari non possit'. (But see *Luc.* 66).

2. Note the vagueness of 'multi sermones perscripti sunt'—by whom? At *De Orat.* III.67 (passage 7 below), we have Arcesilaus deducing the uncertainty of the senses and thought 'ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis'. What I said at Gucker (1978) 37 n. 89—that both *libri* and *sermones* here refer to Platonic dialogues—seems doubtful. True, at *De Orat.* III.60 we have 'cuius ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit'. But the context there—Socrates/Plato/Academics and Peripatetics—leaves no room for a Xenophon or an Aeschines. What *Platonis scripta*, other than some of his Socratic dialogues, could be construed as sceptical? *Laws*, or the Eleatic Guest dialogues, or the letters other than *Ep.* 2? Cicero may well be referring, both at *De Orat.* III.67 and in our passage, to Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι written by both Plato and others. More on this issue below.

II.2. General comments on Section II, passages 1-4

1. The connection between Socrates' profession of ignorance (and refusal to answer other people's questions, preferring to put the questions to others), and his εἰρωνεία, is well-known from Thrasyarchus' outburst at Pl. *R.* I.337a3-7. Thrasyarchus, however, does not say expressly that these professions of ignorance are made for the sake of refuting the adversary. But the connection is very close to the surface, if we remember that εἰρωνεία is an old rhetorical trick. The *Rh.* Al. 21 (1434a18-32) already knows of the two types of εἰρωνεία, later to be classified as trope and schema. From Arist. *Rh.* III.7.1408b19-20 and

III.18.1419b3-5 it appears that its use—and probably its techniques—go back to Gorgias.¹⁴ Thrasyarchus was familiar with earlier rhetorical techniques—including Gorgias’—some of which he developed further: and Plato’s original readers were expected to know of Thrasyarchus as a rhetorician. It is therefore most probable that what Thrasyarchus of Pl. *R.* I is saying to Socrates is, in effect: ‘We rhetoricians know the trick you are using on us by feigning ignorance and refusing to commit yourself.’ In that case, the claim that Socrates’ εἰρωνεία was a trick used *in disputando*, to refute others, may well have been considerably earlier than ‘Lucullus’—Antiochus’—Cicero’s source for ‘Lucullus’ speech. Antiochus would gladly make use of such an available description of Socratic εἰρωνεία for his own philosophical purposes. Or would he? Depends on what one thinks of ‘Varro’’s passage (5a below). On this anon.

But if Socratic εἰρωνεία had already been described in such strictly dialectical terms, why does Cicero not mention this in the *De Oratore* and *Brutus* passages (1-2 above)? Why leave it to the more philosophical discussion in the *Lucullus*? It is no good citing Pl. *Smp.* 216e4-5, εἰρωνεύόμενος δὲ καὶ παίζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ, echoed by Quintil. IX.2.46, ‘cum etiam vita universa ironiam habere videatur, qualis erat vita Socratis’, and made so much of by Vlastos (1991) 33 f. Irony as a ‘way of life’ is not mentioned even in the *De Oratore* passage, where the rhetorical context and the examples make it clear that Socrates excelled others in the use of *rhetorical* εἰρωνεία, and no more. The *Brutus* passage limits Socratic irony to situations ‘cum de sapientia disceptetur’. By implication, this covers professions of ignorance—but still not expressly for the sake of refuting the other side (discomfiting is not quite the same as refuting), and no implication is made that Socrates had his own views.

Could it be that Cicero was aware of this interpretation of Socratic εἰρωνεία, but refused to present it as his own view? If my tentative remark on our *Brutus* passage has any force, could it be that, by the time of composition of the *Brutus*, Cicero was careful not to ascribe to Socrates any kind of εἰρωνεία when speaking *in propria persona*—and, to carry it forward (or backward!)—that even at the time of composition of the *De Oratore*, and even when the speaker is the—philosophically neutral—C. Julius Caesar Strabo, Cicero already refused to take Socratic εἰρωνεία to its philosophical extreme? Is it because he is aware of the interpretation he would later put in the mouth of Lucullus (but which must have existed much earlier: at least, at the time of the Sosus dispute), and refuses to adopt it and draw the consequences—that there were positive doctrines of Socrates? To a sceptic, this is vital, since Arcesilaus derived his scepticism from Plato and Socrates, among others (see passages 7 and 8a below and

¹⁴ The reference to Gorgias’ words concerning τὰ γελοῖα in Arist. *Rh.* III.18.1419b3-9, has been generally ascribed to Gorgias’ Τέχνη or to his περὶ Καίρου ever since Spengel (1828) 81-4. More recently, Cole (1991) has revived the old doubts as to the existence of any systematic written τέχνη much before the 4th century. Yet even Aristotle’s words in our *Rhetoric* passage ascribe to Gorgias a statement which could belong only in a manual of rhetoric. There is much more evidence for the existence of τέχνη at least in the last decades of Gorgias’ life. I hope to deal with this issue—which is marginal to our present discussion—elsewhere.

comments). Was Cicero already beginning to regain his sceptical sentiments as early as 65 BCE? If Steinmetz and the present author are right, at that time he still professed an allegiance to the 'Old Academy'.¹⁵ Görler will probably find in this another proof of the continuity in Cicero's philosophical position.¹⁶ *O Academiam volaticam* ...

2. Some expressions recur in two or three of our passages 1-4. The Fannius story would be repeated *ad nauseam* by Cicero (it is mentioned again at *Off.* I.108): it is, after all, a good Roman *exemplum*, from a book of an annalist epitomized by Atticus. The expression 'cum alia dicuntur ac sentias, cum aliter sentias ac loquere' (passage 1) or 'cum aliud diceret atque sentiret' (passage 3)—echoed by Quintilian's 'aliud dicit quam sentit'—is obviously a current definition of εἰρωνεία: we know too little of the rhetorical literature between Aristotle and Cicero to identify its author. Quintilian relates εἰρωνεία also to ἀλληγορία. Could this definition have been fashioned once ἀλληγορία had come into use (or the other way round)? Quintilian also has 'contrarium ei quod dicitur intelligendum est', and *Rh. Al.* 1434a 19-20 has the similar τοῖς ἐναντίοις ὀνόμασι τὰ πράγματα προσαγορεύειν. *Elegans* and *perelegans* probably repeat χαριεῖς, found, e.g., in Arist. *E.N.* IV.7.1127b22 and 32. These similarities are, perhaps, important for the rhetorical terminology of the period, and for Cicero's repeating from memory phrases he has already used; but I doubt that they point to Greek sources, or to one Greek source excerpted differently in different places (as the typical nineteenth-century scholar would have concluded). If anything, the expressions 'de se detrahere' and 'aliis tribuere' in passages 2-3 may come, somewhere along the line, from some Greek source; but we have seen to what different uses Cicero puts them. From my last remark, it looks as if he uses Greek terms and expressions, and is aware of Greek attitudes—but he knows how to adapt them to the needs of his own context.

III. Socratic ignorance taken seriously

5a. Cic., *Ac.* I.15-6 (Varro loquitur).

'Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, avocavisse philosophiam et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et de vitiis omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quaereret, caelestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum. hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque sunt, ita disputat

¹⁵ Steinmetz (1989), Glucker (1988a).

¹⁶ Görler (1995). *De Orat.* II.269-70 is not among the many passages of that work cited in Görler's article.

ut nihil affirmet ipse refellet alios, nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum, eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant, scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat, ob eamque rem se arbitrari ab Apolline omnium sapientissimum esse dictum, quod haec esset una hominis sapientia, non arbitrari sese scire quod nesciat. quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia permaneret, omnis eius oratio tantum [tantum *Davis* tam ΓΔ tamen *vel* tum ζ] in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intelligi potest'.

5b. Cic., *Ac.* I.17 (Varro loquitur)

'sed utrique [*scil.* Academici et Peripatetici] Platonis ubertate completi certam quandam disciplinae formulam composuerunt et eam quidem plenam et refertam, illam autem Socraticam de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt'.

Comments. 1. 'Varro', of course, is representing Antiochus—but so does 'Lucullus'; and we have seen (our passage 3) that 'Lucullus' takes Socrates' professions of ignorance as mere εἰρωνεία, and regards Socrates as a 'dogmatic'. Antiochus against Antiochus? Lévy¹⁷ points to what he regards as a major contradiction between Varro's speech and Lucullus' speech, and concludes that we have here two speeches with two different purposes, one in which Antiochus' own views, representing what he

¹⁷ See Lévy (1992) 187-94. The 'contradiction' he refers to is that 'Varro' (*Ac.* I.30-2) ascribes to the 'Old Academy' the 'Platonic' contempt of the senses and sole reliance on the intellect and the Ideas, whereas 'Lucullus' (*Luc.* 19 ff.) cannot praise the senses too highly. But one should remember that 'Varro' is offering a historical sketch, in which he first surveys the 'accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio' (*Ac.* I.19-33). This 'Platonis ratio auctoritasque' was strictly adhered to by his successors, from Speusippus to Crantor (34), but much of it was changed by the Peripatetics—especially the refutation of the *species* (ἰδέαι: 30) by Aristotle (33-4). 'Varro's expression here is strong: 'Aristoteles ... species ... labefactavit' (33). Zeno, a pupil of Polemo, 'corrigitur conatus est disciplinam' (35). His 'changes' in dialectic included the rehabilitation of sense-perception in the form of καταληπτική φαντασία (40-2). But Antiochus considered all these innovations of Zeno as 'correctio veteris Academiae' (43; cf. 35), and could therefore accept them into his new amalgam which he named 'Old Academy.' 'Lucullus,' on the other hand, already defends Antiochus' system as it is, without any reference to the historical development of the 'Old Academy' according to Antiochus. The argument between 'Varro' and 'Cicero' in what we have of *Ac.* I is mainly historical and diadochical: who is the true heir of the Academy? The discussions in the *Lucullus* are mainly systematic: whether the 'sceptic' or the 'dogmatic' position is philosophically more tenable.

regarded as the Old Academy, are expressed ('Varro'), and another in which his representative supports Stoic arguments against the Academics, without subscribing to them ('Lucullus'). I see no contradiction where he does,¹⁸ but do see a contradiction between the images of Socrates, and the Stoic element in 'Lucullus's' speech does not seem to help. A Stoic may (?) have taken Socrates' εἰρωνεία seriously (but see end of this comment.) A Stoic would certainly believe that Socrates was really a dogmatic. But why should an Old Academic—or Antiochus—take Socrates to be a sceptic? Does one have any evidence that Speusippus, Polemo or Crates did? Aristotle—who, for both 'Varro' and 'Lucullus' is an Old Academic in all but name—does ascribe positive doctrines to Socrates (often calling him by name, perhaps to distinguish him from Plato, or from 'Socrates in Plato'). Even assuming that the Stoics took Socrates' εἰρωνεία seriously, why should Antiochus adopt their position in one place and the sceptical position in another?

Reid (1885) 110-1, commenting on 'nihil adfirmet', writes: 'It is singular that Varro, the follower of Antiochus, should be here made to dwell on Socrates' constant professions of ignorance. Antiochus himself maintained that the profession was purely ironical; see n. on 2 [*Luc.*] 74. In some things, however, Varro was more inclined to scepticism than his master Antiochus. See his utterances concerning theology in Aug. ciu. d. 7,17.' But 'Varro' here is not the historical Varro. Nor is he here merely 'dwelling on' Socrates' professions of ignorance: he accepts them as a fact. One need not μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν that 'nihil adfirmet ipse refellet alios', in these words, is a description of the Academics' practice of *in utramque partem disputandi*—without revealing whatever they themselves may have thought—ascribed by them to Socrates so often in Cicero's works (locus classicus: *Luc.* 60).¹⁹ 'Varro' is in perfect agreement with 'Lucullus' as to the dogmatism of Plato and the derivation from him of both Academics and Peripatetics (which would suggest that, even if 'Varro' and 'Lucullus' were taken to represent two stages in Antiochus' development,²⁰ these two stages would still date from the period after he had 'rediscovered' the 'Old Academy'). Yet 'Varro' does seem to be prepared to 'give up the possession of' Socrates, as long as he can keep Plato, whose heritage, not that of Socrates, is, after all, in dispute.

In a recent article Ioppolo²¹ has cited our passage 5a and raised the question again. Her answer—that 'omnis eius oratio tantum in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur, ut e Socraticorum libris maximeque Platonis intelligi potest' is evidence that Antiochus did ascribe positive doctrines to Socrates, but only in the realm of ethics—does not convince me. 'Varro' uses expressions like 'nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum', 'eoque praestare ceteris, quod illi quae nesciant, scire se putent, ipse se nihil scire id unum sciat', and 'illam autem Socraticam de omnibus rebus et nulla affirmatione adhibita

¹⁸ See last n.

¹⁹ *Sitz in Leben*: most probably the school of Carneades, where one can adopt as one's own, *in diem*, a philosophical view. See Glucker (1995).

²⁰ A suggestion made—but only to be rejected—by Lévy (1992) 188-90.

²¹ Ioppolo (1995), esp. 118-21.

consuetudinem disserendi reliquerunt'. 'Omnes res' should include ethics, and 'nulla affirmatio adhibita' does not exclude *laudatio* and *cohortatio* to moral excellence: it merely precludes the acceptance of any view—including an ethical view—dogmatically.²²

One can add that, as to Socrates' *confessio ignorantiae*, 'Varro' says 'in ea *sententia* manebat', and 'Lucullus' (3 above; see my comment 2 there) ascribes, by clear implication, *sententiae* (in no way limited to 'exhortations to virtue') to Socrates, just as much as to the Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics. *Sententia* is δόξα. As to Socrates' moral exhortations, they are described here merely as 'omnis eius *oratio*': a weak expression coming after 'id unum sciat' and 'in ea *sententia* permaneret'. 'Varro's 'id unum scire se nihil scire' is also confirmed by 'Cicero's words about Arcesilaus at the end of our next passage (6a). Arcesilaus did not ascribe to Socrates any *sententia* except 'ut nihil scire se sciret'.

Ioppolo²³ also seems to accept Reid's preference for the reading *tamen* of some of the late mss.; see Reid (1885) 111, comm. on *tamen*, whose interpretation is not unlike hers: '... his uncertainty did not extend to morals.' Again, what of 'se nihil scire' and the other expressions we have just discussed? I still find that Davis' emendation *tantum* gives a better sense.

If my scheme of Cicero's sources²⁴ is at least roughly correct, Varro's speech in *Ac.* I may well have originated in a speech by Antiochus in his *Sosus*, defending his version of the 'Old Academy' while the first part (*Luc.* 13-39) of Lucullus' speech may have derived from a speech by Sosus the Stoic, refuting the version of Academic philosophy of Heraclitus of Tyre, Philo's faithful pupil. In that case, would it be possible to assume that Antiochus himself, even in his 'Old Academy' stage, would still accept the view of his sceptical teachers as to Socrates' scepticism, while Sosus, arguing exactly against such a sceptical Academic—and being a Stoic himself—would insist on 'rescuing' Socrates as well? This is not unlike Lévy's solution to other contradictions he has found between 'Varro' and 'Lucullus'—with the difference that here we are attempting to sort out what appears to be a genuine contradiction. In the 'inheritance dispute', neither Philo nor Antiochus were over-anxious to be declared heirs to Socrates: the main issue was which of the two was the proper successor of *Plato*. (Although Arcesilaus—see our passage 7 and comments—did claim that he returned to a Socratic practice, for which Plato was only one of his sources.) The Stoics, on the other hand, regarded themselves as 'of Socratic ancestry', partly through 'the Cynic connection' (e.g. *De Orat.* III.57; *D.L.* VII.2, 31-2).²⁵ For them, a sceptical Socrates would be inconceivable. That the Stoic origin of the first part of 'Lucullus's

²² See n. 6 above.

²³ Ioppolo (1995) 119.

²⁴ Glucker (1978) 406-20, esp. 419.

²⁵ For a fuller discussion, see Long (1988) 160-64, 'Socrates in early Stoicism'. Long emphasizes that the early Stoics inherited some of the Cynics' hostile attitudes to Plato. Panaetius may have been the first Stoic to take Plato seriously as evidence for Socrates—and most probably also in his own right—on which see Glucker (1978) 28-30. On the two likely versions of the Stoics' claim to Socratic ancestry, see Mansfeld (1986), esp. 317-51.

speech is not made quite explicit in a dialogue is not surprising: after all, his whole speech is 'retroactively' ascribed by himself to Antiochus (*Luc.* 61), and in the context of the controversy it is in his interest not to emphasize the Stoic aspects of Antiochus' philosophy: 'Cicero' (e.g. *Luc.* 68-9. 132, 143) will do the job for him anyway. Yet 'Lucullus's words at *Luc.* 12, fin., 'sed ea pars quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est ... ad Arcesilan Carneademque veniamus', should be sufficient to indicate that the next part of the speech will consist of standard Stoic arguments against Academics who spent most of their life fighting the Stoics. His words at the beginning of *Luc.* 40, 'nunc ea videamus quae contra ab his [*scil.* Academicis] disputari solent' may be enough to announce change of subject—and source.

This is tempting—but hold! What about Stob. *Ecl.* II.108.12-13 = *SVF* III.630: τὸ δὲ εἰρωνεύεσθαι φαύλων εἶναί φασιν, οὐδένα γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ σπουδαῖον εἰρωνεύεσθαι? Socrates, if anyone, is clearly ἐλεύθερος καὶ σπουδαῖος.²⁶

I have no answer to this objection.

2. Note the expression 'hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti varie copioseque sunt, ita disputat'. That is: not *all* Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι are sceptical. Cf. the 'ex *variis* Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc *maxime* arripuit' of our passage 7, and 'e quibus nos *id potissimum* consecuti sumus' of our passage 8a.²⁷

6a. Cic., *Ac.* I.45-6 (Cicero loquitur)

'cum Zenone [...] Arcesilas sibi omne certamen instituit, non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi videtur, sed earum rerum obscuritate, quae ad confessionem ignorationis adduxerant Socratem et iam ante [Davis' obvious emendation for the mss. 'et veluti amantes'] Socratem Democritum Anaxagoram Empedoclem omnes paene veteres, qui nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt [...]. itaque Arcesilas negabat esse quicquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum quod Socrates sibi reliquisset, ut nihil scire se sciret ...'

6b. 'Hanc Academiam novam appellant, quae mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus, cuius in libris nihil affirmatur et in utramque partem multa disseruntur. de omnibus quaeritur nihil certi dicitur.'

²⁶ Note that Arist. *Rh.* III.18.1419b6-9—perhaps in an attempt to 'save' Socrates, who is not mentioned by name—makes εἰρωνεία τῆς βωμολοχίας ἐλευθεριώτερον. The Stoics need not have known this passage of Aristotle, of course; but Aristotle sounds as if he is using terms which are already known, since others have used them before him.

²⁷ See above n. 6, which *may* be of some relevance here.

Comments. 1. 'Cicero's words 'non pertinacia aut studio vincendi ut quidem mihi videtur' are a response to attacks on Arcesilaus as a *sedition-sus* whose wish is to 'perturbare philosophiam', and similar accusations, as in 'Lucullus's speech, *Luc.* 13-6. 'Cicero's answer to that accusation, *Luc.* 76-8, begins with the similar words 'Arcesilan vero non obtrectandi causa cum Zenone pugnasse sed verum invenire voluisse sic intellegitur...'. Does this mean that an early version of 'Varro's words in *Ac.* I contained similar accusations? But then, could the *lector candidus* of *Ac.* I in its present form be expected to understand what 'Cicero' is referring to?

This accusation—of course, without the Roman *exempla*—is most probably of Stoic origin, and has been repeated in modern scholarship by Couissin.²⁸ There is no denying that Arcesilaus raised many of his issues in controversy with the Stoics—'Cicero' himself admits it in his answer to 'Lucullus'. But 'Cicero' does mention Arcesilaus' 'predecessors' (*Luc.* 77): 'nemo umquam superiorum non modo expresserat sed ne dixerat quidem posse hominem nihil opinari, nec solum posse sed ita necesse esse sapienti'. But we have just been told in our passage of some of those *superiores* that they 'nihil cognosci nihil percipi nihil sciri posse dixerunt'. Well, what about 'nihil percipere et tamen opinari'; quod a Carneade dicitur probatum' (*Luc.* 78)? Thus the *superiores* of *Luc.* 77 and of *Ac.* I.45 and *Luc.* 14 are consistent: they all claimed that there is *no certain perception or knowledge*, but they did not deny that one should use δόξα: on the contrary, this is all that is left for us to do. Xenophanes fr. B34 DK could well have served as an example.

2. 'Cicero' can, of course, accept 'Varro's sceptical image of Socrates; but, in the tradition of the sceptical Academy, he includes the sceptical Socrates in a list of earlier philosophers who expressed similar doubts. Here we have Democritus, Anaxagoras and Empedocles. At *Luc.* 14 Parmenides and Xenophanes are added. Colotes, as quoted by Plu., *Adv. Col.* 1121F-22A, has Socrates, Plato, Parmenides and Heraclitus in his list of Arcesilaus' presumed predecessors. But Colotes himself also criticizes Democritus (1108E f.), Empedocles (1112D f.), Parmenides (1113E f.), and much of his criticism of these men is concerned with views they expressed which would 'make life impossible' by throwing doubt on the existence of external objects. Ioppolo²⁹ has argued for an Arcesilean source behind Plutarch's *Adversus Coloten*. Colotes' own criticisms of other philosophers as cited and summarized by Plutarch are clearly directed against various types of 'scepticism' about the outside world, ascribed not only to Socrates, Arcesilaus, and some of Arcesilaus' presumed predecessors, but also to Plato, Stilbo and the Cyrenaics. The sceptical image of these philosophers, or of some of them, may have been at least partly derived by Colotes from Arcesilaus and his school.³⁰ But much of

²⁸ Couissin (1929).

²⁹ See n. 21 above.

³⁰ Even here, one should tread softly: see n. 13 above. Had Colotes been properly familiar with the views of Arcesilaus, he could hardly have ascribed positive doctrines to Socrates. Colotes' own words quoted at 1117D do not expressly ascribe dogmatic views to Socrates; but if Plutarch's answer to these words is based on a wider context, not quoted by Plutarch, he must have done so somewhere.

Plutarch's answers to Colotes—for example, much of his explanation of Plato's Forms and phaenomena in *Adv. Col.* ch. 15, or his ascription of clear *dogmata* to Plato in ch.14—could hardly come from Arcesilaus and his school.

3. 'Cicero's' Plato is here represented as an all-out sceptical philosopher, 'cuius in libris—tout court—nihil affirmatur' etc.³¹ 'Varro', and Cicero in other places, are more cautious—see my comment 2 on our last passages, and my comments on the forthcoming three passages.

7. Cic., *De Orat.* III.67 (Crassus loquitur)

'Arcesilas primum, qui Polemonem audierat, ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc maxime arripuit, nihil esse certi, quod aut sensibus aut animo percipi possit; quem ferunt eximio quodam lepore dicendi aspernatum esse omne animi sensusque iudicium primumque instituisse—quamquam id fuit Socraticum maxime—non quid ipse senserit ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare'.

Comments. 1. It is true that in *De Orat.* III.75-9 and 87-8 'Crassus' describes himself as an amateur in philosophy, but one should not take it to mean much more than that he is not a full-time philosopher. In *De Orat.* I.45-7 he relates that he studied Plato's *Gorgias* with Charmadas *diligenter*. See also I.84 f., 93. His acquaintance with Metrodorus of Scepsis is mentioned at II.360, 365, III.75. A man who had no philosophical education could hardly be expected (even in terms of a dialogue) to produce the 'doxography' of I.48-57, or the Socratic διαδοχή of III.60-7. At I.45 he mentions among the philosophers he 'heard' in Athens the Academics Charmadas, Clitomachus, Aeschines and Metrodorus, the Stoic Mnesarchus, and the Peripatetic Diodorus. This sounds like the practice encouraged by the sceptical Academy: see e.g. Cic. *N.D.* I.11, 58-9.

2. But is 'Crassus's' historical excursus on the relations between rhetoric and philosophy, *De Orat.* III.57-72, derived from an Academic source? Mansfeld³² has shown that the Cynic ancestry of the Stoics at *De Orat.* III.62 parallels D.L. I.15 and similar places in Diogenes, and that this ancestry represents one of the two views current among later Stoics as to the 'true origin' of Zeno's philosophy.³³ But our paragraphs 65-6 preclude a Stoic source.

Antiochus, then? The connection between the early Academics and Peripatetics at *De Orat.* III.67 may sound like Antiochus' concept of the *antiqui*—but hold. 'Crassus' says: 'Academicorum nomen est unum, sententiae duo.'³⁴ In genuine Antiochean sources, the difference is in the

³¹ But see again n. 6 above.

³² Mansfeld (1986), esp. 317.

³³ For the detailed discussion, see *ibid.* 317-51.

³⁴ This may be the earliest reference to the later myth of 'Ακαδημαῖκοι ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ακαδημείας and 'Ακαδημαῖκοι ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου found in the later

name, while the *sententiae* are the same or similar: e.g. *Fin.* V.7; 21—both citing Antiochus—and especially ‘Varro’ at *Luc.* 17, ‘una et consensiens duobus vocabulis philosophiae forma instituta est, Academicorum et Peripateticorum, qui rebus congruentes nominibus differebant’. ‘Cicero’, representing the sceptical Academy in the *Lucullus*, is careful to separate the two: *Luc.* 113, 131.

In my comment 4 on this passage, I emphasize that no positive doctrines are ascribed by ‘Crassus’ here to Plato, and that Plato is described, both in our *De Orat.* III.60 and at *Tusc.* V.11 (our 8b below) as someone who wrote down for posterity Socrates’ ‘ingenium varique sermones’ or ‘multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo’—no positive doctrines. But at *Luc.* 15 (our 3 above—see my comment 2 on that passage), it seems clear that ‘Lucullus’, representing Antiochus, regards both Plato and Socrates as philosophers who held positive views.

‘Crassus’ criticism of the Stoics at *De Orat.* III.65-6 is very mild, compared with Antiochus’ harsh words in various parts of *Fin.* V (and *Fin.* IV, whose source is generally admitted to be Antiochus.)

But, most important, the description of Arcesilaus is favourable. He is not accused here—as he is e.g. in *Luc.* 15—of rebelling against true Platonism: rather, he is the discoverer—with the help of some Platonic writings, among other sources—of the true spirit of the Socratic (which is part of Platonic) way of doing philosophy. ‘Crassus’ description of Carneades (*De Orat.* III.68) is more than sympathetic: he was the teacher of many Romans whom Crassus knew. What is more, at III.71 ‘Crassus’ recommends Aristotle and Carneades as model philosophers who were also good orators. The sceptical Academy is called (III.68) ‘recentior Academia’, an expression used by the sceptical Academic to avoid Antiochus’ ‘nova Academia’.³⁵

It thus appears that Cicero has used, as his source for ‘Crassus’ excursus, an Academic source later than Carneades. The precise source is anyone’s guess. Charmadas’ dispute with Menedemus (*De Orat.* I.84 ff.) may reflect some work of Charmadas which also advocated a reconciliation between philosophy and rhetoric (although ‘Antonius’ opens his story on a sceptical note). Another candidate is Philo of Larissa, who taught both philosophy and rhetoric in Rome, and whose views on this issue are well known. (It may not even be too fanciful to conjecture that both our excursus and the Charmadas incident in Book I were derived from a work by Philo justifying the philosopher’s preoccupation with rhetoric.) But ‘Crassus’ references to Arcesilaus and Carneades as good orators (67-8) and to Carneades as an example of a philosopher-orator (71) should not be brushed off.³⁶ What matters, in any case, is that the *Sitz im*

commentators on Aristotle. For references, see Glucker (1978) 216 n. 143.

³⁵ See Glucker (1978) 104 and notes.

³⁶ Reid (1885) on *Ac.* I.46 (comm. on *facultate*) has collected a number of Latin references, and ascribes Carneades’ reputation as an orator to his Roman lectures. But see, e.g., Philostr., *V.S.* 1, δ’ Olear. 486 (where—as in its echo in Synesius, *Dio* 1—‘Αθηναῖος is either a corruption or a reference to the city where Carneades spent all his adult life).

Leben of 'Crassus''s excursus is the sceptical Academy in its final period. Thus, what is said of Arcesilaus here can be taken as an Academic tradition, and be compared with the next two passages, where the speaker is 'Cicero' the sceptical Academic.

3. In my comment 2 on passage 4, I have explained why I now disagree with Glucker (1978) as to 'ex variis Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis', and think this should include both Plato's and other people's Socratic conversations. I think *variis* should be read to apply both to Plato's Socratic λόγοι and to those of others, like Xenophon and Aeschines (see my comment 2 on passage 2).

4. In my comment 2 on passage 5, I compared the 'hic in omnibus fere sermonibus, qui ab is qui illum audierunt perscripti *varie* copioseque sunt, ita disputat' of that passage, with our 'ex *variis* Platonis libris sermonibusque Socraticis hoc *maxime* arripuit', and with 'e quibus nos *id potissimum* consecuti sumus' of our next passage, emphasizing that not all Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι are sceptical. Even assuming—as I am now inclined to do—that the sceptical Academic takes as his sources for Socratic scepticism not only Plato but also other writers of Socratic conversations, he still has a problem. Plato in some of his dialogues (e.g. *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, the later part of *Gorgias*) has his Socrates express views which can be construed as 'dogmatic'. But so does Xenophon, and so probably did other Socratic writers. How, then, can one assume that Socrates was clearly a sceptic?

At Glucker (1978) 37-64 I suggested some ways in which even the 'dogmatic' aspects of Plato's dialogues could be interpreted as sceptical by Arcesilaus (37-50) and Carneades (51-64). Much of this, especially for Arcesilaus, starts from the assumption that their sceptical Socrates was derived almost exclusively from Plato. In what concerns Plato himself, who, for them, was also a sceptic, I would still hold on to some of my arguments there—but reexamine all of them first. If we assume—as I now tend to assume—that Arcesilaus and his followers cast their net wider than Plato for their image of Socrates, one needs to separate the two more than I did at the time. Perhaps expressions like *fere*, *varii*, *maxime*, *id potissimum* point to a tendency of Arcesilaus to admit that there were, in his sources, other images of Socrates, as a philosopher with some positive views. After all even our 'Crassus' is aware of this fact (*De Orat.* II.61): 'nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius *variis* et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderet, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum dispaes, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrabantur'. He goes on to mention the origin of the Cynics, and then the Stoics, from Antisthenes; of the Cyrenaics from Aristippus; and of other 'minor Socratic' sects. At least some of these held positive doctrines. Arcesilaus, then, had to choose the True Socrates out of these various images. One can only guess how he did it. One guess—supported by our present passage and by 5a above—is that he emphasized the image of the man who said that the only thing he knew was that he knew nothing, as consistent with a lot of what we find in Plato and with the scepticism of many of Socrates' predecessors. If you take this *confessio ignorantiae* as a historical fact—and explain the story of the Delphic oracle in this sense

(as does 'Varro' in our passage 5a, and as 'Colotes' does in Plutarch—on which see Ioppolo's article again for right emphasis³⁷)—then you can claim that any positive doctrine ascribed to Socrates by anyone could not be part of the essence of Socrates' way of doing philosophy: in the best case, it could be a 'weak' opinion—or perhaps, part of the 'exhortation to virtue' which 'Varro' refers to as not inconsistent with Socrates' perseverance in his *confessio ignorationis* (see 5a and my comment 1 on *tantum* vs. *tamen*.) (This is not unlike George Grote's image of Plato, who is essentially for him a sceptic in the ancient sense, an open-minded inquirer; and, when he expresses positive views, they are more in the nature of unexamined convictions and predilections than of strongly-held philosophical views.)³⁸

This may help to explain why both sceptical Academics and their critics (not to mention the Cynics and Stoics, with their well-known Socratic roots and ambiguous attitude to Plato) make a clear difference between Plato and Socrates. For them, too, Plato was becoming more and more the main source: e.g. *De Orat.* III.60 (Crassus), 'cuius ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, cum ipse litteram Socrates nullam reliquisset'; *Tusc.* V.11, 'cuius multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo, Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata ...', our 8b below. (Notice that *doctrina*, *decreta* and similar 'dogmatic' expressions are not used here.) But they never forgot—as we often tend to do—that there were other 'disciples' of Socrates—and the writings of Aeschines at least were still available: see my comment 2 on passage 2 above.

Arcesilaus was in a dilemma. As head of the Academy, he had to maintain that, in some way, he continued the Platonic tradition. He obviously did make this claim. Diogenes Laertius tells us that he was an admirer of Plato and possessed his writings (D.L. IV.32; cf. Philod. *Acad.* xx.15 Dorandi). His contemporary Timon called him πρόσθε Πλάτων, ὅπιθεν Πύρρων, μέσσοις Διόδωρος (D.L. IV.33; S.E., *P.* 1.234 = SVF I.344; Timon frs. 31-32 Di Marco (1989) 4-85 (text), 182-186 (comm.)) At the same time, the Academic traditions reported in our passage and in the next two makes him emphasize the Socratic 'sceptical' element, as the genuine Socratic way of doing philosophy, and as the proper philosophical aspect of Plato's works. Note that in *Tusc.* V.11 (our passage 8b), where the speaker is 'Cicero' the sceptical Academic, we are told that Socrates' 'multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo' was 'Platonis [tout court!] memoria et litteris consecrata', and it is from that point, viz. the Platonic dialogues, that it 'plura genera efficit dissentientium philosophorum'. The Academic, then, has to sort out his own Socrates, not only from among the various writers of Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, but even from among the various interpretations of Plato's Socrates—and he does: 'e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti sumus' etc. The *Tusculans* passage does not explain what makes the sceptical Academic choose this particular image of Socrates even within the Platonic corpus. If my previous comments are right, what helps him in this selection is the

³⁷ See n. 21 above.

³⁸ See Glucker (1996b).

comparison with other Socratic writers—and the results of his comparison of various Socratic works, in its turn, also shapes his understanding of the Platonic dialogues.

8a. Cic., *N.D.* I.11 (Cicero loquitur)

‘... haec in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi nullamque rem aperte iudicandi profecta a Socrate repetita ab Arcesila confirmata a Carneade usque ad nostram viguit aetatem ...’

8b. Cic., *Tusc.* V.11 (Cicero loquitur)

‘cuius [*scil.* Socratis] multiplex ratio disputandi rerumque varietas et ingenii magnitudo Platonis memoria et litteris consecrata plura genera efficit dissentientium philosophorum, e quibus nos id potissimum consecuti sumus, quo Socratem usum arbitrabamur, ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus errore alios levaremus et in omni disputatione, quid esset simillimum veri, quaereremus, quem morem cum Carneades acutissime copiosissimeque tenuisset, fecimus ...’.

Comments. 1. Some issues—like those concerning Socrates, Plato, and Plato’s Socrates in the sceptical Academic tradition concerning ‘the choice of Arcesilaus’—have been discussed earlier.

2. One notes that the Socratic *ratio disserendi* of our passage 8a is not unlike ‘Varro’s ‘ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellet alios’. But ‘nihil affirmare’³⁹ is a far stronger negation than ‘nullamque rem aperte iudicare’, which seems to imply that we have a *iudicium* of some sort, but keep it to ourselves. This is closer to ‘ut nostram ipsi sententiam tegeremus’ of our passage 8b. In both passages, Carneades’ name is mentioned, and expressions of Socratic ignorance like ‘nihil se scire dicat nisi id ipsum’ are absent. We are already on Carneadean territory, where the emphasis is on reaching what is *probabile* or *veri simile*, but hiding this *sententia* when arguing with others: see *Luc.* 60—and changing it from day to day, but this is another matter.

3. But note that, in passage 8a, where the discussion is only of the ‘ratio in utramque partem disserendi’, and our own *sententia* is, in the best case, hinted at by *aperte*, one can still treat Arcesilaus as a stage in this development. Even there, the Socratic procedure was merely ‘*repetita* ab Arcesila’—taken over by him lock stock and barrel from Socrates (as he conceived him—see my comments to passage 7). But it was ‘*confirmata* a Carneade’, which implies some sort of change in order to make a stronger case for it. Could one say that the change consisted exactly in rejecting Arcesilaus’ ‘nihil opinari sapientem’, μηδὲν δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν—on which he agreed with Zeno anyway—and accepting a ‘mild’ form of

³⁹ See again n. 6 above.

δόξα, *probabile, veri simile*? This might explain why Arcesilaus, in the Academic books, is only mentioned in connection with Socratic ignorance and the practice *in utramque partem*. This may well have been his great discovery, and in his dispute with Zeno, this is what he emphasized. In our passage 8a—and both our passages here are from later works, which are no longer concerned with the ‘inheritance dispute’, and deal not only with the ‘bare bones’ of epistemology and philosophical method—Arcesilaus is already mentioned as a stage in a development leading to Carneades. Carneades is mentioned quite often in connection with “nihil percipere et tamen opinari”; quod a Carneade dicitur probatum’ (the clearest example: *Luc.* 78), and he is mentioned in connection with *probabile* and *veri simile* (e.g. *Luc.* 33, 98 f.)⁴⁰ Could it be that this distinction is due to Cicero’s (and/or that of his *Quelle/Quellen*) awareness of the difference between the positions of Arcesilaus and Carneades—indeed, of Carneades’ position being something of a *correctio* of that of Socrates and Arcesilaus? In arguing against the Stoic aspects of ‘Lucullus’ criticism, one has to defend *probabile* and *veri simile* as well, since ‘Lucullus’ has attacked them. But in the ‘inheritance dispute’, one should emphasize the continuity between Socrates (and—at least—the sceptic parts of Plato) and Arcesilaus, who merely improved on Socratic ignorance by including in it ignorance itself.

Am I making too much of this? I do not think so. *Ac.* I.46 seems to acknowledge that Carneades made some changes in the *ratio* of Arcesilaus—although the fate of the archetype has prevented us from knowing which changes. The same *ratio* of Arcesilaus, says ‘Lucullus’ at *Luc.* 16, ‘proxime a Lacyde solo retenta est, post autem confecta a Carneade’. Is *retenta* ‘kept from oblivion’ (thus Reid (1885) 191, comm. on ‘retenta est’)? Reid refers to *retineamus* at *Luc.* 18, fin., where the meaning is ‘to uphold’; and earlier (same page, comm. on ‘non probata’), he quotes Polybius to the effect that ‘the New Academy speedily fell into contempt’. What if we interpret this as: Arcesilaus’ *ratio* was upheld only by Lacydes, and then it was strengthened, or ‘refurbished’, by Carneades? This would be a proper sense of *confecta*, and would make it almost parallel to our *confirmata*. *Conficere* may not mean much more than ‘refurbish’;⁴¹ but *confirmare* has a positive ring to it. In rhetoric, it is often the opposite of *refellere* or *reprehendere* (reflecting two senses of Greek ἔλεγχος). We have seen that ‘alios refellere’ is a standard expression for Socrates’ practice. It was adopted by Arcesilaus in the form *in utramque partem disputandi* (which means, in practice, ‘utramque partem refellere’). Carneades’ more positive *confirmatio* may imply, not just adding fresh arguments in support of Arcesilaus’ scepticism and against the Stoics, but also adding the more positive side of *probabile-veri simile* to the sceptical Academic’s stock-in-trade.

⁴⁰ On which see again Glucker (1995).

⁴¹ The speaker at *Luc.* 16, ‘Lucullus’, is intent, in this context, on showing that the ‘New’ Academy introduced no new ideas into philosophy and went on, generation after generation, repeating the same things.

Extra metrum: *Socrates distinguished from Plato*1. Cic., *Fin.* V.84 (Cicero loquitur)

'cupit [Peripateticus] dicere nihil posse ad beatam vitam deesse sapienti. honesta oratio, Socratica, Platonis etiam'.

Comment. 'Cicero' is speaking as a sceptical Academic, criticizing the 'Peripatetic' 'Piso' for his inconsistency.

The distinction between Socrates and Plato made here may be just a 'turn of phrase'—but 'Platonis *etiam*' is fairly strong: 'Socrates, *even* Plato, could say such things: you cannot.' Cicero may have had in mind some aspects of *Philebus*, but decided to disregard that dialogue; or he may merely imply in general terms that Plato has, in his dialogues, elements which are not 'truly Socratic', but that on this particular point he expresses the same sentiments as Socrates. Notice, in any case, that this is a Socratic, even a Platonic, *oratio*: again, not a *decretum*, or even an *opinio*. (Cf. *Ac.* I.16 (Varro loquitur): 'omnis eius *oratio* tantum in virtute laudanda et in hominibus ad virtutis studium cohortandis consumebatur'.) If I had to translate *oratio* here, I would probably opt for 'way of speaking'—or possibly 'expression': 'it is an expression typical of Socrates—nay even of Plato' (and *they* do not have to be consistent or inconsistent, since neither, for the 'Cicero' of this dialogue, is dogmatic).

2a. Cic., *Rep.* I.15-6 (Scipio cum Tuberone disputat)

[Scipio] '... Quo [*scil.* Panaetio] etiam sapientiore Socratem soleo iudicare, qui omnem eiusmodi curam deposuerit, eaque quae de natura quaerentur aut maiora quam hominis ratio consequi possit, aut nihil omnino ad vitam hominum attinere dixerit.

Dein Tuberone: Nescio, Africane, cur ita memoriae proditum sit, Socratem omnem istam disputationem reiecisse, et tantum de vita et de moribus solitum esse quaerere. quem enim auctorem de illo locupletiore Platone laudare possumus? cuius in libris multis locis ita loquitur Socrates, ut etiam cum de moribus, de virtutibus, denique de re publica disputet, numeros tamen et geometriam et harmoniam studeat Pythagorae more coniungere.

Tum Scipio: Sunt ista ut dicis; sed audisse te credo, Tuberone, Platonem, Socrate mortuo, primum in Aegyptum discendi causa, post in Italiam contendisse, ut Pythagorae inventa perdisceret; eumque et cum Archyta Tarentino et cum Timaeo Locro multum fuisse, et Philolai commentarios esse nactum; cumque eo tempore in his locis Pythagorae nomen vigeret, illum se et hominibus Pythagoreis et studiis illis dedisse. itaque cum Socratem unice dilexisset eique omnia tribuere voluisset, leporem Socraticum subtilitatemque

sermonis cum obscuritate Pythagorae et cum illa plurimarum artium gravitate contextuit.'

Comment follows after 2b.

2b. Cicero, *Fin.* V.87 (Piso loquitur)

'... cur Plato Aegyptum peragravit, ut a sacerdotibus barbaris numeros et caelestia acciperet? cur post Tarentum ad Archytam? cur ad reliquos Pythagoreos, Echecratem, Timaeum, Arionem, Locros, ut cum Socratem expressisset, adiungeret Pythagoreorum disciplinam eaque, quae Socrates repudiabat, addisceret?'

Comment. Our only two versions of this story are put by Cicero in the mouth of Scipio, the friend of Panaetius, and of Piso, representing Antiochus. The evidence has been collected by Dörrie (1987) 252-8. Of the four 'fragments' included there, 31.3 (Aug., *Civ.* VIII.4) is merely a repetition of Cicero's story; 31.1 (Cic. *Off.* I.108) is irrelevant: the comparison is between Socrates and *Pericles* and Pythagoras, and as the context (107 ff.) makes clear, what is compared is their characters. We are thus left with the two passages 2a and 2b above.

A number of suggestions have been made as to their possible sources or affiliations. Burkert has suggested that this separation between Socratic and Pythagorean elements in Plato was the product of the sceptical Academy.⁴² But the expressions in our two passages are far from representing Socrates as a sceptic, even in matters of ethics and politics. Plato is supposed, in our passages, to ascribe Pythagorean *disciplina* to Socrates, and for the Pythagoreans *disciplina* must mean dogmatic views. Since Plato wrote dialogues this could only imply that, according to our passages, he expected readers of dialogues like *Philebus*, for example, to ascribe ideas of Pythagorean provenance, expressed there by 'Socrates', to the historical Socrates. But on the same principle, he should have expected ideas on ethics and politics, expressed so often by 'Socrates' in most dialogues, to be ascribed just as much—and on the same basis, as *disciplina*—to the historical Socrates.⁴³ Even the 'Varro' of *Ac.* I.15-6 (our 5a) does not go as far as ascribing positive doctrines to Socrates, even on points of 'exhortatio ad virtutem': see my comm. on 5a.

Büchner, in his commentary on our first passage,⁴⁴ maintains that 'Scipio's answer to 'Tubero' represents the view of Dicaearchus: *Plu., Quaest. Conv.* VIII.2, 719A = Dic. fr. 41 Wehrli, where we have ...ὁ Πλάτων ... τῷ Σωκράτει τὸν Λυκούργον ἀναμιγνύς οὐχ ἥττον ἢ τὸν Πυθαγόραν, ὡς ᾤετο Δικαίαρχος. The Pythagorean origin of some views ascribed to Plato—as Wehrli notes in his comment on this fragment—⁴⁵ is already

⁴² Burkert (1972) 94-5.

⁴³ For a similar view, see Dörrie, *ibid.* 538 (comm. on *Fin.* V.86-7).

⁴⁴ Büchner (1984) 97-8.

⁴⁵ Wehrli (1967) 54.

indicated by Arist., *Metaph.* I.6. But Aristotle's account seems to treat Socrates only as Plato's starting-point for a few of his doctrines, and it does not make it clear whether these doctrines are taken from an interpretation of the dialogues or from ἄγραφα δόγματα (a problem into which I cannot enter here). Dicaearchus seems more likely to refer to matters to be found in the dialogues. Even he does not tell the whole story of our passages, connecting Plato's ascribing Pythagorean doctrines to Socrates of his dialogues with his travels to Egypt and Magna Graecia.

Büchner⁴⁶ suggested Panaetius' περὶ Σωκράτους as the likely source. But what we have from that work are frs. 50 and 132 van Straaten,⁴⁷ and possibly also frs. 133 and 134. They give us the name of this work and deal with the story of Socrates' two wives: thus, from the little we know of this work, it stands in the biographical tradition.⁴⁸ What is of greater importance is that, according to frs. 127, 128 and 129 van Straaten, Panaetius athetized Plato's *Phaedo* since it σαφῶς ἀθανατίζει τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν. Had Panaetius been aware of the story of Plato grafting on to Socratic views the Pythagorean doctrines he learnt in Italy, he would have found it easier to have rejected this view in *Phaedo* as Pythagorean, while still ascribing the dialogue to Plato.⁴⁹

If 'Scipio' the friend of Panaetius, speaker in *Rep.* I.15-6, does not represent Panaetius (and he has, just before our passage 2a, expressed his disagreement with Panaetius' preoccupation with the study of nature), who is the source of this story? The opening words of 'Scipio's answer to Tuberio, 'sed audisse te credo, Tuberio', refer openly to the story of Plato's wanderings. 'Scipio's conclusion, opening with the word *itaque*, may well not be part of what 'Tuberio' is presumed to know, but a new, and recent, interpretation of these facts. 'Piso', on the other hand, presents facts and conclusion in one coherent sentence, as if Plato's visits to the Italian Pythagoreans and its purpose and result were both well known. Could the inventor of this story be Antiochus? The temptation is great. Antiochus may well have known of the Pythagorean elements in some of Plato's dialogues, if only from his reading of those dialogues. He may even have been aware of Dicaearchus' statements, and possibly of Aristotle's. In his time, there were already some 'Neo-Pythagoreans' around, and they may have started the process culminating in the

⁴⁶ *Loc. cit.* n. 44 above.

⁴⁷ Van Straaten (1962) 15, 49-5. Frs. 50 and 132 are expressly ascribed to Panaetius' Περί Σωκράτους by the source (Plu., *Arist.* 335C-D). The other two fragments refer merely to Panaetius.

⁴⁸ But one should remember the warning of Mansfeld (1986) 350-1 that the boundaries between biography, haeresiography and diadochography are far from rigid.

⁴⁹ Especially if one accepts the comment of Long (1988) 160 n. 40, on D.L. II.64. I believe Long is right, not only because of Diogenes' use of ἀληθής rather than γνήσιος, but also because the context is that of writers of *Socratic dialogues*. Athetizing *Phaedo* would thus be an exception. The problem remains whether Panaetius, 'qui semper habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem ... Dicaearchum' (Cic. *Fin.* V.79 = Fr. 55 van Straaten) was unaware of the Pythagorean elements in Plato's dialogues, pointed out certainly by Dicaearchus, and probably also by Aristotle. Unless what he *habuit in ore* was selective.

'Middle Platonic' (e.g. Numenius fr. 24.57 f. Des Places)⁵⁰ and 'Neo-Platonic' view, that Plato was really a Pythagorean, although he did not emphasize this element in his writings for 'tactical' reasons. Antiochus ascribed to Plato a 'perfectissima disciplina, Peripateticos et Academicos' (Cic., *Luc.* 15), described by 'Varro', with a few Stoic 'corrections', in *Ac.* I.17-42. Nothing is said there about Pythagorean elements in the dialogues: in this particular context nothing needed to be said. After all, the dispute there is between Antiochus and the sceptical Academy as to the true spiritual succession to Plato. Neither side seems to have been bothered about Pythagorean elements, the emphasis on which was probably much more recent than the traditional disputes between Academics and Stoics. Thus this story only appears, in Cicero's works, in two marginal contexts, where the nature of Plato's philosophy is not the main issue.

But again, the 'Varro' of *Ac.* I is supposed to represent Antiochus. At I.15-6 (our 5a), 'Varro' also tells the story—well-known since Plato's *Phaedo* and Xenophon's *Memorabilia*—of Socrates' turning away from natural to human philosophy, and follows it soon with his statement about Plato's *auctoritas* as a source for the Academics and Peripatetics (17-8), without any mention of the Pythagoreans as Plato's source for the 'scientific' parts of his dialogues. The reconstruction of 'Plato's philosophy of nature' which follows (24-9) is Antiochus' own amalgam of Platonic, Peripatetic and Stoic elements, with a strong Stoic colouring, often ascribing to Plato things which are never found in the dialogues, or even the opposite of things said in them.⁵¹ The one thing this survey of 'Platonic physics' does not contain is Pythagorean elements. Fair enough: this is only what one would expect from Antiochus and his manner of 'inventing the ancients', especially in an argument with sceptical Academics. But in that case, why should the same Antiochus—even in a different context—describe Pythagorean *doctrina* as dominant in Plato's philosophy of nature—in fact, as the sole source of Plato's philosophy of nature?

This is not the only problem raised in this article which on present evidence, and in the present state of our research, one must leave open. As the tests carried out in this article have shown (I hope), the detailed investigation of the whole issue of 'Cicero's Socrates and Plato' is still at its initial stages. Distinctions between speakers in Cicero's dialogues and familiarity with the traditions and affiliations they represent have given us some clues, but have not solved all our problems—this even in a small group of passages which deal, apparently, with a limited range of issues. Cicero speaking *in propria persona*, even when he does so clearly as a sceptical Academic in one of his dialogues or in works like *Tusculans* and *De Officiis*, is also (so it appears at present) not entirely consistent, especially insofar as Plato is concerned. My comm. to 6 was only a piece of 'first aid': a proposal *pro tempore*, which should be tested, first, as to the application of *adfirmo* and its earlier background, and then applied in practice to numerous quotations from, and references to, Platonic

⁵⁰ Des Places (1973) 63 ff.

⁵¹ See Görler (1990).

passages, to see whether and how far it may work. Though some of the few conclusions drawn in my discussions of some of the passages may prove to be acceptable, they are far from presenting a whole picture, even of the subject of this essay, and more tests—probably even in contexts, and from angles of observation, which have not occurred to me—are needed. In such a state of our work, it appears that demands for ‘accessibility’ outside the ‘laboratory’ are somewhat premature.

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GLI ACADEMICA QUALE FONTE PER LA STORIA DELL'ACADEMIA

T. DORANDI

I

La storia esterna dell'Academia platonica negli ultimi decenni della sua vita secolare di scuola istituzionalizzata, a partire dalla morte di Clitomaco e dall'elezione a scolarca di Filone di Larissa, presenta ancora alcuni momenti oscuri e diverse incertezze a causa, anche della scarsità e della frammentarietà delle fonti antiche in nostro possesso.

Il IV libro delle *Vite dei filosofi* di Diogene Laerzio, dedicato appunto all'Academia, si conclude con la breve biografia di Clitomaco.¹ È stato supposto che Diogene, secondo le linee programmatiche che aveva esposte nel proemio,² considerasse l'Academia come una diramazione della filosofia ionica: essa era stata creata da Platone e terminava con Clitomaco. Diogene ne presentava la storia in una visione tripartita che sembra non conoscesse, o almeno non prendesse in considerazione, un periodizzamento più ampio, riferito da altri autori, in cinque epoche, e cioè: Speusippo, Senocrate, Polemone, Cratete, Crantore, Arcesilao, indicato come l'iniziatore dell'Academia di mezzo, Lacide, che dette origine a una nuova fase nel pensiero platonico con l'Academia nuova, Carneade e Clitomaco.³

Filodemo di Gadara (filosofo epicureo vissuto in Italia nel I sec. a.C.), l'altra fonte principale per la ricostruzione delle vicende dell'Academia, nella così detta *Academicorum historia* (*PHerc.* 164 e 1021), aveva invece rivolto particolare attenzione agli ultimi istanti difficili della scuola di Platone e la sua testimonianza sarebbe stata di estrema utilità, in quanto per motivi geografici e cronologici, egli aveva avuto sicuramente modo di conoscere e di frequentare da vicino alcuni dei protagonisti principali di quegli eventi. Malauguratamente il poco della sezione di quell'opera che ci è giunto è

¹ D.L. IV.67.

² Cf. I.14 e Gigante (1986) 48 s.

³ Cf. Dorandi (1992) 3761-92.

talmente lacunoso e i dati che se ne possono trarre sono, di conseguenza, altrettanto incerti e di ostica interpretazione. Dalla lettura dei capitoli conclusivi della *Storia dell'Academia* filodemea⁴ si ricavano, comunque, alcune informazioni sostanziali che integrano elementi o tradizioni parallele e aiutano, pertanto, a comprendere meglio lo svolgimento di singoli episodi.

Accanto a questi due autori, che vorrei definire storici "professionali" della filosofia, si colloca, per buona sorte, uno scrittore la cui opera, sebbene non abbia fini espressamente o precipuamente "storiografici", tramanda una ricca serie di notizie e dettagli singolari, ignoti alle restanti fonti, i quali consentono di chiarire alcuni punti dubbi, ma di vitale importanza nella ricostruzione delle vicende dell'Academia: mi riferisco a Cicerone e non solo ai suoi libri più propriamente "filosofici".

Non ostante il sempre maggiore interesse per il pensiero "filosofico" ciceroniano e per il suo contributo alla storia della filosofia,⁵ manca ancora uno studio specifico dedicato a Cicerone quale "storico" della Academia. A tale lacuna vorrebbe sopperire, almeno in una minima parte, questo mio contributo. Esigenze contingenti limitano la mia indagine allo studio di una sola opera: gli *Academica*. La scelta degli *Academica* quale banco di prova per saggiare il valore della testimonianza "storiografica" di Cicerone non è senza significato: in alcune pagine dello scritto vi sono infatti sicuri elementi e dettagli oggettivi che accrescono le nostre conoscenze relative alla fase finale della scuola di Platone e, più in particolare, alle vicissitudini biografiche di Filone di Larissa e Antioco di Ascalona. Seppure il mio studio si sofferma, in maniera specifica, sui soli *Academica*, risulterà, tuttavia, ben evidente che, nel corso di esso, non mi è stato possibile prescindere né dal contributo di altri scritti di Cicerone stesso né da quello di altri autori, primo fra tutti Filodemo.

II

Come è ben noto, gli *Academica* ebbero una gestazione e una elaborazione molto travagliate: Cicerone preparò due redazioni

⁴ Il testo secondo l'edizione di Dorandi (1991a). Sul contributo di Filodemo alla storia della Academia, cf. Dorandi (1995) 2-25.

⁵ Cf. Gawlick e Görler (1994).

dell'opera immediatamente successive l'una all'altra. Della prima, in due libri intitolati *Catulus* e *Lucullus*, ci è rimasto solo il secondo; della seconda, in quattro libri, è conservato, invece, solo il primo.⁶ Tali complicate vicende della tradizione antica e medioevale degli *Academica* ne hanno purtroppo limitato, in maniera notevole, il testo conservato e ridotte, di conseguenza, le informazioni. Ciò spiega e, in un certo modo, anche giustifica il perché i riferimenti alla storia delle vicende esterne dell'Accademia possano apparire meno abbondanti di quanto ci si sarebbe aspettati da uno scritto che pur non aveva intenti e fini "storiografici" e era piuttosto orientato verso una discussione teoretica, ma che già nel titolo, programmaticamente si richiama alla scuola di Platone.

Nel corso dell'articolo, è mia intenzione soffermarmi, in particolare, su due passi degli *Academica* che, se correttamente interpretati, portano a una ricostruzione attendibile di un periodo cruciale della storia dell'Accademia: l'episodio della conversione di Antioco al dogmatismo e della conseguente rottura con Filone e la successiva fondazione della Antica Accademia.

Prima ritengo tuttavia necessario accennare a qualche aspetto più generale: Che cosa intendeva Cicerone come Accademia di Platone? Quali tradizioni sull'Accademia gli erano note? Una risposta a queste domande consente di valutare meglio la successione dei fatti storici che costituiscono il nocciolo del mio intervento.

Nelle opere di Cicerone leggiamo una serie di testimonianze sul periodizzamento dell'Accademia che riportano a una divisione in due epoche:⁷ Accademia antica e Accademia recente di contro alle altre fonti che prospettano un periodizzamento in tre epoche: I di Platone, II di Arcesilao, III di Lacide o, alternativamente, I di Platone, II di Arcesilao, III di Carneade; oppure un periodizzamento in cinque epoche: I di Platone, II di Arcesilao, III di Carneade e Clitomaco, IV di Filone, V di Antioco.⁸

Questa differenza non dipende soltanto da una scelta esteriore o formale. Nel caso degli autori che considerano un periodizzamento in tre o cinque fasi, ci troviamo di fronte a un gruppo di testi che mostrano una loro omogeneità interna e che risalgono, in maniera

⁶ Cf. Griffin in questo volume, pp. 1-35.

⁷ Cic., *De orat.* III.67; *Fin.* V.3.7; *Ac.* I.46. Cf. anche Agostino, *Ciu. Dei* XIX.1 e Arnobio, *Adv. Nat.* II.9. I passi corrispondono alle testimonianze 24-28 Gigante, in Isnardi (1980) 17-9.

⁸ Le testimonianze sono raccolte da Gigante, in Isnardi (1980) 17-25.

diretta o indiretta, alla tradizione delle *diadochai* o successioni delle scuole filosofiche e alle loro, talvolta arbitrarie, classificazioni. La suddivisione presente in Cicerone tra *Academia* antica e *Academia* recente non è dettata, invece, da uno spirito storico interessato a classificazioni, ma risponde piuttosto a una sua precisa esigenza di ribadire l'unità della scuola da Platone fino a Filone e di richiamare l'attenzione sulle sue scelte filosofiche costantemente orientate verso l'*Academia* "scettica" di Filone.⁹

Lévy ha dimostrato che Cicerone non conobbe un periodizzamento che comprendeva l'*Academia* di mezzo e ha suggerito di intendere l'espressione *media Academia* che ricorre nelle *Partitiones oratoriae* non come un riferimento all'*Academia* di mezzo, ma al pensiero accademico nella sua autenticità.¹⁰ Quanto all'*Academia* nuova, la posizione ciceroniana è duplice.¹¹ Negli *Academica*, come anche in altre opere, si contrappongono due tesi:¹² Quella degli avversari dell'*Academia* nuova che l'accusavano di avere dato vita, a partire da Arcesilao, a una rottura con la tradizione platonica e di invocare illustri predecessori per dissimulare il carattere sedizioso della loro filosofia e quella di Cicerone che si erge a difensore dell'unità dell'*Academia* nella sua globalità: Arcesilao aveva cercato di perpetuare la pratica filosofica del dubbio propria non solo di Socrate e Platone, ma anche di Democrito, Anassagora, Empedocle e di 'quasi tutti gli antichi'.¹³ Lo studio di queste testimonianze e il confronto con un passo parallelo dell'*Adversus Colotem* di Plutarco—tanto limitata era la pretesa di originalità di Arcesilao che gli avversari lo accusavano di interpretare erroneamente Socrate, Platone, Parmenide e Eraclito come filosofi della *epoché*—¹⁴ porterebbe a concludere che: 'Il n'y eut jamais de "Nouvelle" Académie, mais des scholarques à la fois conscients de leurs responsabilités comme successeurs de Platon et imprégnés de l'idée que l'ἐποχή était inhérente à la véritable philosophie'.¹⁵ E ciò in conseguenza della peculiare natura delle scuole filosofiche istituzionalizzate nell'antichità

⁹ Da ultimo Görler (1995) 85-113, i cui risultati sono sintetizzati in Görler (1994) 1084-9.

¹⁰ Lévy (1980) 260-4.

¹¹ Lévy (1992) 9-14.

¹² Cf. *Luc.* 15, 72-4; *Ac.* I.44 e 46; *De orat.* III.67; *Fin.* V.7.

¹³ *Luc.* 72-4 e *Ac.* I.44.

¹⁴ *Plu., Adu. Col.* 1121F-2A = Arcesilao F 7.14-20 Mette. Sul passo, da ultimo, Ioppolo (1995) 96 ss.

¹⁵ Lévy (1992) 13.

e della grande libertà interpretativa che caratterizzò sempre l'insegnamento platonico.

III

Lasciate da parte queste premesse necessariamente sommarie, passo a affrontare in concreto il tema effettivo del mio contributo.

All'inizio del *Lucullus*—dopo alcuni paragrafi che svolgono la funzione di preludio alla discussione (1-10), nei quali Cicerone tesse una *laudatio funebris* del protagonista e difende gli studi filosofici e il metodo dell'Academia nuova—, Lucullo racconta un episodio al quale egli stesso aveva personalmente assistito, nel 87/86, a Alessandria di Egitto, dove si trovava in qualità di pro questore accompagnato dal filosofo academico Antioco di Ascalona. La narrazione fa da retroscena alla discussione che si svolse subito dopo, tra Antioco e l'altro filosofo academico Eraclito di Tiro, provocata dall'arrivo a Alessandria e dalla lettura dei così detti *libri Romani* di Filone; la viva controversia che ne era sorta si protrasse per diversi giorni e ebbe come protagonisti principali, oltre a Antioco, difensore di una interpretazione dogmatica del pensiero academico, e Eraclito, rappresentante dell'Academia "scettica", anche Aristo di Ascalona, fratello di Antioco, Aristone e Dione di Alessandria. Il passo è famoso, ma vale la pena rileggerlo:¹⁶

Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore—inquit (*scil.* Lucullus)—essem, fuit Antiochus mecum, et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa reuocatur, probatus et nobilis; cum quo et Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam—sed utrumque leniter; et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est, tum erant allati Alexandriam tumque primum in Antiochi manus uenerant; et homo natura lenissimus (nihil enim poterat fieri illo mitius) stomachari tamen coepit. mirabar; nec enim umquam ante uideram. at ille Heracliti memoriam implorans quaerere ex eo uidereturne illa Philonis aut ea num uel e Philone uel ex ullo Academico audiuisset aliquando. negabat, Philonis tamen scriptum agnoscebat; nec id quidem dubitari poterat, nam aderant mei familiares docti homines P. et C. Selli et Tetrilius Rogus, qui se illa

¹⁶ *Luc.* 11-2 = Antioco F 5.19-45 Mette. Per il testo, oltre all'Edizione Teubneriana di Plasberg, si veda quella di Schäublin (1995). I frammenti di Antioco e di Filone sono citati secondo l'edizione di Mette (1986-7).

audiuisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso duo illos libros diceret descripsisse. tum et illi dixit Antiochus quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni et alia plura; nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet, qui Sosus inscribitur. tum igitur et cum Heraclitum studiose audirem contra Antiochum disserentem et item Antiochum contra Academicos, dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex eo totam cognoscerem. itaque complures dies adhibito Heraclito doctisque conpluribus et in is Antiochi fratre Aristo et praeterea Aristone et Dione. quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat. multum temporis in ista una disputatione consumpsimus. sed ea pars quae contra Philonem erat praetermittenda est; minus enim acer est aduersarius is qui ista quae heri defensa negat Academicos omnino dicere; etsi enim mentitur, tamen est aduersarius lenior. ad Arcesilan Carneademque ueniamus.

L'episodio si colloca temporalmente alla fine dell'87, quando Lucullo era stato inviato da Silla in qualità di pro questore in missione a Atene, Creta, Cirene, in Egitto, Siria e a Rodi. Lo accompagnavano il poeta A. Licinio Archia e il filosofo Antioco. Mentre si trovavano a Alessandria, si ebbe notizia di una nuova opera filosofica in due libri, che circolava sotto il nome di Filone di Larissa. Non appena Antioco ebbe letto quei libri, lui che pure era un uomo di natura mite ('homo natura lenissimus'), cominciò a dare segni di impazienza ('stomachari tamen coepit'). In un primo momento, non voleva credere all'autenticità dell'opera; ma Eraclito di Tiro, egli stesso discepolo di Clitomaco e Filone, che era a Alessandria già da qualche tempo, ribadì che si trattava realmente di uno scritto di Filone e affermò che il contenuto era ben lontano non solo da quello che era stato fino allora il pensiero del maestro, ma anche da quello di qualsiasi altro filosofo academico. P. e C. Selio e Tettilio Rogo confermarono, infine, che i libri erano autentici, che già avevano avuto modo di ascoltare, a Roma, Filone esporre pubblicamente simili tesi e riuscirono a procurarsene una copia conforme ('qui se illa audiuisse Romae de Philone et ab eo ipso duo illos libros diceret descripsisse'). Antioco non poté più contenersi e scrisse un'opera contro il suo antico maestro intitolata *Sosus*. Alla sua composizione, seguirono lunghe discussioni alla presenza di Lucullo, nelle quali Eraclito prese le difese di Filone e Antioco argomentò contro l'Accademia "scettica". Alla fine Lucullo offrì la sua persona come *iudex* e si impegnò affinché Antioco potesse acclarare la propria posizione filosofica ('dedi Antiocho operam diligentius, ut causam ex eo totam cognoscerem'). Il resoconto del

dibattito, una *disputatio in utramque partem* che si prolungò per diversi giorni, con la partecipazione anche di Aristo, Aristone e Dione, è quello che Lucullo e Cicerone espongono nelle pagine del *Lucullus*.

Per meglio collocare in un contesto storico questo brano, che mi propongo di analizzare, è opportuno richiamare, per sommi capi almeno, le vicende della scuola di Platone con alcune date a partire dagli ultimi anni di Carneade. Sono momenti critici in cui l'Accademia vive una crisi profonda—comune anche alle altre grandi scuole filosofiche ateniesi—sia come istituzione, sia anche dal punto di vista dottrinario.¹⁷

Quando Carneade di Cirene, ammalato, si vide costretto a cedere la direzione della scuola (137/6), si ebbe, da un lato, la successione ufficiale di Carneade il giovane, che morì prematuramente, pochi anni dopo (131/0), e fu sostituito da Cratete di Tarso; dall'altro lato, si assistette (140/39) alla secessione di Clitomaco, anche lui discepolo di Carneade di Cirene: Clitomaco si ritirò, in un primo momento, nel Palladio e vi fondò una propria scuola in opposizione con quella ufficiale. Qui rimase fino alla morte di Carneade di Cirene (129/8), quando irruppe nell'Accademia, durante lo scolarcato di Cratete di Tarso e si impossessò di fatto del potere. In questo stesso periodo compaiono anche le figure di Metrodoro di Stratonicea e di Carmada, la cui posizione all'interno dell'Accademia "ufficiale", sebbene non ancora del tutto definita, dovette essere marginale. Alla morte di Clitomaco (110/109), fu suo successore Filone, che insegnò a Atene fino all'88, allorché, in seguito all'occupazione della città da parte di Mitridate, fu costretto all'esilio a Roma da cui non fece più ritorno. Suo discepolo fu, per un lungo periodo di tempo, Antioco il quale si distaccò, a un certo momento, per motivi di ordine dottrinale, dal maestro e dette vita a una propria scuola, programmaticamente chiamata Antica Accademia. La rottura ebbe effetti irrevocabili e Antioco non fu mai eletto scolarca dell'Accademia "ufficiale", la quale finì la sua vita, quale scuola istituzionalizzata fondata da Platone, con la morte di Filone (84/3) o poco dopo. Da Alessandria (dove aveva soggiornato a partire dall'87), Antioco rientrò a Atene nel 79; dal 74 al 69 accompagnò Lucullo nella guerra contro Mitridate; morì nel 68.

Ma ritorniamo al capitolo ciceroniano. Una cui interpretazione corretta non è possibile se non si considera prima il contributo di

¹⁷ Cf. Görler (1994) 778 s.

un altro passo del *Lucullus*: mi riferisco cioè ai §§ 69-70.¹⁸ Siamo nella seconda parte del libro, all'inizio della replica di Cicerone alle argomentazioni di Antioco, quali riferite da Lucullo nel suo resoconto della disputa di Alessandria.

Sed prius pauca cum Antiocho, qui haec ipsa quae a me defenduntur et didicit apud Philonem tam diu ut constaret diutius didicisse neminem, et scripsit de iis rebus acutissime, et idem haec non acrius accusauit in senectute quam antea defensitauerat. quamuis igitur fuerit acutus, ut fuit, tamen inconstantia leuatur auctoritas. quis [quam] enim iste dies inluxerit quaero, qui illi ostenderit eam quam [quam] multos annos esse negitauisset ueri et falsi notam. excogitauit aliquid? eadem dicit quae Stoici. paenituit illa sensisse? cur non se transtulit ad alios, et maxime ad Stoicos? eorum enim erat propria ista dissensio. quid eum Mnesarchi paenitebat, quid Dardani; qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum. numquam a Philone discessit, nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere. unde autem subito uetus Academia reuocata est? nominis dignitatem uidetur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere uoluisset. quod erat qui illum gloriae causa facere diceret, sperare etiam fore ut i qui se sequerentur Antiochii uocarentur; mihi autem magis uidetur non potuisse sustinere concursum omnium philosophorum. etenim de ceteris sunt inter illos non nulla communia; haec Academicorum est una sententia quam reliquorum philosophorum nemo probet. itaque cessit, et ut ii qui sub nouis solem non ferunt item ille cum aestuaret ueterum ut maenianorum sic Academicorum umbram secutus est.

Cicerone ribadisce la lunga consuetudine di Antioco come discepolo di Filone, la sua acutezza di ingegno e riferisce della rottura che intervenne fra i due filosofi. Dopo il distacco da Filone, nonostante l'ingegno di Antioco rimanesse vivace, il suo prestigio andò piano piano eclissandosi a causa della sua incoerenza (*inconstantia*). In che cosa consisteva, infatti, il suo nuovo pensiero filosofico se non in una riproposizione di tesi stoiche? Se Antioco si era pentito del suo antico modo di pensare conformemente agli insegnamenti dell'Academia "scettica", meglio avrebbe fatto a passare subito alla scuola avversaria e a diventare lui stesso uno stoico ('cur non se transtulit ad alios, et maxime ad Stoicos?'). Ma non lo fece. Né tantomeno si allontanò da Filone prima di avere anche lui un suo gruppo di allievi. Egli dette vita allora subitaneamente a una scuola che chiamò Antica Academia ('unde subito uetus Academia reuocata est') della quale si proponeva di mantenere alto il prestigio, ma in realtà la sua si dimostrò essere una vera

¹⁸ Antioco F 5.109-28.

e propria scissione dalla genuina tradizione platonica ('nominis dignitatem uidetur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere uoluisse'). Il motivo della rottura non va ricercato in un desiderio di vanagloria e nell'illusione che i suoi discepoli sarebbero stati chiamati 'Antiochei' (*Antiochii*), ma piuttosto nel fatto che Antioco non poteva ormai più sopportare l'assalto di tutti gli altri filosofi ('non potuisse sustinere concursus omnium philosophorum') contro la sua interpretazione del pensiero accademico.

Tra i due brani non c'è uno stretto rapporto di continuità; da una loro lettura simultanea si ricava tuttavia non solo, in generale, una serie di dettagli inediti relativi agli ultimi anni dell'Accademia, ma anche e soprattutto una testimonianza unica per la definizione di avvenimenti salienti della vita e del percorso intellettuale di Antioco. Essi consentono di fare sufficiente chiarezza su alcune questioni ampiamente dibattute: Quali furono i motivi che indussero Antioco a staccarsi dalla scuola di Filone? A quando risale la sua decisione? Quando nacque l'Antica Accademia, intesa come scuola contrapposta a quella "ufficiale"?

Cercherò di rispondere a questi interrogativi soffermandomi anche sulle soluzioni che sono state finora prospettate.

Quando e perché Antioco si allontanò da Filone? Antioco era giunto a Atene probabilmente dalla natia Ascalona prima del 110 e qui aveva cominciato a seguire i corsi di Filone, agli inizi del suo scolarcato.¹⁹ Numenio e Agostino ricordano anche come suo maestro lo stoico Mnesarco, un contemporaneo di Panezio.²⁰ Non ci sono, invece, prove concrete che fosse stato discepolo dell'altro stoico Dardano e che il suo conterraneo, Soso di Ascalona, lo avesse introdotto nella Stoà.²¹ La connessione con Dardano è il risultato di una erronea inferenza da una frase del *Lucullus* di Cicerone (§ 69): 'quid eum (*scil.* Antiochum) Mnesarchi paenitebat, quid Dardani; qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum', che non può significare: 'Perché mutò opinione a proposito di Mnesarco e Dardano?', ma piuttosto: 'Perché non trovò soddisfacenti Mnesarco e Dardano?'²² La testimonianza di Cicerone non prova, dunque, un discepolato di Antioco presso i due maestri stoici; restano tuttavia i passi di

¹⁹ Cf. Agost., *Acad.* II.15 e III.41 = Antioco F 8a; Numenio, F 28 Des Places = T 1.17-20; Cic., *Luc.* 69 = F 5.110 s.

²⁰ Cf. i passi citati a n. 19. Per i problemi connessi con il presunto doppio scolarcato di Mnesarco (e Dardano), rimando a Dorandi (1991b) 29-34.

²¹ Cf., p. es., Glucker (1978) 14 n. 4 e 28 n. 52. *Contra* Barnes (1989) 53 s.

²² Accetto le conclusioni di Barnes (1989) 54.

Agostino e Numenio a proposito di Mnesarco, la cui attendibilità, almeno su questo punto, mi sembra non possa essere messa in dubbio.

I buoni rapporti di Antioco con Filone non durarono a lungo e si giunse, ben presto, a una rottura fra i due filosofi dettata da divergenze di ordine dottrinario nell'interpretazione del pensiero platonico; la conseguenza fu l'abbandono da parte di Antioco della interpretazione "scettica" del platonismo e la sua conversione al dogmatismo. L'opinione, alquanto diffusa, che quell'episodio trovasse origine nella pubblicazione dei *libri Romani* e che risalisse, quindi, al tardo 87 presenta reali aporie.²³ Quando Lucullo narra la storia dei *libri Romani*, nei §§ 11-12, non accenna, infatti, alla conversione di Antioco e, di contro, nei §§ 69-70, Cicerone non menziona quei *libri* né allude all'affare *Sosus*. Si ha, pertanto, l'impressione che per Cicerone il racconto dell'episodio di Alessandria non aveva come fine quello di offrire una rappresentazione "storica" della rottura tra Filone e Antioco.

Se così, quando collocare la conversione di Antioco al dogmatismo? Essa dovette precedere, come vedremo, di qualche anno il suo soggiorno a Alessandria, quando Antioco aveva già fondato l'Antica Accademia e aveva con sé un gruppo di discepoli.

Questa una ricostruzione degli eventi. Su singoli punti restano ancora alcune differenze esegetiche, che vale la pena riconsiderare.

Per Glucker,²⁴ Filone era stato eletto scolarca dell'Accademia perché era una nullità e troppo pusillanime per staccarsi dalla interpretazione tradizionale del pensiero di Carneade, quale codificato dal fedele discepolo Clitomaco. Per molti anni, Filone era rimasto il portavoce della ortodossia dell'Accademia "scettica"; in seguito, di fronte alla defezione di Antioco verso il dogmatismo e all'interpretazione meno rigida dello "scetticismo" carneadeo proposta da Metrodoro di Stratonicea e dopo l'esilio a Roma dell'87, Filone aveva trovato la forza di scrivere i *libri Romani* in difesa di quella che riteneva la genuina tradizione dell'Accademia assumendo posizioni che potevano apparire espressione di una mitigazione del pensiero "scettico" e piuttosto aperte verso una forma di semidogmatismo. Sarebbe poi ritornato alle più rigide tesi primitive dopo la lettura del *Sosus* di Antioco e si sarebbe opposto alla sua interpretazione

²³ Una rassegna della letteratura moderna in Görler (1994) 939.

²⁴ Glucker (1978) 13-120.

stoicheggiante del pensiero accademico. A partire da queste premesse e con il confronto con il § 69, Glucker aveva suggerito di datare la secessione di Antioco agli inizi degli anni 90, nel periodo in cui Antioco manteneva stretti rapporti con gli stoici Mnesarco e Dardano.

A questa ipotesi Sedley²⁵ obietta che dal § 69 non si può dedurre che Antioco si staccò da Filone all'epoca in cui Mnesarco e Dardano erano *principes Stoicorum* a Atene. Qui Cicerone si chiede, semmai, perché Antioco non aveva scelto proprio quel momento per mettere in atto la sua decisione, quando le sue posizioni erano ormai influenzate dallo stoicismo ('cur non se transtulit ad alios, et maxime ad Stoicos?'). La rottura fra i due filosofi si sarebbe verificata più tardi e il motivo che avrebbe ritardato il distacco di Antioco dall'Academia fu forse il suo attaccamento sentimentale al nome e al prestigio della scuola (*nominis dignitatem*). Non si può nemmeno escludere che Antioco pensasse di avere trovato lui la vera interpretazione del genuino pensiero di Platone e aspirasse alla successione di Filone nella direzione della scuola con l'aiuto di fedeli discepoli che aveva raccolto intorno a sé e che lo avrebbero aiutato nel momento dell'elezione del nuovo scolarca. Questo spiegherebbe perché a Alessandria Antioco aveva già con sé un gruppo di seguaci. Le vere e proprie ostilità fra Antioco e Filone scoppiarono dopo l'esilio di entrambi da Atene, quindi dopo l'88: Allorché, durante gli anni dell'esilio, Antioco capì che le possibilità di rientrare a Atene erano remote e che quindi una successione, per così dire "ufficiale", nella carica di scolarca dopo Filone era esclusa rese esplicita la sua interpretazione relativa all'ortodossia del pensiero platonico e fondò l'Antica Academia.

Per Barnes,²⁶ il momento della conversione di Antioco rimane dubbio: dal § 69 sembra si possa concludere che la conversione si verificò quando Mnesarco e Dardano erano a Atene le due personalità più rappresentative dello Stoicismo, con buona probabilità negli anni Novanta. La conversione non ebbe come immediata conseguenza l'abbandono dell'Academia da parte di Antioco e il suo passaggio a un'altra scuola (questo sarebbe il significato di: 'Cur non se transtulit ad alios?'). Antioco rimase, dunque, ancora qualche tempo nell'Academia di Filone e la nascita della Antica Academia risale a qualche anno più tardi, quando Antioco poté contare su un

²⁵ Sedley (1981) 70.

²⁶ Barnes (1989) 68-70.

numero di suoi propri discepoli. Più difficile stabilire il momento in cui il "divorzio istituzionale" divenne effettivo: non si può escludere che questo accadesse a Alessandria, dopo l'affare *Sosus*, ma non si può nemmeno negare che si fosse già verificato a Atene alcuni anni prima dell'88.

Anche per l'affare *Sosus*, Cicerone è l'unica fonte di cui disponiamo: quando Antioco ebbe occasione di leggere i *libri Romani* di Filone e ebbe conferma della loro autenticità sia da Eraclito di Tiro sia dai Selii e da Tetrilio Rogo, la sua reazione fu quella di rispondere alla provocazione filoniana con un'opera che intitolò appunto *Sosus* dal nome del filosofo stoico suo conterraneo. La veridicità storica di questo episodio non deve essere messa in dubbio: quello che ricaviamo con sicurezza dall'analisi della testimonianza ciceroniana è, comunque, che Filone, nell'87, aveva tenuto lezioni a Roma su temi accademici il cui contenuto era stato giudicato eretico da Antioco e combattuto nel *Sosus*.²⁷ Purtroppo è ben difficile definire nei dettagli il contenuto dell'opera di Filone, che Cicerone aveva esposto nel primo libro (perduto) degli *Academica priora* (§ 11: 'isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est'. § 12: 'tum et illi dixit Antiochus quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni et alia plura'). Due sole cose è possibile dire con qualche certezza in proposito. Primo: Filone sosteneva la continuità e l'unità del pensiero accademico (§ 13 s.), ammettendo, di conseguenza, che le dottrine esposte nei *libri Romani* erano identiche a quelle professate da Platone. Secondo: Filone propose una nuova tesi filosofica relativa alla epistemologia e al criterio di verità alquanto complessa, cui Cicerone accenna di sfuggita in un passo del *Lucullus* (§ 18: *noua quaedam*): egli rifiutava la definizione di conoscenza proposta da Zenone di Cizio e ammetteva che alcune cose potessero essere conosciute, credendo in tal modo di confutare nello stesso tempo la definizione stoica di conoscenza e lo scetticismo.²⁸

Ecco la ricostruzione della cronologia degli eventi quale suggerita da Barnes: tra il 110 e il 95 ca. Antioco si mantiene leale discepolo di Filone, accettandone l'interpretazione "scettica" del pensiero platonico; a partire dalla metà degli anni Novanta,

²⁷ Görler (1994) 945 s.

²⁸ Per i *libri Romani*, cf. Görler (1994) 918-20 e soprattutto Mansfeld (1997). Ringrazio vivamente l'autore per aver messo a mia disposizione una prima stesura del suo articolo.

Antioco cominciò a distaccarsi dal maestro e a convertirsi al dogmatismo fino a decidere di abbandonare l'Accademia "scettica" per dare vita a una sua propria scuola, che chiamò Antica Accademia, restando poi fedele alla sua dottrina. Filone rimase scettico, anche se si può supporre, pur mancandone le prove concrete, un leggero slittamento verso posizioni dogmatiche. Quello che mutò nel suo pensiero, durante gli anni dell'esilio a Roma e fino al termine della sua vita, fu una diversa interpretazione della definizione stoica di conoscenza che lo avvicinò, in un certo qual modo, al dogmatismo.

Una nuova lettura dell'episodio ha prospettata Mansfeld a partire da una ricostruzione, a mio avviso convincente, del dibattito fra Filone e Antioco nel perduto *Catulus* ciceroniano.²⁹ Lo studioso ha messo in evidenza che i *libri Romani* di Filone contenevano, tra l'altro, una serie di critiche alla tesi di Antioco che fossero esistite due Accademie: la antica e vera Accademia alla quale sosteneva di avere fatto ritorno e quella nuova, di Arcesilao e Carneade. Filone cercò di provare l'esistenza di una sola Accademia, che dalle sue origini, con Platone, si era perpetuata senza rotture, attraverso Arcesilao e Carneade, fino a lui. Ci troviamo di fronte, dunque, a una reciproca accusa di eterodossia fra i due filosofi, che si consideravano entrambi depositari della genuina tradizione della scuola. Si spiega così perché Antioco, contro le sue abitudini, si era particolarmente adirato nei riguardi di Filone quando era venuto a conoscenza del contenuto dei *libri Romani*. Antioco scrisse il *Sosus* dopo la data drammatica del dibattito a Alessandria con Eraclito di Tiro; qui Antioco ribadiva le proprie convinzioni che ci fossero state due Accademie. Filone non rispose alla replica del *Sosus* con un altro scritto: le accuse che aveva rivolte contro il suo antico discepolo e avversario rimanevano quelle dei *libri Romani*. Alla luce di questi risultati è possibile supporre che il motivo fondamentale della rottura fra Antioco e Filone fu la pubblicazione dei suddetti *libri Romani*, ma che Antioco si era staccato da Filone, almeno formalmente, già da alcuni anni, prima dell'esilio di questo a Roma, dunque alla fine degli anni Novanta. Riprendendo un suggerimento di Sedley, Mansfeld ammette che Antioco aveva, all'inizio, dato origine a una *diatribè* (una specie di "scuola privata") frequentata da un numero di discepoli. Una simile situazione,

²⁹ Mansfeld (1997) 64-71.

comune agli ultimi decenni della storia della Academia, non deve essere interpretata come una vera e propria secessione di Antioco dalla scuola madre: alle origini, Antioco, anzi, rimase a Atene e professò il suo insegnamento nell'ambito della stessa Academia.³⁰

Questa esegesi ha il vantaggio anche di superare alcune concrete aporie che Görler aveva scorte nelle interpretazioni correnti.³¹ Lo studioso richiamava l'attenzione sul fatto che una data troppo antica, agli inizi degli anni Novanta,³² è in contrasto con quanto leggiamo in Cicerone:³³ Antioco nella vecchiaia (*in senectute*) si fece accusatore dell'Academia "scettica" di Filone con acrimonia. Né affidamento si può fare sull'*argumentum ex silentio* che lo stesso Cicerone nel *De oratore*³⁴ (fittivamente ambientato nel 91 a.C.) non parla né di una scuola né di un orientamento filosofico proprio di Antioco ('*apud Philonem, quem in Academia uigere audio*').³⁵ A favore di una cronologia intermedia fra l'inizio degli anni Novanta e l'esilio alessandrino di Antioco Görler adduceva le seguenti ragioni:³⁶ 1. Nel momento dell'arrivo di Antioco a Alessandria, Cicerone presenta Aristone e Dione come due allievi di cui Antioco, insieme con il fratello Aristo, già da tempo, aveva grande considerazione ('*quibus secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat ...*');³⁷ 2. Dalla descrizione degli interessi filosofici di Lucullo delineata da Plutarco nella *Vita di Lucullo*—fin dall'inizio Lucullo fu attratto non tanto dall'Academia nuova di Filone, quanto dall'Antica Academia di Antioco—³⁸ si inferisce che, nel momento in cui l'uomo di Stato romano cominciò a mostrare attenzione per la filosofia, l'Academia "ufficiale" di Filone e l'Antica Academia di Antioco già coesistevano. Resta, semmai, da stabilire a quando vanno riportati questi primi interessi filosofici di Lucullo: nell'87 (Glucker) oppure "negli anni Novanta" (Barnes)?³⁹

³⁰ Sedley (1981) 70. Cf. Mansfeld (1997) 68 s. n. 54.

³¹ Görler (1994) 941.

³² Glucker (1978) 19 s.

³³ *Luc.* 69 = Antioco F 5.112.

³⁴ *III.110* = Filone F 3.

³⁵ Görler (1994) 941 s.

³⁶ Görler (1994) 942.

³⁷ *Cic., Luc.* 12 = Antioco F 5.40 s.

³⁸ *Plu., Luc.* 42.3 = Antioco T 6a.1-7. È unanimamente riconosciuto che in questi paragrafi fonte diretta di Plutarco è il *Lucullus* di Cicerone. Cf. Jones (1982).

³⁹ Glucker (1978) 20, 380-90; Barnes (1989) 90-2.

IV

La fondazione da parte di Antioco di una nuova scuola filosofica, l'Antica Accademia, dopo la sua conversione al dogmatismo e il distacco da Filone, è problema legato strettamente all'esame dei due passi ciceroniani che ho fin qui condotto e riapre anche il dibattito relativo alla successione di Filone nella direzione dell'Accademia "ufficiale" e alla continuità della scuola di Platone.

Il riferimento d'obbligo è alla tesi di Glucker,⁴⁰ ormai divenuta canonica, che con Filone ha fine l'Accademia intesa quale scuola istituzionalizzata fondata da Platone e continuata, attraverso una serie ininterrotta di scolarchi, fino a Filone. Se, in assoluto, le argomentazioni di Glucker sono convincentemente fondate, non si può affatto escludere che l'Accademia "ufficiale" non si estinse con Filone, ma che perdurò almeno per qualche anno ancora diretta da uno scolarca, regolarmente designato e eletto, parallelamente alla Antica Accademia di Antioco.

Pur con queste premesse e pure ammettendo che, almeno, agli inizi, Antioco fosse rimasto in seno all'Accademia, capo di una sua *sub-hairesis*, non trovo vi siano prove per accettare la suggestione di Sedley che il filosofo avesse pensato di mantenere buoni rapporti con Filone e di crearsi, nel frattempo, un gruppo di fedeli che avrebbero dovuto sostenere la sua candidatura al momento dell'elezione del nuovo scolarca. Görler ha, inoltre, dimostrato che essa è in contrasto con quanto Cicerone scrive a proposito della nascita della Antica Accademia, dopo che Antioco era riuscito a raccogliere intorno a sé un numero di discepoli ('ipse coepit qui se audirent habere').⁴¹ Né tantomeno mi sembra si possa ammettere per sicuro⁴² che soggetto della forma verbale διε[δέ]ξατο 'sucedette', da me per la prima volta letta nella col. 34.34 della *Storia dell'Accademia* di Filodemo, sia Antioco, con la conseguenza che, nella testimonianza di Filodemo almeno, Antioco poteva essere indicato quale successore "ufficiale" di Filone nella direzione dell'Accademia di Platone. La successione delle notizie nelle ultime colonne dello scritto filodemeo sembra contraddire una simile possibilità. La col. 33 era, infatti, dedicata a Filone di Larissa; agli inizi della col. 34 è registrata una lista di discepoli verisimilmente di Antioco; la col.

⁴⁰ Glucker (1978).

⁴¹ *Luc.* 69 = Antioco F 5.119 s.; Görler (1994) 941.

⁴² Barnes (1989) 58.

35 conteneva gli ultimi paragrafi del *Bios* di Antioco (suoi viaggi e morte). Resta, dunque, da domandarci chi sia il soggetto di διε[δέ]ξατο. Azzardata, anche se non impossibile, riterrei la possibilità di scorgervi un riferimento alla successione "ufficiale" di Filone, da intendere nel senso che forse Filodemo poteva registrare qui (sotto forma di digressione?), il nome di un non meglio specificato filosofo della cui elezione a scolarca dell'Accademia istituzionalizzata gli era giunta notizia. Cercare di andare oltre e di individuare l'ignoto personaggio sarebbe ancora più imprudente. L'ipotesi che lo identifica con Carmada urta contro difficoltà di ordine cronologico; anche Eraclito di Tiro deve essere escluso.⁴³

Né Cicerone né le altre fonti conservano, purtroppo, dettagli sulla struttura e sulla organizzazione della nuova scuola di Antioco. Da Cicerone⁴⁴ è stato dedotto che in principio Antioco aveva designato la sua scuola semplicemente con il nome di "Accademia" e che solo in seguito (forse dopo il divorzio istituzionale da Filone) la chiamò Antica Accademia ('unde autem subito uetus Accademia reuocata est? nominis dignitatem uidetur, cum a re ipsa descisceret, retinere uoluisse').⁴⁵

Passati gli anni dell'esilio di Antioco a Alessandria, nel 79, l'Antica Accademia trovò, di nuovo, la sua sede stabile a Atene, non nel sito tradizionale di quella che era stata l'Accademia "ufficiale", il boschetto dell'eroe Accademo, ma nel Ginnasio di Tolemeo, un elegante sistemazione frequentata da numerosi allievi, tra i quali anche molti romani.

V

Mi sia consentito presentare, per concludere, un breve sommario dei principali risultati cui sono giunto a partire dallo studio dei due luoghi del *Lucullus* e riassumere il contributo che ne è derivato per la storia esterna dell'Accademia.

L'esame della testimonianza ciceroniana è fondamentale per ricostruire un episodio cruciale della vita di Antioco e degli eventi che caratterizzarono gli ultimi anni della scuola di Platone: la rottura dei rapporti fra Antioco e Filone e la conseguente conversione

⁴³ Görler (1994) 907, 917 e 942.

⁴⁴ *Luc.* 70 = Antioco F 5.120-2.

⁴⁵ Cf. Görler (1994) 942.

del primo al dogmatismo, in opposizione con lo "scetticismo" dell'Accademia tradizionale. Le due vicende non furono concomitanti: si deve distinguere tra il mutamento di orientamenti filosofici di Antioco e il cambiamento istituzionale, che culminò con la fondazione da parte di Antioco dell'Antica Accademia. Cicerone attesta che Antioco, dopo un periodo di leale discepolato presso Filone, si staccò, in un primo momento, dallo "scetticismo" accademico (probabilmente verso la metà degli anni Novanta) e che solo più tardi, ancora a Atene e prima dell'affare *Sosus*, dette vita all'Antica Accademia. Alla morte di Filone, l'Accademia "ufficiale" ebbe fine e l'eredità del pensiero platonico continuò la sua tradizione, solo idealmente, nella nuova istituzione creata da Antioco con sede nel Ginnasio di Tolemeo a Atene. Dopo la morte di Antioco quell'eredità passò poi a suo fratello Aristo di Ascalona.

Questa, in breve, la messe non molto abbondante di risultati che è derivata dalla indagine condotta sugli *Academica* di Cicerone. Uno studio approfondito anche delle restanti opere filosofiche e non dell'Arpinate, potrà completare il quadro e consentirà una più vasta e significativa ricomposizione del contributo ciceroniano nella sua veste di "storico" dell'Accademia, accanto, e forse oltre, l'apporto degli scritti "professionali" di Filodemo e di Diogene Laerzio.

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CHRYSIPPUS, CARNEADES, CICERO
THE ETHICAL *DIVISIONES* IN CICERO'S *LUCULLUS*

K. A. ALGRA

I. *Introduction*

The last part of Cicero's own speech in the *Lucullus* (64-148) is devoted to the dogmatists' disagreement in the fields of physics (116-28), ethics (129-41), and logic (142-6).¹ The section on the *diaphonia* of philosophical *doxai* in ethics in its turn falls into three parts. First, after a brief review of more or less obsolete views on the End (e.g. those of the Megarians and Aristo),² there is a discussion of the famous *Carneadea divisio* (131), an overview of possible conceptions of the *telos*. Next comes a section which deals with the differences between the Stoics and Antiochus (132-7). Finally, Cicero discusses Chrysippus' way of dealing with the various views on the *telos* (138-41). Others have referred to the latter passage as the *Chrysippea divisio*, and for the moment I shall do so too, although I shall qualify the appropriateness of this term later on, and although it should be kept in mind that Cicero himself does not use this label (whereas elsewhere he does use the term *Carneadea divisio*). The two divisions are interesting as parts of Cicero's own philosophical (and rhetorical) strategy, but also as *testimonia* for Chrysippus and Carneades. Indeed *Luc.* 138 may be regarded as paraphrasing Chrysippus' own words, and it was accordingly included as a fragment by Von Arnim (*SVF* III.21, first part). In the case of the *Carneadea divisio* the situation is slightly different. Carneades never published the *divisio* ascribed to him—in fact he never published anything—but we may surmise that he devised and used the division as a tool for his dialectical discussions.

¹ For the names of the parts of the original dialogue and an account of the genesis of the work see Griffin, above pp. 1-35.

² At *Luc.* 130 Cicero admits that the ideas of Aristo and Pyrrho are not quite as obsolete as those of the Megarians, but they nevertheless do not belong to the set of more popular doctrines on which he proposes to concentrate from now on ('has igitur tot sententias ut omittamus, haec nunc videamus quae diu multumque defensa sunt').

These *divisiones* raise a series of questions. First, what was their original context and how do they fit in with what is otherwise known of Chrysippus' and Carneades' positions in ethics and of their philosophical methods? Secondly, we would like to know whether and how the two divisions are related. Their resemblance has long been recognized,³ but the details of their relation (e.g. did Carneades use Chrysippus' *divisio*?) have not received much attention. Thirdly, and finally, we should try to find out how this Chrysippean and Carneadean material has been integrated into Cicero's text, and what role the *divisiones* are made to play within Cicero's own overall philosophical strategy in this part of the *Lucullus*. Indeed a closer study of their role may further our understanding of the scope and purpose of this dialogue.

In the present study I shall attempt to come to terms with each of these questions. Section 2 focuses on Chrysippus, and sketches the historical and philosophical background of the *Chrysippea divisio*. Section 3 focuses on Carneades, studying the various versions of the Carneadean *divisio* and the way it relates to its Chrysippean counterpart. In section 4, finally, the focus will be on Cicero and on his own philosophical stance in the *Lucullus* as it is revealed by the way he applies the two *divisiones* in his own speech.

A common theme connects these three sections. I shall try to show that we are basically dealing with a fixed set of ethical *doxai* which Chrysippus, Carneades, and also Cicero (with Carneades as intermediary) each used in accordance with their own dialectical and philosophical purposes. Here a qualifying note may be in order. I do not mean to imply that this set of standard examples of views on the *telos* ever circulated as a doxographical survey in its own right, although this possibility is not to be excluded either. What matters in the present context is that it makes sense to distinguish between the standard list as such (available in written form, or memorized as a useful tool in the oral teaching in the philosophical schools), and the way it was used by various philosophers. Thus both the Chrysippean and the Carneadean division can be regarded as having been based on the same list of *doxai*

³ Thus Giusta (1964) 224 adduced this Chrysippean fragment in order to show that the *Carneadea divisio* reflects 'uno schema che Carneade aveva elaborato seguendo dei precedenti famosi e abbastanza antichi'. Gucker (1978) 54 notes that 'the main principle of the *Carneadea divisio* had been anticipated, though in a somewhat different form, by Chrysippus who was followed here by Carneades himself'.

which subsequently was reduced by Chrysippus in the course of his dialectical procedure, while it was enlarged by Carneades in the service of *his* dialectical procedure, i.e. among other things to facilitate his attack on the Stoics. Moreover the distinction between the list as such and the way it has been used may also help us to recognize the limitations of a particular kind of Ciceronian *Quellenforschung*. For it may open our eyes to the possibility that the various slightly different versions of the *Carneadea divisio* in Cicero are not to be traced back to different sources, but can be explained by Cicero's own conscious adaptation of a list of *doxai* which had come to be used as a standard *aide-mémoire* in a variety of ethical discussions.⁴

II. *Chrysippus on various conceptions of the telos*

We shall first study the *Chrysippea divisio* as rendered by Cicero, and see whether and to what extent its original Chrysippean context can be reconstructed. The passage at issue runs as follows:

Chrysippus often solemnly avows that there are only three views concerning the chief good that can be defended. He lops off and discards a great many other views: for he holds that either virtue, or pleasure or a combination of the two constitute the End. For [he says] those who say our chief good consists in our being free from all trouble are trying to avoid the unpopular word 'pleasure', but they stay very near to it; and the same is also the case with those who combine freedom from trouble with moral goodness; nor is it much different with those who join to moral goodness the primary advantages of nature. Thus he leaves three opinions that he thinks capable of a probable defence.⁵

⁴ I should add that in these areas, especially where the *Carneadea divisio* is concerned, much work has already been done by others, most recently by Carlos Lévy. Part of what I offer here (esp. in sections 2 and 4) is meant to be complementary to his work. Section 4 partly covers the same ground as the chapter 'Dissensus et doxographie' in Lévy (1992) 335-7, but is written from a different perspective and in some cases arrives at different results.

⁵ *Luc.* 138 (= *SVF* III.21): 'Testatur saepe Chrysippus tres solas esse sententias quae defendi possint de finibus bonorum, circumcidit et amputat multitudinem—aut enim honestatem esse finem aut voluptatem aut utrumque; nam qui summum bonum dicant id esse si vacemus omni molestia, eos invidiosum nomen voluptatis fugere, sed in vicinitate versari, quod facere eos etiam qui illud idem cum honestate coniungerent, nec multo secus eos qui ad honestatem prima naturae commoda adiungerent; ita tris relinquit sententias quas putet probabiliter posse defendi'.

The first thing to be noted is that there are actually *two divisions* involved: the more elaborate one with which Chrysippus started out, and the much more simple threefold division which he ended up with. To judge from Cicero's testimony the initial division comprised at least three possible 'simple' Ends, namely

- (1) virtue (*honestas*)
- (2) pleasure (*voluptas*)
- (3) freedom from suffering (*vacuitas molestiae*)

and three possible complex Ends:

- (4) virtue *plus* pleasure
- (5) virtue *plus* freedom from suffering
- (6) virtue *plus* the primary natural objects (*prima naturae*).

Chrysippus reduced this sixfold *diaeresis* to a choice between three main options, and these, not the original division, constitute what is now sometimes referred to as the *Chrysippea divisio*:

- (i) pleasure
- (ii) virtue
- (iii) a combination of pleasure and virtue.

It is clear from Cicero's presentation that Chrysippus neither assembled his initial list of ethical *doxai* nor drew up his threefold division for purely historical or doxographical purposes. Rather, he was out to show that the apparent diversity of ethical views could be reduced to a philosophically more relevant choice between a few main options. Indeed a few: three according to Cicero's account at *Luc.* 138, but in the same context—and also elsewhere, for that matter—Cicero suggests that the real issue was between the two options of virtue and pleasure.⁶ Thus the original Chrysippean context of the so-called *Chrysippea divisio* may be provisionally characterized as follows. First, we appear to be dealing with the *use* of a list of *doxai* in the service of systematic philosophy, in other words, with dialectic. Secondly, the dialectical procedure appears

⁶ *Luc.* 140: 'Unum igitur par quod depugnet relicum est, voluptas cum honestate; de quo Chrysippo fuit quantum ego sentio non magna contentio'. Cf. also *Fin.* II.44 (= *SVF* III.22): 'Ita ceterorum sententiis remotis, relinquitur non mihi cum Torquato sed virtuti cum voluptate certatio. Quam quidem certationem homo et acutus et diligens Chrysippus non contemnit, totumque discrimen summi boni in earum comparatione positum putat'.

to be strongly reductive: the issue is narrowed down to a choice between virtue and pleasure. Thirdly, we may presume that Chrysippus thought this final issue was relatively easily clinched (cf. *Luc.* 140: 'non magna contentio') by a number of powerful anti-hedonistic arguments. The observations which fill up the rest of the present section are meant to work out these three points in succession.

That Chrysippus' works sometimes contained discussions of lists of *doxai* of other philosophers is also attested elsewhere. Galen (*P.H.P.* III.1.9-17, p. 170.6-30 De Lacy = part of *SVF* II.885) tells us that Chrysippus prefaced his discussion of the question of the seat of the regent part of the soul—a discussion which took up the second half of the first book of the *Περὶ παθῶν*—by an overview of the various *doxai* that had been defended.⁷ I do not need to discuss this text here, but it is perhaps worthwhile to draw attention to one thing which to my mind clearly emerges from this parallel case—and something which should be clear anyhow as soon as the importance of the distinction between lists of *doxai* as such on the one hand and their dialectical *use* on the other has been realized—viz. the fact that Chrysippus' reductive discussion of various conceptions of the *telos* need not have taken place in a primarily historical or doxographical work. Accordingly, a question which scholars have kept associating with their discussions of the context of the *Chrysippea divisio*, viz. whether or not Chrysippus actually wrote a supposedly doxographical *Περὶ τελῶν* ('On Ends'),⁸ appears to be fairly irrelevant. Apart from the fact that the few surviving fragments from the *Περὶ τελῶν* (or *Περὶ τέλοῦς*) show that it was not a primarily doxographical work,⁹ the *divisio* could have been at

⁷ Mansfeld (1990) 3167-77 has plausibly argued that Chrysippus here had access to (and could assume his readership to be familiar with) a specimen of the *placita* literature which for argument's sake he dubs *Vetustissima Placita*, a predecessor of the so-called *vetusta placita* which have been hypothesized as one of the sources of the doxographical work of Aëtius. For an extensive discussion of this fragment and its role within the whole of Chrysippus' dialectical procedure in the *Περὶ παθῶν* see Tieleman (1996), esp. 158-60 and 264-73.

⁸ Cf. Döring (1893) 165, Glucker (1978) 54, Lévy (1992) 348. The discussion has centered upon the question whether Chrysippus wrote a *Περὶ τελῶν* in which the *Chrysippea divisio* could have figured originally, or whether the words *Περὶ τελῶν* as occurring at D.L. VII.85 and 87 should be considered to be the result of a corruption from an original *Περὶ τέλοῦς* ('On the End'), a title attributed to Chrysippus at D.L. VII.91.

⁹ The two references to the *Περὶ τελῶν* at D.L. VII.85 (containing the famous Chrysippean account of *oikeiôsis*) and 87 (on the equivalence of a

home in almost any of Chrysippus' ethical writings, so that there is no need to single out a work with a title that has an allegedly doxographical ring as its probable source.

A rather striking feature of Chrysippus' *divisio* as reported by Cicero is its reductive character. I believe it can be argued that this was intimately bound up with the peculiar nature of Chrysippean dialectic. We are fortunate to have some additional evidence of Chrysippus' preaching as well as of his practice in this area which may help us to put Cicero's account of the ethical *divisio* in perspective. At Plu. S.R. 1036A (= SVF II.127) and S.R. 1036D-E (= SVF II.270) we are told that Chrysippus advocated (a mitigated version of) the Academic way of *disserere in utramque partem*, as long as this was done with due caution, i.e. as long as the plausibility of the opposite view was destroyed rather than defended. Otherwise the hearers might 'get diverted by these arguments and actually lose hold of their καταλήψεις (1036E).¹⁰ For the traditional way of *disserere in utramque partem* was, in Chrysippus' own words

incumbent upon those who in all matters observe suspension of judgment and conducive to their purpose, whereas it is incumbent on those who inculcate knowledge in accordance with which we shall live consistently to instruct their pupils in the principles and to fortify them from beginning to end by destroying the plausibility of the opposite arguments, just as in the courtroom, in those cases where it is apposite to mention them.¹¹

On the basis of the available evidence it is hard to say whether Chrysippus thought the use of dialectic was *confined* to such a 'scholastic' context, in other words whether it was supposed to play an exclusively 'preservative' and defensive role among students of Stoicism who were already entertaining apprehensions (although without having reached the stage of full-blown Stoic ἐπιστήμη. It is

virtuous life and a life according to nature) suggest a more general philosophical rather than a primarily doxographical character.

¹⁰ Note, however, that Plu. S.R. 1036B adds that other Stoics complained about the strong dialectical cases Chrysippus made for the opposite party (in particular concerning epistemological matters, or so the examples given would seem to suggest), a complaint which is also recorded by Cic., *Luc.* 75 and 87 (texts collected at SVF I.109).

¹¹ Chrysippus, as quoted literally at Plu., S.R. 1036A. The translation is Cherniss', with some slight changes. Note that Chrysippus is talking about those (pupils) who aim at attaining knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Of course the Stoics claimed that, once the state of real knowledge had been attained, all apprehensions would *eo ipso* be firm and unshakable, on which see Ac. I.41 (= SVF I.60) and Ar. Did. *ap. Stob., Ecl.* II.73.16 ff. (= SVF III.112).

perhaps not too implausible to suppose that this kind of dialectic was also believed to play a constructive role, by inducing the unfaithful to apprehend the truth of Stoic tenets.

However this may be, the quotations furnished by Plutarch suggest that what we might call Chrysippean dialectic was not really a matter of carefully weighing off the various possible philosophical positions and of giving credit where credit was due.¹² As such it appears to have been rather a far cry from Aristotelian dialectic.¹³ The primary aim was apparently to highlight the contrast between Chrysippus' own position and that of his opponents in such a way that the 'apprehensions' of his readership and students were strengthened rather than diverted.¹⁴ I submit that the *Chrysippea divisio* should be viewed against this background: some views on the *telos* which are at first sight closer to the Stoic view than the Epicurean hedonistic position, and therefore might have some *prima facie* plausibility, are argued to be in actual fact mere versions of the hedonistic position.

Another example of such a 'reductive' approach on Chrysippus' part can be found in a fragment from the fourth book of his *Περὶ βίῳ*, quoted by Plutarch at *S.R.* 1033C-D (= *SVF* III.702). In the context of this fragment Plutarch is attacking the Stoics for having advocated in theory the engagement in politics and government, whereas they led fairly quietist scholarly lives in practice. He now adduces Chrysippus' *ipsissima verba* to show that the latter condemned such a scholarly life (I quote Cherniss' translations with a few modifications):

Chrysippus himself at least in his fourth book on *Ways of Living* thinks that the scholastic life is no different from the life of pleasure. I shall quote him verbatim: 'All who suppose that the scholastic life is especially incumbent upon philosophers seem to me to make a serious mistake from the beginning by presuming that one should engage in this as a way of passing time (*διαγωγῆς τινος ἕνεκεν*) or some other similar purpose and drag out one's

¹² I am here using the term 'dialectic' not in the strict Stoic sense of the word, according to which it is equivalent to 'logic', cf. e.g. *D.L.* VII.41 (= *SVF* II.48), but in the more loose sense in which it is nowadays also customary to speak of Aristotelian dialectic, referring to the practice of systematically discussing the views of others (on the question of whether this use fits Aristotle's own use of the term 'dialectic' see Algra (1995) 158-9).

¹³ On Aristotle's dialectical practice (with a discussion of the most important scholarly literature on this subject) see Algra (1995) 153-81.

¹⁴ For a useful survey of the affiliations between Chrysippean and skeptical dialectic see Tieleman (1996) 158-60.

whole life in some such fashion—which, if accurately examined, means ‘pleasantly’, for we ought not to miss their underlying meaning, since many make this assertion openly and not a few more obscurely’.

We are here in fact dealing with an interesting difference between what we might call the Stoic and the Peripatetic or Platonic conceptions of the βίος θεωρητικός. According to Chrysippus theoretical activity which is merely chosen as a ‘way of life’, or as a way to pass time, is really an instance of hedonistic behaviour, and as such not to be recommended.¹⁵ We may presume that the kind of σχολαστικός βίος he was advocating instead was a life of scholarship in the service of, and governed by, virtue, reason and nature. This, at any rate, would seem to square with the claim, attributed to the Stoics by Diogenes Laertius, that the λογικός βίος is to be preferred to both the πρακτικός βίος and the θεωρητικός βίος,¹⁶ and with Arius Didymus’ report (quoted by Stobaeus) according to which the Stoics reckoned the τέχναι among the things to be preferred (προηγμένα), but only ‘in so far as they can contribute to a life in accordance with nature’.¹⁷ Characteristically neglecting the details of Chrysippus’ position, Plutarch reforges it into the claim that a life of theoretical activity is *always* simply a life of pleasure.

But it is not Chrysippus’ view of the σχολαστικός βίος which primarily concerns us here. What is relevant for the present enquiry is that we are dealing with a fragment which shows us how Chrysippus, in a clearly dialectical context, reduces an ethical position which might have some initial appeal even for a Stoic (‘the best life is a βίος σχολαστικός’) to a position which is much easier to combat, and clearly is to be rejected. On the basis of this passage and of Chrysippus’ remarks on the use and abuse of dialectic, we may now try to reconstruct what was probably the context in which the *Chrysippea divisio* originally figured. A number of rival ethical views were discussed without συνηγορία (S.R. 1035F-6A), their plausibility (πιθανόν) as views deserving separate consideration was to be destroyed, and the arguments of the opponents were thus not allowed to divert the apprehension (περισπώντας τὴν κατάληψιν, S.R. 1036D).¹⁸ Indeed the final choice was presented in

¹⁵ This, at any rate is how I think the words διαγωγῆς τινος ἔνεκεν are to be interpreted. Cherniss’ ‘for the sake of some activity’ is too vague.

¹⁶ D.L. VII.130 (= SVF III.687).

¹⁷ Ar. Did.*ap.* Stob., *Ecl.* II.80.22 (= SVF III.136).

¹⁸ For the rôle of the notions περισπασμός and πιθανότης in a similar dialectic-

such a way that it could not give rise to anything else but κατάληψις of the Stoic view of the *telos*.

I would like to add some further observations on the 'struggle between virtue and pleasure' ('virtuti cum voluptate certatio', *Fin.* II.44). At *Luc.* 140 Cicero shows that Chrysippus thought the intermediate position (according to which the *telos* is virtue and pleasure together) was not a viable option, which is why the real choice was between virtue and pleasure. But even if Chrysippus was thus left with a fairly simple *dilemma* it was, according to his own rules for a dialectical procedure, still incumbent on him to destroy the plausibility of the case for hedonism. Now Cicero claims that at this point Chrysippus did not really have much of a struggle (*Luc.* 140, 'non magna contentio'), and reports the following argument:

If one should follow the former [i.e. pleasure], many things will fall in ruin, and especially fellowship with mankind, affection, friendship, justice and the rest of the virtues, none of which can exist unless they are disinterested, for virtue driven to duty by pleasure as a sort of pay is not virtue at all, but a deceptive sham and pretence of virtue.¹⁹

Von Arnim printed this passage, together with the account of the *Chrysippea divisio* in *Luc.* 138, as *SVF* III.21. And indeed, although the passage might in principle be an addition by Cicero himself, it is most naturally read as an explanation of why Chrysippus thought the choice between virtue and pleasure was not really difficult.²⁰ As such the argument would seem to square well

tical context see also the fragment from the *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Πλάτωνα* quoted Plu., *S.R.* 1040A-B (*SVF* III.313), where Chrysippus argued that Cephalus in Plato's *Republic* was wrong to make fear of the gods a deterrent from injustice, since the kind of stories he was referring to do not differ from the kind of stories used by women to keep children from mischief. The argument about divine chastisements, according to Chrysippus, presents πολλοὺς περισπασμοὺς καὶ πιθανότητας ἀντιπικτούσας, which I take to imply that it distracts us from the right view that justice is a matter of rational behaviour, rather than of (irrational) emotions like fear. Here as well we may observe traces of the kind of dialectical reduction discussed in the text above: the stories adduced by Cephalus may *prima facie* appear to work in favour of justice, but they turn out to be no different from irrational tales which end up having the opposite effect.

¹⁹ *Luc.* 140.

²⁰ Michel (1968) 119 believes that the passage simply reflects Cicero's own views. He does not appear to have even considered the possibility of a Chrysippean ancestry, and fails to mention that it is included in *SVF*. Instead he claims, without any justification, that 'tous les commentateurs sont actuelle-

with what is otherwise known of Chrysippus' anti-hedonistic polemics. As a general point we may note that he went to great lengths to oppose what he apparently regarded as the rival view *par excellence* in ethics. We know that he wrote a work *Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς πρὸς Ἀριστοκρέοντα* in 10 books,²¹ and two works entitled *Ἀποδείξεις πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν τέλος* and *Ἀποδείξεις πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν*, both in 4 books.²² Unfortunately we know nothing about the contents of these extensive works, but some other pieces of early Stoic material show that we are probably not very far off the mark when we assume that the kind of argument which Cicero presents at *Luc.* 140 was thought to be of central importance. Thus we may compare a testimony of Plutarch on Chrysippus' *Πρὸς Πλάτωνα*:²³

But in the books against Plato he [Chrysippus] denounces him [Plato] for appearing to hold that health is good (*ἀγαθόν*), and says that not only justice, but magnanimity too and sobriety and all the other virtues are annulled if we hold that pleasure or health or anything else that is not fair (*καλόν*) is good.²⁴

In spite of the different context—here Chrysippus is not dealing with the question whether pleasure is the *telos*, but with the weaker claim that pleasure is (a) good²⁵—in showing that on any wrong conception of the good the virtues will be annulled the argument is comparable to what we find at *Luc.* 140. According to Cicero's account there, not only the virtues, but friendship as well will cease to exist if virtue is no longer the *telos* governing our behaviour. That this also is a genuinely Stoic idea can be inferred from various other pieces of evidence. Although friendship does not figure in the extant lists of Stoic virtues Chrysippus and his followers did regard it as something closely connected with virtue.

ment d'accord sur le fait que cette argumentation, éclectique dans ses détails, a, dans ses structures générales, des sources platoniciennes: il s'agit essentiellement du débat sur la justice qui domine la *République* de Platon'.

²¹ Incidentally, this work may well have been identical to the *Περὶ ἡδονῆς* which is referred to at D.L. VII.103 (= *SVF* III.156), and in which Chrysippus is said to have argued that pleasure is not a good.

²² D.L. VII.202.

²³ The work referred to is probably identical to that which is elsewhere cited as *Περὶ δικαιοσύνης πρὸς Πλάτωνα* (cf. the texts printed as *SVF* III.288, 313 and 455).

²⁴ Plu., *S.R.* 1040D (= *SVF* III.157); Cherniss' translation.

²⁵ The Chrysippean titles quoted in the text above suggest that the questions whether pleasure was to be identified as the *telos*, i.e. as the *highest* good, or as simply *a* good were thought to deserve separate treatment.

After all they claimed that friendship was to be classed among the goods,²⁶ and, as Cicero informs us in the third book of the *De Finibus*, among the 'things beneficial' (ὠφελήματα, 'emolumenta')—and 'goods' and 'things beneficial' naturally belong to the virtuous.²⁷ Moreover, according to the early Stoics it is the wise, i.e. the virtuous, who cultivate friendship—indeed the only real friendship is to be found among and between the wise.²⁸ The reason for this can be inferred from an interesting report in Arius Didymus (*ap. Stob., Ecl. II.108.15 ff.*). There we are told that according to Stoic orthodoxy true friendship needs faithfulness or loyalty (πίστις) and security (βεβαιότης), traits not found among the non-wise (φᾶῶλοι) who, as a consequence, are only capable of forming alliances that may resemble friendship, but that in reality only arise for external reasons, from need and only in semblance (συνδέσεις ἕξωθεν ἀνάγκαις καὶ δόξαις κατεχομένας).²⁹ In other words, virtue is a prerequisite for friendship, because without virtue friendship will lack the required stability and mutual reliability.³⁰ To anyone acquainted with the ethical writings of Cicero these arguments will be familiar,³¹ and indeed the strong opposition

²⁶ Cf. *Stob., Ecl. II.94.21 W.* (= *SVF III.98*).

²⁷ *Cic., Fin. III.69* (= *SVF III.93*). See also *Stob., Ecl. II.101.5 W.* (= *SVF III.587*) where ὠφελήματα are labelled παρακείμενα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

²⁸ Cf. *D.L. VII.123* (= *SVF III.631*) and *Stob., Ecl. II.108.5 W.* (= *SVF III.630*).

²⁹ *Stob., Ecl. II.108.5 W.* (= *SVF III.630*).

³⁰ These passages strongly suggest that the arguments against the Epicurean conception of friendship cited by Torquatus at *Fin. I.65* ('amicitia, quam si voluptas summum sit bonum affirmatis nullam omnino fore'), *I.66* ('videtur quibusdam stabilitas amicitiae vacillare'), and *I.69* ('ne si amicitiam propter nostram voluptatem expetendam putemus, tota amicitia quasi claudicare videtur') were Stoic in origin (compare Arius Didymus' stress on βεβαιότης and Cicero's on 'vacillare' and 'claudicare'), even though Cicero may be refuting the Epicurean position also on behalf of Antiochus (on whose views on friendship and pleasure see Varro's account at *Ac. I.22-3*), and although he need not have had *direct* recourse to a Stoic source. These arguments, which prompted some 'recentiores' among the Epicureans to slightly revise Epicurus' theory of friendship (see *Fin. I.69-70*), should at any rate not be attributed to 'the Academy' or even 'the Sceptical Academy' simply and solely because Cicero himself appears to subscribe to them, *pace* Rist (1972) 130-1 and Rackham's Loeb transl. of *I.69* ('the opprobrious criticisms of the Academy').

³¹ On the contest between virtue and pleasure see *Off. III.11-9* (esp. 11: 'dubitandum non est quin numquam possit utilitas cum honestate contendere'). On philosophers as followers of either virtue or pleasure see *Leg. I.37-9*; on the fact that friendships should be based on virtue and cannot be based on pleasure *Lael. 8, 20-1, 26-32*; and on the connection between friendship and virtue *Lael. 83-5* (even though in these passages Cicero is explicitly committed to a less demanding conception of virtue than the orthodox Stoic one).

itself between virtue and pleasure is a recurrent theme in Cicero's work. This raises the question to what extent the *Chrysippea divisio* has determined Cicero's thought and the structure of his writings. This question has been extensively addressed by Lévy, who has pointed out that Cicero often uses what we have called the *Chrysippea divisio* in a rather un-Chrysippean way.³² For whereas Chrysippus used it to show that the Academics and Peripatetics were actually no better than the Epicureans, Cicero repeatedly uses it to lump together all the 'good guys' (the Academy, the Peripatos and the Stoa) to oppose them to Epicurus.³³ Insofar as Cicero is usually rather favourably disposed towards the syncretistic tendencies of Antiochus this analysis is basically correct, but concerning the role of the *divisio* proper some caveats are in order.

First, what we call the *Chrysippea divisio* does not serve as a 'doxographical skeleton' or frame of *doxai* in the same obvious way as the *Carneadea divisio* does throughout Cicero's writings. We should recall in this connection that we are dealing with a *divisio* which represents the final stage of a dialectical procedure, rather than a first, more or less complete overview. And since the opposition between virtue and pleasure was characteristic of both Antiochean and Stoic ethics—the two ethical systems that appear to have been most congenial to him—it is only natural that Cicero often refers to it, so that we need not suppose that in doing so he was always consciously applying the Chrysippean scheme. Still less, I believe, should we be prepared to speak of the influence (or even the presence) of the *Chrysippea divisio* where its distinctive *formal* characteristic, viz. its particular dilemmatic (or trilemmatic) structure, is absent.

Two examples may serve to illustrate this point. First, it has been argued that because of the predominant role accorded to the Stoic *telos* of *honestas* the *divisio* in Cato's speech at *Fin.* III.30-1 should be regarded as a combination of the divisions of Chrysippus and Carneades.³⁴ But the options which are ticked off are clearly the *doxai* of the *Carneadea divisio* (on which see the next section), not those of the much more simple trilemma or dilemma of the *Chrysippea divisio*. This strongly suggests that the formal model

³² Lévy (1992) 350-2, 372-6.

³³ Cf. e.g. *Leg.* I.37-8, *Off.* I.6.

³⁴ Thus Lévy (1992) 350-1: 'En fait, Caton lui-même utilise une *divisio* mixte, qui combine celle du scholarque stoïcien et celle de Carnéade'.

Cicero had in mind here was the *Carneadean* division. Of course he *used* this *divisio* in this particular case to bring out the superiority of the Stoic position (after all this is Cato's speech!), but this need indicate no more than that a list of *doxai* may be adapted to the exigencies of a context. Ascribing the doubtlessly Stoic tenor of this passage to the *Chrysippea divisio* (allegedly being interwoven with its Carneadean counterpart) seems to me tantamount to confusing form and content.

A second example is furnished by *Fin.* II.35 where, again, the *doxai* of the *Carneadea divisio*, *not* those of the *Chrysippea divisio*, are being listed (although admittedly in a somewhat unusual sequence, for which see my remarks in the next section). It is true that Cicero regroups these Carneadean *doxai* at *Fin.* II.35 by distinguishing (1) those Ends that do not include *honestas* at all, (2) those that combine it with any other item, and (3) the theory which *exclusively* recognizes virtue as the End. But even though Cicero no doubt adopts this strategy to highlight the relatively isolated position of Epicurus, whom he is here attacking from a predominantly Stoic perspective, the formal resemblances between this threefold regrouping and the *Chrysippea divisio* are only slight, since group (2) has no counterpart in Chrysippus, who only recognized the combination of virtue and *pleasure* as one of the three alternatives. It would appear, then, that also in this case we are dealing with a division which has the *formal* characteristics of the *Carneadea divisio*, but is being *used* according to the requirements of the context (an attack against Epicurean ethics from a predominantly Stoic perspective).³⁵

We may now try to draw some threads together. First of all, the threefold or twofold *Chrysippea divisio* was itself the result of the first stage of a dialectical procedure starting out from a larger list of options which Chrysippus may conceivably have drawn up himself, but which may equally well have been a standard list in contemporary ethical discussions. The aim of this procedure was apparently to subsume a number of ethical theories under one common heading (hedonism), thus facilitating their refutation. This refutation was undertaken at a second stage, where it was

³⁵ Pace Lévy (1992) 363-4 and 373, who in connection with this passage in *Fin.* II speaks (363) of 'un cas précis, qui a cette particularité de juxtaposer la *Carneadea divisio* et celle fondée sur l'*honestas*', and (373) of 'une version de la *Chrysippea divisio* élaborée dans l'Académie'.

shown that with pleasure instead of *honestas* as the End the various traditional virtues as well as social phenomena like friendship would be annulled. According to the information provided by the surviving fragments as to Chrysippus' dialectical method, this procedure was primarily used to strengthen the apprehensions (*καταλήψεις*) of students, and to prevent those apprehensions from being diverted. Accordingly, in the case of the dilemmatic *Chrysippea divisio*, one of its lemmata was most definitely supposed to be accompanied by *comprehensio* (it is important to keep this in mind when it comes to assessing Cicero's use of the *Chrysippea divisio* in the *Lucullus*, more on which in section 4 below). Finally, although the opposition between virtue and pleasure plays an important role in various passages throughout Cicero's works we should, in view of the distinction between form and content, be careful not to explain these passages too readily as the result of a merely formal procedure, i.e. as examples of a more or less mechanical application of the Chrysippean division by Cicero.

III. *The Carneadea divisio in Cicero's works*

The section on ethics in Cicero's speech in the *Lucullus* also contains one of Cicero's versions of the *Carneadea divisio*. This Carneadean *diaeresis* shows a number of interesting resemblances with the comparatively elaborate division from which, according to *Luc.* 138, the *Chrysippea divisio* was derived. It is also itself much more elaborate than the simple dilemmatic *divisio* of Chrysippus, and it is probably for this reason that it serves more prominently, albeit in slightly different versions, as a kind of *aide-mémoire* in Cicero's ethical works. We may assume that Cicero knew this *Carneadea divisio* from Antiochus of Ascalon, who at *Fin.* V.16 is said to have been particularly fond of applying it.³⁶ In addition the division may also have been recorded by Clitomachus, whom Cicero certainly read. The most elaborate version, presented at *Fin.* V.16-8,³⁷

³⁶ *Fin.* V.16: 'Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet'.

³⁷ The most important versions are to be found at *Fin.* V.16-8, *Luc.* 130-1, *Fin.* II.34-5, *Fin.* III.30-1, and *Tusc.* V.84; for more detailed discussions see Döring (1893) and Lévy (1992). Accounts of the *Carneadea divisio* should be based on Cicero's versions only. The alleged 'Greek versions' of Arius Didymus and Clement of Alexandria (overview at Döring 1893) are in fact divisions which

happens to be also the one version of which the Carneadean provenance is explicitly asserted, whereas Cicero here even informs us about the context in which Carneades drew it up—information which he does not present in the case of the other versions which we find elsewhere in his works. We may be reasonably confident, therefore, that this version more or less accurately represents the Carneadean original.³⁸

We shall accordingly take this version as the starting-point for our discussion—a discussion which will be a bit selective and focus exclusively on those aspects which to my mind have as yet not been sufficiently explained.³⁹ I shall first discuss the structure and contents of this division, and the way it is connected to its Chrysippean counterpart. I shall add a few observations on the function of this *divisio* in Cicero's works, venturing to suggest a plausible account of the differences between the various versions in terms of their dialectical *use* by Cicero.

First, then, the structure and context of the *Carneadea divisio*. The account at *Fin.* V.16-8 opens with the claim that the discussion of the right End is closely connected with the various possible views concerning the earliest natural instincts.⁴⁰ Since these instincts are

are partly made up along different lines (i.e. according to different criteria), and they include a lot of material that postdates Carneades.

³⁸ It is of course theoretically possible that the other, less elaborate versions in Cicero (on which see further below, n. 52) represent a different form in which Carneades *himself* put forward his division on other occasions (as was suggested to me by Malcolm Schofield), but here again we should remember that Carneades did not leave anything in writing, and that it is not very likely that various versions of his division were transmitted orally in their original form. Moreover, it is a striking fact that the other 'versions' of the *Carneadea divisio* in Cicero do not bear Carneades' name. I am unable to go along with Glucker (1978) 57, who believes that it is the version of the *Lucullus* that comes closest to the Carneadean original. His reason for believing this—viz. that Cicero is here 'most likely' reporting the version of the school of Clitomachus because he mentions Clitomachus several times in the dialogue—appears to me to be entirely speculative.

³⁹ We cannot discuss them all in detail, but cf. the studies referred to above, n. 37. Also the curious fact that Cicero often associates the *Carneadea divisio* with a set of views which do not belong to the division properly speaking, but which were apparently frequently discussed in the same context, will be left undiscussed; for a discussion of these 'sententiae explosae' or 'reiectae' see Lévy (1980), and (1992) 364-72. Neither need we discuss whether or not the obviously schematized *doxai* here ascribed to the various Hellenistic thinkers adequately represent the spirit of their original views; but see e.g. Striker (1991) 50-61 = (1996) 261-70 on the question of whether the Stoics are treated fairly.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Fin.* V.17: 'Totius enim quaestionis eius quae habetur de finibus

either thought to be directed towards pleasure or towards freedom from suffering or towards the primary natural objects, and since the *telos* consists either in the pursuit or in the actual obtainment of any of these, we end up, on Carneades' scheme, with the following six possible simple Ends (with name-labels attached in most cases):

- (1) the *pursuit* of *pleasure* (not actually defended)
- (2) the *pursuit* of *freedom from suffering* (not actually defended)
- (3) the *pursuit* of the *primary natural objects* (the Stoics)
- (4) the actual *obtainment* of *pleasure* (Aristippus)
- (5) the actual *obtainment* of *freedom from suffering* (Hieronymus)
- (6) the actual *obtainment* of the *primary natural objects* (Carneades *disserendi causa*)

It is a striking feature of this *diaeresis* that options (1)-(3) are all presented as different conceptions of the *honestum* or *honestas* (V.19), although of these only option (3) has as a matter of fact been defended. The *honestum* as such can also be one of the constituents of a complex End, in which case it can be combined with either pleasure or freedom from pain or the primary natural objects, so that we end up with three possible complex Ends:

- (7) the *honestum* plus *pleasure* (Calliphon and Dinomachus)
- (8) the *honestum* plus *freedom from suffering* (Diodorus)
- (9) the *honestum* plus the *primary natural objects* ('antiqui' = Aristotelians and Platonists)

It is worth recalling, to begin with, that Cicero explicitly informs us that Carneades constructed part of this *divisio* himself. Wanting to set out a list not only of those views that had *de facto* been defended, but of all views that *might in principle be defended*, he took his starting-point in what we might call the naturalistic basis of Hellenistic ethics, that is to say in the necessary connection between one's view of the *telos* and one's conception of the first natural impulses. This approach may well have been intended, as Lévy has argued, to show to what extent the Stoic *telos* was basically different from other *telê*, and rather counter-intuitive insofar as it

bonorum et malorum, cum quaeritur in his quid sit extremum, quid ultimum, fons reperiendus est in quo sint prima invitamenta naturae; quo invento omnis ab eo quasi capite de summo bono et malo disputatio ducitur'.

fails to value the actual obtainment of that which people naturally strive after.⁴¹ Apart from this, however, Carneades was probably also simply interested in covering *all* views that were defensible (defensible, that is, on naturalistic principles), because this allowed him to advocate a reasoned *epochê* by arguing *pro* and *contra* in each single case. In his actual application of the *divisio* scepticism and anti-Stoicism probably went happily together.

At any rate we can see clearly that options (1), (2) and (6) owe their existence to Carneades' own dialectical objectives. Options (1) and (2) are presented as merely possible views, i.e. they had not been defended in actual fact. Option (6) was only defended by Carneades himself, and even then not *in propria persona*, but as a dialectical alternative to the Stoic view. If we detract these three Carneadean 'constructs' from the *divisio* as transmitted by Cicero, we end up with a 'core' of six views which *had* actually been put forward by others, three of them representing a single, and a further three representing a complex End. These views are:

- (3) virtue
- (4) pleasure
- (5) freedom from suffering
- (7) virtue plus pleasure
- (8) virtue plus freedom from suffering
- (9) virtue plus the primary natural objects

These are indeed the very same *doxai* that Chrysippus had before him according to *Luc.* 138. The most natural conclusion is that Carneades did not draw up this list all by himself, but that he either took it over from Chrysippus—a possibility which should certainly be envisaged, in view of the extent to which Carneades' philosophy appears to have been stamped (even if negatively) by the issues discussed by Chrysippus—or that he had the same list of *doxai* in mind (or even actually before him in written form) that

⁴¹ Cf. Lévy (1992) 355-6. At any rate Cicero makes it quite clear that Carneades introduced his own position (number (6) in our overview) in a dialectical context (*Fin.* V.20: 'non ille quidem auctor sed defensor disserendi causa'), presumably to oppose the Stoics. We may add that also the other position which Carneades is known to have vigorously defended (cf. *Luc.* 139), viz. that of Calliphon and Dinomachus (*telos* = *honestas* plus pleasure), may have been primarily used as a stick to beat the Stoics. After all Chrysippus had regarded this position as the most easy to refute among the three *doxai* of his final division.

had been used by Chrysippus. In either case the original list, which as we have seen was dialectically *reduced* by Chrysippus to facilitate the refutation of rival views, was dialectically *enlarged* by Carneades to serve *his* dialectical purposes.

At this point we may pause to consider a possible objection to our account of the original form of the *Carneadea divisio*. Carlos Lévy has argued that the three composite Ends (our items (7), (8), and (9)) were added to Carneades' division only at a later stage and not by Carneades himself.⁴² Lévy's main argument concerns the conception of *honestas* which constitutes the common denominator of the three complex views and which, he argues, would not naturally seem to fit the, allegedly typically Stoic, notion of *honestas* which occurs in the section dealing with the simple views.⁴³ To this it may be objected that the first part of the division does *not* appear to use the concept of *honestas* in the specifically Stoic sense either. Rather, the word 'honestas' is used to denote *all* Ends that concern the *pursuit* of something, as opposed to its actual attainment, be that something pleasure, freedom from suffering, or the *prima naturae*.

From whichever [of the three *possible* objects, i.e. pleasure, freedom from pain, or *prima naturae*] it [i.e. Prudence] has decided to be the object of the primary natural impulses, will arise a theory about the right and about the *honestum* which may correspond with one of the three objects aforesaid. Thus the *honestum* will consist either in aiming all our actions at pleasure, even though one may not succeed in attaining it; or at the absence of suffering, even though one is unable to secure it; or at getting the things in accordance with nature, even though one does not attain any of them.⁴⁴

Carneades is thus seen to be working with a fairly general conception of *honestas* in the first part of his division, a conception which he may well have thought to be sufficiently vague to be applicable

⁴² Cf. Lévy (1992) 357, who argues that the three complex views were first attached by Antiochus of Ascalon, whose philosophy is behind the account of *Fin.* V anyway, and who was eager to lump together the views of Academics, Peripatetics and Stoics under *doxa* number (9).

⁴³ Cf. Lévy (1992) 357: 'la méthode choisie par le scholarque pour construire sa classification, à savoir la définition du souverain bien à partir de ce que l'homme recherche dès sa naissance, excluait la présence de l'*honestas*, celle-ci n'étant aux yeux de Carnéade que le nom donné par les Stoiciens à l'effort pour atteindre les 'choses premières selon la nature'.

⁴⁴ *Fin.* V.19. It is clear that the specifically Stoic conception (the pursuit of the *prima naturae*) served as the model for the other merely theoretical conceptions.

to the complex *doxai* of the second part as well.⁴⁵ This is not to say that there is a seamless fit between the divisions of the simple and complex Ends, but then some degree of incongruence is only to be expected—if, that is, our supposition is right that Carneades here combined a systematical (*a priori*) approach (based on the naturalistic principles which appear to have governed Hellenistic ethics) with a more historical approach (based on the same list of ‘real life’ Ends which was at the basis of Chrysippus’ division). In that case we may presume that he took over a list of existing views, both simple and complex ones, and that he enlarged the section concerning the simple views in order to make it better suited for the philosophical use to which he wanted to put it.

According to Lévy, a further reason not to ascribe the list of composite views to Carneades himself is as follows. In the version of *Fin.* V the name-label of the Stoics appears to occur twice, in connection with different *doxai*: not only in its usual slot, i.e. with *doxa* number (3), but also in connection with *doxa* number (9) according to which the End is constituted by virtue plus the primary natural things.⁴⁶ Yet this is only half the truth. Indeed in the division itself the Stoics occur only *once*: their name is attached solely to the *doxa* which identifies the end as *honestas*,⁴⁷ and the composite view of the End as virtue *plus* the *prima naturae* is here ascribed exclusively to the ‘ancients, as we have called both the Academics and the Peripatetics’.⁴⁸ It is only at V.21-2, that is when the Antiochean spokesman Piso sets out to *use* the survey by ticking off and eliminating the various views, that we find the ascription of Piso’s preferred, i.e. Antiochean, view (according to which the End is virtue plus the *prima naturae*) to the Stoics, in terms which are typical of the Antiochean perspective: ‘restant Stoici, qui cum a Peripateticis et Academicis omnia transtulissent, nominibus aliis easdem res secuti sunt’. Thus we may infer that in all probability the hybrid position of the Stoics in this account is due to the way Cicero or his Antiochean source (possibly Antiochus himself) *used* the Carneadean division,⁴⁹ and *not* to the

⁴⁵ See also Görler (1994) 880.

⁴⁶ Cf. Lévy (1992) 357.

⁴⁷ *Fin.* V.20 *ad finem*.

⁴⁸ *Fin.* V.21: ‘aut prima naturae [*scil.* adiungi potest ad honestatem] ... ut antiquis, quos eosdem Academicos et Peripateticos nominavimus’.

⁴⁹ Cf. the introduction to the whole account at *Fin.* V.16: ‘Carneadea nobis adhibenda divisio est, qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet’.

addition (by Cicero or his source) of three *lemmata* with composite *doxai* to the original Carneadean *divisio*.⁵⁰

We may therefore conclude that there are no compelling reasons to believe that the composite *doxai* did not belong to the *Carneadea divisio* in its original form. Indeed, given that these very same composite Ends also occurred in the list which Chrysippus had at his disposal, it would be odd if Carneades had left them out. After all, Carneades *was* striving after completeness so that we may presume that he could not afford to neglect views which were already present in contemporary overviews, and which had already been discussed by Chrysippus. Moreover, we do know that he at least discussed (and defended) the *doxa* that the *telos* is virtue-plus-pleasure (*Luc.* 139), and it is quite natural to suppose that he did so in the context of his own division.

If, then, we may conclude that we can be reasonably confident that Cicero's account in *Fin.* V has preserved the *Carneadea divisio* more or less in its original form, we may now turn to the question to what extent the other versions offered by Cicero are different and how these differences are to be explained. As to the first question, we may note that the 'alternative' versions are on closer view all quite similar as to their overall 'morphology', i.e. they all contain the same set of *doxai*. The version of *Luc.* 128-31, but also those to be found at *Tusc.* V.84-5, *Fin.* II.34-5, and *Fin.* III.30-1 all contain the same 7 items out of the list of 9 *doxai* of the 'original' division represented at *Fin.* V 16-8, to wit the numbers (3)-(9) in the survey which I have given above. This means that they consistently cover all those *doxai* that had in fact been defended (including tenet (6) defended by Carneades only for the sake of the argument), and that they leave out the two merely theoretical constructs ((1) and (2)) which were added by Carneades either for the sake of

⁵⁰ Note that elsewhere in Cicero (*Fin.* III.41, *Tusc.* V.120) Carneades himself is said to have argued that the views of the Stoics and the Peripatetics were different in name but not in substance. Scholars have often shown themselves surprised by this information, precisely in view of the fact that Stoics and Peripatetics occupy such clearly distinct positions in Carneades' actual division. But it seems perfectly possible to me that Carneades made the point at issue in the course of a dialectical *discussion* of the *doxai* listed in his own division. Indeed his claim concerning the resemblances between Stoics and Peripatetics may even have had a polemical *ad hominem* character against Chrysippus, who after all had pointed out the difference between verbal and substantial disagreement, and who had stressed the *substantial* difference between Stoics and Peripatetics (cf. above, p. 114).

systematical completeness or to underline the isolated position of the Stoic *telos* (or for both reasons).⁵¹ At the same time they do not always present these *doxai* in the same sequence, and in some cases the *doxai* are regrouped according to clearly non-Carneadean criteria.⁵²

Now the available evidence certainly suggests that the *Carneadea divisio* had become a well-known list featuring a number of fixed *doxai* which could be applied as a useful framework in various philosophical discussions. At *Fin.* III.31, Cicero mentions several views (held by Aristo of Chius, Erillus of Carthage, and Pyrrho of Elis) which properly speaking did not feature in the *Carneadea divisio* (because they did not fit into its systematics), but which were often discussed in connection with the *doxai* of that division, even if the views at issue were no longer current.⁵³ Now even these 'marginal' views are claimed by Cicero to figure prominently in contemporary ethical discussions ('his singulis copiose responderi solet'). We may presume that this holds *a fortiori* for the (more feasible) views of the *Carneadea divisio* proper. Note, moreover, that at *Fin.* V.16 Cicero explicitly asserts that at any rate Antiochus frequently used this division ('qua noster Antiochus libenter uti solet'). We may accordingly presume that philosophers like Antiochus and—why not?—Cicero himself knew it more or less by heart and could use it as circumstances required. This means that at times certain *doxai* could be left out, that the sequence could differ, and that according to the requirements of each particular

⁵¹ On which see above, n. 41 and text thereto.

⁵² have already indicated above, n. 38, why I do not opt for the possibility that Carneades himself put forward his division in different forms on different occasions and that the 7 *doxai* listed in the other Ciceronian overviews represent such a different version. I would here like to point out, in addition, that the mere fact that all 'versions' in Cicero other than that of *Fin.* V use the Stoic conception of the *honestum* or *honestas* rather than the more general one described in the text above cannot clinch the issue. In fact this is only what we might expect on my account, since these other versions leave out the two merely theoretical *doxai* (dealing with two non-Stoic conceptions of *honestas*) which necessitated the introduction of the general (i.e. not specifically Stoic) conception of *honestas* in the first place. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the two main versions (one of them listing 7 *doxai*, the other 9) both have a Carneadean pedigree would not alter my story substantially: instead of trying to explain why Cicero in these cases slightly reduced the *Carneadea divisio*, we would then have to account for the fact that he here opted for a *different* Carneadean version of the *divisio*. And the reasons I can think of would be the same in either case.

⁵³ On these views see Lévy (1980) and (1992) 364-72.

context different name-labels could be attached to the various tenets.⁵⁴ I would therefore suggest that instead of ascribing different versions of the division in Cicero to different sources, we had better assume that Cicero constructed his own slightly different versions of this *diaeresis*, each time adapting it to the context.⁵⁵

Why then did Cicero leave out the two merely theoretical positions of the *Carneadea divisio*? I believe the answer is to be found in his own philosophical (or even rhetorical) purposes in each of the passages concerned. He apparently used the division for various purposes: to establish the preferability of the Stoic conception of the *telos* when compared to other existing theories (*Fin.* III.30-1), or the inadequacy of the Epicurean *telos* when compared to its rivals (*Fin.* II.34-5), or certain degrees of preferability among existing ethical theories (*Tusc.* V.84-5), or, as I shall argue in the next section, the sheer impossibility of accepting any of the Ends that had been defended as true (*Luc.* 131). In none of these cases would the inclusion of Carneades' two merely theoretical constructs have been of much use.

Also the differences *among* these various 'alternative' versions of the *Carneadea divisio* can in principle be explained with reference to the different (Ciceronian) contexts. In *Luc.* 131 and *Tusc.* V.84-5 we encounter straightforward enumerations of the lemmata of the *Carneadea divisio*, in the one case followed by the sceptical question 'which of these views are we to approve of?' (*Luc.* 132: 'ad vos nunc referor quem sequar'), in the other by the more constructive question 'Let's see what these people can establish' (*Tusc.* V.85: 'hi quid possint obtinere videamus'; Cicero then goes on to show that all these philosophical systems, including even Epicurus', attribute leadership to the soul and claim that the wise man is in one way

⁵⁴ We may recall the famous words by which Cicero describes his own procedure at *Fin.* I.6: 'nostrum iudicium et scribendi ordinem adiungimus'. Indeed, assuming that the three slightly different versions of the *Carneadea divisio* in *Fin.* II, III, and V came from different sources (which moreover each time happened to give the division in precisely the form required by the Ciceronian context) would seem to come close to a *reductio ad absurdum* of this kind of Ciceronian *Quellenforschung* (unless, of course, one is prepared to argue that not only the divisions but also their wider contexts are mere *apographa*).

⁵⁵ For the contrary approach see Glucker (1978) who traces back the version of *Fin.* II to a Stoic version of the *Carneadea divisio* (p. 56, n.151), the version of *Fin.* V to an Antiochean version (p. 55), and the one in the *Luc.* to a version of the school of Clitomachus (p. 57). For an at times slightly inaccurate overview of the Ciceronian versions see Döring (1893), with apposite caveat about ascribing slightly different versions to different sources.

or another immune to the illusions of the passions: V.87: 'nemo est enim eorum quin bonorum animum putet esse iudicem eumque condoceriat, ut ea quae bona malae videantur possit contemnere'). At *Fin.* II.35, however, Cicero regroups the items of the *Carneadea divisio* in such a way as to make them suit his anti-Epicurean stance in this book: there are (1) 'fines expertes honestatis' (including all simple Ends except the Stoic, i.e. including those of Aristippus, Epicurus, Hieronymus and Carneades), (2) 'fines in quibus honestas cum aliqua accessione' (the three composite Ends of the *Carneadea divisio*), and finally (3) 'una simplex, id est Zenonis posita [...] in honestate'. Cicero adds that Epicurus alone among all these thinkers was unable to connect his End with his first principles in an adequate way (since the pleasure which he takes to be the primary object of attraction is *kinetic* pleasure, whereas his End rather resembles that of Hieronymus, viz. 'freedom from pain').

Similarly, at *Fin.* III.30 he regroups the items of the *Carneadea divisio* in accordance with the Stoic tenor of that book, even though no name-labels are added here: those who have placed the Chief Good in the mind (i.e. those opting for virtue) are to be distinguished from those who altogether dissociated the Chief Good from virtue (i. e. those who identified the End with pleasure, or freedom from pain, or the *prima naturae*), and those who held that virtue would be incomplete without some enhancement (i.e. those defending one of the three composite Ends of the *Carneadea divisio*). Cicero here clinches the issue very much in an *ex cathedra* manner (III.31: 'sed quae perspicua sunt longa esse non debent'), and claims that the Chief Good we ought to plump for is the Stoic one, viz. 'to live in agreement and harmony with nature'.

What these passages suggest is that the differences between the various modes of presentation of the *Carneadea divisio* in Cicero's works are primarily due to Cicero's own varying perspectives. Sometimes we are dealing with Cicero the sceptic (*Luc.* 131), at other times with Cicero the probabilist defending Stoicism (*Fin.* III.30), or attacking Epicureanism (*Fin.* II.35), or accepting both, although not on an equal footing (*Tusc.* V.85).

If we take these conclusions seriously, we shall have to face two important corollaries. First, the application of the *Carneadea divisio* has in itself no philosophical implications. Indeed it may be used to support the Antiochean position (*Fin.* V), to support the Stoic

position (*Fin.* III), to oppose Epicureanism (*Fin.* II), to establish a certain common ground between all dogmatic philosophies (*Tusc.* V), or, on the contrary, to advocate a sceptical noncommittal attitude towards all dogmatic theories (*Luc.*). In other words, all depends on context. Secondly, although we cannot and should not exclude the possibility that Cicero found some of these various applications of the division in his sources (especially in Antiochus), these examples at least suggest that Cicero was also himself perfectly able to use it to his own convenience. He must have known it more or less by heart, and we should accordingly be careful not to assume as a matter of course that slightly different versions should be ascribed to different sources, or to contaminations of the *Carneadea divisio* with other material. In principle we may even claim that the mere presence of a version of the *Carneadea divisio* tells us nothing about Cicero's source(s).⁵⁶

IV. *The two divisiones in the context of the Lucullus*

The two divisions which we have been discussing are each in their own way integrated into the ethics section of the second part of the *Lucullus* (*Luc.* 129-41). As for the *Carneadea divisio* this should not really surprise us, since we have seen that it provided a useful framework for many different ethical discussions, and, we may add, its use was particularly appropriate in a sceptical context in which the shadow of Carneades loomed large. However, the function of the *Chrysippea divisio* in the *Lucullus* is not equally obvious at first sight. Indeed, if we recall that Chrysippus himself will have used it in a dialectical context and if we also recall that Chrysippean dialectic was invariably geared to inducing or strengthening *καταλήψεις*, we may suspect right away that in the sceptical context of *Luc.* 129-41 Cicero cannot be using the *Chrysippea divisio* in the Chrysippean manner.

This leaves us with basically two options. Cicero was not only committed to scepticism (of a kind), but also to a certain form of

⁵⁶ Thus, *pace* Lévy (1992) 364, I do not think that the mere presence of the *Carneadea divisio* in *Fin.* II in itself disproves the thesis that this book is to be traced back to a Stoic source, or Stoic sources. Although I would certainly not support Madvig's hypothesis of Chrysippus as *Einzelquelle*, I believe we should leave open the possibility that Cicero here uses Stoic material, which he rearranges in his usual way along the formal lines of the *Carneadea divisio*.

probabilism, and in principle the *Chrysippea divisio* may have been used in the service of either. In the one case we shall have to assume that, whereas Cicero here uses the *Carneadea divisio* as it was originally *meant* to be used, viz. to show that is impossible to make a reasoned and definite choice between the competing ethical theories, he uses its Chrysippean counterpart to show which view nevertheless comes out as at least the most probable. This is basically the way Alain Michel and Carlos Lévy have interpreted our text.⁵⁷ In the other case we shall have to assume that Cicero adduces the dilemma of the *Chrysippea divisio* as yet another example of the impossibility of accepting any particular dogmatic view as true. I shall here defend the latter option, and try to show that neither a closer investigation of the way in which Ciceronian probabilism surfaces in this part of the *Lucullus*, nor a more detailed study of the main themes of Cicero's speech support a probabilist reading of his use of the *Chrysippea divisio*.

First, then, probabilism. Cicero's philosophical preferences in terms of the *probabile* of course do play a certain role in this context (*Luc.* 129-41), but they do so in a rather diffuse manner. On the one hand there is his famous remark at *Luc.* 132 that he would like to follow the Stoics ('cupio sequi Stoicos'), a phrase often quoted to show Cicero's adherence, in spite of his criticisms, to Stoicism in ethics. On the other hand, at *Luc.* 134 he admits to be dragged in two directions, sometimes preferring Antiochus in terms of

⁵⁷ According to Michel (1968) 118-9 Cicero uses the *Chrysippea divisio* to more or less transcend the opposition between Antiochus and the Stoics. He claims that Cicero eventually has the issue decided in favour of 'un Platonisme authentique' by applying the 'argumentation platonicienne' (i.e. presumably of *Luc.* 140) concerning the indispensability of virtue for altruistic behaviour ('amour désintéressé'). I have been unable to find any support for this interpretation in Cicero's text. Lévy (1992) 344-5 thinks that Cicero opts for Stoicism as the most probable view: 'Si la première *divisio* semblait avoir été conçue pour démontrer la difficulté, voire l'impossibilité de choisir, celle du scholarque stoïcien, au contraire, en faisant un tri sévère dans la masse des opinions philosophiques et ne laissant en lice que des solutions de très inégale valeur, permet à Cicéron de justifier son *cupio sequi Stoicos*'. He claims that in the second part of the *Lucullus* the two divisions each play their 'natural' part, with the *Carneadea divisio* being used to indicate *diaphonia*, and the *Chrysippea divisio* to establish the self-evidence of the most probable view, *op. cit.* 345: 'les divisions constituent véritablement l'ossature de la philosophie cicéronienne du souverain bien. Selon la méthode suivie le choix apparaît comme impossible ou au contraire comme allant de soi, l'originalité du texte étant précisément de juxtaposer ces deux extrêmes et même, d'une certaine manière, de les concilier en relativisant ce qui pour un Stoïcien est l'absolu'.

probability, sometimes the Stoics. And when at *Luc.* 139 he commits himself to the exclusiveness of the choice between virtue and pleasure as presented by the *Chrysippea divisio*, he suggests that he is only doing so for the sake of the argument ('sitne sane ita') and adds that he finds it difficult to disregard the Ends of Polemo, the Peripatetics, and Antiochus which, he claims, are as yet to be regarded as the most probable ('nec quicquam habeo adhuc probabilius'). So it appears that in so far as the issue of probability comes up, it does so in a rather undetermined way, with Cicero wavering between the Stoic and the Antiochean position.⁵⁸ In this respect the position which Cicero takes in this part of the *Lucullus* very much resembles the one he appears to defend in the *De Finibus*, where on the one hand he assumes the role of *critic* of all the philosophical systems which are discussed (of Epicureanism in book II, of Stoicism in book IV, of Antiochus in the second part of book V), a role which was of course *de rigueur* for an Academic, whereas on the other hand he makes it clear that he has trouble choosing between the Stoics and Antiochus when it comes to probability.⁵⁹ At any rate nothing indicates that in the *Lucullus* Cicero is primarily trying to present the Stoic view as the probable view *par excellence*.

This brings us to the main themes of Cicero's speech in this dialogue (64-147). Its structure is, roughly, as follows. Having introduced the main point of controversy, viz. the thesis that 'nothing can be perceived' (*Luc.* 68: 'nihil posse percipi; etenim de eo omnis est controversia'),⁶⁰ and after some *ad hominem* arguments against Antiochus to which I shall revert presently, Cicero sets out to reply to Lucullus' speech, which had occupied the first half of the book (*Luc.* 10-62). The first part of this reply (72-112) contains a series of fairly detailed arguments, most of them of a more or less technical epistemological nature. The second part (112-47) deals with the *dissensio* between the various philosophical schools in the three main parts of philosophy (physics, ethics, logic). Of course from a

⁵⁸ This point has been well brought out by Görler (1974) 58.

⁵⁹ What attracts him in the Stoic position is the high value accorded to virtue or the virtues. Yet he rejects the rigour of the early Stoics, and appears to prefer the syncretistic and more realistic ethics of Antiochus, although he complains that it is less coherent than Stoicism. Cf. Görler (1974) 84 n. 2.

⁶⁰ Here as elsewhere in the *Ac.* (cf. *Luc.* 23; and *perceptio* in 30) *percipi* is used as the equivalent of *comprehendi* and stands for cognition in the sense of κατάληψις or *comprehensio*.

more general point of view, the first and second part can be said to deal with the same subject: the impossibility of *katalêpsis* or *comprehensio*, i.e. of accepting or approving a *phantasia* with absolute certainty. After all such a *phantasia* may be either something actually perceived by the senses (such cases are covered by the first half of Cicero's speech) or a philosophical opinion (the subject of the second part of Cicero's speech). A remark at *Luc.* 119 which explicitly makes this point already suggests that even in the sections dealing with physics and ethics the perspective will be primarily epistemic.⁶¹ And indeed the central theme of the whole second part is stated at *Luc.* 114:

This one thing I cannot put up with: when you forbid me to assent to something that I do not know and say that this is most disgraceful and reeks with rashness, but take so much upon yourself as to set out a system of philosophy, to unfold a complete natural science, to mould our ethics and establish a theory of the chief good and evil and map out our duties and prescribe the career that I am to embark upon, and also actually profess to be ready to impart a criterion and scientific system of dialectic and logic, will you secure that I on my side when embracing all your countless doctrines shall never make a slip, never hold a mere opinion? What system, pray, is there for you to convert me to if you withdraw me from the one I am now defending? I am afraid you may be doing rather a presumptuous thing if you say your own system, yet all the same you are bound to say so. Nor indeed will you be alone, but everybody will hurry me into his own system.

The upshot of this passage is clear: Lucullus the dogmatist claims absolute certainty for his views, but cannot guarantee that Cicero, in embracing his doctrines, will not assent to falsehoods, especially since all other dogmatic schools claim the same certainty for their views.⁶² This problem—how should anyone grasp the truth of any of the dogmatic systems with absolute certainty—constitutes the main theme of Cicero's story. The theme is first applied

⁶¹ Cf. *Luc.* 119: 'Quamcumque vero sententiam probaverit, eam sic animo comprehensam habebit ut ea quae sensibus, nec magis adprobabit nunc lucere quam, quoniam Stoicus est, hunc mundum esse sapientem' etc.

⁶² Cicero indicates that the possible objection by Lucullus that he does not claim indubitable truth for his *own* views, but only for the views of the wise, is of no avail: *Luc.* 115. Yet he is willing to phrase his exposition of the *diaphonia* between the dogmatist schools in terms of the question whom the wise man should follow (115: 'discedamus a nobismet ipsis, de sapiente loquamur'). Cf. e.g. 117: 'quaero quem sequatur [*scil.* 'sapiens']'; but note that in the ethics section it is Cicero himself again who is unable to make a definite choice (132: 'at vos nunc refero quem sequar').

to physics: is there anybody so puffed up with error as to have persuaded himself that he actually *knows* this subject? (*Luc.* 116: 'estne quisquam tanto inflatus errore ut sibi se illa scire persuaserit'). Whom should the wise man (or the wise man to-be) follow (117: 'quaero quem sequatur')?⁶³ Even on the most fundamental issues there is so much debate among the great philosophers that it is absolutely unclear which view he should approve (117: 'tantum de principiis rerum e quibus omnia constant videamus quem probet, est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio'). To the Stoico-Antiochean view that the world is governed by providence Cicero opposes the contrary view defended by Strato, who refrained from appealing to divine activity for constructing the world. Cicero does not want to accept either of these two views as true: at one time one seems the more probable, and at another the other (121: 'nec Stratonem tamen adsentior nec vero tibi; modo hoc, modo illuc probabilius videtur').

The section on ethics which follows from *Luc.* 129 onwards, is constructed along similar lines. Here too Cicero is primarily harping on the fact that the truth claims of the various ethical theories are unfounded and that, in view of the existing *diaphonia* among the experts, one cannot be expected to really assent to any of them. These passages accordingly make up a kind of indirect response to Lucullus' claims that our knowledge of the virtues constitutes the greatest proof of our capacity to perceive and grasp many things,⁶⁴ and that wisdom could not exist if it failed to possess an indubitable final good.⁶⁵ Now as I indicated earlier, this ethical section consists of three more or less separate parts: the discussion of the *Carneadea divisio* (129-31), the discussion of the Antiochean and Stoic positions (132-7), and the discussion of the *Chrysippea divisio* (138-41). In what follows I shall try to show how a proper recognition of the overall epistemic perspective from which the ethics section has been written will help us to explain how these three parts fit together. I have emphasized with italics those words and phrases which indicate this perspective, that is to say which indicate that it is the

⁶³ For this use of 'sequi' in the sense of 'to approve', 'to follow with absolute certainty', see also 118: 'Ex his eligit vester sapiens unum aliquem, credo, quem sequatur'.

⁶⁴ *Luc.* 23: 'Maxime vero virtutum cognitio confirmat percipi et comprehendere multa posse'.

⁶⁵ *Luc.* 24: 'Cum vero dubitabit quid sit extremum et ultimum bonorum ignorans quo omnia referantur, qui poterit esse sapientia?'

impossibility of *apprehension*, hence the impossibility of absolute *certainty* which is primarily at stake.

First the *Carneadea divisio*. It is introduced by the question 'what certain knowledge have we got in matters of good and evil?' (*Luc.* 129: 'quid habemus in rebus bonis et malis *explorati*?'). Cicero adds that we will have to establish a *telos* (*ibid.*: 'nempe fines *constituendi* sunt ad quos et bonorum et malorum summa referatur') and that it is precisely here that the *dissensio* among the experts leaves us with little hope (*ibid.*: 'qua de re est igitur inter summos viros maior *dissensio*?').

Next comes the section on the Stoics and Antiochus. After having presented the *Carneadea divisio*, Cicero asks his opponent for advice: which option is to be chosen (*Luc.* 132: 'ad vos nunc refero quem sequar'). As an answer to this question he now states his famous words 'cupio sequi Stoicos'. Yet he immediately goes on to show that he cannot unreservedly subscribe to the Stoic position in view of the *dissensio* between the Stoics and Antiochus, whom he also esteems highly. In view of these differences either the Stoic or the follower of Academico-Peripatetic position of Antiochus will assent to a falsehood (132: 'Non potest igitur uterque esse sapiens, quoniam tanto opere dissentiunt, sed alter. Si Polemoneus, peccat Stoicus rei falsae *adsentiens* [...] sin vera sunt Zenonis, eadem in veteres Academicos Peripateticosque dicenda'). The point presumably is that both are equally plausible, but that they cannot be both true at the same time, whereas there is no way to decide who is right. Thus the two schools disagree on whether or not all sins are equal, but the arguments advanced on either side appear to be equally valid (133, 'quid quod quae dicuntur et acuta mihi videntur in utramque partem et paria?'). Therefore, Cicero argues, he restrains himself in order not to assent to a thing unknown (133: 'contineo igitur me ne *incognito adsentiar*, quod mihi tecum dogma est commune'). The same goes for the way the Stoics and Antiochus disagree about the question whether virtue alone constitutes the happy life. The Zenonian position appears to be too demanding (134: 'ille vereor ne virtuti plus tribuat quam natura patiatur'), whereas Antiochus is hardly consistent (*ibid.*: 'et hic metuo ne vix sibi constet').⁶⁶ Cicero is accordingly dragged in two directions

⁶⁶ Rackham's transl. in the Loeb ed. wrongly suggests that 'hic' here refers to Theophrastus. We are indeed dealing with the same two parties as in the passage a few lines earlier, where we have 'deus ille ... homuncio hic',

('distrahor—tum hoc mihi probabilius, tum illud videtur'), although he admits that one of these views must be true if virtue is not to be overthrown. There follows a series of arguments (135-8) showing that even a number of tenets on which the Stoics and Antiochus agree cannot be firmly accepted (i.e. cannot be *apprehended*) as true (135: 'quid, illa in quibus consentiunt num *pro veris probare* possumus?')⁶⁷ Finally, Cicero asks once more whether his opponent has any advice to prevent him from slipping into forming mere opinions and assenting to something not actually known (138: 'Vos autem mihi verenti *ne labar ad opinionationem* et aliquid *adsciscam et comprobem incognitum*, quod minime vultis, quid consilii datis?')

This brings us to the third subsection, which deals with the *Chrysippea divisio*, for it is precisely this *Chrysippea divisio* which is presented as an answer to the second request for advice.⁶⁸ It is said to leave us with three opinions that can be defended with probability, and Cicero agrees, though apparently only for the sake of the argument,⁶⁹ adding that he finds it hard to take leave of the view of Antiochus *cum suis* which he now presents as the most probable (139: 'Sit sane ita, quamquam a Polemonis et Peripateticorum et Antiochi finibus non facile divellor nec quicquam habeo adhuc probabilius'). And he goes on to adduce arguments pro and con for all three views (139: 'labor eo *ut adsentiar* Epicuro aut Aristippo: revocat virtus vel potius reprehendit manu'; *ibid.*: 'possum esse

and where Rackham rightly renders 'Zeno was a god ... Antiochus is a puny mortal'. A much more elaborate version of the contrast drawn here is to be found in *Fin.* IV and V.

⁶⁷ The fact that this middle section primarily deals with the impossibility of making a definite choice between Antiochus and the Stoics has been overlooked in Michel's analysis of the structure of this part of the *Lucullus* (Michel (1968) 115-20). According to him the middle section simply deals with 'une série de difficultés: toutes les fautes sont-elles égales (133)? Le bonheur réside-t-il dans la seule vertu (134)? Le sage peut-il échapper à toutes les émotions ou seulement les modérer (135)?'; and he apparently thinks that the purpose of all this is to refute Antiochus (*op. cit.*, 118: 'tout est présenté dans le cadre de la réfutation des idées d'Antiochus (132 sq.)').

⁶⁸ Note, once more, that if my reconstruction of the original dialectical context of the division is correct, it was intended to serve precisely the role which Cicero here refers to (although, as I try to show, he does not believe it is really up to that role), viz. to stimulate and strengthen the *katalêpsis* of the Stoic view and to prevent the assent to other views that may have some *prima facie* plausibility.

⁶⁹ This, I believe, is implied by his use of the subjunctive ('*sit sane ita*'); for a similar use see *Luc.* 119: '*sint ista vera* [...] *comprendi ea tamen et percipi nego*'.

medius [...] sed si istum finem velim sequi, nonne ipsa veritas et gravis et recta ratio mihi obversetur'). In the end—a passage already discussed above—the issue boils down to the choice between virtue and pleasure, not a difficult one for Chrysippus (140: 'de quo Chrysippo fuit quantum ego sentio non magna contentio'). If pleasure is preferred, many things such as friendship, justice and the other virtues fall in ruin. Yet Cicero does not stop here. He again adds that we should also hear those who argue for the opposite side (140: 'audi contra illos qui nomen honestatis a se ne intelligi quidem dicant' etc.). Chrysippus' clinching argument about the traditional virtues being annulled if pleasure is the *telos*, is countered by a similar argument on the opponents' part, viz. that nature indicates that the source of all things good is in the body, and that whoever stays away from this norm will never have any objective to follow in life ('a qua qui aberravisset, eum numquam quid in vita sequeretur habiturum').

Cicero concludes by saying that he is most certainly affected by all these views (141: 'nihil igitur me putatis haec et alia innumeralia cum audiam moveri?') The difference with Lucullus is simply that the latter is not only affected but also assents and approves ('tu cum es commotus adquiescis, *adsentiris, adprobas, verum illud certum comprehensum perceptum ratum firmum fixum vis esse*'), whereas Cicero believes that none of these opinions is such as to make him sure that when he assents to it he is not assenting to a falsehood ('nihil eius modi esse arbitror cui si *adsensus* sim non *adsentiar* saepe falso'). So even the *Chrysippea divisio* with its attractive simplicity is not able to induce real *apprehension*—which, as we may recall, was the very reason why it was drawn up by Chrysippus in the first place, and which was also why it was brought up by Cicero himself in this context. Or to put it differently, from the point of view which is relevant in the present context (viz. the question whether any view concerning the *telos* is such as to warrant our unqualified apprehension) the *Chrysippea divisio* constitutes just one more insoluble *dissensio*, besides the *Carneadea divisio* and besides the *dissensio* between Antiochus and the Stoics.

I believe, therefore, that we are entitled to draw the following conclusions. As might indeed be expected given the predominantly epistemic context of the *Lucullus*, the *Chrysippea divisio* is primarily introduced, by way of rhetorical variatio, as yet another *diaphonia* which leaves us with no means to decide—with no

means to decide, that is, in the epistemologically relevant sense of *apprehending* (*katalêpsis*). It thus constitutes one more knot which cannot be cut as sharply and decisively as Antiochus and the Stoics claim.

Does this mean that probabilism does not play any role whatever in the context where the *Chrysippea divisio* is discussed? Of course not. One need only look at the way in which Cicero describes the various tenets: the Epicurean view is said to be concerned with the kind of feelings that beasts have (*Luc.* 139: 'pecudum motus'), whereas virtue links the human being with God (*ibid.*: 'hominem adiungit deo'). These are surely evaluative descriptions. Indeed, as usual both Cicero the sceptic and Cicero the probabilist are present. My claim is merely that the *Chrysippea divisio* is used in the service of Cicero the sceptic and that, accordingly, in the ethics section of the *Lucullus* it is Cicero the sceptic who makes the final point.⁷⁰

⁷⁰ I would like to thank the participants in the *Symposium Hellenisticum* for their critical observations on an earlier version of this paper. I am particularly grateful to Malcolm Schofield and Jacques Brunschwig for their written comments.

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LOGIC IN *ACADEMICA* I AND THE *LUCULLUS*

JONATHAN BARNES

I consider first the conception of logic which Cicero manifests in his Academic works; and then I look at the attack on logic which he delivers at *Luc.* 91-8. I use the English word 'logic' as a rough translation of the Latin *dialectica* and the Greek διαλεκτική. I am interested in the views which Cicero expresses: I do not discuss the sources of these views or the extent to which they are original to Cicero; nor do I offer any opinion as to whether Cicero himself accepted all or any of the views which he expressed.

I

Διαλεκτική, or logic, was standardly conceived of as a part of λογική, the other part being rhetoric. Λογική was itself one of the three parts into which philosophy was standardly divided. The tripartition was the site of two famous battles: a battle over the proper ordering of the three parts; and a battle over the status of λογική—is it really a part of philosophy or should it rather be regarded as a philosophical tool or instrument?

At *Ac.* I.19 Cicero introduces the 'philosophandi ratio triplex',¹ which he ascribes to Plato.² The parts are listed in an unusual order: ethics, physics, λογική.³ Cicero thus implicitly takes sides in the first battle.⁴ By listing λογική as a part of philosophy, he also implicitly takes sides in the second battle—which was neither a trivial skirmish nor irrelevant to sceptical concerns. But Cicero gives no hint that he knows of any fighting, nor does he indicate

¹ *Ratio* presumably represents λόγος; but it would be an error to detect a subtle distinction between a division of the λόγος of philosophy and a division of philosophy herself: see *Ac.* I.30, 'tertia ... philosophiae pars'.

² See e.g. D.L. III.56; cf. S.E., *M.* VII.16.

³ The ordering is marked, if not stressed: note *primum* (*Ac.* I.19), *sequebatur* (22), *tertia* (30).—The same order in e.g. Eudorus, *ap. Stob., Ecl.* II.42.11-3; Sen., *Ep. mor.* 99.9; August., *Civ. dei* VIII.4.

⁴ But in the *Lucullus* we get, without comment, the order: physics, ethics, logic (114).

that there is anything controversial about the thoughts he expresses. I suppose that the second battle at least had not been joined when Cicero wrote.

Διαλεκτική was Latinised as *dialectica*;⁵ but neither in Cicero nor elsewhere in classical Latin do we find the word *logica*. At *Fat.* 1 Cicero offers 'ratio disserendi' as a translation of λογική;⁶ and at *Ac.* I.19 he characterizes the third part of philosophy as being 'de disserendo'.⁷ The characterisation is surprising. For *disserere* usually represents the Greek διαλέγεσθαι, so that 'ratio disserendi' ought to be διαλεκτική rather than λογική as a whole.⁸ There are other indications that Cicero was sometimes inclined to assimilate λογική to διαλεκτική. Thus at *Luc.* 114, in a brief account of the three parts of philosophy, he describes λογική by the phrase 'disputandi et intellegendi iudicium ... et artificium'. No smell of rhetoric here. Again, the discussion of 'the third part of philosophy' at *Luc.* 142-6 does not mention rhetoric; and it is introduced by the words 'iudicia ista dialecticae', which suggest that logic itself constitutes the third part of philosophy.⁹

It is tempting to suppose that Cicero, for good Ciceronian reasons, was unwilling to regard rhetoric as a part—let alone a subpart—of philosophy;¹⁰ and we might infer that Cicero's characterisation of λογική was deliberately done, with the intention of intimating a theoretical stance of his own. But if this was his intention, he did not stick by it.

Outside the Academic writings, λογική is characterised by the formula 'vis loquendi' and divided into logic and rhetoric.¹¹ And at *Ac.* I.4-7 the rude description of the ideas of the Latin Epicureans is

⁵ See below, pp. 143-4.

⁶ Cf. Cic., *Fin.* IV.8.

⁷ See e.g. *Ac.* I.30; *Luc.* 21; *Fin.* I.22.

⁸ For *disserere* used to characterize *dialectica* see e.g. *Brut.* 120, *Leg.* I.62, *Top.* 6, *Fin.* IV.10. But note also e.g. *De orat.* II.157 (where *disserere* characterizes a subpart of logic); *Orat.* 113 (where *dicere* marks off rhetoric, *loqui* logic, and *disserere* is used generically to cover λογική as a whole—as also at *De orat.* I.68).—At the beginning of the *De Interpretatione* Apuleius characterizes λογική as the 'pars rationalis' of philosophy 'qua continetur ars disserendi' (176.3-4): 'in which is contained the art of *disserere* [= *dialectica*]' or 'which is constituted by the art of *disserere* [= λογική]'? The phrase is ambiguous: the context perhaps favours the second interpretation.

⁹ Cf. *Tusc.* V.72.

¹⁰ But note *Div.* II.4, where Cicero—claiming the precedent of Aristotle and Theophrastus—urges that (some of) his rhetorical works be counted as part of his philosophical *oeuvre*.

¹¹ *Fin.* II.17; cf. *Orat.* 113-4.

divided into three parts, a correspondence with the three parts of philosophy being evident if not explicitly marked. Of λογική Cicero there says that 'nullam ... artem esse nec dicendi nec disserendi putant' (I.5). *Dicendi* refers to rhetoric, *disserendi* to logic; the two together constitute λογική; and so here, at least, λογική is not reduced to logic.

Moreover, the characterization of λογική at *Ac.* I.19 reads in full thus:

'[...] tertia de disserendo et quid verum quid falsum quid rectum in oratione pravumque quid consensiens quid repugnet iudicando'.¹²

I suppose that the *et* after *disserendo* is epexegetic, so that the content of λογική is given generically by *disserendo* and specified by the three conjoined clauses—after the *et*. The first conjunct, 'quid verum quid falsum', must allude to the account of the 'criterion of truth'. Perhaps it also covers other items—preconceptions, signs, proofs? If so, then it corresponds roughly to epistemology. The third conjunct, 'quid consensiens quid repugnet', represents the Greek words ἀκολουθία and μάχη, which refer to the logical relations of implication and exclusion and which together frequently serve to indicate the content of logic.¹³ The second conjunct, 'quid rectum in oratione pravumque', is more puzzling; and I find no close or helpful parallels. With little conviction, I incline to the orthodox view that the phrase is intended to characterize rhetoric.

At *Ac.* I.19, then, λογική is itself tripartite. It consists of (A) epistemology, (B) rhetoric, and (C) logic.¹⁴ Ancient texts offer us various divisions of λογική. There is no precise parallel to the division implicit in our passage.

Ac. I.30-3 offers an outline of the Old Academic teachings on λογική. (The account is explicitly ascribed to the Peripatetics as well as to the early Academy.¹⁵) It begins with (1) the criterion of truth, 'iudicium veritatis'. There then follows a reference to (2) 'definitiones rerum'. After that, (3) etymology or 'verborum explicatio'.

¹² The textual problems in the last phrase concern the Latinity, not the content, of the remark.

¹³ See also *Luc.* 22; *Leg.* I.62 (where 'ratio disserendi' is glossed by the phrase 'veri et falsi iudicandi scientia et ars quaedam intellegendi quid quamque rem sequatur et quid sit cuique contrarium').

¹⁴ And so *disserere* must have a generic sense here, as at *Orat.* 113 (above, n. 8).

¹⁵ See 'ab utrisque' at *Ac.* I.30 (with 22); and also *Ac.* I.33.

Next, (4) proofs and signs (*argumenta* and *notae*). 'In which is handed down (5) the whole discipline of logic'. To which is adjoined (6) rhetoric.

Item (6) corresponds to item (B) of *Ac.* I.19. Item (1) is included in item (A). The sentence which gives item (2) starts with the phrase 'qua de causa', so that we may reasonably place (2) within (A). Item (3) is introduced by the particle *etiam*; and this perhaps suggests that (3) may also be placed in (A).

Item (4)—arguments and signs—is prefixed by the neutral word *post*. And then comes the sentence which refers to logic and which begins, in all the manuscripts, with the words 'in qua tradebatur'. The feminine, *qua*, is not easy to understand, and *quo* has been proposed; but *qua* or *quo*, the relative pronoun seems to refer to the content of the preceding sentence—that is to say, Cicero seems to report that the whole of logic was somehow handed down in the context of a discussion of proofs and signs. In that case item (C) of *Ac.* I.19 includes (4), arguments and signs, and also (5), the whole of logic.

This is not particularly satisfactory; for it is not evident that proofs and signs should be thus separated from the epistemological issues of (1)-(3), and it is far from evident that the whole of logic is involved in the account of signs and proofs. (The discussion of paradoxes and sophisms was certainly a part of logic: it has nothing to do with proofs and signs.) Hence it is tempting to detach the sentence about logic from its predecessor: either 'in qua' means, vaguely, 'in this area' and does not refer explicitly to what has just preceded, or else we should emend the text to *denique* or something similar. Then item (4) can be linked with items (1)-(3) and included in (A). Thus item (A) will be given a detailed analysis at *Ac.* I.30-3 (as we should expect, in the context), while items (B) and (C) have merely a phrase apiece.

But perhaps this is too scholastic? After all, it is not evident that *Ac.* I.19 offers a formal tripartition, or that the items at I.30-2 must be distributed among its three parts. Perhaps I.19 offers a brief characterisation of the contents of *λογική* while I.30-2 offers a more extended characterisation, stressing those aspects of the subject which are of most concern to the *Academica*.

However that may be, what of the content of logic itself?

Cicero's word for logic is *dialectica*. He followed the prudent policy of accepting transliterations of Greek words when (and only

when) they were already established in Latin. Thus he says—he has Varro say—that

I shall try to speak in Latin—except in the case of words such as *philosophia* or *rhetorica* or *physica* or *dialectica* which, like so many others, custom has already treated as Latin. (*Ac.* I.25)

In fact, *dialectica* is attested for Varro himself (Isidore, II.xxiii.1)—but it would be rash to infer that Varro had domesticated it and that Cicero is paying him a subtle compliment.¹⁶

What objects does the word designate? At *Ac.* I.32 Cicero writes ‘... omnis dialecticae disciplina, id est orationis ratione conclusae’. He thus apparently identifies logic with the theory of inference. At *Luc.* 91 he remarks that ‘you say that logic was discovered as a sort of arbiter and judge of the true and the false’, thus apparently limiting the scope of logic to a study of the criterion of truth.¹⁷ But the apparent identification in *Ac.* I need not be taken seriously, and the apparent limitation in the *Lucullus* is denied in the sentences which follow:

Then what will logic judge?—It will judge which implications and disjunctions are true,¹⁸ what remarks are ambiguous, what follows what and what conflicts with what. ... The art at first progressed happily enough and explained the parts of speech,¹⁹ the understanding of ambiguities, the theory of inference; and then, a little later, it arrived at the sorites ... (*Luc.* 91-2)

The initial characterization at *Luc.* 91 was misleading.

At *Ac.* I.5 it is said of the Epicureans that ‘they define nothing, divide nothing, infer nothing by appropriate argument’.²⁰ Hence, by implication, logic covers definition, division and inference. Varro continues by observing that

¹⁶ *Philosophia* is found in Cassius Hermina; neither *physica* nor *rhetorica* happens to appear in a pre-Ciceronian text—but the adjectives *physicus* and *rhetoricus* are found in Lucilius and Ennius.

¹⁷ And therefore including item (A) of *Ac.* I.19 under the rubric of logic—something which is also done at *De orat.* II.158.

¹⁸ See *Luc.* 143, where the dialecticians are said to teach *in elementis* ‘How we should judge whether something connected in the fashion of ‘If it is day, it is light’ is true or false.’

¹⁹ *Elementa loquendi*: this has nothing to do with rhetoric.

²⁰ ‘Nihil apta interrogatione concludunt’: I am not sure what *aptus* means in this context, but the phrase should not be confounded with ‘argumenti conclusio’ at *Luc.* 26, which Cicero uses to represent ἀπόδειξις (cf. 44): not all inferences are proofs; and if logic studies inference as such, it is not clear (see above) that it also studies proof.

we, on the other hand, observe the precepts of the logicians and the orators as though they were laws, since our people take each of these capacities to be a virtue. (*Ac.* I.5)

'Our people' are the Old Academics, to whom Varro ascribes the standard Stoic view that rhetoric and logic are virtues. The contrast between *nostri* and the Epicureans might suggest that, according to Varro, the Epicureans do not *use* logic—or even that they *flout* the precepts of the logicians. But I doubt if this accusation need be read into the text.

However that may be, it seems that logic will start from a treatment of sentential connectives; that it will include a study of forms of inference; and that it will end in an examination of the logical paradoxes. Along the way it will deal with the parts of speech and ambiguity and definition and division.²¹

There is little remarkable about all this. But two features, from which an interesting conclusion might be inferred, are worth noting.

First, logic in Cicero is essentially Stoic logic. Or rather, and more specifically, Ciceronian logic contains nothing which is peculiar to Aristotle (or, come to that, to Plato). I incline to believe that Cicero knew nothing about Aristotelian logic save what he had learned from the rhetorical tradition: he knew something about 'topics', nothing about syllogistic. But in any event, *Ac.* I and *Lucullus* betray no interest in or acquaintance with Peripatetic theories.²²

Secondly, Cicero ascribes—or has Varro ascribe—all this logic to Plato. At *Ac.* I.33, immediately after his description of *λογική* has rounded off the discussion of the *ratio triplex*, he observes that 'this was the original form of these things, handed down by Plato'. And when Varro turns to catalogue the changes which Zeno later introduced into the Old Academic philosophy, the only items which he mentions under the third part of the subject concern the criterion of truth (I.40-2). The logic which Cicero depicts in the Academic writings appears to be presented as the doctrine of Plato himself.

Thus Cicero describes Stoic logic, and he attributes what he describes to Plato. Hence—and this is the interesting conclusion I mentioned a moment ago—Cicero attributes Stoic logic to Plato.²³

²¹ Cf. e.g. *Orat.* 16, 115; *Fin.* IV.8-9; *Part. orat.* 139.

²² Recall the remarkable ascription of *ignorantia dialecticae* to the Peripatetics: *Fin.* III.41.

²³ Cf., with qualifications, *Fin.* IV.8-9.

Of course, he does not do so explicitly. Of course, some of the lost parts of the Academic writings may have contained a modification—or even a rejection—of this attribution. But as matters stand, Cicero gives us to suppose that Plato had anticipated Chrysippus. Did Cicero intend to give this impression, or is it a carelessness? I suppose that it was intentional. I suppose that Cicero—shall I for once mention Antiochus?—is intimating the sort of view which is familiar from later texts (from Atticus and Alcinous and others). According to this view, Plato invented the whole of philosophy; everything which later developed is to be found, at any rate in the seed or in the bud, in Plato's writings. In particular, Stoic logic is to be found there.²⁴

The view is, of course, either grossly muddled or else flatly false.

II

The main assault on logic is made at *Luc.* 91-8. First, Cicero plays down the importance of logic (91); then he adduces the paradox of the sorites, which supposedly demonstrates the debility of logic (92-4); and finally he considers the foundation of logic and the thesis that every statement is either true or false (95-8). (But the articulation of 92-8 is not particularly clear.)

II.1: *Luc.* 91

The argument of *Luc.* 91, modelled on a passage in the *Gorgias*,²⁵ characterises logic as 'arbiter and judge of the true and the false'—and proceeds to ask in what area logic can adjudicate. Not in geometry; nor in general in any of the special sciences. Nor even in physics and ethics. What is left? Only logic itself. Thus 'it judges about itself.'²⁶ But it promised more'.

The argument hardly deserves detailed scrutiny. Evidently, Cicero is right to reject the claim that logic is 'arbiter and judge of the true and the false'—if the claim means that logical expertise is

²⁴ Aristotelian syllogistic too, and the theory of categories, according to later authors.

²⁵ Note also *Div.* II.9-12 (from Carneades).

²⁶ According to Epictetus, the fact that logic can 'judge itself' marks it out as the supreme δύνάμις; *Diss.* I.1.1-6.

sufficient (and necessary) to determine the answer to any factual question.²⁷ Evidently, Cicero is wrong to conclude that the only area in which logical expertise has a utility is the study of logic itself.

II.2: *Luc.* 92-4

Luc. 92 introduces the sorites,²⁸ in soritical fashion. 'Dialectic begins happily enough' ('primo progressa festive'); and then, 'paucis additis', it reaches the sorites, 'a slippery and dangerous area' (*Luc.* 92). You start logic with the elements, which seem perfectly innocuous;²⁹ you proceed by small and innocuous steps; and you end with the ἄπορα, and in particular with the sorites, where everything goes to pieces. The argument could be presented in formal soritical garb; and perhaps it was once so presented.

I shall not here examine the content of *Luc.* 92-4. Rather, I ask what the paragraphs purport to show. Cicero begins with a grave warning: 'Since you place such weight on the art of logic, take care that it has not been born wholly to confute you' (92). He ends with the following conclusion: 'this art of yours does not give you any help against the sorites' (94). *Luc.* 92 presumably alludes to the fact that the sceptical opponents of the Stoa used soritical arguments against central Stoic doctrines: the Stoics develop an art which is then used to destroy them. *Luc.* 94 remarks, truly enough, that the art of logic has not yet resolved the paradox of the sorites. These points are serious enough; but we might have expected something a little more startling.

In particular, we might have expected that soritical predicates would have been used to throw doubt on 'the foundation of logic, namely the thesis that whatever is stated ... is either true or false'.³⁰ In uttering sentences of the form 'x is bald' or 'x is a heap of sand', we seem always to *state* something; and yet in some cases it is at least tempting to imagine that what we state is neither true nor false. (I state that deep-browed Homer is bald; but he still has a few tufts of greying hair on his head, and it is neither ('really') true

²⁷ But surely no logician ever made so absurd a claim?

²⁸ See also *Luc.* 49, 147.

²⁹ Of course, they are not as innocuous as they seem, being rent with discord: *Luc.* 143.

³⁰ *Luc.* 95: below, pp. 148 ff.

nor ('really') false that he is bald.) Again, soritical paradoxes are readily represented as a sequence of *modus ponens* arguments. ('One grain of sand is not a heap. If one grain is not a heap, then two grains are not a heap. Therefore two grains are not a heap. If two grains are not a heap, then three grains are not a heap. Therefore three grains are not a heap ...') And the sorites might thus be used to cast doubt on the acceptability of *modus ponens*, which is surely a 'fundamental' form of reasoning and which was the first of the five Stoic 'indemonstrables'. In such ways the sorites might indeed seem to unseat the whole of logic; for soritical arguments threaten to show that a fundamental thesis of logic is untenable and that a fundamental argument form is unacceptable.

Now precisely these two threats are raised in *Luc.* 95-8, so that it is tempting to think that our text does not divide at 95 and that the sorites determines the course of the argument up to 98. But no sorites is mentioned in *Luc.* 95-8; and I am unable to construct a single train of thought which starts in 92 and ends in 98. I conclude, lamely, that Cicero has not made of the sorites all that he might have done.

II.3: *Luc.* 95

'This same art of yours, as though it were weaving Penelope's cloth, ends by destroying its first parts'. The simile may not be pressed too hard; but the strategy which it implies is clear enough (and identical with the strategy in *Luc.* 92-4).³¹ The art begins with certain elements, here characterised as the foundation (*fundamentum*) of logic, and it ends with a problem or paradox which shows that the foundation is unsound.

It is surely the foundation of logic that whatever is stated (they call this an ἄξιωμα which is as it were a statement (*effatum*)³²) is either true or false. (*Luc.* 95)³³

³¹ There is a close parallel at *De orat.* II.158 (weaving and unweaving—but no Penelope); Cf. the simile at *Hort.* fr. 25 Grilli.

³² There is no good English translation—as there was no good Latin translation—for ἄξιωμα. I shall use 'statement', the (serious) inadequacies of which are irrelevant here.

³³ Cf. *Tusc.* I.14: 'As if it were not necessary for anything stated (*pronuntiatum*) in this way either to be the case or not to be the case. Aren't you even acquainted with the logicians? They teach this among the elements (*in primis*).'

An ἄξιωμα is a complete λεκτόν of a particular type: it is a λεκτόν such that, if you say it, you may thereby state something. In the thesis that every ἄξιωμα is either true or false the disjunction is 'exclusive': if 'Either A or B' is true, then exactly one of 'A' and 'B' is true.

Thus the fundamental thesis of logic might initially be expressed in the following way:

If it is possible to state that P, then either it is true (and not also false) that P or it is false (and not also true) that P.

Numerous texts ascribe this thesis to the (Stoic) logicians.³⁴

It is worth remarking that the thesis seems, at first blush, to lie open to various sorts of counterexample. Thus, as I have already noticed, *vague* predicates appear to generate plausible counterexamples. (For if I state that Homer is bald or that France is hexagonal, what I say is perhaps not either true or false.) Certain types of statement about *the future* have sometimes been held to be neither true nor false. (I state that England will lose the test series; but what I state is not—'not yet'—either true or false.) Statements on moral or aesthetical matters have often been denied a truth value. (I state that Strauss is a more subtle composer than Wagner—but is that either true or false?) And so on.³⁵ Some at least of these apparent counterexamples were familiar to ancient philosophers; and it is therefore improbable that the logicians presented their fundamental thesis as a self-evident truth.

Cicero refers to the thesis as a 'definition': 'what becomes of that definition (*definitio*) of yours, according to which a statement (*effatum*) is what is either true or false?' (*Luc.* 95).³⁶ This has caused some clucking in the hen-run. It has been observed that the thesis is not usually presented as a definition: an ἄξιωμα is *defined* as a λεκτόν saying which we may state something; and the thesis purports to offer additional information about the nature of ἄξιωματα. Worse, if the thesis *is* presented as a definition, then it must,

³⁴ E.g. Cic., *Fat.* 20 (ascribing the thesis to Chrysippus); Gellius, XVI. viii.8; [Plu.], *Fat.* 574F.

³⁵ The putative counterexamples all suggest cases in which a statement is neither true nor false. It is less easy to find counterexamples offering statements which apparently are both true and false. (Is it raining?—Well, yes and no.)

³⁶ Cf. *Tusc.* I.14: 'a statement (*pronuntiatum*) is that which is either true or false'.

trivially, be true. Cicero misrepresents the fundamental thesis, and in doing so he shoots himself in the foot.

But this is a misunderstanding. Of course, the thesis is not a definition in the standard modern sense of the word 'definition'; that is to say, it does not analyse the meaning of the word ἀξίωμα. (It is neither a stipulative definition, announcing how the word will henceforth be used, nor a descriptive definition, reporting how the word in fact is used.) But the thesis may for all that be a *definitio*;³⁷ that is to say, it may define or determine the boundaries of the concept. In effect, the word *definitio* indicates that the fundamental thesis is an equivalence rather than a one-way conditional; and it should be written in the following form:

It is possible to state that P if and only if (either it is true (and not also false) that P or it is false (and not also true) that P).³⁸

No misrepresentation by Cicero, and no self-mutilation.

According to Cicero, 'Chrysippus strains every nerve to persuade us that every ἀξίωμα is either true or false'; and he does so because 'he fears that if he is not granted that everything which is stated is either true or false, then he would not be able to maintain that everything occurs by fate and from the eternal causes of future items' (*Fat.* 21). Cicero claims to give Chrysippus' motive for upholding the fundamental thesis; but there is no reason to think that the same motive pushed every logician who accepted the thesis; and in any event the motive does not supply us with an argument for the thesis.

As far as I am aware, none of the nerve-straining arguments of Chrysippus has survived. Indeed, I know of only one ancient argument for the thesis. It is given by Cicero (who does not ascribe it to Chrysippus):

If something which is stated ('aliquid in eloquendo') is neither true nor false, then certainly it is not true; but how can what is not true fail to be false, and what is not false fail to be true? (*Fat.* 38)

The argument is, alas, infantile.

Nevertheless, and despite the putative counterexamples, the fundamental thesis must seem plausible; and it is not difficult to dream up arguments in its favour which are constructed from

³⁷ A 'real definition' if you like: cf. 'definitiones rerum', *Ac.* I.32.

³⁸ But I suppose that Chrysippus was concerned only to defend the left-right half of the equivalence. Indeed, it is hard to imagine why anyone should want to defend the right-left half.

ancient material. For example: if it is possible to state that P, then it is surely possible to state that not-P. And hence it is possible to state that either P or not-P. Now if you can state that either P or not-P, it is surely true that either P or not-P. But, in general, if it is true that either A or B, then either it is true that A and false that B or else it is false that A and true that B. Hence either it is true that P and false that not-P or it is false that P and true that not-P. Hence either it is true that P or it is false that P.³⁹

In general, if it is possible to state that P, then we can produce any number of functions, 'f(j)', such that (i) it is true—or false—that f(P), and (ii) if it is true or false that f(P) then it is true or false that P. Such arguments do not *prove* the fundamental thesis; but they indicate the price which must be paid if the thesis is not accepted. In my example (where 'f(j)' is 'either (j) or not-(j)'), the conclusion may be avoided either by maintaining that in some cases it is possible to state that P even though it is not true that either P or not-P, or by maintaining that 'Either A or B' may be true when neither 'A' nor 'B' is true. And these are not easy things to maintain. The fundamental thesis, in short, is something we might well wish to uphold.⁴⁰

What, next, of Cicero's objection to the fundamental thesis? He first produces examples of items which the logicians call *inexplicabilia* (that is, ἄπορα); and he asks:

if these items cannot be explained and if no criterion (*iudicium*) for them can be found such that you can say whether they are true or false, then where is that definition of yours according to which a statement is that which is either true or false? (*Luc.* 95)

This seems to miss the mark. The fundamental thesis claims that every statement is either true or false. Cicero apparently takes this to mean, or to imply, that, for every statement, we can *determine* whether it is true or false. But this is not so; and the logicians may, with perfect consistency—indeed, with considerable plausibility—maintain the fundamental thesis while allowing that, in some cases, they have no idea how to determine whether a statement is true or false.

However that may be, it is plain what Cicero needs: he needs a case in which it is possible to state that P and yet it is not either true

³⁹ See *Luc.* 97, *N.D.* I.70

⁴⁰ And it is fundamental—fundamental to the logic of *statements*—in the sense that if it is rejected then the rest of logic will have to be revamped.

or false that P; he needs a sentence Σ such that in uttering Σ you may state that P even though it is not either true or false that P. I suppose that—despite his words in *Luc.* 95—Cicero imagined that he had produced some sentences of this sort.

The sentences are evidently related to the Liar paradox—or rather, to that family of paradoxes which bears the surname of ‘The Liar’. Now it is easy to produce a sentence related to this family which appears to fit Cicero’s bill. Take the sentence: ‘This statement is false’. In uttering it I may apparently state something—namely, that this statement is false; but what I state is not either true or false.⁴¹ Cicero does not produce this example; and it is not clear what example he does produce.

Having stated the fundamental thesis, he continues: ‘quid igitur haec vera an falsa sunt?’ The question is rhetorical; that is to say, Cicero suggests that *haec* are not either true or false. The plural *haec* intimates that more than one example will follow.⁴² What, then, are the examples?

The manuscripts offer: ‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis mentiris verum dicis’.⁴³ The final ‘verum dicis’ has no visible connexion to the rest of the sentence. The two words have been deleted; they have been tied in by an *et* or an *an*; and more audacious remedies have been proposed. Deletion gives us a single example, namely the statement expressed by the sentence:

‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris’.

(This sentence certainly appears a little later on, in an example in *Luc.* 96.) Adding an *et* we presumably get the single example:

‘si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris <et> verum dicis’.

The addition of *an* is said to be supported by a passage in Aulus Gellius.⁴⁴ It is not quite clear what the resulting text offers—perhaps the single example:

⁴¹ If it is true, it is false; and if it is false, it is true. Hence it is either both true and false or neither true nor false. In either case it is not either true or false (where the disjunction is, as always, exclusive).

⁴² But see e.g. *Ac.* I.41, where *haec* (if this is the right reading) must be glossed, with Reid, by ‘*talia qualia hoc*’; and in Greek texts a plural demonstrative will not infrequently introduce a single example. Nevertheless, I think that the plural form here at least ‘intimates’ a plurality.

⁴³ Plasberg notes only one trifling variant (*vere* for *verum* in the second hand of A).

⁴⁴ XVIII.ii.10: ‘cum mentior et mentiri me dico mentior an verum dico?’ But Gellius is surely not drawing on our text.

'te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis'.⁴⁵

None of these reconstructions produces a plurality of examples.⁴⁶ If we desire a plurality we must resort to more showy methods. One possible textual intervention will yield:

'si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris <et si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis,> verum dicis'.

Then Cicero gives us a matching pair of examples, namely:

(A) 'si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris',

and

(B) 'si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, verum dicis'.

I am far from confident that (A) and (B) are the examples which Cicero actually gave; but I find this reconstruction of the text as plausible as any other, and I hope that it is worth a short run.

Then why might (A) and (B) be offered as putative counter-examples to the fundamental thesis? Well, we might imagine the following simple consideration. (A) and (B) cannot both be true, since they draw conflicting consequents from the same antecedent. Yet (A) appears to be true; for in general if you state that P and state truly, then P. And (B) appears to be true; for in general, if P and Q, then Q. Thus (A) and (B), taken as a pair, are perplexing: on the one hand, each seems to be true; on the other hand, both cannot be true.

But the simple consideration will not work. Allow that both (A) and (B) are true: what is perplexing about that? In general, if it is not possible that both Q and R, then from 'If P, then Q' and 'If P, then R' we may infer 'not-P'. In particular, from (A) and (B) we may infer

(C) 'non (te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis)'.

That is to say, you cannot truly say that you are lying.⁴⁷

Is this conclusion paradoxical? In a weak sense of 'paradoxical',

⁴⁵ That is to say, the text would paraphrase as: '... Is the following example true or false? You say that you lie and say so truly—is *that* true or false?' (I wonder if the received text cannot bear the same interpretation, if we punctuate: 'verum dicis, mentiris? verum dicis?')

⁴⁶ Unless the second text, which adds *et*, could be construed as offering, in a violent brachylogy, the pair of examples:

'si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris',

and

'si te mentiri dicis idque verum dicis, verum dicis'.

⁴⁷ I follow tradition in using the English verb 'to lie' in connexion with the Liar. But the paradoxes concern false-telling, not lying; and *mentior* (like ψεύδεσθαι) means 'to speak falsely', not 'to lie'.

no doubt it is; for we might vaguely imagine, before falling in with the Liar, that it is easy enough to avow your own mendacity. Moreover, a little further reflection seems to lead us to something even more 'paradoxical'. From (C) we may immediately infer:

(D) 'si te mentiri dicis, non verum dicis'.

And from (D) we may like to infer:

(E) If in uttering sentence Σ you state 'te mentiri', 'non verum dicis'.

(Let the macaroni be pardoned). Now it seems a plausible enough principle that:

(P1) If in uttering Σ you state that P and 'non verum dicis', 'mentiris'.

Hence in particular:

(F) If in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri' and 'non verum dicis', 'mentiris'.

Then from (E) and (F) we might like to conclude to:

(G) If in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri', 'mentiris'.

Take, next, another plausible principle, namely:

(P2) If (if in uttering Σ you state that P, then P), then (if in uttering S you state that P, then you state truly).

An instance of the general principle is:

(H) If (if in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri', 'mentiris'), then (if in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri', 'verum dicis').

From (G) and (H) we reach:

(I) If in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri', 'verum dicis'.

Finally, from (E) and (I),

(J) It is not the case that in uttering Σ you state 'te mentiri'.

— that is to say, whatever you may care to utter, you cannot thereby say that you are lying.

This conclusion may seem seriously paradoxical. After all, it is easy enough to utter the sentence 'I'm lying'; with such an utterance you plainly seem to be stating *something* and what could you be stating other than that you are lying? Well, you can, of course, utter the sentence 'I'm lying'; but, if the argument is sound, whatever else you may do in uttering the sentence there is one thing you certainly do not do—you do not thereby say that you are lying. This is perhaps interesting enough to warrant a closer consideration of the argument which I have just sketched. But it is scarcely pertinent to Cicero's present task; for nowhere in the course of the argument have we yet sniffed the beast for which

Cicero is searching—nowhere is there yet any trace of a statement which is not either true or false.

Or has my nose failed me? After all, the complex sentences which express the several parts of the argument all contain as one of their components the sentence *mentiris* (or its translation into *oratio obliqua*). Now this sentence has a perfectly non-paradoxical use (as does the first person sentence *mentior*); but in the present context we are evidently entitled to look for a paradoxical twist. And we shall quickly imagine someone who utters the sentence *mentior* with the intention of stating that he is *thereby* lying. *Mentior*, in other words, is strictly comparable to 'This statement is false'. And (A), for example, may be paraphrased roughly as follows:

If you say 'I am hereby saying something false' and you speak truly, then what you say is false.

Cicero's examples thus contain potentially troublesome components.

Suppose we now introduce the following principle: if $f(A)$ is a complex statement containing the statement A as a component, then if A is not either true or false, $f(A)$ is not either true or false. I hope that this principle has—or could be given—some plausibility; for I shall invoke it again in what follows. But I must confess that I have not found it expressed in any ancient text. Nevertheless, given the principle, it will follow that (A) and (B) do, after all, meet Cicero's needs; or rather, this conclusion will follow if it is the case that the statement expressed by *mentior* is not either true or false.

It might still be asked why Cicero did not stick to the simplest case: why did he not simply wheel out *mentior* itself? Well, if you restrict your attention to the simple *mentior*, the Liar paradoxes may appear to be a small and isolable phenomenon, a phenomenon which does not endanger the whole of logic. But—or so the choice of complex examples may intimate—this is not so. Nothing, you might think, could be plainer than the plain truth of a statement of the form 'If P and Q , then Q '. But the paradoxes related to the Liar—and in particular, statement (B)—seem to show that even this plain truth is perplexing.

II.4: *Luc.* 96-8

Cicero's argument does not stop with the rhetorical question at the end of 95. After a connecting sentence, to which I shall return, the discussion follows a relatively clear course.

In *Luc.* 96 Cicero adduces two arguments which involve lying premisses, namely:

- (I) If you say that you lie and say so truly, then you lie.
 You say that you lie and say so truly.

You lie.

And:

- (II) If you lie, you lie.
 You lie.

You lie.

Chrysippus, according to Cicero, must accept both these arguments as valid. He accepts:

If you say that it is now light and you say so truly, then it is now light.
 You say that it is now light and you say so truly.

It is now light.⁴⁸

But this argument is pertinently parallel to argument (I)—indeed, this is an instance of ‘the first mode’ (‘*primus concludendi modus*’—the first ‘indemonstrable’). Hence Chrysippus must accept argument (I). Again, he accepts:

If it is light, it is light.
 It is light.

It is light.

But this argument is pertinently parallel to argument (II)—indeed, ‘the very sense of an implication (*ratio conexi*) compels you to concede the consequent once you have conceded the antecedent’. Hence Chrysippus must accept argument (II).

This is not clean; for *each* argument is an instance of the ‘first mode’, and *each* argument may be underwritten by the *ratio conexi*. Nonetheless, Cicero seems to have a case. Arguments (I) and (II) seem to be formally valid, and they seem to be formally valid in virtue of facts which lie at the heart of Chrysippus’ logic. Yet Chrysippus, it appears, would accept neither argument. Of argument (I) Cicero asks:

⁴⁸ The received text is corrupt; but the restoration (Manutius, Davis) is certain.

How can you refuse to accept this argument when you have accepted the earlier argument of the same kind? These are Chrysippus' examples—and not even he has solved them. (*Luc.* 96)

Of argument (II) he says:

You deny that you can either accept it or reject it. Then how can you accept the earlier argument? (*ibid.*)

(Cicero thus appears to make a subtle distinction: Chrysippus *rejects* argument (I); he *neither accepts nor rejects* argument (II). But I can see no explanation for such a subtlety, and I suppose that its appearance in the text is unintentional.)

Next, in *Luc.* 97, Cicero records the logicians' last throw: 'they demand that these *inexplicabilia* be treated as exceptions'. Cicero will not cede the demand. After all, when Epicurus demands an exception to the law of excluded middle, 'the logicians—I mean Antiochus and the Stoics—' will have none of it. Epicurus is represented as suggesting that there are exceptional statements of the form 'Either P or not-P': statements of this form which refer to contingent facts about the future are not either true or false. The logicians reply that

he overthrows the whole of logic. For if a disjunction composed of contradictories (*e contrariis*)—I call propositions contradictories when one of them affirms and the other denies—if such a disjunction can be false, then no disjunction is true. (*Luc.* 97)

Taught by such stern masters—so Cicero concludes in 98—he will insist that if 'If it is light, it is light' is true, then so too is 'If you lie, you lie'. After all, every statement of the form 'If P, then P' is true.

By *Luc.* 98 Cicero has returned to statements; and although he does not explicitly say so, it is plausible to suppose that he offers

'si mentiris, mentiris'

as a further counterexample to the fundamental thesis of the logicians. Is it a counterexample? What is the connexion between the fundamental thesis and arguments (I) and (II)? Why should Chrysippus have felt uneasy about arguments (I) and (II)?

Cicero implies that the logicians themselves did not accept that

'si mentiris, mentiris'

was true. But he does not explain what difficulty or danger they found in it. I suppose that the principle which I aired a few pages ago lies beneath the text: if we can assign no truth-value to *mentiris*

then we can assign no truth-value to 'si mentiris, mentiris'; for if the compound is true or false, then its components must be true or false. The disease which infects the simple *mentiris* obliges the logicians to reject

'si mentiris, mentiris'

and hence to deny an apparently undeniable truth. They must deny that every statement of the form 'If P, then P' is true; and yet the very sense of the connective 'if' appears to guarantee the truth of every such compound.

(All this needs no little refinement; for, as I have already remarked, there are perfectly unproblematical uses of the sentence *mentiris*. But the general line of thought is clear enough: find a problematical Liar sentence Σ , and the conditional 'If Σ , Σ ' will inherit the problem.)

As for the two arguments, Cicero does not explain why Chrysippus could not accept them. But perhaps he did at least explain their pertinence to his theme. The sentence which connects *Luc.* 95 and 96 is transmitted in a corrupt form:

'rebus sumptis adiungam ex iis sequendas esse alias improbandas quae sint in genere contrario'.

A common remedy inserts a second *alias* after the existing *alias*; and translates somewhat as follows:

Taking certain premisses, I shall infer from them that certain things are to be accepted, others to be rejected, which things come from contradictory classes.

That is to say, from premisses A_1, A_2, \dots, A_n Cicero will infer both $B_1, B_2; \dots, B_j$, and also C_1, C_2, \dots, C_k —where the B_i s are to be accepted and the C_i s are to be rejected.

Perhaps he will. But so what? Why should such a thing upset a logician? And what has it got to do with the present context? I cannot find decent answers to these questions; and I can find no honest employment for a text with two *aliases*.

I doubt if Cicero means to make a general remark about the assumption of 'certain premisses': surely he means to talk about the consequences of assuming as premisses the problematical examples which he has just given? In fact, argument (I) does take one of the problematical examples as a premiss. Perhaps, then, we should read '<his> rebus sumptis' (or <quibus>). This ties the ensuing argument to its context.

Given such assumptions, what follows? I guess that Cicero meant

to say something along the following lines: 'Taking these statements as premisses, I will infer something which is both to be accepted and to be rejected'. Suppose that, after *alias*, we add not a second *alias* but the word *et*.⁴⁹

Taking these items as premisses, I will infer that certain other items⁵⁰ are both to be accepted and to be rejected—which properties are contradictory.

And we might construe this as a loose statement of the following claim: 'With the help of (A) and (B) as premisses, I can construct arguments which yield conclusions which must be both accepted and rejected.'⁵¹

What, then, is wrong with argument (I)? Well, the conclusion, *mentiris*, follows from the premisses and yet must be both accepted and rejected. It must be accepted precisely because it *follows* from the premisses. It must be rejected because from the very same premisses we can infer 'verum dici' which is incompatible with it. At least, this, I suspect, is what Cicero implies is wrong with the argument. But of course (for reasons which I have already given) Cicero's position here is frail.

Indeed, we might think that Cicero's position is hopeless—after all, why should not Chrysippus *accept* argument (I)? Why should he not simply say: 'Argument (I) is indeed *valid*—it is a straightforward example of the first indemonstrable. But of course it is not and cannot be a *sound* argument; for its premisses, as we have already seen, cannot be true.'

Cicero's text gives us no hint at all as to why Chrysippus was unhappy with the two arguments. But it is not difficult to dream up some plausible reasons. Here is one dream. According to Chrysippus and his logicians, an argument is valid if and only if its corresponding conditional is true. That is to say, the argument 'A₁, A₂, ..., A_n: therefore B' is valid if and only if the conditional statement 'If (A₁ and A₂ and ... and A_n), then B' is true. Now (by the principle which I have already twice invoked) a conditional statement—like any other compound statement—is only true if each of its constituents possesses a truth-value. Hence if the conditional statement

⁴⁹ Again, I have no confidence that this suggestion is correct—other scholars have proposed to insert extra clauses into the text.

⁵⁰ *Alias*: i.e. other than the premisses'.

⁵¹ In fact, my text says not quite this but rather: '... I will draw a conclusion to the effect that 'we must accept that P and also reject that P'.

'If (A_1 and A_2 and ... and A_n), then B ' is true, then each ' A_1 ' is either true or false and ' B ' is either true or false. But in arguments (I) and (II), this is not so. Hence the corresponding conditionals are not true. Hence the arguments are not valid.

II.5: *Conclusion*

Cicero's argument in *Luc.* 95-8 is not easy to follow. There are textual difficulties; and in any case the subject is intrinsically baffling. Nonetheless, some things emerge with reasonable clarity. It is clear, for example, that Cicero's argument is *ad hominem*—and none the worse for that. It is clear that he is trying not merely to produce paradoxical statements, but to produce paradoxical statements which seem to threaten the very foundations of logic. In itself, *mentior* might seem an idle curiosity: Cicero's sentences indicate—in a less than pellucid form—how the malaise of *mentior* infects *modus ponens* reasoning and the most elementary of logical truths. It is clear, too, that Cicero is right to reject the feeble claim that the ἄπορα form 'exceptions' to the general rules of logic: the rules of logic, unlike the laws of physics, hold everywhere if they hold anywhere.

There is, nonetheless, a weakness—and, I think, an evident weakness—in the case which Cicero makes. The whole argument presupposes that in uttering the sentence *mentior* I make a statement, and indeed make the statement that I am thereby lying. Without this presupposition, the argument collapses. But the presupposition is anything but evidently true. Cicero does not attempt to support it. He does not even observe that his argument requires it.⁵²

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⁵² I am very grateful for the comments which were sent to me by Jaap Mansfeld and by Mario Mignucci (who, *inter alia*, pointed out a grotesque logical error in the first draft).

NATURAL CRITERIA AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF
JUDGEMENT
ANTIOCHUS, PHILO AND GALEN ON EPISTEMOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION

R. J. HANKINSON

I. *Galen's thesis: the existence of natural criteria*

Galen thought that, in spite of their protracted and wordy disagreements, there was really no issue of substance dividing Academic sceptics¹ and Stoics on matters of epistemology. Indeed, for all their technicalities, the views of both schools really amount to no more and no less than what ordinary people ordinarily believe, that there are some things which are simply evident to perception, and others evident to the intellect, from which all knowledge derives:

the discrimination of these things [sc. true from plausibly false argument] is reduced to impression (*phantasia*), which as the more recent Academics² say is not only plausible but also thoroughly examined (*periôdeumenê*) and unreversed (*aperispastos*),³ or as Chrysippus says to the apprehensive (*katalêptikê*), or as everybody generally believes, to evident perception and reasoning. But although the expressions just mentioned are supposed to differ from one another, if one considers the matter with greater care they have the same import (*dunamis*), as too when someone says that they begin from common conceptions (*koinai ennoiai*) and posit these as the primary criterion for everything which is credible on

¹ For clarity and convenience in what follows, I shall talk of 'sceptics' (lower-case 's') in general to cover both Academics and Pyrrhonists—where I intend to make a specific reference to one or other school I shall use the latter designations.

² The 'more recent Academics' are Carneades and his school: cf. Galen *On the Best Method of Teaching* (*Opt. Doct.*) I.40 Kühn (see further the discussion in Ioppolo (1993)). Here and elsewhere I refer to Galen where possible by way of the monumental edition of Kühn (1821-33) because in this case (and most others) where later and superior editions exist, they are none the less keyed to it. *Opt. Doct.* is edited and printed in its entirety as Fr. 28 in Barigazzi (1966) 179-86 (although in fact the actual fragment occupies only a couple of lines: I.47-8 K. = Barigazzi (1966) 183.10-12 = Barigazzi (1991) 100.17-19); Barigazzi has recently re-edited the work as CMG V,1,1 (1991).

³ For these technical terms of Carneadean philosophy see S.E., *M.* VII.166-89; *P.* I.226-9.

its own account (*ex heautou piston*). (1: Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* [hereafter *P.H.P.*] V.778 Kühn)⁴

That claim that Academics and Stoics are really in agreement is striking, not to say bizarre: and it is usually dismissed.⁵ Here, however, I am more concerned with a different strand in Galen's syncretism,⁶ the claim that differing Dogmatic epistemologies are united by the fact that they all ultimately agree on the structure and sources of human knowledge, differences of terminology notwithstanding:

that the primary criterion must be indemonstrably credible is agreed by everyone, although not everybody thinks it must be natural and common to all men. (2: *ibid.* 778)

Some perversely deny what is evident to all for reasons of sectarian affiliation, while others will assert what they know to be false to discredit other positions (778-9): but this does not compromise the basic epistemological agreement.

After sketching the distinction between useful and useless inquiries relative to particular disciplines (779-81),⁷ and noting that the human body is far more complex and well-adapted than any lay individual tends to think, Galen goes on to argue, in an anti-atomist vein, that it is obvious that the animal kingdom is the result of creative skill and planning (782-91):

⁴ *P.H.P.* has been most recently edited, with English translation and commentary, by De Lacy (1978-83), to which I am greatly indebted.

⁵ For instance by Long (1988) 200: 'the difference between the Academic's "convincing" impressions and the cognitive impression of the Stoics could only be treated as a fine one by someone who was either philosophically inept or unconcerned, for his own purposes, with the distinction between the "apparently true" and the "certainly true". Galen knew the difference, but chooses here to ignore it.' I defend Galen's position in Hankinson (1991).

⁶ For a general discussion of which see Hankinson (1992).

⁷ The doctor needs to know where the rational faculty is located, but such information is of no moment to the moral philosopher (779; cf. *P.H.P.* V.794 K.: while both doctors and moral philosophers need to know that the powers of the soul are distinct and what those powers are, neither need worry about which parts of the soul are mortal and which immortal). Equally, from the point of view of ethics and politics, it is unimportant to establish whether the world had a beginning, or what the gods are like substantially, although it does matter crucially whether the world was created with divine forethought and providence or not (779-81 K.). On Galen's divine, creationist teleology, see Hankinson (1989). Galen's teleological biology is given its fullest expression in his *On the Function of the Parts* [*U.P.*] (III 1-IV 366 K.; *U.P.* is also edited by Helmreich (1907-9).

so, just as we make judgements about human moulders, so too should we do so in the case of the divine.... If we will say that he does not exist on the grounds that we do not see him, we will not be maintaining consistency with judgement in the case of the arts, where we did not make our judgement that it was a result of art depend upon seeing the man who had put together the ship or the couch, while failing to investigate the function of each part: rather the latter was of capital importance.... And it would be absurd when a ship or a house or a bed has been built in the finest manner but its builder is unknown, to suppose that such things had come to be without art or by chance, since everyone distinguishes between the one, which rarely fails of its objective, and the other which rarely achieves it, and to think of the cause of the construction of the body as functionless and inartistic, while maintaining consistency of judgement between cases in which the artist is observed and those in which he is not. For it is not appropriate to introduce an external criterion for assessing something which we all possess by nature.⁸ (3: *ibid.* 789-90)

The argument from design was of course fundamental to Stoic cosmology (see most fully Cic., *N.D.* II.73-167). The Stoics too made use of the analogy with human artistic skill (*ibid.* 87-8), and poured scorn on the improbability of the atomists' accounts of order emerging randomly from chaos (*ibid.* 93). Nor, of course, were such arguments proprietary to the Stoics: they go back to Plato's *Timaeus* (which Galen quotes with approval—*P.H.P.* V.791-3 K.—and on part of which he wrote a commentary); and at one stage of his development Aristotle too endorsed them (in his own cave-image: Cic., *N.D.* II.95). Galen seeks to emphasize to his own syncretist ends the general agreement to be found in all the great authorities of old on matters of substance (indeed *P.H.P.* has for its express purpose the goal of demonstrating the theoretical harmony of Plato and Hippocrates): and he is surely right to discern, among non-sceptical and anti-atomistic philosophies, a very considerable general agreement at least as to nature's purposive nature, even if

⁸ In Galen's view, this emphasis on the appropriate criteria is Hippocratic: Hippocrates spoke of these criteria when he said 'nature, being well-instructed, does what is required without being taught' (cf. ps.-Hipp., *De Alimento* 15), and in other places where he extolled nature's role in the scheme of things (*P.H.P.* V.790-1 K.: the other Hippocratic slogans are 'nature is well-instructed, and does what is necessary without having learned it' and 'natures are the cures for diseases' [*Epidemics* VI.5.1]; and 'nature is sufficient for everything' also culled from *Alim.* 15). Hippocrates made no rash pronouncements as to the nature of this nature: but in common with all of mankind, he gave the name 'nature' to whatever happened to be our *aition poiêtikon* (791 K.).

the structure and origin of such purposes are the subject of widespread dispute.

Such syncretism was typical of the age, and is to be found in other authors of the period (e.g. the Middle Platonist Alcinous); but its origins may be traced back to Antiochus of Ascalon two hundred and fifty years earlier. Yet while Galen shared some Middle Platonist methodological and historical assumptions about philosophy,⁹ his discernment of fundamental accord beneath the facade of diversity is for him more than just an unthinking manifestation of the prevailing *Zeitgeist*: it is, in fact, an integral part of his refutation of scepticism.

The passages cited above make four basic claims regarding human criteria for knowledge:

(C1) they are fundamental;

(C2) they are 'credible on their own account';

(C3) they are common to all;

and (C4) they are natural.

(C1) and (C2) are closely related: it is because the criteria are fundamental and primary that they cannot be justified in terms of anything more basic, and hence, if they are to be justified at all they must do so for themselves. Equally (C3) and (C4) go together: it is a mark of something's being natural that it is universal (cf. 32, below § XIV).

Criteria in this sense are not propositional in form: Galen is not concerned (at least directly) with axiomatic *statements* which serve to ground a structure of knowledge. Rather he has in mind certain physical and psychological capacities possessed by human beings in virtue of which they can come to an understanding of the world they inhabit, a point backed up by another text central to Galen's epistemology, his refutation of Favorinus' scepticism in *On the Best Method of Teaching*.

It is plainly evident to us that there is something securely known¹⁰ even if the sophists try their hardest to make it untrustworthy, saying that there is no natural criterion: for the compass describes a

⁹ On which see Frede's pioneering study (1981).

¹⁰ Accepting the supplement of Barigazzi (1991) 102.10 for Galen's evidently lacunose text.

circle, while the ruler distinguishes lengths and the balance weights. Man has created these things on the basis of natural organs and criteria, beyond which we have no more venerable and honorable criterion. So if we must begin from there—for mind tells us once again that while we may believe or disbelieve our natural criterion, we cannot judge it by means of something else: for how could this thing, by which everything else is judged, be judged by something else?—will you wish to place your trust in eyes which are seeing clearly and a tongue which is tasting as to the fact that this is an apple and that a fig? (4: Galen, *Opt. Doct.* I.48-9 K.)¹¹

Galen's argument takes the following form:

- [A] (i) there evidently exist certain precise mathematical arts of measurement and construction;
- (ii) these arts could not exist were it not for the existence of natural criteria (i.e. the senses);

hence

- (iii) natural criteria exist.

[A] is an anti-sceptical argument: and it makes central use of the concept of nature, a notion much deployed by dogmatists of one sort or another in their attempts to counter scepticism (and equally one much attacked by sceptics: cf. e.g. S.E., *P.* I.135; III.178-82; D.L. IX.101). But why should a sceptic accept Ai? Pyrrhonists are officially committed to following the teachings of the arts as part of their 'observation of life' (*P.* I.23-4), although of course they do so

¹¹ The comparison of the natural criteria with the artificial or instrumental ones of the compass, etc. (cf. 'rule, balance, set-square, and compass': *ibid.* I.47 K.), recalls the Epicurean notion of the criterion as a *kanon*, or yardstick, and their characterization of epistemology as canonicity (D.L. X.31; cf. Lucr. IV.513-21): cf. S.E., *P.* II.15-6; on the proliferation of 'criteria', and on the apparent equivocation in Sextus as to whether they are supposed to be means of judging hidden truths or guarantees of the truth of evident states of affairs, see Brunschwig (1988): Brunschwig usefully labels them 'adelic' and 'prodelic' criteria respectively. The history of the development of the Epicurean notion of a criterion, and of its relation with its Stoic cousin, and of the Sceptical appropriation of the terminology, is admirably discussed by Brunschwig (1988) 166-75 = (1994) 237-43; see also Striker (1974) 56-63 = (1996) 26-33. Sextus' in many ways puzzling division of the criterion is to be found in *M.* VII.29-37 and *P.* II.14-7, which also distinguishes natural from artificial criteria: on the resolution of these puzzles, one of which concerns the scope of the notion of an artificial criterion, see once again Brunschwig (1988) 162-6 = (1994) 234-7.

undogmatically; Favorinus, a self-described Academic sceptic,¹² offers an account of the best method of teaching. Do not such arts rely on the ability to form special judgements, to apply particular criterial rules? If they do, then insofar as sceptics accept and even practise the arts they appear to be committed to the adoption of technical criteria. But crucially they will hold that they if they do accept them, they do so undogmatically, without any commitment to their being *really* criterial. Only if Galen (and other dogmatists) succeed in showing that such acceptance without commitment is incoherent will the sceptics be forced to accept Ai in any damaging sense.¹³

Secondly, even if they accept Ai, sceptics do not appear committed to Aii, at least in any sense strong enough to imply the real existence of criteria and thus compromise the coherence of their scepticism: for while they may reasonably allow that the artificial forms of measurement in some sense rely on the senses (you couldn't use a ruler if you were blind), they don't, consistently with their attitude to Ai, need to accept that the senses are criterial in the sense of giving us a hot-line to the clear, undisputable, metaphysical truth of things. The upshot of this is that only if we construe Ai and Aii strongly do they have any tendency to entail Aiii—and so far no reasons have been given as to why anyone should interpret them in such a way, much less as to why a *sceptic* should be forced to do so.

II. *Antiochus, Philo and Stoic epistemology*

Galen's anti-scepticism recalls that of Antiochus of Ascalon as reported in the early part of Cicero's *Lucullus*. Antiochus also claimed that if there were false 'notions' (*ennoiai*), or ones which were caused by impressions which were not such as to be able to be distinguished from false impressions, then there could be no

¹² For an account of Favorinus' philosophical position, see Ioppolo (1993), although I am not entirely convinced by her claim that Favorinus wished to reinstate a full-blooded, anti-Philonian Academic scepticism: see further n. 70 below.

¹³ This issue is of course a special case of the far more general, and fundamental, dispute between sceptic and dogmatist about the possibility of life without belief: see Frede (1979), Burnyeat (1980), Barnes (1982), Hankinson (1995) chs. 17-18.

such thing as memory (since memory is definitionally veridical), and nor equally could there be arts and sciences, since they too rely on the ability of their practitioners accurately to grasp the crucial 'mental perceptions' (Cic., *Luc.* 22: see further below, § XI). Antiochus is defending his own dogmatic 'Academic' epistemology against his erstwhile master, Philo of Larissa:

Philo and his associates say that, as far as the Stoic criterion (i.e. the cataleptic impression) is concerned, things are unapprehended [or: inapprehensible], but as far as their own natures are concerned they are apprehended [or: apprehensible]. (5: S.E., P. I.235)

That text is, as Robin (1944) 131 drily notes, 'passablement obscur';¹⁴ and it receives only limited illumination from Cicero:

But Philo, while advancing some novel views because he was scarcely able to withstand the arguments against Academic obstinacy, was clearly in the wrong, as he was criticized for doing by the elder Catulus, and, as Antiochus showed, he slipped into the very position he feared. For when he maintained that nothing could be apprehended [...], if that impression of which he spoke [...] was, as Zeno defined it, an impression impressed and moulded from the object in a form such that it could not have come from an object that was not in fact the one that it actually did come from—we say that Zeno's definition was absolutely correct, for how can anything be grasped in such a way as to make you absolutely confident that it has been perceived and known, if it has a form that could belong to it even if it were false?—when Philo weakens and abolishes this, he abolishes the criterion of the unknown and the known, which leads to the inference that nothing can be apprehended—so he is brought round by carelessness to the position he most wants to avoid. (6: Cic., *Luc.* 18; cf. 44, 111).

Barnes (1989) 72 calls that paragraph 'condensed and artfully clumsy'; but he claims that whatever its obscurities, 'it emerges clearly, first, that Philo *rejected* Zeno's definition of knowledge, and second that he *accepted* that some things can be known'.¹⁵ The first is certainly clear from the text; and while 6 is interpretable otherwise, it seems best to take it as implying that Philo did indeed hold that some things could be known (consistently with the apparent import of 5).¹⁶ Philo, then, abandons to some degree the scepticism

¹⁴ See also Tarrant (1985) ch. 3, esp. 53-62; Barnes (1989) 70-8, 83-5.

¹⁵ Barnes uses 'knowledge' and 'know' for κατάληψις and καταλαμβάνειν here.

¹⁶ Cicero's Latin reads: 'hoc cum infirmat tollitque Philo, iudicium [i.e. κριτήριον] tollit incogniti et cogniti, ex quo efficitur nihil posse comprehendī'; Rackham punctuates heavily with a semi-colon after 'cogniti', which

of the Carneadean New Academy, and holds that things can be known—apprehended even—although not by way of cataleptic *phantasiai*.

III. *The definition of the cataleptic impression*

The key feature of the complex and controversial Stoic doctrine of *katalêpsis* is captured in 6's rhetorical question: the cataleptic impression must (i) derive from some real object and (ii) represent that object accurately;¹⁷ but crucially it must also be such that (iii) it could not have failed to derive from the object in question; or, more accurately, it must be such that no impression indistinguishable from it could ever occur which did not derive from the object in question. This refinement, the addition of (iii) to the definition,

makes the clause 'ex quo [...] comprehendi' express the unfortunate, unforeseen consequence of Philo's own arguments. However if we punctuate lightly or not at all after 'cogniti', the text would say that, if we abolish the graspable impression so that we cannot distinguish between the unknown and the known, we cannot then *assert* that nothing is graspable: i.e. Philo is debarred by his own negative epistemology from ἀκαταληψία (which would, then, presumably be what he had tried to assert). The text would thus ascribe a desire to Philo to assert the non-apprehensibility of things, a desire logically frustrated, however, by his own arguments (cf. *Luc.* 44: 16 below): and Philo would turn out to be more of a Middle Academic (at least if it is true to say that Arcesilaus adopted ἀκαταληψία, itself a controversial question: see Ioppolo (1986), Maconi (1988), Hankinson (1995) 75-8, 85-6). Such a view could be rendered consistent with other testimony as to Philo's views by insisting that he only insists on *ungraspability* as such, not unknowability; or, more radically, we could hold that text 5 merely ascribes to Philo the view that objects are not rendered inapprehensible as a result of their own impenetrable natures, i.e. it's not their fault if we don't grasp them, but ours: a position perfectly compatible with a sceptical refusal to claim knowledge of any kind (I owe the latter suggestion to David Sedley). There are difficulties with this strong view, however: it becomes hard to see what Philo's 'novel views', his 'nova quaedam', would amount to on this interpretation, and why they should have so infuriated Antiochus (Cic., *Luc.* 11); moreover, why should a *sceptic* affirm that things are 'apprehensible insofar as their own nature is concerned'? But the whole question is difficult, and requires much more thorough investigation—and the plain fact is that we know virtually nothing about Philo's epistemological views; I take up the issue again in § IX below. See further Gisela Striker's contribution to this volume, pp. 257-76.

¹⁷ Cataleptic impressions come '*apo huparchontos kai kat' auto to huparchon*': *M.* VII.249. I follow tradition (e.g. Bury) in translating ὑπάρχον as 'existing object', and the examples debated by the Stoics and Academics do indeed apparently involve impressions of objects in a fairly straightforward sense; but it may be that the scope of *ta huparchonta* should be broadened to include real states of affairs in general. Nothing much turns on this for our purposes.

was made by Zeno in response to Arcesilaus' objection that the original Stoic characterization, involving only clauses (i) and (ii), was inadequate, since if there were false impressions indistinguishable from true ones, we could never as a matter of fact know that (i) and (ii) were satisfied in any particular case (*Luc.* 77).

A cataleptic impression, then, represents an object, and represents itself as representing that object (or so, at least, Academics such as Arcesilaus apparently interpreted it; cf. S.E., *M.* VII.430; and 162-3: 35, § XIV below); moreover cataleptic impressions are invariably distinguishable, at least in principle, from their non-cataleptic congeners (*M.* VII.247-52).¹⁸ This is not to say that, as the Stoic doctrine emerges from the dialectical battle, every receiver of a cataleptic impression must perceive it as such. We may possess cataleptic impressions without being aware of that fact, and refuse to assent to them as cataleptic:

whereas the older Stoics declare that this cataleptic impression is the criterion of truth, the more recent ones added the clause 'provided that there is no obstacle (*enstêma*)'. For there are times when a cataleptic impression occurs, yet it is incredible (*apistos*) because of the external circumstances. (7: S.E., *M.* VII.253-4; cf. 10 below)

Cases where such an *enstêma* occurs were much beloved of the Academics. Admetus is confronted with his resurrected wife Alcestis but, not unreasonably, refuses in this case to believe the clear evidence of his senses (S.E., *M.* VII.254; cf. *P.* I.228; compare the case of Menelaus and the phantom Helen: *M.* VII.180, 255-6).

The Stoics respond by allowing that there can on occasion be such obstacles to acceptance, but that this fact does not impugn the overall plausibility of their account. They must presumably then insist that the no-*enstêma* clause does not compromise the theoretical indistinguishability of true from false impressions. Admetus has all the materials to hand to recognize Alcestis—he is prevented from recognizing them as such by the force of various further beliefs to which he is committed. In language the New Academics themselves are perfectly prepared to countenance as long as it is

¹⁸ More controversies press in here, having to do in particular with the history of the Stoic definition of the cataleptic impression, and how it evolved in response to Academic attacks upon its coherence: see Frede (1983), Hankinson (1991a). The history of the development of clause (iii) in particular may be more complex than I allow here: see Striker in this volume, pp. 265-72.

stripped of any metaphysical implications (cf. 1 above), Admetus' impression of Alcestis is plausible (*pithanê*), and perhaps tested (*diexôdeumenê*) as well (Admetus takes a closer look, touches her, and so on); but it is not unreversed (*aperispastos*): for Admetus agrees with Hume (*Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* § X) that miracles are intrinsically unbelievable.

The Academics, by contrast, had argued since Arcesilaus (*Luc.* 77; cf. S.E., *M.* VII.252) that for any impression at all, no matter what characteristics it might possess, it was logically possible that there exist another impression indistinguishable from it which was not caused by the same object (either caused by some different object, or by no object at all: *M.* VII.249). The Stoics adduced Leibnizian arguments for clause (iii)—no two distinct things can as a matter of metaphysical fact be absolutely alike. But even if this were true, counter the Academics, it is not to the point: for what matters is not *theoretical* indiscernibility but practical indistinguishability.

IV. Clarity and obscurity

Central to this debate is the notion of *enargeia* or clarity (Cicero's *perspicuitas*). Arcesilaus held (at least for the sake of argument)¹⁹ that everything was non-evident (*adêlon*), with *epochê* the only reasonable consequence. By contrast, his greatest successor Carneades argued for *akatalêpsia*, but denied that this made everything *adêlon*:

he applied the same method in argument as Arcesilaus, and he also adopted the practice of arguing on each side of a question, and used to upset all the arguments used by others. But in the principle of *epochê* alone he differed from him, saying that it was impossible for a man to suspend judgement upon all matters, and there was a difference between 'non-evident (*adêlon*)' and 'non-apprehensible (*akatalêpton*)', and while everything was non-apprehensible, not everything was non-evident. (8: Numenius *ap.* Eus., *P.E.* XIV.7.15)

There is no grasping of the natures of external objects, as Stoic *katalêpsis* pretends—but not everything is thereby reduced to obscurity and indifference.

¹⁹ I take no stand here on the issue of whether Arcesilaus ever espoused any position *in propria persona*, although I am inclined to believe that he did: on this see Ioppolo (1986), Maconi (1988).

Philo agreed—and went one crucial step further. Numenius, in his admittedly jaundiced and highly-coloured account of the various tribulations of the Academy, writes:

but as time went by and his [sc. Philo's] *epochê* began to fade as a result of ordinary life (*sunêtheia*), he no longer remained firm in his convictions about these things, but the clarity (*enargeia*) and agreement (*homologia*)²⁰ of his experiences turned him around. (9: *ap. Eus., P.E. XIV.9.2*)

Not only are some things not *adêla* (indeed they are *enargê*): they can even be known, and although they cannot be apprehended by the Stoic criterion, they can be grasped 'as far as their own nature is concerned' (5). The proper interpretation of this position is controversial; and its consistency was impugned by Antiochus. But it appears that Philo is committed to the view that we may advance beyond mere Carneadean plausibility and actually know how things are (6).

But how can we know that? The beauty of the Stoic criterion is that it at least holds out the hope of our being able to ground knowledge on incontrovertible internal evidence (cf. e.g. *Ac. I.41*). The transparency of the cataleptic impression leaves no room for doubt as to the existence and nature of its object. On the other hand, the Stoics were forced to concede that, since we might on occasion not recognize cataleptic impressions for what they are (above, 7), they are not transparent to all, or under all circumstances; and people clearly sometimes take things to be certain when in fact they are not. The pressing questions then become: what, in view of the no-*enstêma* concession, does the Stoic insistence on the criterial nature of the cataleptic impression amount to? And what justification can Philo offer for his claim that no such criterion is required in order for us to know that we know some truths?

Frede has argued with great subtlety and ingenuity that the cataleptic impression fulfills the role it does for the Stoics not because it

²⁰ There was some discussion in Utrecht as to the meaning of *ὁμολογία* here; I had originally translated 'consistency', but now prefer 'agreement', on the grounds that the former is too technical and gives the wrong emphasis (two experiences having absolutely nothing to do with each other will still be consistent). The point, I take it, is that Philo was impressed with the general stability of his experience—one experience tending to confirm another—both synchronically (as when the deliverances of two different sense-modalities confirm one another) and diachronically (as when a current experience resembles a past one in all its crucial features).

carries with it some internal guarantee of veridicality which is available to introspection, but rather because of its causal provenance and efficacy:

The Stoic theory, I want to suggest, escapes this difficulty because it assumes that the distinctive feature of cognitive impressions is a causal feature of impressions such that cognitive impressions play their role not through our awareness of their distinctive feature, but through the causal effects they have on our minds in virtue of this feature [...]. For these reasons, then, it seems that the differentiating mark of cognitive impressions is a causal feature rather than a phenomenological character to be detected by introspection. (Frede, 1983) 83, 85)

This interpretation is supported by a striking metaphor Sextus attributes to the Stoics:

hence the cataleptic impression is not unconditionally the criterion of truth, but when there is no obstacle to it. For this latter, being evident and striking, takes hold of us, as they say, practically by the hair and drags us to assent. (10: S.E., *M.* VII.257; cf. 7 above)

Frede himself cites a passage from Sextus' rebuttal of the Stoic position:

so if impressions are cataleptic to the extent to which they draw us on to assent and to adjoin to them the corresponding action, then since false ones are also of such a kind, we must say that non-cataleptic impressions are indistinguishable (*aparallaktōi*) from the cataleptic. Furthermore, the hero [*scil.* Heracles] grasped the impression from his own children that they were the children of Eurystheus in the same way as from the arrows as arrows.²¹ So since both moved him equally, it must be conceded that the one is indistinguishable from the other.²² (11: S.E., *M.* VII.405-7; cf. *M.* VIII.67)

Sceptics were perfectly happy to take on the Stoics on their own causal ground. They accept that certain impressions have motivating force (cf. *P.* I.21-4);²³ but they deny that their merely possessing such force gives us any grounds for believing them to be *true* (where 'true' is to be explicated in terms of correspondence with

²¹ Accepting Heintz' plausible supplement (ὥς τόξων). Sextus is discussing another mythological case, that of the madness of Heracles in which he slew his own children mistaking them for those of his enemy Eurystheus, a sceptical commonplace also mentioned at Cic., *Luc.* 90.

²² Frede also cites *Luc.* 38 (to which we will return shortly), and Plu., *Adv. Col.* 1121E, 1122C.

²³ Indeed such a concession is at the heart of their defence of the livability of the sceptical life: see n. 13 above.

some real state of affairs independent of and prior to the impression itself). And much the same goes for Carneades' practical criterion of the *pithanon* (S.E., M. VII.166-89; cf. Cic., *Luc.* 101-11; however cf. *Luc.* 36).

V. *Truth and content*

The Heracles case is taken to show that, for Heracles at least, true impressions were indistinguishable from false ones in point of motivation. Here it may help to introduce a little mild technicality. We may distinguish between the impressions themselves, considered as occurrent tokens, and their contents. The impressions are particular mental (or perceptual) events, their contents the propositions which they express (or perhaps more accurately the propositions to which anyone assenting to them assents).²⁴ Let us stipulate (in accordance with standard Stoic logical theory) that such contents do not themselves involve spatio-temporal indices, so that any number of distinct impressions I_0 - I_n may share the same content; moreover, contents (in this sense) are not (like Putnamian meanings) determined by what is as a matter of fact their reference in any particular instance: rather they are intensional items, individuated according to their senses. Finally, an impression is true if and only if its content does as a matter of fact map onto the world in the appropriate manner (i.e. what it represents as being the case in this instance actually is the case).

Heracles receives two concurrent impressions I_1 and I_2 with the following contents:

(C_1) these are my arrows;

(C_2) these are Eurystheus' children.

Both equally move him to action—yet C_1 is true while C_2 is false (*pace* the Epicureans at least: see n. 37): hence from a practical point of view veridical and delusive impressions may be indistinguishable. (Sextus is not here advancing the counterfactual claim that there could occur some other impression I_2^* with identical content C_2 which would in that case be true, although that is indeed the

²⁴ This will do for the time being: we shall see later on (§ VII) that content must be interpreted more strictly and restrictively for the Stoics.

standard Academic contention.) The Stoics are thus faced with two distinct challenges: (a) to account for the equal motivational force in certain cases of true and false impressions; and (b) to answer the Academics' claim that two distinct impressions may share the same content, and yet one be true and the other false (cf. e.g. S.E., *M.* VII.252, 409-10; Cic., *Luc.* 20, 55-6, 58-9, 84-6; cf. § VII below).

On the face of it, their response to (a) is straightforward: not all impressions with motivational force are cataleptic. The fool may well assent to an impression that not only is not cataleptic, but which is actually false as well. But then of course it is incumbent upon the Stoics to offer some characterization of the difference between the sage and the fool which does not simply amount to saying that the sage won't be fooled; and it is by no means clear how they are to achieve this.

As a preliminary, they will of course point out that the sorts of cases adduced by the sceptics tend to involve either non-standard cognitive conditions (the madness of Heracles: cf. Cic., *Luc.* 89; or of Orestes: S.E., *M.* VII.170, 244-5, 249; or of Pentheus: *M.* VII.249, cf. 192), or non-standard circumstances (Alcestis' resurrection: *P.* I.228; Menelaus' encounter with the real Helen: *P.* I.228, *M.* VII.180). The occurrence of delusion in such cases need not cast doubt on the general reliability of sensory impressions when conditions are propitious. Indeed, the Stoics held that five things needed to be in agreement (the sense-organ, the sense-object, the physical circumstances, the manner of perception, and the intellect) before an impression could be taken to be reliable (*M.* VII.424): this amounts to a spelling-out of the *no-ensêtêma* clause (7, 10 above).

This provokes an obvious sceptical riposte. We can certainly agree that things appear different under different circumstances; but given this variation in circumstances, how can we assert, without simply begging the question or indulging in unsubstantiable *ex cathedra* pronouncements, that one appearance is the true one? Sextus offers a rather odd illustration of the point, ascribed to the Academics:

moreover, if anything is apprehensive of anything, sight will be. But in fact this is not apprehensive of anything, as we will establish. For sight appears to perceive (*lambanein*) colours and sizes and shapes and motions, but it perceives none of these things, as is apparent to us once we begin with colours. For [B](i) if indeed sight grasps (*katalambanein*) some colour, the Academics say, it will grasp

that of Man. But (ii) it does not grasp this; (iii) so it will not grasp any other colour. And it is self-evident (*prodêlon*) that it does not grasp this [*scil.* the colour of Man], since it alters in respect of seasons, activities, natures, ages, circumstances, diseases, health, sleep, and waking, so that while we know that it is various in this way, we do not know what it is in reality. (12: S.E., M. VII.412-3)

Sextus follows this up by pointing out that things can appear differently to different senses and from different positions. A painting looks rough but feels smooth, and an oar looks bent in water but feels straight (cf. *P.* I.92, 120-1; cf. Cic., *Luc.* 19, 79, 82); a square tower seen from a distance appears round (a favourite trope exploited to quite different ends by both Epicureans and sceptics: S.E., *P.* I.32, 118; M. VII.208-9; Lucr., IV.353-9, 501-2); a ship seems motionless in the distance but in motion close to (S.E., *P.* I.118; cf. *ibid.* 107; Cic., *Luc.* 81).

These perceptual oppositions are much exploited by the Pyrrhonists (they form the core of their Fifth Mode: S.E., *P.* I.118-23). But 12 is in some ways puzzling. Of course human skin-colour varies with race, occupation, age, season, and so on; but why should that entail any sceptical conclusion? Why should we not believe that these are *real* differences, that in the summer my skin really is darker than in the winter, that it really is more pallid when I am sick, or that in general my pigmentation really is lighter than that of an African or an Indian?

VI. Reality and agreement

Sextus is here relying on the idea, common both to dogmatic Platonists and Stoics, that if something really possesses a property (possesses it *phusei*, 'by nature'),²⁵ then it does so non-relatively; and to possess a property non-relatively is to possess it under all circumstances. That is, they adhere to the following principle:

(P) if x is F by nature, then x is F under all circumstances.

Let the species 'Man' substitute for x here, and it is readily apparent that there is no colour-predicate substitutable for F consistent with

²⁵ On the force of the *phusei* operator, see Frede (1979), Striker (1983).

the principle. Man, then, really has no colour. And, by the argument Bi-iii of 12, if Man doesn't nothing else will.

That argument is designed to shock; and a Stoic should have little trouble refuting it. If 'grasping the colour' of something means grasping that colour which that thing invariably possesses, then clearly Bii is true—we do not grasp the colour of Man, since there is no such thing. But in that case, Bi loses whatever intuitive plausibility it might otherwise have possessed. If on the other hand 'grasping the colour' of something only means recognizing what colour it has at some particular time, then Bii is false.²⁶

Yet that brisk refutation will not decommission the entire sceptical arsenal. In fact, sceptics will insist on a principle rather stronger than P:

(P*) if x is F by nature, then x should appear to be F under all circumstances;

or perhaps (even more strongly)

(P**) if x is F by nature, then x should appear F under all circumstances.²⁷

P** underwrites the sceptical reliance on examples of non-standard perceptual states and circumstances. Thus if any property is to count as real or natural, it should be apparent not only to the sane

²⁶ The sceptic's argument [B] may, however, be defended a little further here: what sort of properties are we to determine by the 'natural criterion' of the senses? Surely, paradigmatically, perceptual properties. In the case of the sense of sight, then, and of the human species, we should be able to determine (if anything), what is the natural human colour; but empirical evidence immediately shows that there is no such colour to be determined; hence, by P, there is no such colour. But if this is undeterminable by sight, *a fortiori* so will be everything else regarding the nature of Man. To refute such arguments, effectively, Dogmatists must show how it is reasonable to suppose that the deliverances of the senses can be refined by reason. The sceptic, in turn, will naturally argue that no such combined tactics are available without an unacceptable begging of the criterial question: see S.E., P. II.63-9, M. VII.354-69.

²⁷ The difference between appearing F and appearing to be F is important. Something may appear F without appearing to be F : the latter locution carries a commitment to the extra-perceptual truth of the impression, and to a belief in its content (cf. Arist., *de An.* III.3.428b1-4: the sun seems about a foot across, although we believe it to be larger than the inhabited world; Epicurus famously denied this: Cic., *Luc.* 82). But we may happily ignore this distinction here (cf. Austin (1962) on the difference between illusion and delusion).

and sober in a good light, but to those in the grip of dreams or delirium (cf. S.E., *P.* I.100-17, the Fourth Mode).

Anti-sceptics (or Lockean sceptics, if you prefer: *Essay* 2.8.8-25) will reject P**: there is simply no reason to suppose that things will present their true phenomenal colours under all circumstances and to all observers no matter how situated with regard to internal and external conditions. Thus once again the Stoics and other dogmatists must justify their implicit reliance upon the fact that certain cognitive conditions really are epistemically superior to others; furthermore, they need to establish that the deliverances of the senses in such conditions are not merely to be trusted from a pragmatic point of view: they are the truth.

VII. *Indiscernibility and content*

But before turning to that issue, let us briefly consider the Stoics' second challenge (b) (§ V above). Can two distinct impressions I_1 and I_2 share the same content C ? And if they can, what becomes of the cataleptic impression? If contents are to be determined purely intensionally, there seems no *a priori* bar to two quite distinct impressions sharing the same content. Moreover, this could apparently occur in one of two distinct ways. Either (a) two distinct impressions I_1 and I_2 might both represent the same object O (I might see you on Tuesday morning and then again on Thursday afternoon);²⁸ or (b) two distinct impressions I_1 and I_2 might both apparently represent O even though one (or indeed both) failed to be caused by O . The Stoics are, of course, perfectly happy with content-sharing of type (a); it is (b) they balk at: or rather they will refuse to allow that apparent cases of content-sharing of type (b) really amount in fact to sharing of content.²⁹

²⁸ I shall ignore as irrelevant to our purposes further complications having to do with the similar impressions caused by the same object arising in different observers.

²⁹ I should stress at this point that 'content' in this sense is not simply a matter of the phenomenal contours, if you will, of impressions: rather it involves commitment to the identity of what causes the impression, which is why I described it in § V in terms of propositions. But even that it is not strict enough for the Stoics: if I interpret their position aright, then my steady impression of you full-face, at close quarters, on Tuesday morning has precisely the same content as my blurry, three-quarter profile glimpse of you from a distance in Thursday's twilight, at least if I identify you correctly and

Here some further clarifications are in order. Impressions, according to our earlier stipulations, are individual perceptual-event tokens: strictly speaking, each impression occurs once only, and the same impression cannot recur. But we may also consider classes of type-identical impressions, where a set *S* of impressions {*I*₁, *I*₂,... *I*_{*n*}} are type-identical just in case they are all impressions of the same thing.³⁰ The Stoics will presumably allow that two token-distinct impressions *I*₁ and *I*₂ may share *C* provided that they both belong to some *S* (i.e. they are type-identical, of type (a) above); but they will reject the possibility ((b) above) that any two impressions not belonging to the same type may share a content. Thus content determines type-identity (although not of course token-identity) for impressions.³¹

This amounts to introducing a referential condition on type-identity of impressions, as well as on strict identity of contents: content, strictly speaking, is no longer purely intensionally determined. But can this be any more than mere stipulation? Is it enough just to say that two contents are different simply because their causal provenance is different? Even if we allow that this is the case, how can that help us determine truth and falsity of impressions? The prospects for the latter are indeed bleak if the Stoics

unhesitatingly on both occasions, or, as the Stoics would put it, if my impressions accurately represent your particular characteristics, or *idiômata* (S.E., *M.* VII.250-1): indeed it is the fact that you have the *idiômata* you do which accounts for the *idiôma* of the particular type of cataleptic impression (*ibid.* 252). Thus (if I interpret the notion of an *idiôma* rightly here) cataleptic impressions are made so by the essences of the object they represent—and those essences, being immutable, make it the case that all cataleptic impressions of the same object share content. But this is a sketch only: much more needs to be said here.

³⁰ This expression is loose, but I hope its looseness is benign; for simplicity's sake, consider type-identical impressions to be impressions of the same object, received via the same sense-modality.

³¹ My distinctions here gain some support from *Luc.* 57-8, where Cicero, in the voice of the Antiochean Lucullus, is discussing the troublesome examples of identical twins, indistinguishable eggs, and so on: if we do not possess a strong Stoic-style criterion for distinguishing true from false impressions, then 'not merely the comprehension of the true and the false, but even their nature will be abolished if there is no difference between them, so that what you are in the habit of occasionally saying, namely that when impressions are imprinted on the mind you are not saying that there is no difference between them at all but only that there is none between their species (*species*), namely their particular forms, is also absurd' (*Luc.* 58). *Species* here clearly renders εἶδος (see further n. 45 below): and the point is precisely that sceptics will allow there to be true and false impressions which share strict content.

are to claim that such content-distinction really is, in all cases, actually discriminable on internal grounds alone. But if content-distinction depends, in Putnamian fashion, on external referential facts, and the intensions of two distinct contents may be the same (contrary to the earlier account), how can *we* distinguish them? How do we know if it is Castor or Pollux (cf. S.E., *M.* VII.410), H₂O or XYZ?³²

Sextus' strategy, in arguing against the Stoic criterion at *M.* VII.402-35, consists first in showing that false impressions can be found that do not differ from true ones 'in respect of the clear and intense characteristic (*idiôma*)'³³ (408: i.e., presumably, in view of the Heracles example [above, 11], their motivational power, their Humean force and vivacity), and then that false impressions can be found that do not differ from true ones 'in respect of stamp and impression' (i.e. their internal contours: they are not distinct in the Cartesian sense). The latter contentions centre on the familiar examples of identical twins and indistinguishable eggs (409-10) which Cicero also invokes (*Luc.* 20, 55-6, 58-9, 84-6). Surely, sceptics urge, the Stoics must allow that there are cases of two (or more) objects resembling each other so closely that people do as a matter of fact regularly mistake the one for the other?

The Stoics' (and Antiochus') response is that such mistakes are corrigible (indeed presumably we would not know that mistakes were being made at all unless they were).³⁴ And they are

³² The latter refers to Putnam's celebrated 'Twin-Earth' thought-experiments designed to support the referential theory of meaning (Putnam (1973), (1975); cf. Putnam (1970)). For Putnam, these cases show that 'meanings ain't in the head': whether or not they are is exactly what is at issue here. Frede (1983) 90 notes (in the identical twins case) that 'it also may be mentioned that according to Stoic logic the two impressions one receives when one sees Socrates and his twin brother would differ in one crucial respect even if the two brothers were exactly alike: if they are impressions that this is Socrates, they would differ in propositional content, since the demonstrative has a different referent.' That is no doubt true: but it is hard to see how an appeal to that sort of Putnamian consideration can be of any assistance to the Stoics in their pursuit of an actual practical criterion of discrimination. This is presumably what the Academics are driving at when they maintain that it is not the indiscernibility as such of the impressions themselves which is at issue, but the indistinguishability of their species (Cic., *Luc.* 58: cf. nn. 31, 45).

³³ The *idiôma* of the cataleptic impression itself is not of course the same as the *idiômata* of the object which it 'artistically reproduces' (S.E., *M.* VII.250; cf. n. 29).

³⁴ Although we might know that there was a possibility of such error in default of any criterion for telling the two objects apart: suppose I have the impression of meeting an individual on the street on a number of occasions:

corrigible in virtue of the fact that the impressions themselves do differ internally, albeit subtly and indistinguishably to the untrained eye, and hence do not share contents. The Stoics and Antiochus both hold, for metaphysical reasons, that, since no two objects can be exactly alike (everything is *sui generis*: *Luc.* 54, 56, 85), any impressions from distinct objects which really are clearly stamped and such as faithfully to reproduce their objects' individual *idiômata* (cf. S.E., *M.* VII.250-2) must differ from one another in internal structure: for such impressions there can be no complete coincidence of content even in the narrow, internal sense. They will differ in more than merely their relational properties: i.e., they will not be differentiated solely in virtue of their having distinct referents. The sceptics here naturally turn to Democritus, and the view that, in an infinite space and time, worlds precisely resembling ours in all non-relational characteristics can, and indeed will, arise; the Stoics simply deny that this is in fact possible in their finite universe (*Cic.*, *Luc.* 55).³⁵

VIII. *False impressions and the criterion of truth*

But once again one may wonder why it should matter if, as the Stoics insist, referentially-distinct impressions are theoretically distinguishable? Is it not enough that impressions be on occasion

i.e. on several occasions $0_1, 0_2, 0_3, \dots, 0_n$, I receive impressions $I_1, I_2, I_3, \dots, I_n$, all of which share the same apparent content C (apparent contents here being intensionally determined)—I will then form the opinion that I have met the same individual n times. Suppose, however, that on occasion 0_{n+1} I see *two* such individuals, each giving me impressions with identical apparent contents. I will then presumably suppose that in the past I *may* have been seeing distinct individuals (although I may not have been), and that in any case I do not know now which of the two now before me I have seen on any occasion in the past.

³⁵ The Academics might also, more devastatingly, have asked what impact on Stoic Leibnizianism the theory of eternal recurrence would have had. If the successive worlds differ only temporally, but are the same numerically (as the Pythagoreans held: Eudemus, *ap.* Simplic., *In Phys.* 732.23-33), then presumably there is no problem here (although of course there is a difficulty with the overall coherence of the concept of the recurrence of numerical identicals, again on Leibnizian grounds). On the other hand, if the worlds differ numerically (and hence so too do their denizens), but share all non-relational properties, then it looks as though we should have indiscernible non-identicals. The evidence (*SVF* II.623-7; see Long and Sedley (1987) 52) suggests that the Stoics themselves were none too clear as to what to say here, perhaps with good reason and perhaps as a result of Academic pressure.

as a matter of fact indistinguishable (Cic., *Luc.* 40, 83-4: 13-14 below), as even the Stoics allow (7, 11, §§ III-V)? They are, after all, committed to the view that the sage never makes mistakes by assenting to something non-evident: this is the root of their doctrine, much exploited by Arcesilaus, that the Sage will never form mere opinions (Cic., *Luc.* 59, 101; S.E., *M.* VII.152, 155-7).³⁶ It is, in fact, a point of widespread agreement among the contending schools that the possibility of secure perceptual knowledge rests upon the availability of some infallible and constant perceptual criterion.³⁷

The differences between the schools in regard to the veridicality of perceptions are clearly brought out by Cicero:

there are four general premisses (*capita*) which conclude to the position that nothing can be known, perceived,³⁸ or comprehended, around which the whole debate centres: [C](i) that some false impression exists; (ii) that this cannot be perceived; (iii) that in the case of impressions among which there is no difference it is not possible that some of them can be perceived while others cannot; (iv) that there is no true impression deriving from the senses to which there is not adjoined another impression which does not differ from it and cannot be perceived.³⁹ Of these four, everybody

³⁶ Carneades argued that the sage might form opinions even though he grasped nothing (cf. 8 above): but whether he did so *in propria persona* or merely for dialectical purposes was disputed, indeed formed the core of the disagreement between the Clitomachean and the Metrodoran interpretations of Carneades' philosophy (Cic., *Luc.* 78; cf. 32-3).

³⁷ The Epicureans famously, if somewhat unperspicuously, held that all perceptions were true (Epic., *KD* 23; Sext., *M.* VII.203-10, VIII.63; Lucr. IV.353 ff., 379 ff., 469 ff.; D.L. X.31-2: see Striker (1977), Taylor (1980), Everson (1990a)), and they did so motivated at least in part by the sceptically-influenced (cf. S.E., *P.* I.100-17) belief that if they allowed that any perceptions were false, they would have to admit that all of them might be, and would thus be robbed of any criterion (Cic., *Luc.* 79; cf. Lucr. IV.473-521, implicitly commenting upon Democritus, Fr. 68B125 DK). Thus 'the images (*phantasmata*) of both madmen and dreamers are true, since they motivate, and the non-existent does not motivate' (D.L. X.32). Thus Epicurus too appeals to the causal force of the impressions as an indication of their truth or reality.

³⁸ Throughout the *Lucullus* Cicero uses the verbs *percipere* and *percipi* in a strong sense, as roughly equivalent to *comprehendere*, *comprehendi* i.e. καταλαμβάνειν, καταλαμβάνεσθαι (for Cicero's introduction of his technical translations of the latter terms, see *Ac.* I.41-2), although he never indicates which (if any) Greek term he intends to translate by them. The obvious candidate semantically speaking is αἰσθάνεσθαι; and it is possible on other grounds in view of the usage of αἰσθησις and cognates by the Stoics in just such a strong sense (D.L. VII.52; cf. S.E., *M.* VII.424); alternatively, Cicero may be seeking to render λαμβάνειν, λαμβάνεσθαι (cf. *M.* VII.257, 258, 405-6, 410, 412). Since the significance of the terms in these cases is clear, however, nothing much turns on this.

³⁹ This formulation is problematic and occasioned some discussion at

admits (ii) and (iii); Epicurus does not grant (i), but you with whom the current dispute is taking place (*scil.* Antiochus and his supporters) allow this one too; the whole conflict concerns (iv). (13: *Luc* 83, cf. 40-1)

Since Antiochus accepts Ci-iii (cf. *Luc.* 106), and since Ci-iii together with Civ entail that nothing can be perceived, he must reject Civ (cf. *Luc.* 99, 101).

Cicero illustrates the point with the identical twins example (*Luc.* 84; cf. 56). Suppose you meet Tweedledum⁴⁰ on several occasions, yet are unaware that he has a twin brother. Then you come across Tweedledee. Since your impressions of Tweedledee will have precisely the same (intensionally-determined) content as those caused by Tweedledum, you will mistakenly assume that you have met Tweedledum again, and form a false opinion. No matter that this error is readily correctible as soon as you start conversing with Tweedledee about rattles and so on: you will have assented to a false presentation as though it were true, which is enough to show (by way of Ciii) that you never actually perceived Tweedledum in the first place. Even if there is, as the Stoics assert, some non-relational difference between Tweedledum and Tweedledee, and even if that will suffice, at some suitably fine level of discrimination, to ensure that the impressions from the one are not absolutely identical in content to those from the other,⁴¹ none the less they have *appeared* indistinguishable:

it [*scil.* the false impression] surely can appear to be [*scil.* absolutely indistinguishable from the true], and therefore deceive the sense; but if one resemblance is deceptive, everything will be called into question. For if that criterion which is required for recognition is removed, even if the one you see actually is the one he appears to

Utrecht, in particular as to the meaning of 'non adpositum sit', which I translate as neutrally as possible as 'there is not adjoined'. Cicero's Latin suggests that every true impression will as a matter of fact have a false congener, which is a strong (one might think too strong) claim (the sceptic seems neither entitled to it nor to require it); yet it is clearly echoed in Sextus' report of Carneades, *M.* VII.164: 'no true impression is discovered such that it could not be false [cf. *M.* VII.154, on Arcesilaus], but there is discovered appointed (καθεστάναι) to each apparently true one a false one indistinguishable (ἀπαράλλακτος; cf. 11 above) from it'. I suppose Cicero to have been following, indeed virtually translating, the same Greek handbook as Sextus here, which accounts for his 'adpositum sit'. I thank Woldemar Görler for his remarks at the conference.

⁴⁰ Cicero own example is that of the identical Servilius twins; cf. *Luc.* 55.

⁴¹ It is worth noting that the latter claim is neither equivalent to nor uncontroversially entailed by the former.

be, you will not make that judgement as you say it ought to be made, by way of a mark which is such that it cannot have a false congener. (14: Cic., *Luc.* 84)

Here and elsewhere Cicero insists that the Antiocheans (and presumably also their Stoic forebears) are committed to the view that the properly cataleptic impression does involve internal markers which are such as to distinguish it from any non-cataleptic congeners (cf. *Luc.* 101, 111; S.E., *M.* VII.252). And this (however it is to be cashed out) is a very strong claim indeed.

IX. *Antiochus and Philo on truth*

We may now return to the main threads of our discussion. Antiochus thinks that it had better be the case that some impressions are not only true, but known to be true. He does not adopt the Epicurean position that they must *all* be accepted as being true on pain of throwing everything into doubt and confusion (n. 37 above); but he angrily rejected the contention of Philo's 'Roman books' (*Luc.* 11) that knowledge of some sort was possible in default of Stoic-style *katalêpsis* (5-6 above; however, see n. 16). Indeed, he thought it incoherent: Philo was taking advantage of a distinction between what was and what was not apprehensible in order to attack the Stoic concept of apprehension, but in so doing he undermined his own argument.⁴²

There are, I think, two distinguishable Antiochean objections:

(O1) Philo's rejection of the Stoic criterion makes knowledge of any kind (including that claimed by Philo himself) impossible;

and

(O2) Philo's rejection of the Stoic criterion makes it impossible for him to deny (as he does) that anything is apprehended (sc. according to the Stoic criterion).

⁴² Once again, this position bears comparison both with Democritus' dialogue between reason and the senses (68B125 DK, preserved, significantly, by Galen: *On Medical Experience* 15: Walzer (1944) 114), and with the Epicurean denial that any perception can be taken to be false, since perceptions cannot falsify one another and nor can reason, since it takes its material from them: 13 above; *Lucr.* IV.473-521.

O1 is usually discerned in 6, although that is not the only way of taking the text, which may, rather, assert no more than O2 (see n. 16 above): but 5, although itself dark and controversial, makes it likely Antiochus would also have argued for O1 as well. We do not know precisely what form that argument took; but it can be reconstructed from two passages of the *Lucullus*, which at first sight have to do rather with O2.

At *Luc.* 43, Lucullus alleges that the Academic position courts incoherence: Academics themselves seek to refute dogmatic positions by means of making precise distinctions and classifications (cf. *Luc.* 42), which, although a worthy philosophical undertaking, is yet one which is

as remote as possible from the cause of those who speak in this way [i.e. Academics]. For definitions and divisions [...], similarities and dissimilarities and the subtle and precise distinctions between them belong to those who believe that these things are true, established and certain, not to those who claim that none of these things is more true than false. (15: Cic., *Luc.* 43)

If they accept that definitions are true, they must accept that they exclude everything not comprehended by the definition, and hence that what is explicated by the definition can be apprehended; while if they don't accept them as true then they are not entitled to make use of them. Moreover

if they say that they can grasp what they speak of with absolute clarity and that they are not impeded by any indistinguishability of the impressions, then they will admit that they can apprehend these things. But if they deny that true impressions can be distinguished from false ones, who will be able to proceed any further? [...] For there cannot be demonstration⁴³ unless the assumptions which conclude to it are so well established that there could not be any false ones of the same type. Therefore if a process of reasoning which has depended for its progress on matters apprehended and grasped generates the conclusion that nothing can be apprehended,

⁴³ I am grateful to Woldemar Görler for drawing my attention to the similarity of language between this passage ('concludi argumentum non potest') and that of *Luc.* 26, where Cicero glosses his phrase 'argumenti conclusio' with the Greek ἀπόδειξις, which strongly suggests that he is talking of demonstration here. This in turn suggests that 'quae ad concludendum sumpta' does not have for its antecedent the *visa* of a couple of lines earlier (which would in any case be odd: we do not *assume* impressions), but rather refers quite generally to the (propositional) material upon which a demonstrative conclusion is based. Of course that propositional material will itself be derived from the impressions, whose truth and falsity is still ultimately the concern of the passage.

what more self-contradictory argument could be found? [...] But they are most completely refuted when they assume as consistent two propositions which are violently inconsistent, first of all saying that there are some false impressions, which implies that some are true, and then that there is no difference between false and true impressions. But you had first assumed that there *was* a difference, and hence the two propositions cannot both be held at the same time. (16: Cic., *Luc.* 44)

Allegations of self-refutation were common currency in dogmatic arguments against sceptics of all stripes;⁴⁴ and in general sceptics can provide adequate answers to them. Their adoption of such distinctions and definitions is dialectical only, and consists in turning the dogmatists' own weapons against them without thereby at any stage in the argument committing the sceptics damagingly to their truth (moreover, their refusal to countenance, in their own persons, any grasp of objects as such does not preclude them from conceptual apprehension: S.E., *P.* II.1-10). But such charges are better aimed against crypto-dogmatists such as Philo. After all, if Philo is such a dogmatist, he *does* wish to distinguish between true and false impressions in his own voice:

nor, Lucullus, did you omit that refutation of Antiochus (unsurprisingly, since it was one of the most significant) which Antiochus himself used to say caused Philo the greatest trouble: for when it was assumed (i) that there were some false impressions and (ii) that these differed in no way from true ones, he did not realise that the former had been accepted by him because of a certain apparent difference among the impressions, but that this was abolished by the latter, in which he denies that true impressions differ from false ones: and nothing is as inconsistent as that. (17: Cic., *Luc.* 111, cf. 32-6)

Philo wishes to hold both (i) and (ii): but (it is alleged) they are inconsistent, or at least generate inconsistent results. Cicero replies on Philo's behalf:

that would be the case if indeed we abolished truth altogether; but we do not: for we discern true impressions just as we do false ones. The type (*species*) is the source of our acceptance; we have no sign of perception.⁴⁵ (18: Cic., *Luc.* 111)

⁴⁴ See Burnyeat (1976); and see in particular the dialectic between Stoics and sceptics regarding the concept of proof: S.E., *P.* II.185-92, *M.* VIII.463-81: McPherran (1987).

⁴⁵ This passage is multiply difficult, and requires some comment. Here is the Latin in full: 'id ita esset si nos verum omnino tolleremus; non facimus,

I.e., presumably, appearances suffice for us to be able to make the distinction between truth and falsehood, even though we have no incorrigible mark of truth or falsehood in any particular case (cf. *Fin.* V.76). Antiochus argued that, since knowledge depends upon truth, and since Philo is not entitled to claim that any particular proposition is true, he cannot claim to know anything (the 'in no way' of 17 is a misleading exaggeration: they differ, if I am right for Philo, in no way *as regards their species*, i.e. as regards discernible internal characteristics: cf. nn. 31, 45). Philo replies that empirical knowledge does indeed depend upon truth—but he does not do away with truth altogether, only with the claim that there must be foundationally true propositions which are such as to be incapable of being false, and whose truth is rendered certain by the nature of the impressions which underwrite them. In effect, Philo will claim that there are indefinitely many propositions that he knows, but none which he is certain that he knows, and hence none which he knows that he knows. For all that, many of them may yet be, in an objective sense, certain, and equally (and distinctly) his knowledge of them may also be certain, in the sense of being causally well-founded.

nam tam vera quae falsa cernimus. Sed probandi species est, percipiendi signum nullum habemus'. Interpretation is not aided by the compressed nature of the original, and the lack of logical connectives (with the exception of *nam*). *Vera* clearly picks up *visa* of the previous sentence, which is why I translate *vera* as 'true impressions'. *Cernimus* I render as 'discern', i.e. 'perceive' in a non-technical sense (sc. not as implying a Stoic cataleptic grasp of things): it is not intended to bear the sense here of 'distinguish'. The main problem concerns the *species*. I had followed Reid and Rackham in supposing this to render φαντασία (hence my unhelpfully literal rendering in Hankinson (1995) 117, rightly castigated by Gisela Striker in this volume: p. 259, n. 2), the idea being that appearances are only to be thought of as the causes of our assent, and not as containing some infallible marker of their truth. Striker (*loc. cit.*) pertinently wonders how that claim could count as a response to the objection of 17; perhaps Philo simply maintained that the fact that we accept some impressions (in the sense of being motivated to act upon them) while rejecting others is sufficient to show that we differentiate between truth and falsity (since acceptance is acceptance *as true*, while rejection is rejection *as false*). Striker suggests taking *species* here as equivalent to εἶδος, yielding the sense 'this (i.e. our recognition of truths and falsehoods) is only a kind of approval'; but this requires reading a fair amount into the text which is not there. I now incline to suppose that *species* here does precisely the same work as in *Luc.* 58 (see n. 31 above), the point being that what causes our assent is the broad type of impression, or its content, a broad type which is consistent with its content being on occasion false: there is no particular internal distinguishing mark of its truth on any occasion (the *specie probabile* of *Luc.* 99 is compatible with this reading).

But this puts Philo in a tricky position. Consider the domain of his beliefs B . He is committed to asserting that in B there is some item i which is an instance of knowledge; but he cannot assert of any i in B that *that* is an item of knowledge. Antiochus presumably argued that the only reason for accepting claims of the form $(\exists x)(Fx)$ for any domain $\{a_1 \dots a_n\}$ would be the antecedent knowledge that F was true for some a_i in it;⁴⁶ but that is precisely what Philo does not claim to have. What he needs, then, is some general argument, which does not rely on establishing for certain in advance the truth of any individual beliefs, designed to show that it is reasonable to suppose that some of his beliefs are true.

X. *The light of nature*

Such arguments recur throughout the history of philosophy. Descartes, in the 3rd *Meditation*, offers the most famous of them: we can know on *a priori* grounds that God exists; but it is inconsistent with the existence of a god possessing the familiar divine attributes that we be consistently and irremediably deceived; hence some (indeed much) of what we think we know we actually do know. But, given the sceptical concessions of the 1st *Meditation*, he is forced to rely on the claim that he has a clear and distinct conception of the infinite of a sort which could only have been generated by an entity of which infinity was itself predicable, and as such makes his argument vulnerable at two points. Does he really have the concept of the infinite which he claims to have? And is it really 'evident by the light of nature that there must be at least as much in the efficient and complete cause as there is in the effect of that same cause' (*Med.* 3: Adam and Tannery (1897-1913))

⁴⁶ Philo's position does not of course commit him to any general non-standard interpretation of quantification (where $(\exists x)(Fx)$ can be true for some domain, even though no member of that domain is determinately F): what makes his general claim to know true will be the existence in his belief-set of some determinate item of knowledge—it is just that it will not be transparent as such to him. On the other hand, the position formally resembles the paradox of belief-humility: it is rational to believe that some of one's beliefs are false, but not rational to believe of any particular one of one's beliefs that *it* is false (rational from the inside, that is: of course any number of one's beliefs may be, from an objective point of view, irrational and irrationally held). See further Hankinson (1995) 118-9.

7.40)? How, indeed, can we be sure that we know anything 'by the light of nature'?⁴⁷

Descartes himself is sensitive to the issue:

when I say here that 'I have been taught thus by nature', all I mean is that I am driven by a spontaneous impulse to believe it, and not that some light of nature shows me that it is true. These are two very different things. For whatever is shown me by this light of nature, e.g. that from the fact that I doubt it follows that I exist and so on, cannot in any way be doubtful. This is owing to the fact that there can be no other faculty that I could trust as much as this light and which could teach that these things are not true. But as far as natural impulses are concerned, in the past I have often judged myself to be driven by them to make the worse choice when it was a question of choosing a good. (19: *Med.* 3: Adam and Tannery (1897-1913) 7.38-9)

It is not enough that one's impulses to believe be natural: the beliefs themselves must show themselves to be true.

Descartes' particular strategy—the advancement of claims regarding certain transparent facts about his own conceptual contents in conjunction with a supposedly *a priori* truth of causal efficacy—is not, I think, directly paralleled in the ancient world (although Plato's argument for *anamnêsis* at *Phd.* 72e-77a bears some resemblances to it). But some features of the general approach are interestingly anticipated in our texts.

Descartes claims in 19 that what we do discern by the natural light is such that no other faculty could cast doubt upon it. This is not, or at least not necessarily, the claim that the 'natural light' carries its own internal guarantee (although elsewhere Descartes appears to suppose that it does); rather it is the Moorean contention that nothing could as a matter of fact serve to confute what appears to us very clearly and distinctly, since the hypothetical refuter would have to be even more clear and distinct (it is instructive at this point to recall Galen's claim in 4 that we have 'no more venerable and honourable criteria' than those of our sense-organs in their natural conditions).

⁴⁷ A wealth of familiar issues are involved here, crucially in regard to the status of clear and distinct impressions, and the alleged circularity of Descartes' argument, allegations already made by Descartes' first objectors: see for example Gassendi, *Disquisitio Metaphysica: Opera* III, 281b ff., 389b-390a. Moreover, as Descartes himself is perfectly well aware, the mere existence of human error and folly requires some accounting for, given the nature of the divinity which Descartes supposes himself to have established: *Med.* 4. But those issues are beyond the scope of this study.

Compare another passage from Sextus. The Stoics point out that everyone confronted with an impression that is murky (*amudra*) seeks to place themselves in a position to receive the clearest and most unambiguous impression possible:

he concentrates his vision, and approaches the visible object more closely so as not to go completely astray, rubbing his eyes and in general doing everything until he draws out a clear and striking impression of the object to be judged, as though considering that the credibility of the impression depended upon it. Moreover, it is impossible to say the opposite, and necessarily anyone who refuses to think that impression is the criterion does so under the influence of the existence of some other impression, and thus confirms that impression is the criterion, as if nature has provided the perceptual capacity and the impression that occurs by way of it as a light for us with which to discern the truth. (20: S.E., *M.* VII.258-9)

Here too the claim is not that what appears in the natural light is self-certifying accurate, but rather that any attempt to confute it is self-stultifying (compare Antiochus on reason, 'the light and illumination of life', Cic., *Luc.* 26). There *can* be no higher court of appeal than this against which we might test its claims upon us; and anyone who attempts to make such an appeal implicitly relies upon other impressions which, again implicitly, they take to have higher probative force. But their commitment to their refutation rests upon their acceptance of the force of those higher-order impressions.⁴⁸

But that is not the only way in which a modest, Philonian sceptic might argue the case. Since the dogmatists readily accept that perceptual information frequently requires supplementation and careful critical examination, they must allow, for any individual perception taken on its own, that it may be confuted by some other, yet clearer perception. But that process is open-ended—and hence no perception can ever be taken with absolute certainty to be true. Of course, as a matter of practical and empirical fact, we do stop our processes of confirmation and disconfirmation after a certain point, in order not to die the death of the Humean Pyrrhonist. But such a cessation is, in principle at least, provisional only.

Even so, why think that any of our perceptions are none the less *true*, where 'true' means, as it standardly does for the ancients,

⁴⁸ It is worth comparing here the anti-sceptical strategies of Moore (1915) and (1939), Wittgenstein (1969), and Wright (1985); and Hume on miracles (*Enquiry* § X) is again relevant.

accurately corresponding to and reporting an external reality? This presumably is the central novelty of Philo's account of knowledge.⁴⁹ Carneadean epistemology, whatever its intended status and function, accepts the importance of testing and refining perceptual data for pragmatic purposes—but it stops deliberately short of declaring that there is any truth to be found that way (of course it does not *deny* that there might be truth there either).

We may suppose (although I can find no direct evidence for this) Philo to have accepted the general dogmatic belief that impressions could not be a sound guide for action unless they were true in this sense. After all, what we are seeking (among other things) is a practical criterion, a way of getting around in the world. The world which we have to navigate is independent of us: it is not directly at least subject to our whims and caprices. We cannot simply determine by *fiat* that it conform to our desires.⁵⁰ Hence, insofar as our navigational strategies turn out to be *ex post facto* successful (note Philo's emphasis on the *homologia* as well as the *enargeia* of his experiences: 9 above), we have reason to believe that they are based upon the truth, a truth which amounts to more than merely the fact of their success expressed in other terms (note Cic., *Luc.* 36: 'they will be unable to act with confidence even if they get most of the way, indeed as far as possible, towards the truth itself, as they themselves are wont to say'). Truth, for the ancients, is never coherence as such; although the facts of coherence may be guides to (and justifications of) the truth.⁵¹ So it is the independent, metaphysical fact that our navigationally-successful beliefs and impressions for the most part track the truth that

⁴⁹ Striker, arguing elsewhere in this volume for a minimalist interpretation of Philo's innovations (pp. 273-6), suggests that all he did was claim that Carneadean plausibility was in fact sufficient for knowledge: we needn't buy into the excessively strong Stoic (or Antiochean) knowledge-conditions. But knowledge implies truth, and not merely apparent truth: he must then justify his claim that we can know that we do, in fact, know some, perhaps many, things. Which is why I attribute to him the further arguments I do; however I should stress that the position in which my Philo and Galen end up in strongly resembles her option (b) (pp. 274-5) for Philo: denying that there need be any inference to the truth of certain impressions, based upon some criterion external to them.

⁵⁰ Such observations are central to the development of both Descartes' and Berkeley's otherwise very distinct philosophies: *Medit.*, Adam and Tannery (1897-1913) III.38; *Principles of Human Knowledge* §§ 28-30, 33, 34, 41, etc.

⁵¹ On the concept of 'metaphysical' truth in relation to a coherentist account of justification Bonjour (1985) ch. 8; and also Bonjour (1980).

explains that success. Anything else would involve a massive, and massively improbable and inexplicable, cosmic coincidence (see further § XIV below).

XI. *Epistemology naturalized: Antiochus*

Here we may note the availability to the Philonian of a further, quite distinct type of argument, one to which, ironically, Antiochus himself apparently subscribed. Both Epicureans (cf. Cic., *Fin.* I.28-9) and Stoics were, in their rather different ways, disposed to appeal to the natural instincts for self-preservation manifested by new-born creatures of all species.⁵² For the Stoics, this manifests a central concept of their ethics and action-theory, that of *oikeiôsis*, appropriation, seeking out what is in fact suited to one's particular constitution (e.g. D.L. VII.85-6; Sen., *Ep. Mor.* 121.6-15; Hierocles, *Ethical Outline* cols. i.34-ii.9). Antiochus himself argues (Cic., *Luc.* 24-5) that action requires cataleptic impressions on the grounds that otherwise the agent will not be able to initiate actions as a result of appetitions (*hormai*) in accordance with its own nature:⁵³

that which moves someone must first be seen and believed in by him, which cannot be done if the object of vision cannot be distinguished from a false one. But how can the mind be moved to appetition if the object of vision is not perceived as being in accordance with its nature or foreign to it? (21: Cic., *Luc.* 25)

In Book V of the *De Finibus* (9-74) Cicero reproduces, in the mouth of Piso, a lengthy account of Antiochean ethics, in which appeals to the force of nature are legion (24-6, 27, 31, 33, 34-7, 39-40, 41-3, 44, 46-7, 55, 58-9, 61, 66). This ethics is characteristically syncretistic: Piso begins by summarizing Peripatetic ethics (9-14), emphasizing that Antiochus was the most authentic and scrupulous adherent of

⁵² See Brunschwig (1986) for a careful examination of these 'cradle arguments'. For our purposes, otherwise important distinctions between the Epicurean and Stoic treatments of such subjects (notably their disagreement as to whether the source of the initial instinct lay in the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, or by an innate perception of the body's own structure and needs), as well as between the Stoics and others (perhaps indeed Antiochus) as to the role (if any) of cognition in such procedures, can be safely ignored. See however Inwood (1984), Görgemanns (1983), Tarrant (1983).

⁵³ Compare the Stoic injunction to 'live in accordance with nature': D.L. VII.87; Cic., *Fin.* IV.14-5; V.26.

these ancient doctrines (14), while endorsing the general Peripatetic conception of the end, and alleging that the Stoics simply appropriated it under a different terminology (21-2, 74). But it is also quite clear that the Platonic Academy is seen as the ultimate source and origin of these doctrines (7).⁵⁴

Throughout Piso's speech, virtue's naturalness, and its origins in *oikeiôsis*, and natural self-love (27-34) and affection for others, are constantly emphasized (cf. 55-8). The supreme good is 'life in accordance with nature which we interpret as living from human nature when it has been perfected and lacks nothing' (26). This tendency is manifested in a rudimentary form in new-borns (24, 42-3, 55, 61), and is developed by an appropriate upbringing (24-6); but 'human ability (*vis*) is so generated by nature as to seem to have been made with a view to grasping every type of virtue' (43).⁵⁵

Most importantly, the senses are natural faculties:

in the senses there is the particular virtue of each, in virtue of which nothing impedes each sense in the performance of its own function of perceiving rapidly and expeditiously those things which are subjected to it. (22: Cic., *Fin.* V.36)

And a little later on:

Nature [...] perfected the mind with its remaining requirements just as it did the body: for it adorned it with senses suited to the

⁵⁴ Antiochus no doubt distorted and minimized genuine differences between the schools (such is the syncretist way), most particularly in his refusal to see any real difference between the Peripatetic conception of the End as virtue plus natural goods and the Stoic insistence that such 'natural goods' were really indifferent (although they were 'preferred' and hence to be chosen). But that difference, real though it is, is a subtle one, and may easily appear to amount to no more than philosophical hair-splitting. For Antiochus' syncretism, see Cic., *Fin.* V.88-92; *Leg.* I.55; and cf. *Ac.* I.37; *N.D.* I.16. See Barnes (1989) 86-9.

⁵⁵ Julia Annas drew my attention to an important disanalogy between the alleged natural nature of virtue, and that of the senses, namely that not even the Stoics are prepared to argue from the fact that virtue is in this sense natural to the conclusion that all or most will possess it—on the contrary, it is the rarest of achievements. By contrast, naturalistic epistemology is designed to show that more or less everybody is in a good position in regard to the senses. I would tentatively suggest, however, that perhaps the appropriate notion here is one of normality rather than frequency. The Stoics may be able to hold, given their cosmology of cosmic progress, that virtue is natural in the sense of being a final condition—in its most fully-achieved state the universe will manifest virtue (although those contentions are obviously vulnerable at several points). But ultimately I am inclined to see this as a problem for the Stoics rather than me, and for ethics rather than for epistemology.

perception of things, requiring little or no assistance for their verification. (23: Cic., *Fin.* V.59)

This eulogy of human sensory capacities is mirrored in the *Lucullus*: no-one could wish for better or more accurate senses in view of the clarity of their pronouncements (*Luc.* 19, a claim later hotly contested by Cicero the speaker: *Luc.* 81-2). Not that some perceptions are not false—but ‘there is the greatest truth in the senses as long they are healthy and strong, and everything which impedes and gets in their way is removed’ (*Luc.* 19; cf. the Stoic conditions on veridical perception: S.E., *M.* VII.424). Moreover, their acuity can be augmented with practice (*Luc.* 20). These accurate perceptions are the source of our common notions (*koinai ennoiai*), the general concepts in virtue of which we order our universe (*Luc.* 21-2), by way of first abstracting general properties such as whiteness and sweetness from particular instances, then combining them to produce nominal concepts of substances such as man and horse, and finally proceeding therefrom to their real definitions, which are the source of all scientific inquiry. But

if there were such false notions, or ones impressed upon the mind by impressions such as could not be distinguished from true ones, how could we make any use of them? And how could we tell what was consistent with any particular thing and what inconsistent with it? (24: Cic., *Luc.* 22)

Memory too is called into question, and hence the whole basis of scientific knowledge (*ibid.* 22).

Much of this is fairly unexceptionable (although it is also fairly jejune and unsophisticated). It could, indeed, have been accepted by both Peripatetics and Stoics alike,⁵⁶ and even (in all essentials) by the Epicureans. It was, moreover, adopted by Galen, who took over and emphasized at great length the importance of the natural origins of our perceptual capacities. Of course, quite how nature is

⁵⁶ For the Peripatetics, cf. Cic., *Luc.* 112; for the Stoics, cf. *Ac.* I.42, in the Antiochean summary of Zeno’s philosophy: ‘as a result of this he placed trust in the senses, because... he said that the grasp (*comprehensio*) created by the senses appeared both true and faithful, not because it grasped everything there was in the thing, but because it missed nothing which was capable of falling under it, and because nature has provided, as it were, a yardstick (*norma*: presumably = κανών) and principle (i.e. ἀρχή) of itself, from which afterwards the notions of things are imprinted upon the mind, from which not only the first principles, but also certain broader roads to the discovery of reason are opened up’.

to be appealed to may yet be controversial: is the nature in question simply an immanent teleological force in the world, on the Peripatetic model, or is it the product of a sentient and artistic divinity, as Platonists and Stoics contended? Antiochus is revealingly reticent on the issue;⁵⁷ he presumably does not think it necessary to give an account of the nature of nature itself in order to make use of its explanatory force.

However 24 suggests that the pivot of Antiochus' argument is the common notions, which recalls Galen's unnamed theorists who made them 'the primary criterion for everything which is credible on its own account' (1). The argument apparently runs as follows:

- [D] (i) non-deceptive common notions are a prerequisite for successful action;
- (ii) cataleptic impressions are a prerequisite for non-deceptive common notions;

hence

- (iii) successful action requires cataleptic impressions.

but then, given that

- (iv) there is successful action,

it follows that

- (v) there are cataleptic impressions.

At first sight, that argument is hardly more impressive than any of the others we have been considering. But it bears a little closer examination. The 'common notions' here are, apparently, not simply the pre-theoretical classifications of things (*prolêpseis*), but rather the fully-developed grasps of their natures:

if anything is a human, then it is a mortal animal participating in reason; from this class of thing our notions of things are imprinted, without which we could neither understand anything, nor inquire or dispute about it. (25: Cic., *Luc.* 21; cf. ps.Plu. *Plac.* 900B-C = Aët. IV.11.1-4 Diels)

⁵⁷ Galen, for his part, adopted a highly detailed theological teleology: see Hankinson (1989).

Successful action, then depends upon an understanding of the essences of things.

Now, that seems an excessively strong claim: surely plenty of people, the vast majority even, get around perfectly well throughout their lives with little if any theoretical grasp of the essence of anything. They may, we may allow, know the Lockean nominal essences of things—but can they (or indeed anyone, for that matter) get any kind of a grip upon what it really is to be a particular natural kind?⁵⁸ Here we may recall another fundamental Hellenistic debate, between Stoics and Epicureans this time, concerning the nature of induction and signs.⁵⁹ The Epicureans held that all scientific inference was ultimately founded upon induction, or inference from similarity: if *a* is like *b* in respect of *F* then it is reasonable (at least under some circumstances, or consequent upon a suitable run of similar cases) to suppose that, if *a* is *G*, *b* will be *G* as well.

However such inferences are notoriously fragile—and the Stoics fastened upon their fragilities.⁶⁰ They argued that inference by way of elimination (or contraposition) alone could establish universal truths such as ‘all men are mortal’, and hence ground quasi-inductive beliefs such as that to the effect that the next man I meet will be mortal (Philodemus, *Sign.* 1.2-4.13 De Lacy). These inferences seek to show that it is logically impossible for the antecedent and the negation of the consequent in such conditionals both to be true: if something is immortal, it can’t possibly be a man. Only armed with such contrapositive necessities can we be certain that the next man we meet will be mortal. Otherwise, we will have no grounds for supposing that men, who (necessarily, as distinct individuals) differ from one another qualitatively do not differ precisely in respect of their mortality (*ibid.* 6.1-14). For a predicate properly to be projectible across all individuals in a species it must be part of, or at least entailed by, the essence of that species. Hence projectibility requires knowledge of essences.

⁵⁸ For Locke’s own scepticism on the issue, see *Essay* 3.3.15-8; the Stoics themselves allow that not everything to do with objects is accessible to perception: Cic., *Ac.* I.42, n. 56 above.

⁵⁹ On which Sedley (1982); Asmis (1984) pt. III; for Philodemus *De Signis*, see De Lacy (1978).

⁶⁰ Compare the objections of Asclepiades to the practical epistemology of the Empiricist doctors: Galen, *On Medical Experience* 3-6, Walzer (1944) 87-93.

But how is that knowledge to be acquired? The Epicureans agree with the Stoics in a sense that knowledge of essences is required here, but hold once again that such essential knowledge is inductively-based (*ibid.* 34.29-36.17). The Stoics reply once more that knowledge simply cannot be based upon such a frail foundation. We must, for our knowledge to be knowledge at all, be in possession of some more direct access to the natures of things themselves. But here an earlier difficulty re-surfaces: it is preposterous to suppose that everybody has such a direct access.

Perhaps it is, if it were supposed to result in conscious, articulated understanding of such natures, which everybody could, if pressed, spell out in their entirety. But that is not, after all, what is required. People only need to know the essences in a sense strong enough to ensure that, in general, they do not make radical errors in navigation. And such a knowledge can be unconscious and inarticulate, merely manifesting itself in a stable functional ability. Knowing an essence in this sense does not imply knowing that you know it; and it certainly does not entail any fully-developed propositional understanding of it.⁶¹

Of course, if we want to do science we must know those essences, express them in propositional form, and integrate them into the appropriate system of inferences which will mirror and make patent the structure of that part of the universe with which they are concerned. And that is no trivial or simple undertaking. In Galen's view it requires natural ability, moral commitment, and conscientious persistence to a preternaturally high degree. But such scientific understanding is not required for successful navigation through the shoals of our daily lives.

⁶¹ Knowing an essence in this sense thus parallels Frede's interpretation of the cataleptic impression: above, § IV. There is perhaps a hint that earlier Stoics consciously went down this route: at D.L. VII.54, Chrysippus is said to have gone against his earlier orthodox acceptance of the cataleptic impression as the criterion in the first book of his *On Reason*, maintaining rather that αἴσθησις and πρόληψις were the criteria, where πρόληψις is glossed as a ἐννοια φυσική τῶν καθόλου (the text is disputed here, but the dispute does not affect the basic point), thus stressing the importance of the pretheoretical general notions. For more on Chrysippus and the importance of properly classifying *prolēpseis* and *ennoiai*, see Plu., *C.N.* 1058E-59C. I am grateful to David Hahm for allowing me to read a manuscript of his as yet unpublished 'Anti-sceptical strategies' on the issue; I disagree, however, with his suggestion that this Chrysippean innovation lies directly behind the arguments of Cic., *Luc.* 21-2 and 30-1.

XII. *The abilities of animals*

This position is, I think, ultimately one which commended itself to almost all non-sceptical thinkers of later antiquity. It would, in all its essentials, be just as congenial to a Peripatetic⁶² as to a Stoic; it is appropriated, in the name of the old Academy, by both Antiochus and Philo; moreover, for all their differences regarding the classification, analysis, and appropriateness of certain types of inference, the Epicureans subscribe to something very similar.⁶³ This fact underlies Galen's syncretistic claim in 1 that for practical purposes these epistemologies all come to the same thing.

Galen himself went further: animals are perfectly capable of recognizing essences, although they cannot articulate that recognition, nor reflect upon its contents. In an important and amusing passage of *De Methodo Medendi* [hereafter *M.M.*], Galen compares the relative cognitive capacities of donkeys ('by common consent apparently the stupidest creatures of all': *M.M.* X.133 K.) and Empiricist doctors, much to the latter's disadvantage: for donkeys

manage to distinguish between things which are one in form and those which are one numerically. For when it sees a camel, the donkey draws back, flees, and is afraid, even if it has never seen a camel before. If on the other hand it was used to the sight, and you had shown it several camels, it would no longer be afraid because of habituation, since it recognizes the same form in the one which it now meets for the first time as in that to which it has become accustomed. And similarly with men: for it recognizes the indi-

⁶² In fact, it is strongly reminiscent of some of the central features of Aristotle's famously compressed and puzzling account of concept formation in *APo.* II.19; see Barnes (1994) 259-71. It is often assumed that Antiochus' epistemology is proprietorially Stoic (e.g. Dillon (1977) 69); but this is an exaggeration. His concentration on the cataleptic impression is of course Stoic-inspired—but he views this as merely an emendation to the fundamentally correct account already supplied by Plato and elaborated by Aristotle: 'I believe it to be true, as our friend Antiochus used to maintain, that it [i.e. Stoicism] should be thought of as a correction of the old Academy rather than as some new doctrine' (Cic., *Ac.* I.43; cf. *Luc.* 112; see Barnes (1989) 83-4).

⁶³ They hold that the incompatibility between the antecedent and the denial of the consequent of the crucial conditionals is conceptual rather than logical; and they are forced into difficulties in explaining just what such conceptual impossibility amounts to. But they too need to give an account of how we can be sure that we have the right concepts, whose entailments will generate inductive truth—and to answer that question, they have to make very similar moves: their criterial *prolêpseis* are, after all, simply supposed to be directly perceptually-acquired beliefs which are evident (cf. e.g. D.L. X.31-3); see Everson (1994a).

vidual form in them too. So if it sees its donkey-driver, it recognizes him not only as a man, but as *this* man, and shakes its ears, swishes its tail, brays, and leaps up when it sees him, emphasizing the fact that it knows him. He recognizes this individual both as a man and as someone he is used to. But he recognizes one he sees now for the first time as a man only, and not in the same way as one he is used to. (26: Galen, *M.M.* X.133-4 K.)

The point is made *ad Empiricos*, in order to point up what Galen at least takes to be their excessively naive account of identity and similarity.⁶⁴ But it is interesting in its own right. He first emphasizes donkeys' instinctive distrust of creatures they have not seen before, a distrust motivated by their innate drive for self-preservation (cf. the Stoic *oikeiôsis*: above, after n. 62). Then, on the basis of experience, they come to learn (as indeed children do: *ibid.* 132-3) that such creatures fall into a general type; finally they recognize particular individuals as individuals. Furthermore, their behaviour shows that they understand the general form of roads in different way from that in which they recognize particular pathways (138-9).

In *De Locis Affectis* (VIII.442-4 K.), Galen describes how on one occasion, while vivisectioning a pregnant goat in order to demonstrate its 'reproductive economy', he discovered inside its womb a fully-developed kid, which survived the Caesarian delivery. He took it into the house, and placed in front of it a number of bowls containing various liquids (milk, wine, honey, oil, etc.), as well as miscellaneous grains and fruits. The kid first got up onto its feet 'as if it had been told that legs were for walking'; then it licked itself clean of amniotic fluid, scratched an itch on one flank with a hoof, and sniffed at each of the bowls before drinking the milk, causing the assembled company to cry out in unison 'the natures of all things are untutored'.⁶⁵ Such behaviour cannot have been taught—it rather represents an innate drive for self-preservation coupled with an instinctive ability to discriminate between various objects and choose what is appropriate.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ In fact, the Empiricists are forced into the claim that each *syndrome* is really numerically one in a strong sense, precisely in order to evade the inductive difficulties raised against their position by Asclepiades and others: see above, n. 60; see also Hankinson (1991b) 213-8.

⁶⁵ Reading πάντων for the ζῶον of Kühn's text; the slogan derives from the pseudo-Hippocratic *Alim.* 39 (cf. n. 8 above). See Manetti (1985) 200-6.

⁶⁶ At *U.P.* IV.248-9 Galen describes the untutored natural ability of newborns to perform various actions (in particular suckling) as 'the greatest

XIII. *Reason and the senses*

Such appeals to nature for evidence of the existence of criteria for judgement are spelled out in more detail in *P.H.P.* Book IX of that treatise, with which we began, is devoted to the issue of how to discriminate the plausibly false from the securely true, particularly in the case of arguments. Plausibly false arguments are sophisms (V.82 K.);⁶⁷ and the greatest source of human error is an inability to distinguish between sophism and demonstration on account of the former's similarity to the truth (*Pecc. Dig.*, V.61-3, 72 K.). Yet, given reasonable natural ability, dedication, training, and practice (Galen constantly stresses the importance of these ingredients; cf. *P.H.P.* V.732-4 K.), anyone can learn how to diagnose and expose them, although this is impossible for the unpractised.

Galen proudly tells us how he trained a group of youths in the resolution of sophisms so successfully that they were immediately able to show where, in any sophism posed them by a group of bystanders, the argument failed, either through a concealed falsehood in the premisses or an invalid logical form, where others, older and supposedly wiser, could not (*Pecc. Dig.*, V 73-4 K.).⁶⁸ The latter group were unable to distinguish between mere opinion and securely-established fact and did not know what required demonstration and what simply needed pointing out (*endeixis*), while others, even though they are ignorant⁶⁹ as to the way in which that which requires pointing out differs from what is 'primary and credible on its own account' (cf. 1 above) nevertheless try to make assertions about subjects which they have not properly investigated (*ibid.* 74-5).

Sophisms are to arguments what illusions are to sensation. Galen takes over from the tradition the view that there are two

wonder' of nature's providence. The point is also made at greater length at *U.P.* III.5-7.

⁶⁷ See also e.g. *On Hippocrates' 'Epidemics'* XVIIB 61-2 K.; *On the Diagnosis and Cure of the Errors of the Soul* [*Pecc. Dig.*] V.72-5 K.); *M.M.* X.18; *Pecc. Dig.* is edited by De Boer (1937). Galen also wrote a brief early treatise exclusively devoted to categorizing sophisms: XIV.582-98 K. The definition is of course originally owed to Aristotle: *S.E.* 164a23-5a32.

⁶⁸ Antiochus too is concerned with the exposure of sophistry: when people are taken in by fallacious and sophistical arguments which they cannot refute, they abandon the truth (Cic., *Luc.* 46; cf. Gal., *On Antecedent Causes* i.3, vii.106, x.142, xiii.162, 170-2),

⁶⁹ Reading οὐκ with L instead of οὐκ, read by de Boer, 1937.

criteria of truth, reason and sensation, which operate (ideally at least) in distinct but complementary spheres (cf. *Opt. Doct.* I.49 K.) Truths are known either directly (they are evident, *enargês*) or derivatively; and the latter are known, insofar as they are known, on the basis of the former. The former divide into two classes, those which are evident to the senses and those which are evident to the intellect (*M.M.* X.36 K.)⁷⁰—both of these are ‘primary and credible on their own account’ (*M.M.* X.34 K.; *P.H.P.* V.240-1 K.; cf. 1 above).

The idea that clarity or evidentness (*to enarges*) is criterial both for the senses and for the intellect may perhaps be Antiochean.⁷¹ However, at the very least the emphases of Galen and Antiochus are different. Galen stresses that some truths are immediately knowable by the intellect, and he has in mind principally mathematical and logical laws (Galen thinks it scandalous that Carneades should have dared to question the axiom of equals (Euclid cn. 1): *Opt. Doct.* I.45 K.), as well as certain metaphysical propositions having to do with causation (*M.M.* X.36-7 K.: Galen agrees with Descartes that some such propositions, paradigmatically ‘nothing

⁷⁰ See further Hankinson (1991b) 126-7; (1991a) 270-2.

⁷¹ It is fathered on the Peripatetics, in particular Theophrastus, by Sextus (*M.* VII.217-8). That attribution is sometimes called into question; but I agree with A. A. Long (1988) 199 n. 59 in seeing no real reason why it should be. If Antiochus does indeed lie behind the doxography of *M.* VII, then some version of it is presumably attributable to him as well; but I take no stand on this issue (note in this context D.L. VII.54: Chrysippus at one stage held that *aisthêsis* and *prolēpsis* were the criteria; Boethus the Stoic admitted *nous*, *aisthêsis*, *orexis*, and *epistêmê*, cf. n. 60). It was pointed out at the conference that it is not clear that Antiochus, at least on Cicero’s evidence, subscribed to the view that there were two distinct criteria of truth at work here: the crucial text, *Luc.* 31, rather seems to have reason go to work on the material which has already been supplied (and hence criterially vouched for) by the senses (cf. 35, 45); while even more strongly *Luc.* 30 suggests that properly understood mind really is identical with the senses. Nor is it quite clear just what is required for reason to be a separate criterion; Galen, after all, is an empiricist to the extent that he believes that reason relies for its raw material upon sensory input. Galen’s point is, presumably, that reason alone (in the form of such logical principles as the Laws of Non-Contradiction and of the Excluded Middle) can show us that certain conjunctions of propositions, however good their apparent credentials are, cannot be held—and this would be enough, I think, to make reason an independent criterion even if we assume (as Galen I think for one did not) that such logical principles are in fact empirical generalizations. But whatever else is true, it is notable how unconcerned Antiochus is, in Lucullus’ presentation at least, with logical laws, indeed with matters of pure logic at all (although of course Cicero, in his own Academic voice, attacks Stoic logic, and in particular the principle of bivalence, at *Luc.* 91-8: see Barnes in this volume, pp. 140-60).

comes to be from nothing', are *apriori* certainties: cf. *P.H.P.* V.566-7 K.). Antiochus says nothing about logical or metaphysical laws; and, following the Stoics (cf. Cic., *Luc.* 8, 56, 60), concentrates on elaborating the empiricist account of concept-formation noted above (§ XI): reason goes to work on material supplied by the senses (*Luc.* 19-20, 31, 43-4).

But for Galen too substantial truths about the way the world is can only be won on the basis of perceptual evidence; and any attempt to use reason to subvert the deliverances of the senses is, for him, obviously and immediately self-stultifying. In *On the Composition and Powers of Simple Drugs* (*S.M.T.*) XI.459-62 K., Galen chastises those who construct theoretical accounts of the world whose consequences are in flat contradiction with sensory evidence. If you maintain, on theoretical grounds, that the only things naturally pale and bright are light and fire, and simply refuse to acknowledge that 'snow, white lead, ice, and innumerable other things' are at the same time among the brightest and coldest of things', you would be thought to be crazy in trusting abstract argument over the clear evidence of the senses. Moreover, you would be abandoning the fundamental empiricist principle 'nil in intellectu quod non prius in sensibus': the senses provide the *archai* for all reasoning, and hence cannot be subverted by it (*ibid.* 460-1 K.: again cf. Democritus, 68B125 DK).

Galen has explicitly in mind here (*ibid.* 461) the paradoxical thesis of Anaxagoras that snow is really dark, since it is frozen water, and water is dark (59A97 DK), a contention unsurprisingly seized on by the sceptics (*P.* I.33; cf. Cic., *Luc.* 100). He remarks, with characteristic waspishness, that if he is to be allowed freely to speak the truth as is his habit, he would diagnose people

who talk this sort of nonsense as having progressed beyond insanity. For if they overturn what is plainly apparent through the senses, they will have no place from which to begin their demonstrations. And if they begin from credible premisses, how can they reasonably disbelieve them later, given that the *archai* of demonstrations are more credible than the things demonstrated, which require the credibility derived from other premisses? The *archai* of demonstrations are not only credible in regard to themselves, but also in relation to the discovery of what is sought. (27: Gal., *S.M.T.* XI.462 K.)

Galen goes on to say that it would be nice if everything yielded to immediate evident perception, since there would then be no difficulties or disputes; but as things stand, reason is required in order to

discover those things which evade the senses. However one should not begin such reasoning at a great distance from the facts of sensation, as those who practise it poorly habitually do (cf. *ibid.* 459 K.). We should start by getting our terminology clear, in order to avoid fallacies of equivocation, and then proceed to distinguish what is really causally efficacious in any particular case (Galen is discussing the active properties of drugs) from what is merely incidental (462-3 K.); failure to do this leads to all kinds of mistaken inferences (463-9 K.), as does the reliance of the 'sophists' on weak inductions and rhetorical arguments from cases (469-71 K.). And the capital importance of being able to distinguish the essential from the accidental, and the particular properties of things from those attributes which they share in common with others, is stressed throughout Book IX of *P.H.P.* (indeed it is its underlying theme).

So Galen, in common with Antiochus, holds evident perception to be the fundamental, non-negotiable criterion of truth. Call that into question, and you undermine everything, including your own calling it into question; moreover without it there could be no firm basis for the arts and sciences, as Antiochus also argues (Cic., *Luc.* 22: § II above). This attitude is expressed with characteristic vigour and forcefulness in Galen's *De Optima Doctrina*. Favorinus, reviving the argumentative practices of the Carneadean Academy⁷² and asserting that they are 'the best method of teaching', none the less holds that nothing is apprehensible, and denies the reality of cataleptic impressions: yet he claims too that some things are 'securely known', *bebaiôs gnôston*, which can only mean *katalêpton* (*Opt. Doct.* I.41-2 K.).⁷³

Galen is here characteristically careless of sophisticated doctrinal differences; and it is by no means obvious that 'securely known' and 'apprehended' have to come to the same thing (indeed

⁷² For a scholarly discussion of Favorinus' philosophical allegiance, see Ioppolo (1993). She takes Favorinus to be unequivocally a Carneadean, indeed sees him as a deliberate doctrinal irredentist, rejecting the watered-down pseudo-scepticism of the Philonian Academy in favour of its more red-blooded Carneadean predecessor. The one thing standing in the way of this otherwise persuasive thesis is Galen's claim that Favorinus did indeed hold that some things were *bebaiôs gnôston* (*Opt. Doct.* I.41-2 K.), not a Carneadean thing to think at all (Carneades' concession that not everything is *adêlon*, however it is to be interpreted, clearly does not amount to anything anywhere near as strong).

⁷³ On Galen's assimilation of *katalêpton* to *bebaiôs gnôston*, see Glucker (1978) 286; Hankinson (1991a,) 276-7.

the whole point of Philo's new epistemology is that they need not). But Galen's underlying argument here is once again Antiochean in general inspiration. If you don't grasp anything, you can't claim that anything is known, and hence you can't pretend to teach anything, much less that yours is 'the best method of teaching'; and these grasps must initially rely on the senses, only subsequently supported by argument and analysis in order to detect and defuse sophistry (*ibid.* 45-6 K.). Academics like Favorinus are in the same state as a craftsman asking his apprentice to measure or weigh something without giving them a ruler or a balance (46-7 K.). And such instruments, while criterial, themselves must rely on the prior natural criteria of the senses (4, § I above). Favorinus

has apparently done something equivalent to saying that although Dion is blind, none the less he can tell which of us is dirtier and which cleaner, not knowing that anyone who is to judge this sort of thing needs to be sighted. (28: Gal., *Opt. Doct.* I.51 K.)

The Stoics had employed a similar image (S.E., *M.* VII.260), as indeed had Antiochus (Cic., *Luc.* 33).

Even so, how can we *know* that we are sighted, in the sense of being able accurately to determine by vision what things are like?

there are some things which we think we see, hear, or in general perceive, such as in dreams or delusions, while there are other things which we not only think we see or in general perceive but actually do so; and in the case of the second class everybody other than the Academics and Pyrrhonists,⁷⁴ think that they have arrived at secure knowledge, while they consider everything of which the soul produces images while asleep or delirious to be false. (30: Gal., *Opt. Doct.* I.42 K.)

Elsewhere, in the course of a long and tortuous discussion of the opening of the Hippocratic text *On the Surgery*, in which it is asserted that we should pay attention to

⁷⁴ Galen does not often specifically distinguish between Academics and Pyrrhonists, generally lumping them together, as he does here; cf. *Pecc. Dig.* V. 60, 92, 94 K. ('Academics and Sceptics'); *S.M.T.* XI.380-1 K. talks of 'sceptical philosophers and Empiricist doctors' as both holding that the essence of the productive cause is unknown; at *On the Differences of Pulses* VIII.710 K. 'Sceptics and Aporetics' will speak only of 'their perception of the peculiar affections of touch, afraid to say something about anything external as though it existed'; these are contrasted with 'those rightly called "rustic Pyrrhonists" who claim that not even their own affections are securely known (711). For 'rustic Pyrrhonists', see also *On Prognosis* XIV.628 K.; *An in Arteris Sanguis Contineatur* IV.727 K. See Ioppolo (1993) 193 n. 37.

similar and dissimilar, beginning with the greatest and easiest, which can be known completely and in every way, which can (i) be seen and touched and heard, and which can (ii) be perceived by sight and touch and hearing and by the nose and the tongue and the intelligence, which can be known by all the things with which we know, (31: Hipp., *On the Surgery* 1)

Galen notes (without actually endorsing it)⁷⁵ that some people gloss the distinction between (i) and (ii) as being that between non-cataleptic (or not necessarily cataleptic) and cataleptic perception (Galen, *On Hippocrates' 'On the Surgery'*, XVIII B.654-5 K.).

Class (i) consists of 'the general categories on the basis of which indications (*sêmeiôseis*) occur to us, while (ii) is about that which is made accurate and credible' (*ibid.* 654-5 K.). This, according to these exegetes (who Galen says are influenced by the Stoics: 654), amounts to saying that the proper diagnostic signs are not any old sensory data, which include cases of misperception, but rather 'those which are well and cataleptically perceived by each of the senses and by the intelligence' (655). This cataleptic perception amounts to seeing the very natures of things, something which can be done by all the sensory modalities and by the mind, 'since it belongs to all of them in common to take on cataleptically the forms of the underlying objects' (655).

One of the other interpretations of the passage mentioned by Galen (n. 75 above) bears brief rehearsal. Some people distinguish between things which are 'strictly perceptible' (perceptual properties such as colour, taste, smell, sound, as well as roughness, smoothness, heat, cold, 'and in a word tactile properties'), and those which are not strictly perceptible (e.g. apples, pomegranates, pears). The latter 'are not known by perception alone, but as Plato said, by opinion along with irrational perception';⁷⁶ and these may be deceptive, since wax imitations of such fruits may well be indistinguishable (the word Galen uses is *aparallaktos*: cf. S.E., *M.* VII.164, 252, 405-7: 11, § IV above) from the real thing prior to

⁷⁵ Galen's procedure in this passage of commentary is unusual: he remarks that much has been said about these passages by many people, 'some of it unpersuasive and unworthy of remembering, some of it persuasive and worthy of remembering' (650 K.); he then runs briefly through a series of interpretations before remarking that 'it is now time for me to return to my continuous exposition, and for you, after examination, to select the best of the opinions just mentioned' (655-6 K.).

⁷⁶ *Tim.* 52a, although perception is not said in this passage to be irrational; cf. *Phlb.* 39c.

touching, tasting or smelling them.⁷⁷ The only solution is to rise above mere perception, by way of intelligence (*gnômê*) and reason (*dianoia*) with the help of memory and 'enumeration' (*sunarithmêsis*) (650-2 K.).

Although Galen does not explicitly endorse either of these two (fundamentally compatible) accounts, it is reasonable to assume that he would have been in sympathy with both of them, and equally reasonable to suppose that they were both at home in the Antiochean tradition (compare Cic., *Luc.* 19-22, 30-1). The upshot of all of this is that everyone, in Galen's view, supposes that there is a difference in clarity and veridicality between waking experience and what appears in dreams or madness (30). Moreover, even if judgements which go beyond the explicit perceptual content of the impressions can be delusive or misleading, the situation is not thereby rendered hopeless, as the sceptics would have it. For both Galen and Antiochus, reason rides to the aid of the senses in distress.⁷⁸ If it could not do so, and relatively reliably at that, we would not be capable of performing the sorts of cognitive and artistic feat which we can (at least with a certain modicum of innate ability honed by practice: *De Dignoscendis Pulsibus*, VIII.786-802 K.)⁷⁹ all reasonably aspire to.

⁷⁷ Galen's mention of the pomegranate recalls the famous story of Sphaerus the Stoic and Ptolemy Philopator: D.L. VII.177.

⁷⁸ The opening pages of ps.Galen *On the Best Sect* (I.106-10 K.) are both interesting and relevant here. The author distinguishes *ta phainomena* from *ta kekrummena*. *Ta phainomena* are divided into two classes: (a) those graspable in themselves (perceptual properties such as pale, dark, etc.), and (b) those graspable on the basis of signs (presumably commemorative rather than indicative signs: cf. S.E., *P.* II.100-2). *Ta kekrummena* also fall into two categories: (c) those which are evident (*enargê*), such as 'twice two is four' and 'the same man cannot be both in Egypt and at Athens at the same time', and (d) those grasped by way of demonstration. The criterion for (a) is perception and the sense-organs; for (b) 'comparative observation' (*sumparatêrêsis*); for (c) 'the common conception of all mankind'; while the criterion for (d) is 'coherence (*sumphônia*) in relation to things accepted (*ta homologoumena*)'. This coherence comes in three forms: that in regard to the *phainomena*, that in regard to the *enargê*, and that in regard to things already demonstrated (*Opt. Doct.* I.108-10 K.) Compare 175-6 K., where the author takes the Methodists to task for treating their 'commonalities' (*koinotêtes*: the general internal dispositions of the patients) as *phainomena* even though they are not grasped by the senses: 'these people seem virtually to call what is *enargês* a *phainomenon*'. Galen himself is perfectly happy to speak of what is *enargôs phainomenon* to the intellect (cf. *M.M.* X.35-7, where the Methodists' communalities are also mentioned; the restriction of *ta phainomena* to things grasped by the senses is there attributed to the Empiricists).

⁷⁹ Cf. Cic., *Luc.* 20: the passage in *Dig. Puls.* immediately follows Galen's

XIV. *Epistemology naturalized: Galen*

This claim is underlined, and an argument for it sketched, early in Book IX of *P.H.P.*:

if there is no natural criterion for us, we will not be able to find a scientific one either. Do we then possess any natural criteria, common to all men? For we could not call them natural unless they were common to all; indeed natural things, in addition to their being common to all, must also possess a common nature. I hold that all of you possess these natural criteria [...]. And what are they? Eyes in their natural condition seeing visible things, ears in their natural condition hearing audible things, and the tongue tasting flavours and the nose odours, and the whole skin tactual objects; and in addition to this intelligence (*gnômê*) or mind (*ennoia*) or whatever else anyone wants to call it, with which we distinguish entailment and incompatibility and the other things which go along with them, among which there are division and composition, similarity and dissimilarity. (32: Galen, *P.H.P.* V.722-3 K.)

Note the identification of what is natural with what is universal: it is in part the fact that these criteria (at least in their raw state) are the property of all that allows him to outflank the sceptics (cf. C3 and C4 above: § I; principles P, P*, P**: § VI; and compare Descartes' remarks about good sense: *Discours sur la Méthode* 1, Adam and Tannery (1897-1913) VI.1-2). Galen then refers to the passage of *On the Surgery* mentioned above (31, § XIII), and continues:

it will suffice here simply to mention his [*scil.* Hippocrates'] principal point, namely that in order to approach the precise discrimination of similars and dissimilars, we must make the beginning (*archê*) of our investigation from the natural criteria, which are perception and intelligence (*gnômê*). (33: Gal, *P.H.P.* V.724 K.)

After characteristically remarking that it doesn't matter what you call the second faculty (*dianoia*, *nous*, *logismos*, or whatever), as long as you preserve its *ennoia*, Galen continues:

how does Hippocrates say that we discover the nature of things? By beginning with 'the greatest and easiest' [above, 31], greatest in regard to its utility, easiest in regard to our knowledge of it. For nature gave us both of these things, the criteria themselves and untutored trust in them. The criteria themselves are the organs of

criticism of radical scepticism, briefly discussed below (pp. 208-9); in it, Galen describes how he trained his tactile sense to be able to detect the weak trace of the arterial systole, something which other theorists held to be inapprehensible.

perception and the faculties that make use of them. Untutored and natural trust in them belongs not only to humans but to the other animals too: for when they see things approaching and hear a noise or a voice, they immediately flee an animal that seems bigger but stand their ground whenever they perceive the approaching animal as smaller and weaker. Moreover, if someone distrusts those things which are clearly apparent to perception and reason, they will not be able to attempt the construction of any art; but if the results of the arts are seen to be useful for human life, then the men who made their judgements about them did so at any rate trusting in their natural criteria. (34: Gal., *P.H.P.* V.725-6 K.)

That claim that the perceptual criteria are natural is supported by two considerations: (1) reliance on perceptions of this sort is ubiquitous in the natural world (again compare C3 and C4: § I above; and 21-3, § XI); and (2) if there were no such criteria, there could not have arisen arts and skills with the utility they plainly possess.

(2) need not detain us for long: we have already seen these considerations urged elsewhere (cf. 4; [A] above, § I; Cic., *Luc.* 22). But it is worth pointing out that the strong interpretation of the premises of argument [A] now has something to be said in its favour. It is only if we construe A_i and A_{ii} in a strong sense, if, that is, we suppose that the success of the arts really does entail the existence in a strong sense of natural criteria, that we will be in a position to *explain* such expertise: surely our pragmatic success cannot simply be due to constant good luck (see § X above). The sceptics' position is not incoherent—but it leaves a blatant and troubling explanatory gap. Now, this might not have worried sceptics unduly (indeed, it had better not do so on pain of compromising their *ataraxia*); but surely, one might think, there are reasons why it *ought* to. Explanations, after all, are comforting—and mental comfort is the goal of the sceptical life. But more importantly such explanations have more to recommend them than the mere fact that they are stress-reducing: they hold out the possibility of a more complete and better-grounded picture of the way the world really is.

Yet even so, may not such 'explanations' be deceptive? Might not the world simply resist reduction to explanation in this manner? In a sense, they may and it might: but only on condition that we think of 'the world' here in a strongly realistic sense. As has often been noted, scepticism and realism go hand in hand—scepticism gains its leverage against a realistic conception of truth, in which facts about the world which are themselves utterly distinct from and prior to sense-experience make those experiences which

happen to be veridical true. Now, such realism was common currency in the ancient world—the sceptics were justified, dialectically at least, in fastening upon it as an ubiquitous dogmatic assumption; moreover, that there *was* an external world of some sort is never directly called into question in the major sceptical texts.⁸⁰

Turning to (1), such claims are clearly directed against the arguments of the sceptics, of all stripes, who insist, *ad nauseam*, that the variety and inconcinnity of human experience makes it impossible to appeal to nature in any way at all—there is, in this sense, no nature of things.⁸¹ On the contrary, Galen urges, there is no real *diaphônia* here⁸²—we all, whatever we may say from the official standpoint of the non-asserting, non-assenting, non-judgemental sceptic, agree in relying upon our natural criteria, and in supposing that if they are in good condition and exercised under propitious circumstances, then they will at least furnish us with the basis for understanding (cf. the *homologia* of Philo's experience: 9, § IV above). The Pyrrhonists of course challenged the latter assumption: on what grounds can we privilege waking experience over the reality of dreams? Even though the former seems the more real to the person who is awake, the latter is, after all, real for the dreamer. We cannot simply beg the question in favour of waking experience in this manner (S.E., P. I.102-4; esp. 102).

Galen is characteristically dismissive of this sort of Pyrrhonian rusticity (n. 74): people who talk in this fashion are no better than madmen, and not worth wasting our time upon. Yet in addition to the argument to the best explanation canvassed above, Galen hints at an anti-realist response to sceptics of this extreme sort. Galen takes them on in a passage of *Dig. Puls.* (VIII.776-86 K.).⁸³ If someone insists, in hyper-Pyrrhonian fashion, in qualifying absolutely every assertion with a sceptical 'it appears',⁸⁴ and, when the sun has clearly risen or a ship evidently put into land, refuses to say that these things are the case, then he should stay in bed and

⁸⁰ On this issue see in particular Burnyeat (1982).

⁸¹ On this sceptical approach and its deployment in Pyrrhonian discussions of ethics, see Hankinson (1994a).

⁸² As Long (1989) 197-8 notes, the same is true of Ptolemy's very similar epistemology.

⁸³ See Hankinson (1991a) 295-6.

⁸⁴ On this piece of Pyrrhonian methodology, see S.E., P. I.135, 195, 202; M. XI.18-9; see Barnes (1983) 155, 192 n. 20

refuse to disembark, if he really is uncertain about such matters (*ibid.* 782-3 K.)

On the other hand, Pyrrhonists claim to follow the appearances (*ibid.* 781 K.; cf. S.E., *P.* I.21-4), and to be sceptical only of essential natures. But in that case, their position is empty. If you want, you can talk the language of appearances, and say that after an apparent rain-storm, what looked like a river gave the impression of rising and destroying what seemed to be a bridge (*Dig. Puls.* VIII.784 K.); but such language signifies nothing unless it represents an attitude which cashes out in different behaviour. Compare the remarks about figs and apples (4): even if in order to know that something is a fig, we need to have integrated a variety of past experience, and even if we may on occasion mistake a figment for a fig by acting on the basis of insufficiently corroborated evidence, what on earth could possibly tell against such an identification in optimum conditions? if it looks like a fig, tastes like a fig, feels like a fig, smells like a fig, and has the enterine effects figs standardly have, then it's a fig. What else could it possibly be? That is just what a fig *is*. The sort of hyper-realism that makes it seem possible to suppose that even under optimum perceptual conditions what seems to be a fig might not be a fig makes no sense: Galen, indeed, will not give a fig for it.

This account is also suggested by the single argument in S.E., *M.* VII securely attributable to Antiochus. Sceptics attack the claim that the impression can 'both reveal itself and be indicative of its object' (*M.* VII.163; cf. 430-2), on the familiar grounds that impressions do not always present a real object as it in fact is, but sometimes 'misreport the states of affairs which despatched them, like bad messengers' (163). Dogmatists, however,

must hold that an impression is an affection of an animal which presents both itself and the other [i.e. its object]. For example, when we have looked at something, Antiochus says, we have had our visual faculty disposed in a certain way, and we do not maintain it in the same condition as it was in before looking. And so we grasp two things together by this type of alteration, one being the alteration itself (i.e. the impression), and the second being that which produced the alteration (i.e. the thing seen). (35: S.E., *M.* VII.162)

The impression is likened to light, which reveals both itself and visible objects.

This brief argument suggests the following unpacking: we can know, when we are perceptually affected, that we are so affected

by something external to us (compare Descartes and Berkeley: n. 50 above); moreover that very affection is what serves to reveal the object. Again, could not distinct objects produce the same affection? No: for them to be distinct at all, they must in principle be discriminable—and they are in principle discriminable only if we can, as a matter of fact, with practice and diligence, discriminate them.

This in turn suggests a different way of glossing the infallibility of the cataleptic impression. It is not that the impression itself carries in its wallet a certificate of authenticity (as Cicero's Antiochean account suggests: *Luc.* 33, 36, 84, 111): it is rather that, when it presents itself with sufficient clarity, nothing could tell against the truth of its content. Scepticism at this point becomes, for Wittgensteinian reasons, idle.⁸⁵ It is worth recalling at this point the centrality of *ennoiai* in the Antiochean account: what we cannot (under suitable conditions) genuinely doubt is the fit of a particular perception to an *ennoia*, paradigmatically the ascription of a particular to a species (hence the importance of determining essences and natures). The sort of proposition paradigmatically in question does not concern individuals ('this is Tweedledum'), but particular examples of universals ('this is a man' or 'this is a pomegranate').

XV. *The transparency of waking*

But even so, what of the sceptical arguments about dreaming? surely it is the case that, sometimes at least, we can mistake the dream-state for waking, and take for gospel delusive impressions? And again, why even privilege the waking state in the first place? Here again both Galen and Antiochus (Cic., *Luc.* 51-4) content themselves with a bluff rejection of the sceptical premisses: you have to be mad if you can't distinguish dreams from waking, or if you fail to prefer the latter to the former. But there is more than just invective involved here. Antiochus takes the strong line that we must deny that the 'empty impressions' which occur 'in sleep, wine, and insanity' have any *enargeia* at all:

for who, when he imagines something and depicts something in thought to himself, is not aware, as soon as he rouses himself and

⁸⁵ Cf. Wittgenstein (1969) esp. props. 341-4.

pulls himself together, of the difference between clear and empty impressions? The same holds for dreams [...] as soon as we wake we reject those impressions and do not treat them as equal to the things which we experienced in the forum. (36: Cic., *Luc.* 51)

It is not enough to point to the fact that when asleep our dreams seem to have the same vividness as waking impressions do, even if that were the case (Antiochus hints at the fact that some dreams are transparent, known by the dreamer to be dreams), since we know that when we are asleep our faculties are dimmed, just as we know that when we are drunk our capacities are impaired; and equally, this fact can sometimes be transparent to the drunkard, just as those in the grip of insanity are sometimes aware that they are insane, at least at the beginning of the attack, or when the delusions are fading (Cic., *Luc.* 52).

To say that 'empty impressions' have no perspicuity is surely a strong claim, and the sceptic's response, that at least they appear to have to someone in their grip, is initially a powerful one. Antiochus is in the same case as Descartes, trying to distinguish genuinely clear and distinct impressions from those which only seem to be so: what is to be made of such 'clarity' if it is not transparent to the observer? Here, however, I think there is a further argument at their disposal, which Antiochus at least gestures towards in 36.

Sceptics effectively rely on the symmetry of dreaming and waking experience with regard to their own internal characteristics: the dreamer (in general) is no less satisfied with the quality of his experience than someone awake. But there is a crucial asymmetry involved here too. The waker prefers the waking state to the dreaming state, at least in terms of veridicality, but the dreamer does not so prefer the dreaming state: and insofar as he is aware at all that he is dreaming, he knows that his dreams are delusive. I may dream of having dinner with Michele Pfeiffer; and I may become aware that it is only a dream, and may well prefer the dream-state from an affective point of view to the dismal banality of my waking life, and actively seek to prolong the dream: but I do not do so *thinking that this condition is more real*; indeed it is presumably precisely because it is not that I want it (temporarily at least) to continue.

The crucial asymmetry involved here may be expressed in another way: in the case of clear experience (of the Antiochean and Cartesian sort) it is possible falsely to believe that you have it when

you do not (as Heracles and Admetus both do: 7, 11, §§ III-V above), but not possible falsely to suppose that you do not have it when you do (true love was traditionally supposed to have such characteristics). When asleep, I may suppose I am awake; but when awake (wide awake at least) I cannot genuinely suppose (at least for any length of time) that I might be asleep, at least on pain of psychosis. Such conditions are absolutely transparent to the experiencer.⁸⁶ They do not, of course, guarantee the truth of any impression received while in that condition—but they do, in conjunction with considerations already rehearsed, make it idle to suppose that what appears very clearly and distinctly under such conditions, when all precautions have been taken against perceptual error, may yet be false (to be sure, we cannot perhaps know that all precautions *have* been taken). This is, I suppose, what Descartes' 'light of Nature' (at least in part) amounts to. And if this is right, a fundamental sceptical argument (that of S.E., P. I.102-4) collapses.

XVI. *Conclusions*

If what I have said has anything to be said for it, the following general conclusions emerge. As a result of the long epistemological battle between Academic and Stoic, we find, at the end of the Academy's institutional history, a disagreement between Philo and Antiochus regarding the proper characterization of knowledge and its objects. Antiochus insists (against earlier generations of Academics) that we know things, but holds that we can do so only if something like the Stoic account of knowledge is correct, which he at least (at least as portrayed by Cicero) interprets strongly⁸⁷ as requiring us to be able to be certain of individual items of perceptually-based knowledge that they are knowledge (and hence true) on the grounds that the perceptions on which they are based are unquestionably veridical and known to be so.

Philo counters, more in the spirit of the New Academy, that things can indeed be known: but they cannot (taken *seriatim* at

⁸⁶ Since writing this, I have noticed that Bernard Williams makes a very similar point: Williams (1978) Appendix 3, 309-13. I hope to treat further of this issue elsewhere.

⁸⁷ It does not matter for my purposes whether this is the correct or canonical interpretation: see Striker in this volume, pp. 257-76.

least) be known to be known, since the Academics have conclusively undermined the plausibility of the strong Stoic criterion. For all that, we can indeed know that we know some things, although there are no things such that we know that we know *them*.⁸⁸ This position requires further justification—and its foundations are to be found, ironically enough, in Antiochus' own appeals to the naturalness of our perceptual capacities and the existence of developed skills and expertises, provided that we can successfully account for our grasp of the concepts of truth and falsity independently of our grasping (conclusively) any particular truth.

This development is taken over and refined in the subsequent tradition, paradigmatically by Galen, in whose syncretist, anti-sceptical tapestry we may discern the threads of Stoic, Peripatetic, Platonic, Philonian and Antiochean argument. Provided that we do not interpret the Stoic cataleptic impression in the strong, Antiochean manner, then we are perfectly at liberty to allow that we know certain things, and that what we know we know on the basis of veridical impressions which appropriately convey the appropriate information: i.e. they are cataleptic in the original Stoic sense. Epistemological disagreements, and with them scepticism and perhaps even the practice of epistemology itself, are over.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Formally: $Ka:(\exists p)(Kap)$, but not $(\exists p)(Ka:Kap)$ (where a is an individual, p a proposition, and K a dyadic predicate 'knows that').

⁸⁹ This paper was read (in part) to the 7th meeting of the Symposium Hellenisticum in Utrecht in August 1995. I benefited greatly from the comments of the other participants, both inside and outside the formal sessions. In particular I should like to thank Julia Annas, Myles Burnyeat, Woldemar Görler, John Glucker, David Hahm, Brad Inwood, Malcolm Schofield, David Sedley, and Gisela Striker. Parts of the argument were also presented to a receptive audience at the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro on June 17th, 1996: I should particularly like to acknowledge my host, Danilo Marcondes de Souza Filho, for his warm hospitality and engaging companionship.

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CARNEADEAN ARGUMENT IN CICERO'S ACADEMIC BOOKS

J. ALLEN

I

Carneades argued for positions to which he did not subscribe. This is uncontroversial. According to Cicero, he defended the view that the end consists in the enjoyment of the first natural things, not because he was of the opinion that it did, but in order to challenge the Stoics (*Luc.* 132; *Fin.* II.35, V.20). Cicero also tells us that Carneades argued for the position of Calliphon—that the end is a combination of virtue and pleasure—so zealously that he almost seemed to approve it (*Luc.* 139). According to Cotta, the Academic spokesman in the *De natura deorum*, we are not to suppose Carneades embraced the consequences of his theological sorites, which appears to reduce theism to an absurdity; he argued in this way not to abolish the gods—what could become a philosopher less?—but to convict the Stoics of having shown nothing clearly about them (III.44). And there are of course Carneades' notorious arguments that justice either does not exist or is the height of folly, which according to tradition were presented during the famous embassy of the philosophers to Rome in 155 BCE. Although questions can be raised about which of these arguments Carneades may have made while in Rome and against which schools of philosophy he directed them, there is little doubt that the arguments themselves were his and that his motives were, as tradition maintains, much the same as those already cited: not to convince his auditors that there was no such thing as justice or that prudence requires us to be unjust, but rather to expose the difficulties in the philosophers' theories of justice.¹

There are significant differences between the kinds of argument illustrated by these cases, but they have a characteristic in common that is at least as important: they set out from premises to which their author is not committed and draw conclusions to which he need, therefore, be no more committed. If we call

¹ Cf. Ferrary (1977), Roots (1988).

arguments like these 'dialectical', it seems there is hardly anything Carneades could not have said while arguing dialectically. Yet ancient philosophers and modern scholars alike have tended to suppose that there were limits to what Carneades, or indeed any Academic before Philo or Antiochus, could consistently have said about epistemological matters. Very roughly speaking, they have imposed these constraints out of the conviction that the Academics from Arcesilaus to Carneades were sceptics, who argued dialectically in order to drive home the sceptical moral that nothing can be known (*ἀκαταληψία*), of which, unlike the conclusions of their ethical and theological arguments, they were somehow convinced.

Such a view, I believe, lies behind the success enjoyed in recent times by an interpretation of a difficult passage in the Cicero's Academic books. At *Lucullus* 34 the title character, who speaks for Antiochus, objects to the error, as he sees it, of some Academics who distinguish *perspicua*, or evident matters (*ἐναργή*), from *percepta*, or apprehended matters (*καταληπτά*), and maintain that there is something evident which is true and impressed in the soul and mind and yet cannot be apprehended. This passage follows closely on the heels of another, in which Lucullus attributes a range of views to the Academics, some apparently related to this one, others seemingly very different from it (32-4):

Nor indeed am I able sufficiently to determine what is their intention or what they wish. For sometimes when we put the case to them in this way, 'if the conclusions for which you argue are true, then all things will be nonevident', they reply: 'but what is that to us; is it our fault? blame nature, which has, as Democritus says, hidden truth in the deep'. Others, however, reply in a more refined manner; they even complain because we accuse them of saying all things are nonevident and attempt to show how great a difference there is between the nonevident and that which cannot be apprehended and to distinguish them. Let us deal with these then who distinguish them; those who say that all things are as nonevident as whether the stars are even or odd in number let us abandon as hopeless cases. [...] They are caught in a similar error when, compelled by the reproach of truth, they wish to distinguish evident matters from those that are apprehended (*perspicua a perceptis*) and attempt to show that there is something evident, this is true and impressed in the mind and soul, but all the same it cannot be apprehended.

Despite the good reasons to which a minority of dissenters have pointed for supposing that it was Carneades who distinguished

between *perspicua* and *percepta* in this way and argued that some things are evident though nothing is apprehended, the majority of scholars have held that these arguments were not Carneadean, because, I take it, they cannot reconcile the note of epistemological optimism sounded in them with their view of Carneades as a convinced sceptic. I shall side with the minority view. What is more, I shall argue, though more speculatively, that all the views mentioned by Lucullus in the passage beginning at 32, including the view that everything is as nonevident as whether the stars are even or odd in number, could have been defended by Carneades and most likely were. This reading of *Luc.* 32-4 is, however, only a corollary of my principal thesis, viz. that Carneades could speak with as much dialectical freedom about epistemological issues as about any other matter. Indeed if I am right, the note of epistemological optimism sounded at *Luc.* 34, far from presenting a problem, is precisely what we should expect, *inter alia*, from him. If to be a sceptic is to be prevented by one's convictions from arguing in this way, then Carneades was not a sceptic. Whether there is another way of being a sceptic in which Carneades and other Academics qualified as sceptics is a question I shall touch on only at the end of this paper.

II

Antiochus commits himself to a particularly strong form of the view I mean to oppose when he insists that the Academics cannot waver about the thesis that nothing can be known as they do about all other matters (*Luc.* 29; cf. 109).² For he goes on to compare it to the defining tenets of the other philosophical systems, maintaining that the Academy's *summa*—what the Academic philosophy comes down or amounts to—consists in this dogma. This makes a certain amount of sense. We implicitly refer to first principles of this kind when, in order to explain the beliefs and actions of a consistent member of one of these philosophical schools, we say

² 'quoniam enim id haberent Academici decretum (sentitis enim iam hoc me δόγμα dicere), nihil posse percipi, non debere eos in suo decreto sicut in ceteris rebus fluctuari...' (cf. 109). Cf. *N.D.* II.2, where the Academics are also pictured as wandering from view to view: 'est enim et philosophi et pontificis et Cottae de dis immortalibus habere non errantem et vagam ut Academici sed ut nostri stabilem certamque sententiam'.

'as a Stoic' or 'as an Epicurean' he was bound to act or speak as he did. We do the same when finding fault with an opponent for inconsistency with his basic tenets. Thus, e.g., Cicero faults Torquatus, the Epicurean spokesman of the *De finibus*, and Epicurus himself not for their conduct, which is faultless, but for the lack of agreement between their blameless behavior and the fundamental tenets of Epicureanism (*Fin.* II.70, 80, 84, 88, 89, 96, 98, 99; cf. I.41, 55; *Off.* I.5). Philosophical systems like these also have the advantage of being, as it were, 'self-explaining'. The fundamental doctrines to which they are committed include or imply an account of what it is about human nature and the human situation that gives rise to and makes worthwhile the philosophical inquiry of which they are the object. And one would like to understand the motives and the origins of Academic philosophizing in this way as well. These Antiochus claims to have discovered in ἀκαταληψία, the principle that nothing can be known, but with this crucial difference: while the tenets of the other schools afford them a basis upon which to erect a fixed system of doctrines, the fundamental Academic dogma explains the Academics' practice of defending shifting and inconsistent views about everything apart from itself.³

But we cannot understand the Academy simply by replacing the content of a dogmatic school's fundamental tenets with new sceptical matter in a form common to both. The sceptical thesis that nothing can be known makes a decidedly odd first principle. If you will, it brings us no closer to 'the ultimate springs and principles of the Academic philosophy'. Unlike the first principles of the other schools, it is not the kind of truth, or supposed truth, a real

³ It cannot be denied that this conception of the Academy seems to draw some support from Cicero, who unlike Antiochus is a partisan of the New Academy. In *Academica* I he tells us that Arcesilaus came to affirm that nothing can be known as Socrates and other distinguished figures had done before him, moved as they had been by the obscurity of things. And, Cicero adds, 'he did what was consistent with this; he argued against the doctrines of all so that, when confronted with the equal strength of the arguments on both sides of the question, they would suspend judgement' (*Ac.* I.45). The practice of dialectical argument by Arcesilaus and Carneades (on either side of questions to neither side of which they were committed) appears to be represented here as a consequence of a more fundamental commitment to the sceptical doctrine that nothing can be known, of which the call for suspension of judgement is here regarded as the natural corollary (cf. Lactantius, *Div. inst.* V.17.9). But at *N.D.* I.11 the quest for truth is given as the motive for the same practice of argument, which is there said to have originated with Socrates, been taken up again by Arcesilaus and strengthened by Carneades.

or supposed grasp of which affords a motive for doing anything, let alone practising philosophy. Certainly scepticism conceived in this way does not explain its own origin as the other schools explain theirs.

Yet motives and origins there must have been, as scepticism is no more an unreflective condition into which people are born or happen to fall than Stoicism or Epicureanism; it is the product of philosophical inquiry no less than they are. What is more, if in an effort to explain at least how the Academics come to be committed to the thesis that nothing can be known, we appeal to the arguments they brought in support of it, we are confronted not only with the problem that their right to the premises of these arguments appears to be abolished by the conclusion they draw, but another as well. Though, as I shall argue, the matter is more complicated than is always acknowledged, these epistemological arguments do not appear to be any less dialectical than those put forward by the Academy in other areas. But if a dialectical character made the latter arguments unsuited to implant conviction, then why should it not have done the same to the former? It seems, then, that we should not divide Academic disputation into two parts, the first somehow establishing the sceptical thesis that nothing can be known, which then furnishes the Academics committed to it in this way with their motive for the dialectical arguments that make up the second part.

If we seek a motive which might have moved the Academics to argue as they did, we need look no further than the passages in which Cicero represents the Academics' ultimate aim as the discovery and grasp of the truth (*Luc.* 7, 60, 66, 76; cf. *N.D.* I.11; *Plu.*, *S.R.* 1037C).⁴ We should take the Academics at their word: the principal motive and inspiration for their philosophical activities was the desire to discover the truth.⁵ What could become a

⁴ To be sure, the idea of a school of thought that owes allegiance only to the principle commanding pursuit of the truth is not without problems of its own. One might wonder, as the Academy's ancient opponents did, how seriously to take the profession of a school whose search for the truth had achieved no definite result after generations of effort (*Luc.* 60). Cicero himself admits to Pascalian concerns: might not too nice a concern to discover the truth 'free from all contention' stand in the way of one's fulfilling obligations to the gods? (*N.D.* I.7). And quite generally, the Academics' opponents will have maintained that it is not enough to seek the truth; there are certain truths one has to have grasped.

⁵ Cf. Annas (1992).

philosopher more? Such a desire will, to be sure, give rise to a quest for the truth only in those who do not believe themselves to have it. But there is a difference between the Socratic profession of ignorance, which is a precondition for open-minded inquiry, and the commitment to the thesis that nothing can be known as a first principle, which Antiochus regards as the fixed point and ultimate inspiration of everything the Academics do as philosophers (cf. *Luc.* 27).

This 'Socratic' conception of the Academics' motives also has the advantage of explaining their choice of a dialectical method of inquiry. One has to begin somewhere, and an inquirer in this situation, without any established starting points of his own, will naturally start by examining the positions on offer, arguing from provisional assumptions borrowed from them or assumptions which in one way or another show some promise. I suggest, then, that the thesis that nothing can be known and its corollary, that judgment should be suspended, are, in the first instance, consequences broadly deduced from the Stoa's position, and defended in order to show that the Stoics had established nothing clear about knowledge. The thesis that nothing can be known is not the one fixed point to which the Academics must adhere, but only the most prominent sticking point in their debate with the Stoa. It is the difficulty of those uncovered by the Academy which goes by the straightest route to the heart of the matter in dispute. For it confronts the Stoics' project of founding wisdom on a basis of self-evident sense impressions with its stiffest challenge.⁶ In the same way, the Academy's probabilism should be regarded as an alternative to the Stoa's insistence on certitude, defended in the first instance at least, like Calliphon's position in *Ethics*, for the sake of argument to show that the Stoics were not entitled to rule out alternatives to their position. But to say this is not yet to answer the question whether they should be regarded *only* in this light, as advancing these dialectical purposes and no others. This is a large question, which I cannot answer here. I shall only note that an answer would require us to consider whether the condition of the sceptic and probabilist envisaged in the Academics' arguments was understood by them to throw light on the condition in which at least

⁶ I am indebted for the notion of a 'fixed point' of this kind to Lévy (1992) 275, 298.

some of them seem to have found themselves, that of open-minded inquirers whose long sustained search for knowledge had yet to arrive at a conclusion.

III

The thesis that nothing is known, then, is not the ultimate object of the Academics' allegiance; they are attached to it, in the first instance at least, as an instrument to be tenaciously defended in order to obtain their real object, the discovery of the truth. No thesis whose defense could contribute to this end was off limits to them. But if we are to appreciate the particular features of the Academy's debate with the Stoa which, as I shall argue, recommended the defense of epistemologically optimistic theses, among others, to them, we must first take a closer look at how dialectic served the Academy in the pursuit of its ultimate aim. For an interpretation of the kind I am proposing must confront the problem that many of Carneades' arguments do not, at least according to some conceptions of dialectic, seem especially dialectical. Some of these arguments are elenctic, i.e., they aim to deduce unwelcome consequences from the views of an opponent just as we expect dialectical arguments to do. Others do not seem to confine themselves to premises acceptable to the Academy's opponents, and some of these do not confront those opponents with conclusions that are unwelcome in the same way. Instead as we have noted, the Academics sometimes defended alternatives to their opponents' positions, arguing for conclusions that need not have been unwelcome in themselves and for which, in any case, their opponents were not responsible.

It may help to compare a distinction that Aristotle makes within dialectic between *peirastic* and dialectic narrowly so called (cf. *S.E.* 2.165b3; 8.169b25; 11.172a22). Though by itself it does not yield precisely the distinction we need, it will throw light on one of its elements. *Peirastic* can be used by someone ignorant of a field to test claims to expertise in that field. It proceeds from the beliefs of the respondent at the same time exploiting certain common matters that it is necessary for anyone who has a specialized expertise to know, but which one can know without having any specialized expertise in particular. On the other hand, dialectical arguments,

strictly so called, deduce their conclusions from *endoxa*, or reputable opinions.

Much of the Academy's argument can be viewed as broadly peirastic. As the Academics often emphasize, the view that the sage will suspend judgement about all matters follows from the Stoics' own proscription of opinion (cf. *Luc.* 68, 78; S.E., *M.* VII.155). And the Academics strove to make their arguments for the conclusion that nothing can be known follow as much as possible from views acknowledged as their own by the Stoics. They argued, e.g., that the gods could fashion false impressions indistinguishable from true ones by appealing to the heaven-sent divinatory dreams which the Stoics accepted (*Luc.* 47). But it was not clear that the Academics always succeeded in showing that the Stoa must accept the unwelcome conclusions for which they argued on pain of inconsistency.⁷ Their arguments often depend on premises some of which the Stoa can reject without contradicting any of its tenets. Indeed the Academics sometimes explicitly acknowledge that they are taking premises from other than Stoic sources. Thus at a crucial point in the argument the Academics appeal to the view of Democritus that among the infinite worlds in the universe there are some which are exactly alike in every particular, in this way attempting to make it plausible that there could be objects such as twins exactly like each other in this world, the better to show that even the sage might be misled by resemblances and could, therefore, remain safe from error only by suspending judgement (cf. *Luc.* 55). But it is not, as Lucullus misleadingly suggests, because they have turned in desperation to the views of a figure they had previously ridiculed, that the Academics appeal to Democritus, but rather because Democritus is, as Aristotle would have put it, a reputable philosopher.⁸

Perhaps, then, these arguments should be regarded as more like dialectical than peirastic arguments. At this point, however, it might seem that a crucial difference separating the Academics from Aristotle prevents them from arguing as he did. Aristotle was, if you will, an epistemological optimist. The favor with which

⁷ Cf. Frede (1983).

⁸ Elsewhere Cicero stresses that Democritus is a philosopher by comparison with whom Cleanthes and Chrysippus seem to belong to the fifth class (*Luc.* 73); cf. his reference to the Cyrenaics as the least contemptible of philosophers (76).

a view had been received by the many or the wise was of more than sociological significance to him. Such a view has a claim on us; it is to be reckoned with and not lightly dismissed. As we know, the position that did the most justice to the reputable opinions could in his view fairly claim to be true. But we might hesitate before ascribing such a view to the Academy. Granted, by confronting the Stoics with the reputable views they were obliged to reject, such arguments would serve to show how high a price in plausibility the Stoics were obliged to pay for consistency, but why should this matter to the Academics?

The larger issue raised here is whether the Academics can proceed without an epistemological framework of the kind which explains the efficacy of dialectic for Aristotle. But a partial answer to the immediate question would be to point out that the gap between peirastic and dialectic may not be as wide as one might at first suppose. Dialectical examination of the kind practiced by the Academy tests whether a position satisfies standards accepted by its proponents. The most effective way of bringing home the flaws in a view to its proponents is by a peirastic argument, which deduces from it a conclusion so subversive of their intentions as to call that view into question for them.

But the Stoics did not merely set themselves the task of showing that their position was consistent, that they were not obliged by it to make any concessions from which a conclusion unacceptable to them followed. If they had, they would not have been the philosophers they were. Rather they were bound by their own convictions to take the views of those outside of their school seriously. They appealed to the *consensus omnium* because of the part played in their epistemology by the common notions, the acquisition of which marks a human being's arrival at the condition of mature rationality. And it is the rational faculty constituted by this stock of common notions that, when properly exercised, enables human beings to reject the false, discover the truth and in this way advance towards wisdom.⁹ Prominent among the views which, to this way of thinking, enjoy the support of the common notions already possessed by all adult human beings are those which make up Stoic philosophy (cf. Plu., *C.N.* 1060A). These are therefore the positions at which sincere and intelligent inquirers ought

⁹ Cf. the passages collected at *SVF* II 104, 473.

to arrive, especially if guided by the arguments of those who had already found their way to them. The failure of their theories to gain quick and universal acceptance was, therefore, not a cause for concern to the Stoics, who cheerfully acknowledged that many of their theses were paradoxical (cf. Plu., *ibid.* 1060B). But they were obliged to regard it as a serious problem when fair-minded, intelligent persons who have made a careful study of the issues remain unconvinced by their arguments. The Academics, then, were granted a license by the Stoa to look beyond the confines of Stoicism for their premises. And there is nothing peculiarly Stoic about this. The Stoics appeal to the common notions was, after all, merely their version of the kind of account any philosopher who believes in the power of rational inquiry and argument to discover the truth will give.

We are still dealing with broadly elenctic arguments, however; they are relative to Stoic positions, from which they aim to draw unwelcome sceptical conclusions, though with the aid of auxiliary assumptions whose rejection by the Stoics may present them with a problem distinct from self-contradiction. The second kind of Academic argument that I want to distinguish takes us still further from the simple peirastic model of dialectic with which we began. It needs to be viewed as part of a second phase of the debate, inaugurated by the Stoa's reaction to the Academy's first set of elenctic arguments. Faced with arguments which, if they do not quite succeed in reducing the Stoic position to self-contradiction, do seem to have raised serious problems and shown some of the assumptions on which that position rests in an implausible light, the Stoics strove to undermine the plausibility of the assumptions on which the Academy's arguments depend (cf. Plu., *S.R.* 1036A). They tried to show that the effect of the Academy's arguments, if sound, would be to deprive us of any basis for action and reflection. The aim of the Stoics, and Stoicizing Academics like Antiochus, then, was to vindicate their position indirectly by demonstrating just how untenable and thoroughly at odds with our experience would be the consequences of its rejection. By arguing in this way, I suggest, they hoped to bring about a shift of perspective; faced with the consequences shown to follow on the conclusions of the Academy's arguments, the Stoa's opponents would be obliged to reevaluate the premises that had made those arguments seem compelling and see their plausibility for the illusion it was, at the

same time coming to see that the Stoic position was not as paradoxical as it had first appeared.

In other words, the Stoics and Antiochus aimed to defend their position by establishing that there were no plausible alternatives to it. In this they were greatly helped by the close and systematic connection among the parts of that position of which they were so proud, famously going so far as to claim that the change of a single letter would topple the whole (Cic., *Fin.* III.74).¹⁰ The Stoics' accounts of wisdom and virtue, of action and moral responsibility all crucially relied on the cognitive impression. To challenge it as the Academics did was to challenge them, and if the Stoics were right, to make impossible any satisfactory account of these matters at all. By the same token, to make use of any part of the system was thereby to be committed to the whole, or so the Stoics would have us believe.

It is against this background that we can best understand Carneades' distinctive contribution to the debate. For he seems, more than any of his predecessors, to have accepted the challenge implicit in the Stoics' claim that there were no plausible alternatives to their position by demonstrating that there were. His attack was no longer directed, in the first instance at least, against a thesis that was part of the Stoic theory proper—that there are cognitive impressions, say—but the supplementary contention the Stoics had taken it upon themselves to defend: that the consequences of its denial were intolerable.¹¹ His arguments are, therefore, to be judged by a different standard. His aim was now to do justice to a set of considerations concerning our epistemic needs and resources that are more roughly formulated and more broadly shared than the tenets of the Stoics' theory, though of course nonaccidentally very

¹⁰ On the wider significance of this passage see Brunschwig (1978).

¹¹ I say 'in the first instance' because it would be an oversimplification to suppose this aim excludes the other. Carneades' account of probable impressions, if successful, shows not only that the disastrous consequences alleged to follow on the assumption that there are no cognitive impressions do not follow, but also that Stoic epistemology's reliance on self-evident sense impressions is fundamentally mistaken even as an ideal. For according to the theory, our powers to discover the truth by means of sense impressions can be refined and improved; this improvement is not a matter of discriminating ever more perfectly self-evident sense impressions but rather of appreciating the complicated relations between impressions by means of which they add to or detract from each other's value as evidence. I have defended this interpretation in Allen (1994).

much like the expectations to which the Stoics claimed to do justice as no others could. Considerations of this kind afforded Carneades with the point of departure for his famous generalization of the Academy's argument and subsequent development of probabilism (S.E., *M.* VII.159 ff.). Of course, by arguing in this way he also bolstered the Academy's original sceptical arguments by showing that the Stoa was not in a position to dismiss the difficulties raised by them or compel a reevaluation of their premises along the lines it preferred. At the same time, the diligent pursuit of the truth could only profit from the broader perspective opened up by a free and fair investigation of the alternatives.

IV

This way of looking at the matter also helps explain the form taken by some of Carneades' inquiries. For they resemble nothing so much as virtuoso variations within a broadly Stoic framework in which, as it will have seemed to the Stoics, inviolable rules are broken, essential elements dispensed with and impossible combinations effected. The alternatives he put forward for consideration challenge the inevitability of the Stoics' claim for their position by making a fair show of performing the tasks the Stoics had set for it, but without its more distinctive and troubling features.¹²

This approach shows itself most clearly in Carneades' handling of questions regarding assent. In this matter, we are told, he differed from Arcesilaus, who is supposed to have preferred his scepticism whole, so to speak, affirming the unknowability of all things and the consequent necessity of suspending judgement about every issue. By contrast Carneades sometimes yielded on the second point (*Luc.* 59, 67). This was in response to the first of two closely related arguments by which the Stoics attempted indirectly to bolster their case, namely the argument that life would be rendered impossible by the suspension of judgement called for by the Academy because action is impossible without assent (cf. *Luc.* 37-9, 62). According to the view I am advocating, the aim of Carneades' 'concession', in the first instance at least, was to show that, even supposing that action is impossible without assent—

¹² Cf. Cic., *Fat.* 23, where Carneades is said to have shown the Epicureans how to do what they set out to do without the swerve.

which we know he was also willing to dispute (*Luc.* 104, 107-8)—the Stoics' case has still not been vindicated.

The Stoics' case is a strong one only as long as the links between action and assent on the one hand, and assent and the cognitive impression on the other, are kept immune from revision. So long as they are, considerable pressure can be put on the Academy's case for ἀκαταληψία. Carneades' concession shows how that pressure might be reduced by plausible revisions of the links on which the Stoics' case relied. These links are held in place by the Stoic conception of assent, according to which it has, as it were, two faces, one that looks towards action, the other towards cognition. At the risk of oversimplifying, the first involves what we might call 'a practical commitment sufficient to give rise to an action', the second 'a taking for true'. Of course the Stoics grant that assent can be and often is given to false impressions, but they insisted that assent is an unqualified taking for true, not a conjecture or a hazard; it expresses complete confidence, and is therefore warranted only by an impression that cannot be false. Were there no such impressions it would lose its point, becoming impossible for anyone aware of this (cf. *Luc.* 18, 36, 59). But once the connections on which the Stoics' argument depends have been brought to light in this way, the question has to be asked whether action requires such an unqualified taking for true. Carneades' concession permits him to approach this question afresh from the side of action. Beginning with a conception of assent tailored to the need for practical commitment, he can then ask whether assent, so conceived, can only legitimately be given in the conditions specified by the Stoa, i.e., in the presence of a cognitive impression, or could instead be bestowed, in a prudent and discriminating way by a sage, on impressions which, without affording the kind of warrant the cognitive impression did, nevertheless give us something to 'go on', i.e., on probable impressions. If a revision of the Stoa's account of assent along these lines is possible, we seem to have a way of releasing the pressure built up by the inactivity argument at least as reasonable as the concession of the existence of cognitive impressions, the case against which seemed a strong one on its own merits.¹³ Thus, far from being a sign of weakness, a retreat before superior force, Carneades' concession is a concession from

¹³ Cf. Striker (1980), esp. 75 = (1996) 109.

strength; it shows that, even if disputed points are conceded to the Stoics, they are still far from the vindication they seek.

Philo and Metrodorus, to be sure, took Carneades' concession to represent his real conviction. But in his most considered and authoritative statement about the matter, Cicero, following Clitomachus, advocates a 'dialectical' interpretation according to which Carneades' aim was to separate the issues of ἐποχή and ἀκαταληψία in the way I have described (*Luc.* 78):

This last [that there is no true impression that cannot be matched by a false impression of the same kind] is the one contention that has persisted until this day, for the other point, that the wise man will assent to nothing, did not relate to this controversy. It was permitted 'to apprehend nothing but have opinions nonetheless', which Carneades is said to have approved. For my part, believing Clitomachus more than Philo or Metrodorus, I hold this was maintained in argument rather than approved by him.

We might even go a bit further ourselves and suppose that the view Clitomachus went on to defend as Carneades' own was put forward for the sake of argument in the same way. Carneades' aim, on this view, would have been to show, by demonstrating that the sage will be able to act and inquire without assent, that the Stoics were not entitled to the concession that action requires assent, even though, as we have seen, had it come to that, the Stoics would still not be in a position to dismiss the case for ἀκαταληψία. The refusal to concede that assent is necessary for action also advanced the inquiry into the nature of assent by allowing Carneades to approach the issue from the other, as it were, more theoretical side. Conceiving assent in the Stoic manner as the mental act of taking an impression to be true which is warranted only by an impression justifying complete confidence, he was able to ask whether action and inquiry can take place only on the basis of this kind of assent. As we know from Clitomachus, he went to some trouble to explain that to withhold assent was not to forgo every reaction to impressions which would allow one to use or follow impressions so that the sage would be able to act and inquire without assent (*Luc.* 104; cf. 110).¹⁴

Carneades certainly intended at least this much. I shall again put aside the questions whether and to what extent this or any of

¹⁴ A difficult passage, the best account of which is that of Hirzel (1883) 168 n. 1.

the other positions he advanced in this way struck him or his followers as throwing light on or somehow suiting the condition of the Academic inquirer. For the present, it is sufficient to note that, by defending alternative solutions to the problem of assent, Carneades has made it plain that where the Stoics maintained that there was but one solution that could be plausibly and consistently defended, there were in fact several. The Stoic solution holds that wisdom, and indeed any kind of life at all, were possible only with cognitive impressions and assent. Carneades has now defended the views that they are possible without apprehension but with assent and that they are possible without either. What is more, it is not clear that the Academics were as firmly wedded to ἀκαταληψία as is usually supposed. Though Cicero does not make very much of it, he indicates that the Academics were willing, it seems, to argue that assent should be withheld even if there were cognitive impressions, i.e., were perhaps willing to consider a life characterized by the fourth possible combination, cognitive impressions without assent (*Luc.* 68).

V

The Stoics also argued that without cognitive impressions we shall not have any basis for judgement, or if you will, anything to go on. This argument is distinct from, though obviously closely related to the argument we have just been considering. If successful, it would provide essential support for the Stoics by demonstrating that they are right to confine assent to the cognitive impression.¹⁵ But if my account of Carneades' handling of assent is right, and if ἀκαταληψία is, as I maintain, a difficulty which arises in the Academy's examination of the Stoic position and is relative to it, there is another question we should expect to see asked. So far we have proceeded as if the Academy's principal contention, ἀκαταληψία, was equivalent to and can be rendered as the thesis that nothing can be known. That it is often so understood by all parties to the debate is undeniable, but that is because it is often taken to be an implication of the contention that, strictly speaking, goes under the head of 'ἀκαταληψία', namely that there are no cognitive impressions. But this assumption can itself be questioned. Here I do

¹⁵ Cf. G. Striker (1980) 63 ff. = (1996) 99 ff.

not mean the Stoics' view that apprehension of cognitive impressions is only a necessary condition for the perfectly firm and unshakeable cognition for which they reserved the term 'knowledge' (ἐπιστήμη) and that on their view belongs only to the wise. The item in Stoic epistemology that corresponds most closely to the condition which we and not a few of the ancients should be happy to call knowledge is 'apprehension' (κατάληψις), which is on the Stoic view the common property of the wise and the foolish (S.E., *M.* VII.152). And it is the alleged relation between the cognitive impression and less exalted cognitive conditions like this that I wish to suggest did not escape Carneades' attention.

According to the official Stoic definition, a cognitive impression is:

- (i) from what is, where this is understood to mean true,
- (ii) stamped and impressed in exact accordance with what is, and
- (iii) such as could not be false.¹⁶

Our sources tell us that the third clause was added later in response to Academic criticism (*Luc.* 77; S.E., *M.* VII.252). The Stoics augmented their definition in this way, however, not in order to introduce a new feature independent of those specified in the first two clauses, but rather to make explicit a feature of the cognitive impression which they took to be already implied by the definition as it stood. This reveals an element of complexity in the definition which played an important part in the debate between the Stoa and the Academy. Stoic epistemology requires a class of perceptual impressions marked off by a character which belongs to no false impressions and can somehow be discriminated. Only in this way, by confining his assent to impressions with this character, will the wise person be able to avoid forming false beliefs of the kind that result from the acceptance of false perceptual impressions. This character is referred to in the third clause of the definition, and it is clear from our accounts of the debate that it came to be understood as a kind of evidence, intensity or forcefulness (*Luc.* 45, 51; S.E., *M.* VII.257, 403, 408). But the Stoics do not simply postu-

¹⁶ Cf. Frede (1983) for a fuller account of the definition, especially a defense of this interpretation of the first clause.

late such a feature nor, in the strictest sense, do they make it a defining feature of the cognitive impression. Instead they seem to have regarded it as property (ἰδίωμα, *propria nota*) of the cognitive impression, in the old-fashioned sense of the term according to which a property of a species is an attribute which, though belonging to all and only the members of that species, is not part of its essential character. It is the second clause of the definition which comes closest to specifying the essential and defining feature of the cognitive impression. And it is the stamping and impressing specified in this clause—which occurs whenever the individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions having to do with the perceiver, the object, the medium of perception and so on are satisfied (*Luc.* 19; S.E., *M.* VII.424)—that supports and thereby explains the cognitive impression's other features by guaranteeing, on the one hand, that it is true and, on the other, imparting to it the characteristic property by means of which it is to be discriminated.

In its controversy with the Stoa, the Academy strove to show that the features specified in the definition are not related as the Stoics' definition maintained they were and as they had to be if the cognitive impression was to play its assigned part. To this end they argued that the alleged characteristic property of the cognitive impression is not in fact confined to true impressions. This conclusion will follow if it can be established that the alleged characteristic property does not belong exclusively to impressions arising as a result of the process which the Stoics say is alone capable of guaranteeing their truth, but belongs also to impressions that arise as a result of processes that afford no such guarantee. This is the aim of the first and best known of the arguments brought forward by the Academy, those appealing to impressions experienced while dreaming, drunk or mad. The conclusion would also follow if the process by which cognitive impressions are supposed to be formed according to the Stoa fails to guarantee their truth even though it does impart to the impressions to which it gives rise an evidence and intensity they share with no other impressions. This is the aim of the second set of Academic arguments, to which we shall soon turn. Both are treated as arguments from indistinguishability (ἀπαρραλλαξία) because they purport to show that would-be cognitive impressions are indistinguishable from false and thereby non-cognitive impressions with regard to the alleged characteristic property of the cognitive impression. And because cognitive

impressions must be determined by a discriminable characteristic property, arguments of both kinds serve to establish ἀκαταληψία.

The Academics organized their argument under four heads (*Luc.* 41, 83). The first, according to which there are false impressions, distinguishes the Stoic approach to knowledge from that of the Epicureans, who solve the problem posed by false perceptual impressions by denying that there are any (cf. *Luc.* 19, 79, 83, 101). The second, according to which a false impression cannot be cognitive, re-states the requirement that cognitive impressions afford reliable access to the truth and thus corresponds to the first clause of the Stoics' definition. According to the third, a class of impressions which do not differ among themselves cannot have some members that are cognitive and some that are not. The looseness with which this difference is specified matters, for as we shall see, the Academy's arguments exploit more than one variety of difference that putative cognitive impressions can fail to exhibit with non-cognitive impressions.¹⁷ Nonetheless its purpose is, at bottom, to re-affirm the crucial requirement stated in the third clause of the Stoics' definition that cognitive impressions be discriminable: to the underlying difference between cognitive and non-cognitive impressions there must correspond a difference between impressions that have, and impressions that lack, the characteristic property of the cognitive impression. As Cicero observes, the Stoa accepted all these points; the disagreement with the Academics comes down to the fourth head, their contention that there is no true impression that could not be matched by a false impression that is indistinguishable from it. Together with principles stated under the second and third heads of the argument, it furnishes the Academics with the grounds they need to deduce ἀκαταληψία.

It is a fair question, however, whether the nonexistence of the cognitive impression for which the Academy argued in this way need imply that nothing can be known. Philo notoriously came to believe that the implication did not obtain; the Academy's arguments were sound, but knowledge is possible all the same. But he did not make this point, as I think he might have, by maintaining that ἀκαταληψία does not put knowledge out of our reach, using for 'knowledge' a term from outside the family that includes ἀκατα-

¹⁷ This is the cause of a good deal of confusion in the *Lucullus*, but the difference is marked clearly enough by Sextus (*Luc.* 40, 44, 58, 111; S.E., *M.* VII.408).

ληψία. Rather, he chose to say that things were apprehensible (καταληπτά) even though there are no impressions satisfying all three clauses of Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression, and inapprehensible (ἀκατάληπτα) only on the Stoa's mistaken assumption that κατάληψις must be by means of such impressions (cf. S.E., *P.* I.235).¹⁸ This probably reflected and may even have contributed to the development that saw the terminology of 'apprehension', which had originally been tied quite closely to Stoic theory, achieve common currency (cf. *Luc.* 145). In any event, Philo's predecessors did not take this step. Before his time, it seems not to have occurred to anyone that 'apprehensible' could mean anything other than what the Stoics said it did, i.e., that indistinguishability necessarily implied inapprehensibility. This is implicit in the third point of the Academy's argument, which Cicero represents as completely uncontroversial (*Luc.* 77; cf. 78). But that should not have prevented his predecessors from asking—to put it in the least contentious way possible—just how bad our epistemic situation is if, as they had argued, there are no cognitive impressions.

To be sure, when their opponents maintain that we could hardly ask a god for better perceptual powers than we already possess, precisely on the grounds that there are cognitive impressions which afford us a perfectly secure grasp of the world, the Academics disagree, observing that there are many improvements we can imagine in this area (cf. *Luc.* 19, 80 ff.). But they are not obliged to agree when the Stoics and Antiochus argue that if the conclusions of the Academy's arguments are true, we are in effect deprived of our senses, blinded and plunged into worse than Cimmerian darkness (*Luc.* 26, 29, 34, 54, 61; cf. 99, 103, 110). In a curious way it is these arguments of the Stoics and Antiochus that sound the most epistemologically pessimistic, and in this sense, sceptical note of the whole debate.¹⁹ But this should not come as a surprise. The Stoics and Antiochus argue in this way on the assumption that they are wrong about the cognitive impression and the Academy right, just as they did in connection with assent, to show that there is no alternative to their being right and the Academy wrong. What we should expect at this point, I suggest, is an exchange of roles between Stoa and Academy. The Academy will oppose to the

¹⁸ Cf. Barnes (1989), esp. 71-6.

¹⁹ Cf. Lucullus' remark: 'cum *adhibemus* ad eos orationem eius modi; si ea quae disputentur vera sint tum omnia fore incerta' (*Luc.* 32).

Stoa's *conditional* scepticism a case for epistemological optimism conditioned by the same assumption, that there are no cognitive impressions. In particular, we should expect Carneades to proceed, as he did in regard to assent, by proposing an alternative that could be plausibly represented as performing the tasks set by the Stoa, but without the cognitive impression. Such an alternative was of course also essential if the two solutions to the problem of assent he proposed are to have a chance of succeeding, for both of them require that there be something to go on, follow or use.

Lucullus' case for conditional scepticism presupposes an epistemological framework, which though not peculiar to the Stoics, has been analyzed in terms drawn from their theories. It is not easy to say where the framework originated or how it spread, but it is clear from Cicero's citation of Clitomachus that Carneades had already been faced with arguments that presuppose it in the same way (*Luc.* 99). Common to all of its versions is a division of matters into those which lie within our epistemic reach, so to speak, and those which do not. The latter are the matters which are and must remain nonevident or uncertain.²⁰ Nonevidence of this kind is most frequently illustrated by the example 'whether the stars are even or odd in number' (cf. *Luc.* 110). Several different versions of the division of those matters which are, by contrast with these, in one way or another within our epistemic grasp are preserved by Sextus (*P.* II.97; *M.* VIII.145 ff.; 316 ff.; cf. *M.* VII.25). All distinguish between evident matters, which are grasped by direct observation apart from inference, and nonevident ones the apprehension of which requires an inference ultimately rooted in a grasp of evident matters. Something like this outlook also seems to underlie Lucullus' very brief account of the coordinated notions of inquiry (*quaestio*, ζήτησις) and proof (*argumenti conclusio*, ἀπόδειξις). Inquiry is an impulse directed towards the apprehension of a matter which is unclear; it terminates in discovery, which typically takes the form of a proof that puts a conclusion resolving the issue into an inferential relation with facts already apprehended (*Luc.* 26).

The Stoics and Antiochus contend, of course, that only an analysis of the kind they offer does justice to this framework; to dispense with it is, on their view, tantamount to scrapping the whole system. Thus they were able to argue that by abolishing

²⁰ 'ea quae permanent incerta' (*Luc.* 26).

apprehension the Academy's arguments leave everything as non-evident as whether the stars are odd or even in number. If you will, the Stoics maintain that the 'technical-seeming' result, ἀκαταληψία, has an implication that we can all see is untenable, namely that everything is nonevident. The challenge confronting the Academy, then, was to show that this not so: the framework, or a large and significant part of it, lends itself to a different analysis and can, therefore, survive the refutation of the Stoic account. Cicero devotes little attention to the details of Carneades' theory of probability in the *Lucullus*, but we do find traces of the use to which the theory was put by the Academy in its alternative account of the epistemological framework.

Various Academic reactions to the conditional scepticism of the Stoics and Antiochus are alluded to and dismissed in the rather compressed passage, *Luc.* 32-4, that I earlier promised to discuss. The passage is difficult, I suggest, not only because of its compression, for which Cicero should be held responsible, but also owing to the character of the speaker he means to depict. If Cicero is not being unfair, some of the blame lies with Antiochus, whose spokesman, Lucullus, is portrayed here as a spluttering dogmatist. 'I cannot determine what their intention might be or discover what they wish' he says. What follows is intended to establish what a confused and sorry lot the Academics are. 'Sometimes', Lucullus continues, 'when we confront them with the argument that, if the conclusions for which they argue are true, everything will be nonevident'—i.e., the argument we have been discussing—they respond, "what is that to us; blame nature?" By this point 'sometimes' should have a familiar ring to it. If we pause here, we might expect Lucullus to go on to mention other positions defended at other times by the Academics with characteristic inconsistency. Instead as we have seen, he proceeds to divide them into factions. 'Others', he continues, 'are more refined; they even complain when we accuse them of rendering all things nonevident and attempt to show how great a difference there is between the nonevident and that which cannot be apprehended (the *incertum* and *quod percipi non posset*)'. He then announces that he will direct his fire against the last mentioned group, giving up as hopeless those who say 'everything is as nonevident as whether the stars are odd or even in number', presumably the same people as those who would have us blame nature. The more reasonable faction,

Lucullus then tells us, appeal to probability, just as we would expect. After a brief and conspicuously feeble argument that probability will not do, as we have seen, 'they', not further specified, are said to fall into a similar error when, 'driven by the reproach of truth' they attempt to distinguish things evident from things apprehended (*perspicua a perceptis*) and attempt to show that there is something evident, that this is true and impressed in the mind and soul and yet cannot be apprehended.

It is my view that the expectation aroused by Lucullus' initial 'sometimes' probably gives us a fairer picture of the real situation than his subsequent division of the Academy into factions. It would have furthered the Academy's dialectical aims to defend the positions of each of the factions for the sake of argument; in particular I think it very likely that Carneades argued for all of them, though it then becomes a nice question how Antiochus became confused about this point. Was it by reading different Academic books in which different lines of argument were developed? In any case, this is the most speculative version of my thesis; it includes a proper, less speculative part, to which I shall turn first: the distinction between *perspicua* and *percepta* and the refusal to grant that ἀκαταληψία implies that everything is nonevident belong to the same position, which was defended and originated by Carneades. That one of its components belongs to Carneades is attested by Eusebius, probably quoting Numenius (Fr. 26.109 ff. Des Places; cf. *Luc.* 99, 102, 103, 110). Carneades, he tells us, held that there was a difference between the nonevident and the unapprehended, and although everything is unapprehended (ἀκατάληπτα) not everything is nonevident (ἄδηλα). And there is nothing surprising in this. If to maintain that all matters are nonevident is to hold that we stand to every issue as we do to the question whether the stars are odd or even in number, Carneades will of course have distinguished between ἀκαταληψία and non-evidence. Yet a surprisingly large number of scholars have, with varying degrees of conviction, denied that Carneades distinguished between *percepta* and *perspicua*. The usual tendency has been to connect it with the innovations of Philo's Roman period, or failing that to assign it to another figure or even deny that any such distinction was ever made in the Academy.²¹ Apart from the

²¹ Zeller (1923) 616 with n. 2; Hermann (1855) 12 ff. endorsed Zeller's suggestion (already to be found in the earlier edition), but saw in Philo's

small minority who regard the passage as Carneadean, they have done this despite what one might have thought was the obvious difficulty of divorcing the denial that all things are nonevident from the affirmation that some are evident.²²

As we have already noted, the recognition of evident matters has always seemed to sound a note of epistemological optimism hard to harmonize with the picture of Carneades as a convinced sceptic. But the burden of my argument has been that, far from being a problem, this is precisely what we should expect from Carneades. As we have just seen, the Stoics exploit an epistemological framework whose elements have been analyzed and defined in terms of their epistemological theory. In this analysis much use in particular is made of that theory's most essential and distinctive component, the cognitive impression. The Stoics even go so far as to define sense perception, properly understood no doubt, with reference to it (cf. *Ac.* I.41; *D.L.* VII.52). They seem to do the same with the evident as well, presumably defining an evident matter as one of which we have, or can have, cognition by the senses. If this analysis is correct, the Academy's arguments for ἀκαταληψία threaten to bring the whole framework down. But according to the view I have been defending, Carneades' aim is to challenge the Stoics' claim that it is correct and can be seen to be so because there are no plausible alternatives. His task, on this view, was to show how much justice he could do to the epistemological

defense of *perspicua* a repudiation of the senses in favour of a form of mental apprehension which he believed marked a return to genuine Platonism; Reid (1880) 100: '[the recognition of *perspicua*] was possibly one of Philo's devices to cover his return to dogmatism'; Brochard (1887) 197-8 who, however, takes Philo's Roman views to be a less significant departure from Carneades' than some other authors; Schmekel (1892) 387-8; Goedeckemeyer (1905) 60 n. 4, who thinks Antiochus' attribution of a doctrine of perspicuity to the Academics is due to his own imagination and nothing else; von Fritz (1938), esp. 2540; Robin (1944) 132; Sandbach (1971), esp. 32; Glucker (1978) 74-8, who forcefully states the reasons why *Luc.* 34 should not be attributed to Philo, but cannot see a way to credit it to Carneades; he suggests it is the view of a 'Metrodorean splinter group'; Moreau (1979) 343; Sedley (1983) 19 n. 49; Tarrant (1985) 9, 49 ff.; Mette (1986-7) 17 (fr. 5), cf. *ibid.* 11, 22, who counts *Luc.* 34 as a fragment of Philo's, though his name is nowhere mentioned; Hankinson (1995) 120; Schäublin (1995) 218 n. 96.

²² Cf. Hirzel (1883) 211-2, who first stated the minority view. He has been followed by Lévy (1992) 292-4 with n. 141, and Görler (1994) 865-6. Long and Sedley (1987) II.441 hold that the affirmation that some things are evident and the denial that all are nonevident are of a piece, but credit both of them to Philo.

framework with a theory whose basic unit is the probable rather than the cognitive impression.

In Cicero's response to Lucullus we can see traces of Carneades' attempt to do just this. With Clitomachus as his authority, Cicero tells us that Carneades distinguished between two ways of dividing impressions into kinds (*Luc.* 99). According to the first, some impressions are cognitive, others not; according to the second, some probable, others not. Everything said against the senses and the evident (*perspicuitas*), he goes on to say, relates to the first, whereas against the second, it is fitting to say nothing. This way of putting the matter is perhaps a little confusing, but Cicero's meaning is clear enough.²³ The Academy's argument counts against the senses and perspicuity or evidence only if they are conceived as the Stoics insist they must be, i.e., defined with reference to the cognitive impression. Understood in this way, perspicuity and the senses are abolished by the case for ἀκαταληψία; but if they are understood with reference to the theory of probable impressions, as Carneades maintains they can be, they are not called into question by the Academy's arguments. In this way, nonevident matters are not those beyond the reach of apprehension, but those regarding which we cannot obtain probable impressions (cf. *Luc.* 110). To argue as the Academy does, then, is not to threaten perspicuity.

This tone of epistemological optimism is sustained in the broader context of the passage beginning at *Luc.* 98, whose object is to rebut the charge that the Academy's arguments reduce everything to the condition of nonevidence. Cicero grants that the Academy's opponents are within their rights when they reproach the Academy for denying that anything can be apprehended, but insists that this reproach must at least take into account the Academy's appeal to probability; the Academics should at least to be spared the tiresome query 'then you discern nothing, you hear nothing, nothing is evident to you?' (*Luc.* 102, 105). In other words, none of these theses is maintained by the Academy of Carneades without qualification, but only with reference to Stoic conceptions of evidence, sense-perception and the like, to which, as we have seen, it has been at pains to argue there are alternatives. Cicero's pronouncement that his opponent's defense of the evident (*tuum perspicuitatis patrociniū*) fails (*Luc.* 105) should, I suggest, be understood along

²³ Cf. Madvig (1876) lxvii ff.

the same epistemologically optimistic lines as well. He says this not because he takes the Academy to have shown that everything is nonevident, but rather because the Academy's account of evidence in terms of probability has shown its opponents' defense of it to be unnecessary.²⁴ As Cicero remarks a little further on: 'we take away only what never was and leave what is sufficient' (*Luc.* 146).

VI

Can we say anything more about the conception of evidence permitted by Carneades? Defenders of the minority view, which credits Carneades with the acceptance of *perspicua* at *Luc.* 34, have rightly pointed to the famous 'generalization' by which Carneades prepares the way for his theory of probability (*S.E., M.* VII.160-1). There he argues that the criterion must be sought in 'the affection of the soul from the evident', by which he clearly means sense impressions.²⁵ But as he immediately goes on to demonstrate, no sense impression is criterial in the way required by the Stoa, i.e., such that it could not be false (164). Attention must therefore be directed to a criterion 'common to the true and the false', i.e., the probable impression. Evidence, then, does not imply truth, though it may serve to bring out the foundational role assigned to sense impressions, a feature Carneades' theory shares with that of the Stoa.²⁶ Another clue is furnished by the account Sextus gives of the arguments for 'indistinguishability' (ἀπαράλλαξία) made by the Carneadeans (*M.* VII.402 ff.). According to the first of these, the fact that false impressions are just as evident and striking (ἐναργές and πληκτικόν) as (putatively) cognitive impressions is a token of their indistinguishability. That they are equally evident and striking is supposed to be shown by the fact that the actions attendant upon impressions follow false impressions just as surely as they do true impressions. Thus the argument establishes 'the indistinguishability of (putatively) cognitive and non-cognitive impressions with reference to a peculiar character consisting in evidence and

²⁴ 'With the introduction and establishment of probability, free, unfettered and unburdened by any difficulty, you see, Lucullus, your defense of perspicuity collapses.'

²⁵ Cf. Hirzel (1993) 209; Görler (1994) 856.

²⁶ Cf. Frede (1983) 72 ff. = (1987) 157 ff.; Tarrant (1985) 16, 54.

intensity', by exploiting a notion of evidence which it argues is not confined to true impressions and which it explains with reference to 'strikingness' and 'intensity' (408). And this brings the evident into close connection with the theory of probability, whose point of departure is the tendency of impressions to strike us as true in such a way that we go along with or follow them unless impeded by a conflicting impression or a feature of the circumstances in which the impression arose that calls its veracity into question.²⁷

We have good grounds, then, to conclude that Carneades, as it were, detached the subjective side of evidence from the objective relation to the truth from which the Stoics had claimed it was inseparable. To be evident was to be probable, or probable in a certain way. And this, I believe, points the way to the solution of the one remaining difficulty presented by *Lucullus* 34. When Lucullus complains about the error of the Academics who distinguish *perspicua* from *percepta* and attempt to show that there is something which is evident, this is true and impressed in the soul and mind, but is nevertheless not able to be apprehended, it is tempting to suppose that he is defining or characterizing a *kind* of impression. Evident impressions would then be impressions which are true and impressed in the mind and soul. Zeller, e.g., seems to have believed that the evident impression is a kind of impression that is placed somehow between cognitive and probable impressions.²⁸ But as he immediately goes on to observe, it is hard to see how there could be a place for such a kind of impression. Nor does it help if we treat the evident as a kind of especially probable impression characterized by the same features. And it is not hard to see why. The point is easily made in terms of Carneades' distinction between the two states or relations (σχέσεις) of an impression (S.E., *M.* VII.168). One of these is to the object of the impression, the other to the person whose impression it is. According to the first, it is true or false; according to the second, it is apparently true or not apparently true, i.e., probable or not probable. In these terms, according to the Academy, the Stoics aim to show that there is a state relative to us, i.e., a way of being probable,

²⁷ Perhaps evidence lies behind Cicero's remark (*N.D.* I.12): 'non enim sumus i quibus nihil verum esse videatur... ex quo existit et illud, multa esse probabilia, quamquam non perciperentur, tamen, quia *visum* quendam haberent *insignem* et *inlustrem*, his sapientis vita regeretur'.

²⁸ Zeller (1923) 617.

exhibited only by true impressions. As we have seen, this was to be accomplished by the defining feature of the cognitive impression, the fact that it is stamped and impressed in exact accordance with its object. The Academy argued in opposition that every state exhibited in relation to us by an impression that is, as it happens, true is exhibited by false impressions, so that there is no way of being probable such that only true impressions are probable in that way. To allow that there are evident impressions, where evidence is the condition of an impression in relation to the perceiver that coincides with being true and impressed in the mind and soul would, then, be to concede victory to the Stoa. On the other hand, to make evidence a condition of impressions in relation to their objects only, as Philo did with the condition of apprehensibility, would be to give up the crucial relation of the evident to us, i.e., the characteristic property of the cognitive impression.

But the Academics about whom Lucullus complains in 34 are not trying to characterize or define a kind of impression, and Lucullus does not say that they are. He objects to their willingness to grant that some evident impressions (*aliquid perspicui*), i.e., impressions that are striking, intense, in a word, probable or probable in a certain way, are, as it happens, true and impressed in the mind and soul. To his way of thinking it accomplishes nothing. It is compatible with the Academics' argument for indistinguishability and of a piece with their 'puerile concession'—that the first two clauses of Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression are often fulfilled though the last is not—to which he has objected a few lines earlier and which is elsewhere attributed to Carneades (*Luc.* 33; S.E., *M.* VII.402). The Academics stand accused not of defining evidence in terms of truth and the subtlety with which an impression is impressed on the mind but of separating it from these features, thereby making its coincidence with them imperfect in a way unacceptable to Lucullus. But we can now see, I believe, that this passage fits quite well with the epistemological optimism we already have good reasons to suppose Carneades sometimes evinced, for the fact that on rare occasions we might be misled by probability, and the tenor of Carneades' argument is that such occasions will be rare, is no reason not to rely on it or to deny that evident impressions conceived as probable impressions can play the part required of them in the epistemological framework at issue (cf. *M.* VII.175).

VII

There remains the problem of the epistemological pessimists dismissed by Lucullus in the same passage (*Luc.* 32). The second part of my thesis is that Lucullus is not so much declining to argue with a certain party in the Academy as refusing to take up the line of argument pursued by Carneades and his associates. I grant that this is distinctly more speculative than the first part, but perhaps not much more so than the suggestion sometimes made that Lucullus is referring to Pyrrhonists or followers of Aenesidemus about to become Pyrrhonists.²⁹ In any case, I am more confident that it was open to Carneades to argue as I shall suggest he did than that these arguments are actually being alluded to by Lucullus here.

It is striking that the view that the hopeless sceptics are supposed to have embraced so zealously, that everything is as nonevident as whether the stars are even or odd in number, seems to have entered the debate as a conclusion deduced by the Academy's opponents as part of their conditional scepticism. As we have seen, this inference was vigorously opposed by Carneades. But as we have also observed, he was not confined to pursuing a single line of argument about the issues that engaged his attention. In the first instance at least he advanced his probabilism for the sake of argument to challenge the alleged implication between ἀκαταληψία and the nonevidence of all things. But even if Carneades was a convinced probabilist, he was not prevented from pursuing other lines of argument in the dialectical context suggested by Lucullus' remark, 'sometimes when we put it to them that if what they say is true, then everything is nonevident...' In particular, he will have wanted to pursue the line of argument that conjoins the Academic thesis that nothing can be apprehended with the Stoics' rejection of the alternative proposed by the Academy to infer the conclusion that we are in the epistemically desperate straits so vividly described by Lucullus. By conceding the case for probabilism in this way, he will have been able to remind his opponents that their attempt to vindicate their position indirectly by calling attention to the catastrophic consequences of its rejection might not be enough for their purposes. If the case for ἀκαταληψία remains strong, the consequences might just have to be faced. But then, as the Academics who so offend Lucullus put it, nature would be to blame.

²⁹ Brochard (1887) 245; most recently Lévy (1992) 293.

But from another point of view, it was nature as conceived by the Stoics that was responsible. And Carneades certainly had good reasons to pursue the argument that we are in the condition of those for whom everything is as nonevident as whether the stars are odd or even in number to draw attention to this fact, in this way challenging the Stoics' too confident assumption that the suspicion generated by their conditional scepticism can fall only on the Academy's thesis that nothing can be apprehended. For with the theory of probability in hand, the Academics were in a position to bring to light the connections on which the Stoics relied to take them from ἀκαταληψία to the abolition of perception, reason and life. The transition could now be seen to be far less straightforward than the Stoics would have us believe because it depended on additional, potentially contentious assumptions.

It is easy to find traces in the *Lucullus* of arguments that aim in this way to shift the blame for the consequences alleged to follow upon theses defended by the Academy.³⁰ At the conclusion of his survey of conflicting views in physics, e.g., Cicero suggests that the Stoics' rigidity threatens to undermine the authority of matters that are clearer (*inlustriores*) (*Luc.* 128). By restricting us to one reaction, whose only legitimate application is to impressions in which absolute confidence is completely justified, they put everything on a level. They are for example, compelled to regard the impression that it is light now as no better apprehended, and therefore as no more worthy of approval, than the view that the crow's cry bids or forbids us to do an action. Doubt about any thesis of the Stoics must then spread to every thesis. Thus it is the Stoics' insistence that our reaction to impressions must take the form of wholehearted commitment or complete suspension of judgement leaves us unable to do justice to the superior epistemic standing of, say, the view that it is light compared with that of the Stoic dogma that the world is a rational living being (*Luc.* 119). The Academy's probabilism, on the other hand, permits a range of reactions to impressions expressing different degrees of conviction. When Lucullus asks 'do they not see that they render all things nonevident which they wish

³⁰ This strategy is quite explicit in the anecdote Cicero relates about the famous embassy to Rome. To a Roman who asks 'do I then seem to you not to be a praetor, because I am not a sage, Rome not a city because its inhabitants are not wise?' Carneades replied that it was not he, but his Stoic colleague, Diogenes, who believed this (*Luc.* 137).

least of all things (*Luc.* 54)?' Cicero in effect replies that it is rather the Academy's opponents who fail to consider that by their stubborn refusal to countenance probabilism they abolish the authority of matters which are clearer.

I should like to suggest that some of the arguments for ἀκαταληψία via indistinguishability should be viewed in this light as well, i.e., as intended to show that the epistemologically disastrous consequences alleged to follow upon ἀκαταληψία are instead the fault of requirements needlessly imposed by the Stoics. In the accounts preserved by Sextus and Cicero, the Academy's arguments are divided into two groups with reference to the kind of indistinguishability they aim to establish, that according to the peculiar character (ιδίωμα) that consists in evidence and intensity and that according to stamp (χαρακτήρ) and impress (τύπος) (cf. *M.* VII.408). The familiar sceptical arguments based on dreams, drunkenness and madness belong to the first group. As we have already observed, they aim to show that false impressions can be just as intense, striking and compelling as impressions that arise in the manner required by the Stoics, i.e., that they are indistinguishable in point of the features by which impressions recommend themselves to us. The Stoics responded, not implausibly, that the impressions of people who are sane, sober and awake do differ in this respect from those of people in the opposite conditions (*Luc.* 53; cf. 88).

The next set of arguments are based on the possibility that qualitatively identical objects might give rise to impressions that are indistinguishable by being perfectly alike in every particular. It is important for my purposes that the arguments be presented, as they are in both accounts, in this sequence.³¹ Up to this point, it has been assumed that impressions produced in the way specified by the second clause of the Stoics' definition by being stamped and impressed in exact accordance with their objects must be true. The dispute concerned the Stoics' view that evidence and intensity are a characteristic property of impressions with this defining feature. I should like to suggest that the most natural point of departure for the second set of arguments is the concession by the Academy of the Stoics' case against the first. Evidence and intensity are now granted to be inseparable from the defining feature of the cognitive

³¹ 'similitudines ...pueriliter consecretantur' (*Luc.* 53), though Cicero does not follow this order in his reply (83 ff.).

impression, belonging to all and only impressions that arise in the prescribed way. At issue now is whether impressions arising in this way must be true, and therefore, whether the characteristic property, now granted to be inseparable from them, determines a class of impressions by confining his assent to which the wise person can be sure of avoiding error.

On the strength of Sextus' attribution of both sets of arguments to the Carneadeans (*M.* VII.402), let us imagine Carneades arguing as I am suggesting he did. He begins by granting, for the sake of argument of course, that the Stoics are right. The impressions of the sane are different from the mad and so on. He further grants that impressions arising in the ideal conditions specified by the Stoa, those stamped and impressed in exact accordance with their objects, will be distinguished from those not so favored by a character the sage can discriminate. On my view, this would be the ideal moment for him to argue that the sage will still not be immune from error as the Stoics require, and can obtain the immunity he seeks only by a policy of suspending judgement. Qualitatively identical objects viewed in ideal perceptual conditions could be the source of impressions that give rise to errors of identification.

Accounts of the argument are preserved by both Cicero and Sextus (*Luc.* 84-5; *M.* VII.408 ff.). Though Cicero's presentation is not as clear as it might be, it preserves a crucial detail missing from Sextus' version. The argument, I suggest, proceeded roughly as follows. Suppose one looks at Publius—one of the Servilii Gemini whom Cicero substitutes for Castor and Pollux in the Greek version of the argument—and forms an impression as a result of so doing. Let us further suppose that the impression arises in the ideal perceptual conditions specified by the Stoa, i.e., that it is stamped and impressed in exact accordance with its object. But if one takes it that it is Quintus, Publius' identical twin, the impression will not be true. Therefore, despite being stamped and impressed in exact accordance with its object, it will not be cognitive either. This follows with the second of the four heads under which the Academy organizes its arguments. But in that case the impression that this is Quintus, had while looking at Quintus in conditions that are no less ideal, will also not be cognitive, for by the principle stated under the third head of the argument, when a class of impressions do not differ among themselves in the relevant way, if one of them

is not cognitive, none of them are. And the burden of the Academy's argument is that the true impression that this is Quintus will not differ at all from the false one because the twins are themselves exactly alike and the process by which the impressions are produced captures their objects perfectly. This is what made it plausible that one would be taken in by the false impression in the first place. As we would say, one will be in exactly the same intrinsic state in both cases.

Traces of the next step of the argument are preserved only by Cicero: how, he asks, can someone looking at Cotta be sure that it is Cotta? This represents a further step in the argument because Cotta does not have a twin. It is perhaps a little more difficult to follow than the preceding steps because it exploits both kinds of indistinguishability. We have just seen how exactly similar objects could produce impressions indistinguishable in point of stamp and impress, thus giving rise to errors of misidentification. But the impression that this is Cotta, stamped and impressed in exact accordance with Cotta, is not indistinguishable from those of Publius and Quintus in this way. As Cotta differs from the Servilii Gemini so will the impression of him differ from impressions of them. Indeed as Cotta has no twin, the impression stamped and impressed in exact accordance with him will differ from the impression of every other object. But it will not differ from impressions of the Servilii Gemini in point of the alleged characteristic property of the cognitive impression, which, it has been agreed, belongs to all and only impressions produced in the manner demanded by the second clause of the Stoics' definition. Not differing from these impressions in this way—applying once again the principle stated under the third head of the Academy's argument—it can be cognitive only if they are. Therefore it is not cognitive. And if, as the Stoics seem to have assumed, every cognitive impression must in the first instance grasp its object in its unique particularity, it seems there will be no cognitive impressions.

To appreciate the force of this argument it is essential not to see it as a straightforward attempt on the part of the Academics to show that human beings are in dire epistemic straits, the better to defend *their* dogma that nothing can be known. If this were its aim, it would be a dismal failure. What is to prevent one from responding to Cicero's query: 'I know this is Cotta because he does not have a twin'? Indeed why should one not say 'I know this is Quintus

because Publius is abroad'? Though it is no part of my view that all the arguments advanced by an Academic must harmonize with each other, it is surely significant that it is considerations of precisely this kind—related impressions with some bearing on the truth of the impression at issue—which Carneades argued we both do and should consult in his alternative probabilist epistemology. It is no less significant that the Stoics forbid us to countenance them. Instead of attempting to explain how the Academics could have regarded this argument as a convincing case for *their* view that nothing can be known and that all is therefore nonevident by attributing to *them* the additional beliefs the argument requires if it is to be cogent, we should see the supplementary assumptions which the argument needs for what they are, namely as principles of Stoic epistemology. The Stoics, it will be recalled, maintain that there is a class of true impressions characterized by a discriminable property. On their view, only by confining his assent to cognitive impressions will the wise person be able to avoid all errors at the perceptual level. To this end, his assent is to be regulated by the characteristic property alone. In its presence he can ask for nothing more; in its absence he will have nothing to go on at all. But if the Academy's argument is right, there is no such property; the character, the *nota* or ἰδιώμα, alleged to set true and cognitive impressions apart belongs to false impressions as well. Therefore, as the mark that had promised to preserve the sage from error, and by which and only by which he was on that account obliged to judge, does not exist, nothing is apprehended and everything is consequently nonevident (cf. *Luc.* 84). Or if it is not the case that everything is nonevident, it will not be because judgments correctly arrived at have been determined (as the Stoics insist they must be) by an alleged uniquely characteristic property of the cognitive impression.

If it strains credulity that the slight possibility of error—a possibility that can be significantly reduced by the prudent use of contextual information, e.g., that P. Servilius has a twin while Cotta does not—should render everything nonevident, this is as it should be; the responsibility lies with the epistemological requirements imposed by the Stoics. It is a consequence only for those who stake everything on the existence of the cognitive impression as they do. In the same way, the question Cicero puts to the Old Academics, 'how can you be sure that someone else does not appear to you as

Cotta?', presents a devastating challenge only to those who follow the Stoics in forgoing appeal to the grounds others would happily cite.³² I suggest that Carneades wanted suspicion to fall on the features of the Stoic position that made it vulnerable in this way.

This way of understanding the argument does not emerge clearly from Cicero's account of it.³³ In part this seems to be because he was too impressed by Lucullus' objections to it. These objections are a further instance of an Antiochean tendency of which we have already had cause to complain: the inability to see that the Academics were free to argue from different sets of premises and the resultant insistence that they adhere firmly to a particular set of views, at least as regards epistemology. To this way of thinking, the standpoint from which the Academy argues for the first kind of indistinguishability suits them. It is what we should call a sceptical standpoint. However, the standpoint assumed for the sake of the second type of argument from indistinguishability, as I have described it, is not obviously sceptical in the same way. Indeed it appears to be robustly optimistic about our epistemic situation, and draws on theses of Democritean physics. Lucullus and his master regarded the assumption of the Democritean thesis on which the argument depends as incompatible with the doubts the Academy has on other occasions raised about the speculations of the natural philosophers (*Luc.* 53). And Lucullus suggests an alternative, which he maintains would suit the Academics better and serve their purposes just as well. Rather than insisting that there are or could be qualitatively identical objects, they should argue that we cannot distinguish very similar objects. We would be compelled to suspend judgement just as much as if things were qualitatively identical (*Luc.* 58).³⁴

³² 'quando igitur postest tibi P. Geminus Qunitus videri, quid habes explorati cur non possit tibi Cotta videri qui non sit, quoniam aliquid videtur esse quod non est' (*Luc.* 85)?

³³ Certain confusions in Cicero's presentation are the basis of the reconstruction I have proposed. Thus Cicero begins (*Luc.* 84): 'qui igitur P. Servilium Geminum videbat, si Quintum se videre putabat, incidebat in eius modi visum quod percipi non posset, quia nulla nota verum distinguebatur a falso'. But there is no need to cite here the principle according to which an impression that is not characterized by a *propria nota* of true impressions cannot be cognitive, because the impression is false and already noncognitive on that account. The principle is needed to show that a true impression is not cognitive because indistinguishable from this false impression.

³⁴ Here I follow the interpretation of Plasberg's text proposed by Heintz (1932) 283-96.

It is not entirely clear whose inability to distinguish similar objects Lucullus is speaking about here, for he has just mentioned the Delian poultry farmers who are supposed to have been able to tell by which hen an egg was laid and mothers who can easily distinguish between twins who can be told apart by no one else, and this is the most natural antecedent for Lucullus' 'this' (*id*), which he claims is not supposed to count against his opponents (*vos*). But perhaps reference to such exceptional powers of discrimination is meant to establish that there are differences to be discriminated even among the objects that resemble each other most closely rather than to show that we can make such distinctions. The *we* in question would then be human beings, Stoic sages included, concerning all but the tiny handful of matters about which any one of us, however wise, can hope to have expertise of the kind the Delian poultry farmers have regarding their hens. In any case, Cicero seems to agree, insisting that it is not necessary that things be qualitatively identical; it is enough that they might seem to be (84).

The problem with this suggestion is not that the argument it would have the Academics make is one they should not make. It is well worth making, and it is duly made by Cicero when he asks whether the need for so much expertise does not count against the Academy's opponents (*Luc.* 86). Rather, the problem is that it is not the same argument as the other and cannot be substituted for it without something valuable being lost. For if my account of the second kind of argument from indistinguishability is correct, its point will have been to show that, even in what might seem to be exceptionally favorable epistemic conditions, we should still be obliged by Stoic epistemology to regard everything as nonevident. The argument will, of course, have this effect only if these apparently optimistic assumptions about our epistemic situation are conjoined with a tenet of Democritean physics that the Stoics vigorously reject. And nothing prevented the Academy from conceding this point and allowing that there are differences between even the most similar items, in order to argue that the Stoics gain very little thereby, just as Antiochus suggested they do if the above account of *Luc.* 58 is correct. At the same time, however, nothing prevented them from arguing from the opposite assumption, namely that Democritus was right, with the intention I have described.

The mistake of Antiochus and Lucullus was to suppose that the

first argument can legitimately be made by the Academy while the second cannot. To be sure, the Stoics and those who think as they do would rather face the first argument. For whenever possible they preferred to treat evidence put forward by the Academy to show that there are no cognitive impressions as tending instead to show how hard it is to discriminate in their favor. And they seem to have been willing to go very far in acknowledging these difficulties while continuing to insist that the discrimination they require is possible. But as we have seen, Antiochus may also have thought the first style of argument suits the Academics because it is grounded in the thought that our impressions are unreliable, and thus has a place in the position which on his view they were obliged to uphold, whereas the other argument is not one they can make compatibly with that position because it proceeds from a thesis of Democritean inspiration about the world as it is independently of our impressions and at the same time makes assumptions about the reliability of those impressions at odds with premises from which the first argument set out.

It is a consequence of the account defended here that the two types of argument for ἀκαταληψία cannot easily be combined to form a single position. The assumptions from which they proceed do not agree with each other, and though the conclusions they establish are unified under the head of ἀκαταληψία, they have very different implications about our epistemic situation when not viewed in strict relation to the Stoic position, according to which everything stands or falls with the existence of the cognitive impression. It is not surprising that those in search of sceptical arguments for epistemologically pessimistic conclusions, whether because they wished to embrace or refute them, have made much of the arguments based on dreams, madness and the like and little of those based on twins. But I hope by now it is plausible that the Academics did not have an epistemological position of their own to defend and that it was open to them to examine the Stoic position from a variety of angles, including that from which it can be seen that that position would require us to take everything to be nonevident even in conditions which seem to supply all one could ask—if one is not already a Stoic—in the way of empirical foundations for knowledge. If it was Carneades above all who pursued the last possibility, this is just one more sign of the unrivalled richness and variety of argument for which he was famous.

VIII

None of this answers the question whether Carneades or any of his Academic predecessors and successors were sceptics. Of course much depends on what is intended by 'sceptic'. If we take the term, as we have up to this point, to mean what it is often, perhaps most often, understood to mean, namely a committed adherent to a pessimistic epistemological position affirming the impossibility of knowledge, Carneades and the Academics, most of them at any rate, were not sceptics. This is not to deny that they argued for a sceptical position, or even that it was *their* position in the sense that it was first put forward in this form by them. But as we have seen, the Academy's arguments were dialectical. The assumptions which furnish their point of departure are borrowed from the Stoics. If the Academics had been sceptics in the sense at issue, where their opponents were convinced that knowledge, conceived as it is by Stoic epistemology, is possible, they would have had to be convinced that knowledge, conceived in much the same way, is impossible. The burden of my argument has been that the object of the Academics' arguments, especially those of Carneades, was at least as much to call the Stoic conception of knowledge into question as to suggest that knowledge is impossible, so that questions about why the Academics should have embraced the Stoic conception of knowledge in the course of convincing themselves that knowledge is impossible need not arise.

There is another and arguably more authentic way of conceiving scepticism, however. The Academics were called sceptics neither by themselves nor their contemporaries. The Pyrrhonists were ultimately responsible for our use of the term, and they applied it to themselves in the etymologically correct sense of 'open-minded inquirer'. Now the Pyrrhonists maintained that it was a sceptical attitude of precisely this kind that set them apart from the Academics, whom they represented as dogmatic adherents of the thesis that nothing can be known. But in this they were wrong; the Academics were at least as deserving of the title, understood in this way, as the Pyrrhonists.

But the matter cannot be allowed to rest here. Sincere as the Pyrrhonists may have been in their devotion to truth, it cannot be denied that their scepticism was heavily tinged with the epistemological pessimism that is for us the mark of the sceptic. According

to their account, it was precisely because of their scrupulous devotion to the intellectual virtues of care in argument and avoidance of rashness that they were unable to bring their long sustained inquiries to a conclusion. Instead the effect of their investigations was to make them acutely sensible of just how difficult the matters under study were and of how much was to be said for the conflicting theories that had been put forward to explain them. Part of their scepticism, then, was their persistent inability to arrive at settled conclusions. And it was this state of mind to which they gave expression when they declared, in language that ultimately goes back to the epistemological theories of the Stoics, that everything is inapprehensible, rather than a conviction about the unknowable nature of things (cf. S.E., *P.* I.200). If you will, their scepticism was less a position than a predicament, though a curiously congenial one. Traces of an outlook resembling this one are not hard to find in the *Lucullus*. The Academics' willingness to speak of ἀκαταληψία as a dogma are perhaps best understood along these lines (*Luc.* 27, 109-10). So too are Cicero's reference to the view that assent should not outrun apprehension as a dogma he shares with his opponents and the aversion to opinion which was a conspicuous feature of Arcesilaus' philosophical reputation (*Luc.* 133; cf. 66, 68, 77, 113; *Ac.* I.45). Both betray an Academic affinity with the Stoa, though what the Academics seem to have taken from the Stoa were less the details of its theory of knowledge than its unwillingness to rest content with anything short of knowledge satisfying the highest standards—whatever they may be. That some at least of the Academics were sceptics in this way seems undeniable. And an Academic form of scepticism of this kind is especially prominent in the version of Carneades advocated by Clitomachus, through whom it was able to influence Aenesidemus and Pyrrhonism. But whether Clitomachus was right to grant this side of Carneades precedence over his other sides is a difficult question we cannot answer here.³⁵

³⁵ I am grateful to the other participants in the Symposium for their comments and criticism, especially Gisela Striker, with whom I was able to discuss some of the ideas defended here before the meeting of the Symposium, and Julia Annas and Brad Inwood, who were kind enough to write up their reactions for me.

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ACADEMICS FIGHTING ACADEMICS

G. STRIKER

I

When I read Cicero's *Lucullus* for the first time many years ago, I read it as a straightforward account of the epistemological controversy between the Stoics and the Academic sceptics. That is, after all, what Cicero promises, although he makes it clear that his own information comes from a late stage in the debate, when the positions of both schools had presumably evolved and shifted in response to objections of the other side. But Cicero explicitly distinguishes between several different positions within the sceptical Academy, and in the *Lucullus* he sets aside the most recent among them, that of Philo's 'Roman books', in order to concentrate on the arguments of Arcesilaus and Carneades (*Luc.* 12). Antiochus, on the other hand, is introduced as an orthodox representative of the Stoic view, which he apparently adopted lock, stock and barrel as a 'correction' of the doctrines of the early Academy (*Ac.* I.35). The somewhat petty dispute about Academic pedigrees reported in the *Varro* looked like a less important side issue that could be safely ignored if one was mainly interested in the philosophical arguments.

Over the last twenty years, however—thanks above all to the books by Glucker (1978) and Tarrant (1985)—the figures of Antiochus of Ascalon and Philo of Larissa began to take on more definite features, and I also realized that the doctrine of Philo's Roman books—*pace* Cicero—was of great interest not just historically (which has been doubted), but also from a twentieth-century point of view. It appears that Philo was the first to formulate a modest conception of knowledge that can be compared to contemporary versions of fallibilism, dropping the requirement of certainty that has bedeviled so many epistemological debates both before and after his time. It is a great pity that the Roman books did not survive, not even in the summary version of the report that Cicero apparently gave in the lost *Catulus*.

We cannot hope to recover Philo's own arguments, but I think that the indications offered by Cicero about the main epistemological issue in the dispute with Antiochus, and about Philo's previous position, allow us at least to make an educated guess at the reasoning behind Philo's revolutionarily move. One factor that has so far received less attention than it deserves seems to me to be the fact that the *Sosus*-affair was a dispute among Academics—not just with respect to the tradition of their school, but also, I think, in terms of the epistemological arguments of both sides. Given Cicero's emphasis on the novelty of the views expressed in Philo's Roman books, all commentators have of course been careful to distinguish Philo's Roman views from earlier versions of Academic scepticism. But most have also followed Cicero in taking Antiochus' version of Stoic epistemology at face value—and this may actually be rather imprudent. Antiochus never became a member of the Stoa, and while he probably did get first hand information from his Stoic contemporaries in Athens (Mnesarchus and Dardanus, according to Cicero, *Luc.* 69), it is likely that his understanding of Stoicism was strongly influenced by his education as a member of the sceptical Academy. We may therefore expect him to rely on an Academic interpretation of Stoic doctrine, whether he realized it or not; and we should not assume without further ado that this was exactly the interpretation the Stoics themselves would have wished to defend.

Having raised some suspicions about Antiochus' Stoic credentials, let me begin by listing the information Cicero provides in the *Lucullus* about the main point at issue between Philo and Antiochus.

1) In *Luc.* 18, the speaker for Antiochus briefly refers to Philo's innovations. He mentions two objections: first, Philo is said to tell 'manifest lies', for which he had been taken to task by Catulus the father (i.e., in the lost first book); second, Antiochus showed that he (Philo) found himself in exactly the position that he feared: '... et aperte mentitur ut est reprehensus a patre Catulo, et ut docuit Antiochus in id ipsum se induit quod timebat'. The 'manifest lie' had been mentioned before (12): it consisted in denying that the Academics had ever held the view that was defended by Catulus the day before, namely (as we can safely assume) the claim that nothing can be known (ἀκαταληψία).¹ The second point is explained in

¹ A note on translation: in this paper, I translate the Greek verb καταλαμβάνω

the following lines. According to Antiochus, when Philo attacked Zeno's definition of the cognitive impression (καταληπτική φαντασία), he did away with the criterion of what is known and unknown, from which it followed that nothing can be known—the position that Philo was trying to avoid. So Philo rejected the Zenonian definition of the cognitive impression, and he did not wish to accept the thesis, argued by his Academic predecessors, that nothing can be known. The connection between these two points is brought out by Sextus Empiricus: Philo said that as far as the Stoic criterion is concerned, nothing can be known; but as far as the nature of things themselves is concerned, they can indeed be known² (*P. I.235: ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτά*).

2) Philo's new doctrine was one that had not been held by any Academic before, including Philo himself at an earlier stage. Philo, of course, maintained that everybody from Plato on had

βάνειν (literally "to grasp") and its derivatives (κατάληψις, καταληπτός) as "to know", "knowledge" and so on, except for the adjective καταληπτική, which is translated as "cognitive". It seems to me that this is the best way of making it clear what these philosophers were arguing about. I am of course aware of the fact that the Stoics reserved the ordinary Greek verb for "knowing", ἐπίστασθαι, for the intellectual state of the expert or the sage who has a systematic understanding of a given field, while using καταλαμβάνειν and its cognates for the act of coming to know something or for an individual piece of knowledge. But English does not have a convenient pair of terms such as the German "Erkenntnis" and "Wissen" to mark this distinction, and the term of art "cognition", used in English translations of Kant, has not become part of everyday philosophical language. The English equivalent of "Erkenntnistheorie" is "theory of knowledge", not "theory of cognition".

² This interpretation was first proposed by Hirzel (1883) 196-200, and accepted by most later scholars; most recently e.g. Barnes (1989), Lévy (1992) and Bächli and Graeser (1995). I see no reason to read the second clause of this statement as the strong claim that *the nature of things* can be known (so Hankinson (1995) 119). The thought is, I believe, simply that if there is an impediment to knowledge, it lies in the Stoic conception, not in the nature of things themselves. This does amount to the claim that we may have objective knowledge of things (because they are not of such a nature as to be unknowable), but not that we can come to know their nature.

A different interpretation has been suggested by Sedley (1981) 72: Philo said that the (sensible) world is unknowable to us because of the lack of an infallible criterion such as the Stoics postulate, but that the truth about the sensible world is accessible to god. It seems to me that this cannot be read into Sextus' statement. The phrase ὅσον ἐπὶ indicates a limitation of the claim that things cannot be known to those who accept the Stoic criterion, not to humans in general.

held his view, but Antiochus' claim to the contrary was apparently confirmed by Heraclitus of Tyre, another Academic said to have been present at the debate in Alexandria (*Luc.* 11).

3) Before the Roman books, Philo held a position of mitigated scepticism or probabilism shared by other Academics, notably Metrodorus (*Luc.* 78).³ These philosophers thought that the Stoic definition of the cognitive impression was correct, but that its conditions could not be met. So they endorsed the thesis that nothing can be known; but they also maintained—following, as they saw it, the great Carneades—that it was legitimate, even for the wise man, to hold probable or plausible opinions, both about everyday matters and concerning philosophical investigations and arguments.

Given Philo's own claim of continuity within the Academic tradition, it is not likely that he came up with a radically new epistemology.⁴ The most economical assumption about his "revolutionary" claims would seem to be that he decided that he himself and his fellow Academics had been too modest and overly impressed by the Stoic doctrine. The thesis that nothing can be known was a consequence only of the excessively high standards set by the Stoics. Once one sees this point, one can claim not just reasonable opinion, but knowledge, though not the infallibility that the Stoics demanded for their wise man. What Philo rejected, then, was the requirement of certainty contained in the last clause of the Stoic definition of cognitive impression: an impression that provides knowledge must be such that it could not arise from what is not so.

³ I take it that when Cicero says in the dedicatory epistle to Varro (*Fam.* IX.8) that he himself is playing the part of Philo, he is referring to the position Philo held before the innovations of the Roman books. This would agree with the stance Cicero adopts explicitly in his last speech in the *Luc.*, 112-3: he endorses the Stoic definition of the cognitive impression as well as the claim that nothing can be known, and concludes that he (unlike the wise man) will hold opinions. The disagreement with Philo and Metrodorus about Carneades mentioned at *Luc.* 78 seems to concern only the point that even the sage will hold opinions. But Cicero also tells us in the *Varro* (*Ac.* I.13) that he heard Philo expound the doctrines of the Roman books, and I think one can see some traces of their influence in this speech, esp. at 146 (see below n. 19).

⁴ Such as the doctrine ascribed to him by Tarrant (1985), who introduces two new elements that are found nowhere in Cicero—nor for that matter in other sources, I think. See Striker (1991).

If this hypothesis about Philo's innovations is correct, then we have at least one set of arguments directed against Philo's position insofar as it was similar to the view of those Academics who held that the Stoic criterion was not needed for the conduct of life or for philosophical argument, since one could rely on probable impressions. These people were offering a substitute for Stoic cognitive impressions, and the difference between Philo's earlier and later epistemological position would have consisted simply in the claim that the substitute he offered was good enough to justify claims to knowledge. In *Luc.* 32-6, Lucullus/Antiochus argues that the alleged substitute will not do. These arguments must be either Antiochus' own or those of contemporary Stoics, since they attack the views of Carneades' successors. The arguments are not very impressive, but they reveal, I think, what Antiochus took the Stoic position to be.

As far as I can see, Antiochus offers two main arguments:⁵

(a) those who claim that true and false impressions cannot be distinguished cannot even claim to have the notions of truth and falsehood (*Luc.* 32-3). Let us disregard the polemical formulation of the Academic thesis: they did not hold that true and false impressions could not be distinguished at all, but only that no true impression was such that an exactly similar one could not in principle be false. Antiochus may have thought that this was tantamount to the statement that there was no difference at all. But there is no reason to agree with him that one cannot form a concept unless one is able to decide with certainty whether it has been correctly applied. Faced with the question whether Antiochus is a man or a warship, anyone would no doubt assert that he was a man, and that it is false to say that he was a warship. Unless we want to go for rampant self-contradiction, we will take what we believe to be true and its contradictory to be false. But this does not imply that we have a general method for deciding what is true and what is false (hence the frequent disagreements among ordinary people as well as philosophers).

Cicero's attitude to this argument is a little ambiguous (*Luc.* 111). On the one hand he calls it a particularly admirable point by

⁵ I skip the argument that the wise man will need to trust his own convictions and hence must have a reliable 'mark of truth', briefly alluded to in 36. This point seems to me to belong to the moral side of the dispute; see *Luc.* 23-4.

which—according to Antiochus (!)—Philo was greatly disturbed. On the other hand, he rejects it with a somewhat perfunctory remark: ‘we recognize both truths and falsehoods, but this only goes as far as approving⁶—we do not have a sign of knowledge.’ Perhaps he was sufficiently impressed by Antiochus’ boasting that he did not see exactly how the argument could be refuted; but his brief remark seems to show that other Academics were not greatly disturbed.

(b) Antiochus’ second argument is based on the assumption that in order to distinguish between true and false impressions, one must have a mark (*nota*) or sign (*signum*) of truth.⁷ There seem to be two versions of such an argument in *Luc.* 32-6, but the first may be intended to be the same as the second. The first version appears in *Luc.* 33-4: if a cognitive impression has its features in common with

⁶ The text is: ‘nam tam vera quam falsa cernimus. sed probandi species est, percipiendi signum nullum habemus’. The phrase ‘probandi species est’ is difficult, and my rendering is tentative. Reid (1885) *ad loc.* (followed by Rackham in the Loeb ed.) claims that *species* is a translation of φαντασία— as it may, but need not be (see Bächli and Graeser (1995) 278 n. 321). The sentence would then say, according to Reid’s paraphrase, that an impression may lead to approval, but will not warrant a knowledge claim. But how would this be a reply to the objection? Cicero should say something to the effect that one can make the distinction without having an infallible criterion. Given that *species* may also be used to translate εἶδος (see e.g. *Luc.* 58, discussed below), I would suggest that this sentence should be closely connected with the preceding one (reading a comma after *cernimus*), and understood as saying ‘this (i.e., our recognition of truths and falsehoods) is only a kind of approval, (since) we do not have a sign for knowledge’. I do not know what sense to make of Hankinson’s literal translation (1995) 117: ‘the impression is of approval’, but it underlines the fact that the usual rendering is not very close to the Latin.

⁷ Plasberg lists both *nota* and *signum* as translations of the Greek σημεῖον in his index, and I think he is right. It is tempting to suppose that *nota* must be a translation of ἰδίωμα or χαρακτήρ, words used by Sextus in his report on the epistemology of the later Stoics for the alleged peculiar feature that characterizes cognitive impressions (so e.g. Bächli and Graeser (1995) 216 n. 92), while only *signum* translates σημεῖον. But a look at the relevant passages shows, I think, that this will not do. In several passages the *nota* must be the Stoic criterion, that is, the cognitive impression itself (e.g. 84: ‘eius modi notam quae falsa esse non possit’, and *ibid.*, ‘non ea nota iudicabis qua dicis oportere ut non possit esse eiusdem modi falsa’), and Cicero seems to switch freely between *nota* and *signum* in 33-6. In *Ac.* I.32, *nota* is combined with *argumentum* just as is *signum* in *Luc.* 36. There is only one passage where it seems better to take *nota* to refer to a feature of the impression rather than the impression itself, *Luc.* 58 (discussed below): ‘quasi vero non specie visa iudicentur; quae fidem nullam habebunt sublata veri et falsi nota’. But there the special character of cognitive impressions seems to be indicated by the word *species* rather than *nota*.

a false one, there will be no criterion, because a peculiar fact cannot be indicated by a common sign ('in eo autem si erit communitas cum falso, nullum erit iudicium, quia proprium in communi signo notari non potest'). What this seems to say is that if anything is a sign both of *x* and *y*, then it cannot be used as a sign of either separately. For example, if fever is a sign of both pneumonia and meningitis, it cannot be used to diagnose either of these diseases. The point about 'common signs' is of course correct, but it does not seem to apply to the situation it is supposed to illustrate. An impression that *p*, even if it is compatible with the truth of not-*p*, will still be an indication (if at all) of *p* only, not of not-*p*. So perhaps Antiochus is using the terminology known from Philodemus (*De Signis* 1.1-17), according to which a common sign is one that may be present even if the thing signified is not. This is the point made at *Luc.* 36: "what could be more absurd than their way of speaking: 'this is indeed a sign or argument of such-and-such a thing, and that is why I follow it; yet it is possible that what is indicated be either false or nothing at all'." ('quid autem tam absurde dici potest quam cum ita locuntur: 'est hoc quidem illius rei signum aut argumentum, et ea re id sequor, sed fieri potest ut id quod significatur aut falsum sit aut nihil sit omnino'.) But what 'they' say is not absurd at all. In the absence of any evidence for not-*p*, I may take an impression that *p* as evidence for *p*, and act accordingly, even though it is (logically) possible that *p* is false.⁸

So much for Antiochus' arguments against the probable impression as a substitute for the Stoic criterion. What is most remarkable about the last argument is that Antiochus describes the Stoic criterion as a 'mark' or 'sign' of truth. I very much doubt that any real Stoic would have used such language. For cognitive impressions were supposed to provide precisely those basic truths that are not established by inference—the evident starting points of proofs, from which one could then infer further non-evident truths. Cicero's concise rendering of the argument shows, I think, that the choice of terms here is no accident: 'peculiar feature' (*proprium*, Greek ἰδιον) and 'common sign' (*commune signum*; κοινὸν σημεῖον) were technical terms in the debate about sign-inferences reported e.g. by Philodemus and Sextus Empiricus. Whatever notion of a sign is involved here—and there is no further explanation in

⁸ For a brief discussion of the argument see Barnes (1989) 84f.

Cicero's text—its use implies at least that the 'sign' can be observed independently of the thing signified, and this is a point that no Stoic worth his salt should have admitted about cognitive impressions. On the other hand, the conception of impressions as signs or evidence for underlying facts fits very well with the role ascribed to impressions in the Carneadean 'theory of criteria' in Sextus' report (*M.* VII.159-89).⁹ Although the technical language of sign-inference is absent, impressions are clearly treated as evidence—for example, they are compared to messengers (163) or witnesses (184) who may or may not be reliable. In order to be infallible guides to the truth, cognitive impressions, on this model, would have to be conclusive evidence, and if this is what Antiochus took them to be, then he could quite correctly describe them as proper signs of the facts they represent.

But this conception does not fit the—presumably Stoic¹⁰—comparison of sense impressions with light, according to which sense impressions show us the objects of perception in the way in which light reveals both itself and the objects of sight. I do not infer that there is a table in front of me from the fact that I can see one in broad daylight. The presence of daylight may make me confident that I can trust my eyes, but it is not a sign of the presence of tables.

Nonetheless, the light-analogy appears side by side with Carneades' theory in a revealing passage in Sextus (*M.* VII.163-4):

Just as light shows itself and all that is in it, so the impression, being the starting point of knowledge in the living creature, must, like light, reveal itself and also be indicative of the evident thing that produced it. But since it does not always indicate the truth, but often deceives and disagrees with the things that sent it forth, the way bad messengers do, it followed necessarily that one could not accept every impression as a criterion of truth, but only, if any, the true one. Again, since there is no true impression of such a sort that it could not be false, [...] , the criterion will be found in an impression that is common to the true and the false.

By switching from the light-analogy to the messenger-analogy, this passage puts a distance between the impression and the object or fact that caused it. What the observer receives is the impression,

⁹ It is not necessary for my argument to assume that Antiochus himself is the source of Sextus' report, as has been argued by several scholars (first by Hirzel (1883) 493-524; more recently, Tarrant (1985) 89-114; Sedley (1992), *contra*, see Barnes (1989) 65), but this would of course offer a convenient explanation of the similarities between *Luc.* 33-4 and *M.* VII.163-4.

¹⁰ Ps.-Galen ascribes it to Chrysippus, cf. *SVF* II 54; Diels, *DG* 401.11 ff.

which may or may not correctly represent its object. While the light-analogy seemed to stress the point that the impression and its object are grasped simultaneously, the messenger-analogy suggests that the impression offers only a report and does not provide direct access to the object. The description of the criterion as a sign obviously fits the second analogy, but not the first.

There is, then, some reason to think that Antiochus' interpretation of Stoic epistemology was Academic rather than genuinely Stoic. Yet since Antiochus himself professed his acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of cognitive impressions, we must presume that he took himself to be advocating the Stoic view. In order to see how Antiochus or his Academic predecessors arrived at this interpretation of Stoic doctrine, we should go back, I think, to the beginnings of the debate with Zeno and Arcesilaus. The story of this debate has been told in greater detail elsewhere; so I will mention only what I take to be directly related to Antiochus' interpretation.

II

In an anecdote that is no doubt too good to be true, Cicero tells us (*Luc.* 77) that the debate began when Arcesilaus, impressed by Zeno's novel claim that the wise man would hold no mere opinions, inquired of Zeno how this would be possible if the wise man could not attain any knowledge. Zeno confidently replied that the sage would not need to have any opinions because he could indeed attain knowledge: namely of things grasped by cognitive impressions. He then produced the following definition of the cognitive impression: 'an impression that arises from what is, imprinted and sealed and rendered exactly as the thing is'. Arcesilaus next asked whether this would still be the case if the true impression were such that it might also be false. Zeno saw the point of the question and added another clause to his definition: 'such as could not arise from what is not that existing thing'. From then on, the Academics produced a series of arguments to show that there cannot be a true impression of such a sort that there could not be a false one of exactly the same sort.

This story puts the long debate in a nutshell, which makes it unlikely to be historical. But apart from the issue whether one could live without assent, which Cicero lightly sets aside in *Luc.* 78, the epistemological discussion between the two schools was indeed

centered around the third clause of the Stoic definition. Now even if it is true, as the story suggests, that this clause was added to forestall Academic objections (so also S.E., *M.* VII.252), it is likely that Zeno or his successors would have thought of the addition only as a clarification, not as a new and logically independent requirement. As the subsequent debate shows, the third clause can be taken in either of these ways, which I will call, for brevity's sake, the weaker and the stronger interpretation.¹¹

On the weaker interpretation, the third clause makes explicit what is already implied by the second, namely that the cognitive impression will represent its object with such precision and accuracy that it could not come from any other thing. In other words, Zeno assumed that a sufficiently precise and accurate impression of any given object would capture all its peculiar features in such a way that it was necessarily different from any impression that might have come from a different object.

On the strong interpretation, however, the third clause stipulates that a cognitive impression must be different *in kind* from any non-cognitive one, so that the reason it could not arise from any other thing would lie in the fact that it is not the kind of impression that could misrepresent the object that caused it. Hence cognitive impressions would have to be of a type that distinguishes them from all others, regardless of their content.

If one looks at the Stoics' replies to the various kinds of counter-examples and objections put forward by their Academic opponents one can see, I think, that they tried to rely on the weaker interpretation, but that they were pushed by the Academic objections to adopt the stronger one. It is this stronger interpretation that eventually led to the version we find in Antiochus.

The examples introduced by the Academics to support their notorious thesis of ἀπαράλλαξία—the claim that for any true impression one can describe conditions such that a false one would be exactly alike and hence indistinguishable—were roughly speaking of three different kinds:

(a) Kinds of similar objects: eggs, coins, identical twins, impressions from the same seal (cf. *Luc.* 54, 56-7, 84-6). The Academics suggested that these objects were so similar to one another that it would be impossible to distinguish them by any perceptible

¹¹ Frede (1983), repr. in Frede (1987), notes the ambiguity at (1987) 165, but then settles for the stronger interpretation.

features. The Stoics replied by appealing to the metaphysical principle that individuals of any given kind will necessarily have peculiar features that distinguish them from all other individuals of the same kind (*Luc.* 50, 85). They supported this claim by examples of experts like the famous Delian poultry farmer who was allegedly able to tell which egg came from which hen. If one accepts the general principle, then this would go to show that any two individuals, however similar, must in principle be distinguishable, though it may take considerable experience and skill in some cases to make the correct distinctions. The Stoic sage, who would not have to be a poultry farmer, would presumably refrain from making assertions about the identity of individual eggs or coins, considering that he lacks the requisite expertise (cf. *Luc.* 57). So error can be avoided either by exercising due caution or by acquiring the relevant skill.

(b) Dreamers and madmen (*Luc.* 48, 51-3, 88-90). When dreaming or in a state of mental derangement, people may have less than accurate or even wildly false impressions, but they will not be able to realize that this is the case, and hence be unable to distinguish cognitive from non-cognitive impressions. In fact, as the Academics urged, such people may be quite confident that their sense impressions are accurate; so it would seem that error could not be avoided in this kind of situation. Here the Stoics replied, first, that the impressions of madmen and dreamers are in fact unlike clear impressions received in the waking state, as witness the hesitation and bewilderment expressed sometimes by people on the verge of derangement, as well as the readiness with which one rejects a dream impression once one wakes up (*Luc.* 51-2). Secondly, a state of lethargy, drunkenness or madness may indeed be such that the normal capacity to exercise due caution is temporarily lost. Hence it might be that even the sage would not be able to avoid all error in such a state.

The question of the sage's powers of judgment in abnormal states was, I think, what triggered the dispute over the question whether virtue can or cannot be lost (see the testimonia in *SVF* III, 237-244, pp. 56 ff.). It is probably significant that Chrysippus, unlike Cleanthes, is said to have held that virtue may be temporarily lost in states of disease or madness.¹² These counterexamples, then, can

¹² D.L. VII.127: καὶ μὴν τὴν ἀρετὴν Χρύσιππος μὲν ἀποβλητὴν, Κλεάνθης δὲ ἀναπόβλητον· ὁ μὲν ἀποβλητὴν διὰ μέθην καὶ μελαγχολίαν, ὁ δὲ ἀναπόβλητον διὰ

be avoided by restricting the claim of distinguishability, as seems quite reasonable, to the case of healthy and sober perceivers.

So far, I think, the Stoic defenses rely on the weak interpretation. The cognitive character of an impression is supposed to be due to its precision and accuracy, and in situations where one knows that such accuracy is hard to come by, as with eggs or coins, one will avoid error by refraining from judgement. The appeal to the principle of peculiar features of individuals makes it clear that the distinctness of an impression is assumed to be due to the distinctness of its object, not to any special feature characterizing cognitive impressions as such. The examples of madness and similar states can be set aside if one is willing to grant that these are passing episodes, recognizable as abnormal once one has returned to the normal state. The argument here would be, then, that impressions received in a deranged state of mind are not accurate enough to be trusted. The Academic objection merely shows that one will make mistakes while in such a state, not that one cannot avoid error while sane and sober. It appears that the more general question as to whether and how one can tell at any given time that one is not dreaming or deluded did not play an important role in the dispute.¹³ This may seem surprising to a modern reader, but it will appear less strange once one realizes that the relevant point was covered by the third and, I think, most damaging kind of examples.

(c) Tricks and deception. Two early instances of this type of argument show up in the biographies of Zeno's pupils Aristo and Sphaerus (D.L. VII.162 and VII.177 respectively), both presented as designed to refute the thesis that the wise man will not have opinions. In the first story, Persaeus—himself a Stoic—'refutes' Aristo by sending one of two twin brothers to deposit a sum of money with Aristo, and having the deposit collected by the other twin. It may be, as Ioppolo argues,¹⁴ that the 'refutation', coming

βεβαίους καταλήψεις. Cf. Simplicius *In Cat.* 402.22-6: according to the Stoics, in states of derangement virtue is lost together with the entire 'rational disposition', which does not mean that vice takes its place, but that its 'firmness' is relaxed.

¹³ See *Luc.* 54, where Lucullus/Antiochus points out that if there were no difference between the impressions of sane and insane people, one could not even be sure of one's own sanity. He treats this as an absurd consequence of the Academic position, not as a point raised by the Academics themselves.

¹⁴ Ioppolo (1986) 82 f.

from a Stoic, was aimed only at Aristo's claim to be a sage himself; but it still raises the question how a real sage would have avoided the mistake. The same goes for the anecdote about Sphaerus. King Ptolemy Philopator is said to have trapped him with a practical joke by ordering wax pomegranates to be served at the dinner table. Sphaerus was apparently deceived into thinking they were real pomegranates, and the king triumphantly pointed out that he had assented to a false impression. Sphaerus then replied that he had assented only to the impression that it was reasonable to think these were real pomegranates. Now if this is supposed to represent the reaction of a wise man, then it begins to look like a retreat to the position advocated by Arcesilaus, namely that in the absence of (any) cognitive impressions, the sceptic will be guided by 'the reasonable' (S.E. M. VII.158). If it is not what the sage would say, the question arises once again how he would have avoided error in such a situation.

What distinguishes these two examples from the kinds of cases mentioned before is that—as far as one can tell—the observer is sane, sober, in full possession of his perceptual faculties, and well placed to get a clear and accurate impression of the object. He has no reason to think he might be hallucinating. But he also has no reason to exercise special caution, as in the case of eggs or coins, because he does not know, and has no reason to suspect, that he is dealing with objects of a sort that might come in several very similar species or exemplars. In order to defend the claim that the wise man will nevertheless not be taken in even in such situations, the Stoics might say, as Sphaerus' reply suggests, that the sage will always exercise caution, never taking a sense impression to be true unless he has thoroughly investigated the object, but being guided by reasonable assumptions when a full investigation is not practicable. (After all, it would have been very impolite of Sphaerus to examine the fruit at the king's table to make sure it was real.) Aristo should perhaps have accepted a deposit only from a person he knew well enough to be certain that he had no identical twin. Alternatively, the Stoics might have claimed that the sage has extraordinary powers of perception such that he will immediately recognize a fake pomegranate or a previously unknown twin brother because his impressions (and his memory) are so precise and accurate that he will notice the slightest deviation. This is not a very plausible move, however, given that the Stoics themselves

seem to have pointed out that precise perceptual discrimination between similar objects requires special training or experience, as with the Delian farmer or the mother who can tell her twins apart (*Luc.* 57). Caution would seem more appealing, and one might also argue that practical jokes are not all that ubiquitous—in most cases of unimpeded perception, what it would be reasonable to assume will really be so. This is not enough, however, to guarantee infallibility. What is disconcerting about examples of this sort is that even though cases of trickery or accidental resemblance may be rare, they cannot be predicted. Since Arcesilaus is already said to have argued for the general thesis of ἀπαρραλλαξία (S.E. M. VII.154), I would assume that he based his generalization on this kind of case. Now caution will definitely have to lead to complete suspension of assent if there is reason to think that deceit might be ubiquitous and that is exactly what was suggested, presumably by Carneades, in the notorious sorites-argument about the deceiver god (*Luc.* 47 and 49). The Stoics apparently responded to the suggestion that such a god could produce a false impression indistinguishable from a cognitive one just as Descartes did many centuries later, by saying that a god would not do such a thing even if he could. They may also have thought that not even a god could bring it about that there was no difference at all between two distinct individuals, so that impressions produced by different objects would necessarily have to be distinct (*Luc.* 50). But this is not enough to solve the problem. The Academics might even grant the assumption that any two distinct objects, however similar, must produce different impressions (*Luc.* 85); for once it had been shown that any true impression could conceivably be very similar to a false one, the Stoic sage would have to exercise caution in every single case. That is to say, he would either have to refrain from assent in every case, or acquire an incredible amount of technical skill (*Luc.* 86).

It is at this point, I think, that the Stoics would have been tempted to resort to the stronger interpretation of the clause 'such as could not arise from what is not that existing thing', by postulating a peculiar feature that distinguishes cognitive impressions as a class from non-cognitive ones. Antiochus, for example (*Luc.* 46, 51), maintains that all 'empty' impressions lack the perspicuousness that characterizes cognitive impressions. This may be plausible for dreams and hallucinations, but what, for example, would have prevented Aristo from getting a clear and accurate impression of

the twin brother who came to collect the deposit? At *Luc.* 58, Antiochus rejects an argument 'occasionally' (*interdum*) used by the Academics, according to which they did not wish to maintain that there was no difference between the impressions themselves, but only that there was no difference between the 'species et quasdam formas eorum'.¹⁵ The expression is difficult to understand, since it sounds like 'appearance of an appearance', but the combination *species et forma* may indicate that Cicero is rendering the Greek εἶδος (for a similar use of *species*, compare perhaps *Luc.* 99 'specie probabile' and 111 'probandi species'). The Academic argument would then be that the impressions themselves might be granted (for the sake of argument: 85) to be distinct, given that they arise from different objects, but since there is no difference *in kind* between cognitive and non-cognitive impressions, they may still not be distinguishable (cf. *Luc.* 40). Lucullus/Antiochus responds by insisting, indignantly, that impressions *have* to be judged by their *species*, and that this implies the availability of a 'mark of truth and falsehood'.

But what exactly might be the feature or set of features that characterizes cognitive impressions as a kind? Sextus, in one passage (*M.* VII.252), says that according to the Stoics, cognitive impressions differ from all others in the way in which horned snakes differ from all other kinds of snakes. This is, I think, an unfortunate move.¹⁶ Not only do we never find a more specific account of the alleged special feature of cognitive impressions; but the suggestion that there is such a feature also invites a regress argument: if we recognize cognitive impressions by their special mark, then how do we recognize the mark? By another cognitive impression? And how do we recognize that? (cf. *M.* VII.427-9). On the other hand, the snake-story has an attractive aspect that makes it similar to the light-analogy discussed above: horns are an intrinsic feature of horned snakes, and one obviously does not need an inference to get from seeing a snake that has horns to the belief that one is seeing a horned snake. But the truth of an impression must be a relational property—as pointed out, once again, by

¹⁵ See also *Luc.* 40 and 84, where the same argument seems to be mentioned, but without the words *species et forma*.

¹⁶ The comparison with different kinds of snakes may have been inspired by the example, presented as a difficulty for the Stoics, of snakes in a covered basket who look out one by one, so that one cannot tell whether it is the same or a different snake raising its head each time: S.E. *M.* VII.410.

Carneades, S.E. *M.* VII.168—and hence any intrinsic feature could at best be necessarily linked to truth.

Since Sextus' remark about the distinguishing feature has no parallels elsewhere, it is more likely that most Stoics simply insisted that cognitive impressions were recognizably more clear, accurate and vivid than any others. This would mean that the distinguishing characteristic of a cognitive impression was not some additional feature, like a blue ribbon or perhaps a watermark, discernible only with due training. Rather, the distinguishing feature or features would be ones that are present in all presentations to a certain degree, such as clarity and precision. There would be indubitable cases at both ends of the range impressions that are overwhelmingly clear or very murky—but there would also be an intermediary range in which it was arbitrary or impossible to decide whether a given impression was to count as a cognitive or not. The suggestion that the distinguishing feature comes in degrees would seem to be confirmed by Chrysippus' notorious advice for responding to a sorites-argument (*Luc.* 93). Finally, Sextus discusses two possible sets of 'characteristics' (ιδιώμα) that are obviously a matter of degree: clarity and force (ἐναργές, ἔντονον) or accuracy and precision (κατὰ χαρακτήρα καὶ κατὰ τύπον, *M.* VII.408). Needless to say, the Academics reacted by arguing that true and false impressions may have all of these characteristics to the same degree.

The suggestion of the special character of cognitive impressions as a kind, however, invites the sort of account that we find in the *Lucullus*: it seems that we can separate the content of an impression from its characteristic features as an impression of a certain kind, and maintain that it is the special features that guarantee its truth. Hence the situation could be described by saying that we infer the truth of an impression from its characteristic 'mark of truth'. The result is, however, an awkward combination of alleged self-evidence with knowledge reached by inference.

I do not wish to suggest, of course, that the Stoics themselves ever explicitly described their criterion as a sign of truth. But given the strong interpretation of the third clause in their definition of the cognitive impression, it seems to me that the Academic interpretation was not unfair.

III

I assume that it was this version of their epistemology that both Philo and Antiochus attributed to the Stoics. Antiochus apparently accepted it because he had come to think that it was absurd to maintain that knowledge is impossible, but continued to believe, with other Academics, that the Stoic definition was correct. Philo, on the other hand, remained convinced by the Academic arguments purporting to show that the kind of impressions postulated by the Stoics could not be found. And once the cognitive impression had come to be considered as a sign, that is, a piece of evidence from which to infer the truth of the corresponding proposition, Carneades' arguments would indeed seem to be compelling: to show that an impression is reliable may justify its acceptance, but it cannot constitute a demonstration of its truth. Or to put it in the terms of Sextus' report: even the most reliable witness may occasionally go wrong, and there is no way of guaranteeing, in any given case, that he has not made a mistake.

Now Philo and other Academics had for quite a while been advocating the view that knowledge cannot be attained, and that we must therefore be content with fallible opinions. But the Academy after Carneades had also developed a sophisticated account of more or less reasonable opinions. Philosophers were not supposed to accept just any impression that might strike them as convincing; they were expected to exercise caution, to ascertain that the situation was normal in all relevant respects, and that there was no countervailing evidence from other impressions or background beliefs to indicate the contradictory of the proposition under scrutiny. The opinions one would arrive at in this way would be based on impressions that could be considered reliable, even though there could be no guarantee of their truth. Moreover, these opinions would coincide for the most part with what a Stoic might say he had grasped by a cognitive impression.¹⁷ Hence one might come to think that the difference between the 'probable' opinions of the Academics and some rash and inconsiderate beliefs was far more significant than the elusive line between the reasonably justified but fallible opinions claimed by the followers of Carneades and the

¹⁷ See *Luc.* 105: 'sed ea quae vos percipi comprehendique eadem nos, si modo probabilia sint, videri dicimus', and cf. Allen (1994) 104.

allegedly certain knowledge guaranteed by the Stoic criterion. Why not, then, follow ordinary life and redraw the line between knowledge and mere opinion so as to separate well-founded judgments from superficial beliefs?¹⁸ I would suggest that this was the consideration that led Philo to his Roman innovations. He concluded, plausibly enough, that the Stoics had set their standards too high. It was unnecessary modesty on the part of the Academics to concede that all they could hope for was opinion, not knowledge.

Our sources unfortunately do not permit us to say exactly how Philo would have re-defined knowledge (κατάληψις), if indeed he explicitly offered a new account. There seem to be two options:

(a) Philo might have said that a plausible and thoroughly 'tested' impression was sufficient to warrant the inference to its truth. This would mean that he continued to adhere to the Academic way of treating impressions as evidence or 'messengers' rather than as sources of non-inferential information. This line, however, would be implausible, given that the Academic arguments for indistinguishability—which Philo apparently continued to accept—were designed precisely to show that such an inference could never be warranted.

(b) The second option would be to deny that any inference is needed to acquire true and reliable information through the senses. One may use the procedures outlined by Carneades to make sure that an impression is reliable, but it is a mistake to think that one then goes on to infer the impression's truth from its reliability. The impression that there is a table in front of me, together with the observation that this impression was received under standard conditions, may justify my claim to know that there is a table. But if this claim is correct, it is because, as the Stoics might have put it, my senses have revealed the presence of the table and thus provided me with true and accurate information—or, in today's fashionable jargon, because I am in the right causal relation to the table. My knowledge is not based on the spurious

¹⁸ A consideration of this sort appears at *Luc.* 146, where Cicero points out that accomplished artists like the painter Zeuxis or the sculptors Phidias and Polyclitus would be rather offended if told (by a Stoic) that they had no knowledge. They would look more kindly upon the Academics, realizing that they 'reject only what can never be found, but leave in place all that is needed for their crafts'. Cicero presumably means that they would be content with having their knowledge re-described as probable opinion; but one might also think that it is absurd to deny that these people have a kind of knowledge.

inference from “I have the impression that p, and p is a reliable impression” to “p is true”.

If this was the option Philo chose, he may have been the first to distinguish clearly between justifying acceptance and offering a proof. He would also have preserved the distinction between ‘evident’ truths grasped without inference and other true propositions that may be derived from them by argument and inference—the distinction that underlies the theory of inference from signs. In other words, he would have offered something that could be called a criterion of truth—a non-inferential means of grasping what is the case—though not an infallible one. Even though we do not have any positive testimony, then, I am inclined to believe that this would have been Philo’s view.

Once he had taken this step, he could also say that he was just reverting to a conception of knowledge that had been held by the great founders of the Academy, Plato and Aristotle.¹⁹ For even though they obviously thought, just as did Philo himself, that the knowledge of an expert must consist of truths or even necessary truths, they did not claim that an expert could never make a mistake. Cicero tells us several times (*Luc.* 77, 113) that no one before Zeno had put forward the view that the wise man will have no opinions, and I think this is historically correct. If an expert did make a mistake, this would show simply that his claim to knowledge was false in this instance, not that he had no knowledge at all.²⁰

This would still not show that the Academy had always agreed with Philo’s Roman views, of course, for Arcesilaus and Carneades, as far as we can see, had followed the Stoics in arguing that the wise man should not assent unless he was certain he had grasped the truth. But Philo’s version of the “true Academic line” seems to me to have no less plausibility as regards the early Academics than Antiochus’ picture of a thoroughly Stoicized dogmatic orthodoxy.

¹⁹ For this point, see also *Fin.* V 76: ‘nihil enim est aliud quam ob rem mihi percipi nihil posse videatur, nisi quod percipiendi vis ita definitur a Stoicis, ut negent quicquam posse percipi nisi tale verum, quale falsum esse non possit. itaque haec cum illis est dissensio, cum Peripateticis nulla sane’.

²⁰ For Aristotle see e.g. *Phys.* II.8.199a33-5: ἀμαρτία δὲ γίνεται καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην (ἔγραψε γὰρ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ γραμματικός, καὶ ἐπότισεν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ὁ ἰατρός τὸ φάρμακον) ...

In the famous summary of Photius (*Bibl. cod.* 212, 170a16), Aenesidemus is said to have described the Academics of his day as 'Stoics fighting Stoics'. The dispute between Cicero's teachers Philo and Antiochus was actually a case of one Academic arguing against another Academic, but if my interpretation of Philo's Roman views is somewhere near the truth, then there would not be much to choose between these two descriptions. Both parties to the dispute were dogmatists, differing only in their greater or lesser modesty; both held theories that can be seen as versions or variants of Stoic epistemology; and neither of them could any more be called a sceptic.*

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ANTIPATER AND SELF-REFUTATION
ELUSIVE ARGUMENTS IN CICERO'S *ACADEMICA*

M. F. BURNYEAT

I. *Introduction*

The *Academica* alludes to many arguments which it does not report in full.

For some of these allusions, the missing details would have been supplied in a portion of the text that has not come down to us. But the curious publishing history of the *Academica* is certainly not the sole cause of its allusiveness. The history of argument is equally important. By Cicero's day the epistemological debate has gone on so long, the moves and counter-moves on either side are so well rehearsed, that when someone invents a new variation on an old strategy, the participants can all see where the argument is leading. There is little need to spell it out in full; even less when someone else comes up with a variation on that variation.

This complexity is reflected in the rhetorical structure of the work. The climax of the first edition is a refutation of a refutation. In the final speech (*Luc.* 64-147) Cicero refutes Lucullus' refutation (memorised from Antiochus) of the Academic refutation of (the Stoic theory of) the possibility of knowledge. The second edition starts the reader off with Varro giving Antiochus' refutation of Philo's refutation of a mistaken view (as Philo maintains) of the entire history of philosophy (*Ac.* I.13-4). No wonder Cicero decided to rewrite the first version with different characters:

The whole Academic treatise I have transferred to Varro. At first it was assigned to Catulus, Lucullus, and Hortensius. But then that seemed inappropriate (παρά τὸ πρέπον). They were too well known, not of course for ἀπαιδευσία, but for their ἀτριψία in these matters. (*Att.* XIII.16)

These 'Academica'¹ were λογικώτερα than anything those characters would ever have dreamed about. (*Att.* XIII.19)

¹ On the vexed question whether to translate *Academica* here as the work's title or not, see Griffin's contribution to this volume, pp. 1-35—an essay to which I am indebted more generally for the sense her arguments *pro* and *contra* convey, viz. that the truth about the writing of the *Academica* has not yet been definitively established.

Cicero's Greek is economical but expressive.

The *dramatis personae* of the first edition are supposed to know the philosophical issues well enough.² They do not suffer from ἀπαιδευσία, even if they lack the expertise of a professional.³ They have at least an amateur acquaintance with epistemology, and Lucullus is praised for his great interest in the subject (*Luc.* 4; cf. 10 fin.). If Catulus' own interest is not sufficiently vouched for by *Luc.* 63 and 148 (not to mention his defence of philosophy in Cicero's *Hortensius*), his function is to speak for his deceased father, whose passionate interest is recorded at *Luc.* 18. As for Hortensius, his role in the *Hortensius*, where he attacked philosophy on behalf of rhetoric, is quite compatible with his being informed enough to expound the most prominent ('in promptu', *Luc.* 10) of Antiochus' arguments against the Academy.⁴ Notoriously, Plato's attacks on rhetoric display all the skills of the enemy.

What the word ἀτριψία suggests these people lacked is a competence that 'rubs off' only on those who take a regular, active part in the ongoing controversy.⁵ It is one thing to be acquainted with the issues and interested in the outcome, quite another to become familiar enough with the twists and turns of debate to be dexterous at handling them oneself. The word λογικώτερα suggests something similar, that the two books of the first edition were too abstractly argumentative and dialectical to suit the original characters.⁶

² In contrast to the non-contemporary *dramatis personae* of Cicero's earlier dialogues, which were accused (so he tells us at *Luc.* 7) of introducing characters who had no knowledge (*scientia*) of the matters discussed.

³ A good introduction to the distinction between παιδεία and ἐπιστήμη is Arist., *P.A.* I.1.639a 1-16; cf. *Pl. Prt.* 315a. Oblivious to the difference, Reid (1885) 32-4 misinterprets the letter as a confession by Cicero that his original characters had no learning at all. Lévy (1992) 139 is aware of the distinction, but at times (e.g. 154, 192 n. 33) writes as if epistemology as such lay beyond παιδεία. For a just estimate of the philosophical level of the original characters see Barnes (1989) 60-61 with n. 42, where the philosophical works in Lucullus' famous library very properly weigh in to his credit.

⁴ Reid's translation of Hortensius' words at *Ac.* I.10, 'I merely stated arguments I had ready to hand, while I expect from Lucullus others more abstruse', denigrates the speaker unnecessarily. Rackham makes better sense of the contrast between *in promptu* and *reconditoria*: '... it was the more obvious points that were expounded by me, whereas I look to Lucullus to give us the more abstruse doctrines'. But for 'doctrines' read 'arguments': n. 7 below.

⁵ *LSJ* know the word ἀτριψία only from Cicero's letter; they translate 'inexperience, amateurishness'. Cicero would be familiar with Plato's contrast between τριβή and τέχνη at *Grg.* 463b, *Phdr.* 260e.

⁶ λογικώτερα can hardly mean they were too technical, because λογικός does not mean 'technical' and the *Academica* keeps technicalities to a minimum.

For example, at *Luc.* 63, when Lucullus' speech is concluded, we learn that Hortensius has all along been gesticulating his applause. Quite right too, adds Cicero, because never has the case against the Academy been argued with more subtlety (*subtilius*).⁷ *Subtilitas* is a virtue of argument. Even readers prepared to swallow the idea of Lucullus' prodigious memory (*Luc.* 2, 4, 10-2, 63) might think it inappropriate (παρὰ τὸ πρέπον) for the general to discourse with great *subtilitas*, and for Hortensius to be enthused by this; inappropriate, that is, to characters whose ἀτριψία was well known.

The characters had to change, not the arguments. Otherwise Cicero could not have written on epistemology at all. By his day, layer upon layer of argument and counter-argument was what the subject had become. So far from explaining the allusive argumentation of the *Academica* by reference to its publishing history, we do better to proceed the other way around.

Debates in modern philosophy can reach a similar level of near-static complexity. The debate for and against Utilitarianism is an example. But this is a case where we can look back over the books and journals to discover in detail how the argumentative strategies evolved, from Bentham to today. Cicero's *Academica*, begun in 45 BCE, takes stock of some 200 years of epistemological debate for which we have all too little evidence outside the *Academica* itself. The only way to compensate for the truncated, allusive nature of our text is to speculate about the missing details. Such speculation, I

Nor does λογικός mean 'abstruse' (Shackleton Bailey), still less 'philosophical' (Winstedt in the Loeb). The word can refer to λογική as one of the three main divisions of philosophy, the division that includes epistemology. But not here, otherwise the comparative, if it made sense at all, would imply that epistemology was altogether beyond these people (cf. Reid (1885) 33: 'they could not even have dreamed of the doctrines they had been made ... to maintain'). That *would* be ἀπαιδευσία. A meaning such as 'argumentative, dialectical' is both a fair description of the books and disqualifies the original characters for much the same reason as ἀτριψία. Likewise, when Cicero writes that the first version made these noble but not φιλόλογοι characters speak 'nimis acute' (*Att.* XIII.12), and implies that the four books of the second version are suitable for Varro because they are 'sane argutulos' (*Att.* XIII.18), translators would do well to consider whether these epithets might not refer, at least in part, to the subtleties of argument rather than to the philosophical ideas discussed (cf. φιλολογία at Pl., *Thet.* 146a, *argutissime* at Cic., *De orat.* II.18).

⁷ Although *dictum* does not on its own mean 'argued', that is what it refers to in the present context. Apply this back to the beginning of Lucullus' speech and you will see why I want *reconditiora* at *Luc.* 10 to refer to arguments rather than to doctrines (n. 4 above). The *reconditiora*, in contrast to *in promptu*, are the arguments of depth and detail.

contend, is a positive duty for those who write on the *Academica*. Better to chance one's arm than ignore the rich texture of argument and counter-argument that lies, out of reach, just off the page.

II. *Antipater*

My first set of speculations is in aid of the Stoic philosopher Antipater of Tarsus, head of his school c.152-c.129 BCE. I have felt sorry for Antipater ever since I came across the story in Plutarch and Numenius which tells of him sitting in a corner, writing book after book to refute Carneades, because he was unable to match him in live debate; this earned Antipater the nickname *καλαμοβόας*, 'Pen-shouter'.⁸ Surely, I thought, you can be a good philosopher even if you are not as quick on your feet as the notoriously nimble Carneades.

Cicero is not much kinder. There are just two passages of the *Academica* where Antipater is allowed to speak. Both of them are critical of the point he wanted to make. Both seem to echo the hostile story of Antipater's withdrawal into writing.

(A1) From this sprang the demand put forward by Hortensius,⁹ that you [*scil.* the Academics] should say that that very thing at least ('*id ipsum saltem*') is perceived by the sage, namely, that nothing can be perceived. But when Antipater used to make the same demand, claiming that for someone who affirmed that nothing can be perceived it is still consistent to say that that one thing ('*unum illud*') can be perceived, even though other things ('*alia*') cannot,¹⁰ Carneades would resist him with greater acumen.¹¹ For

⁸ Plu., *Garr.* 514C-D = *SVF* III Antipater 5; Numenius fr. 27.47-56 Des Places = *SVF* III Antip. 6. 'In a corner' is Numenius' addition (perhaps inspired by Pl., *Grg.* 485d7), the nickname Plutarch's.

⁹ In the lost book I of the first edition, the *Catulus*.

¹⁰ '*ut alia non possent*' is ambiguous, because of the many meanings of *ut*. The translation in the text follows Reid's choice of the meaning codified in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary s.v.*, para.35. Yonge and Rackham opt for the epexegetic meaning of para.39: 'that one thing can be perceived, namely, that other things cannot'. Either translation should be compatible with the interpretation I shall offer.

¹¹ Rackham's translation of *acutius* seems preferable to Reid's 'with great shrewdness', since no great shrewdness is visible in what Carneades proceeds to say. But greater than what? Rackham does not stop to ask. The answer must be: greater than the acumen displayed by Antipater's consistency claim, which Antiochus in *Luc.* 109 calls stupid (*pingue*). Since Lucullus speaks for Antiochus on (A1), his evaluation *acutius* corresponds to his master's *pingue* in (A2). Thus *acutius* is dispraise of Antipater more than praise of Carneades.

he maintained that, so far from being consistent, nothing could be more inconsistent. For the person who denies there is anything that can be perceived makes no exception; accordingly, it is necessary that not even that very thing ('*id ipsum*'), since it has not been excepted,¹² can in any way be grasped and perceived.

Antiochus seemed to attack that position more closely (*pressius*):¹³ he argued that because the Academics hold it as doctrine (*decretum*, δόγμα) [...] that nothing can be perceived, they ought not to be uncertain (*fluctuare*) in this doctrine of theirs in the way they are in other matters. ... This, therefore, was a better way (*potius*) to demand from them that they admit to perceiving this one thing at least ('*hoc unum saltem*'), that nothing can be perceived. (*Luc.* 28-9)

Plutarch described Antipater as unable and unwilling to come to close quarters with Carneades (*Garr.* 514D = *SVF* III Antip. fr. 5, μὴ δυνάμενος μηδὲ βουλόμενος ὁμόσε χωρεῖν τῷ Καρνεάδῃ). Lucullus' description of Antiochus as attacking *pressius* implies the same criticism as Plutarch's ὁμόσε: Antipater would not get to grips with Carneades. The charge is picked up again in Cicero's reply:

(A2) And yet you bring back that well-worn and often rejected demand,¹⁴ not in Antipater's way but, as you say, 'more closely' (*pressius*); for Antipater, you tell us, was censured (*reprehensum*, scil. by Carneades) because he said it is consistent for a person who affirms that nothing can be grasped to say that that itself ('*id ipsum*') can be grasped. That seemed stupid (*pingue*) and self-contradictory to Antiochus as well;¹⁵ for it cannot be consistently said that nothing can be grasped if, of anything at all, it is said that it can be grasped. The way he thinks that Carneades should rather have been pressed ('*potius urguendum*') is the following: to make him admit that, since the sage can have no doctrine (*decretum*) that is not grasped, perceived, known, this very doctrine that nothing can be perceived, because it is the sage's doctrine, is perceived.¹⁶ As if the

¹² Or: 'which has not been excepted'. I wonder whether Cicero would have been aware of an ambiguity in *quod* here.

¹³ Another comparative adverb, which (A2) confirms is to be explained as follows: Antiochus attacks Carneades' position ('*istum locum*') on 'Nothing can be perceived' more closely than Antipater did. Once again, the comparative signals dispraise for Antipater.

¹⁴ The translator has to supply a noun with '*illud usitatum et saepe repudiatum*'. Yonge's 'objection' is better than 'argument' (Reid, Rackham), but 'demand' is what *illud* was called in (A1). The demand is that the Academic agree to a proposition such as 'The sage perceives that nothing can be perceived', which can *then* serve as a premise for argument against them.

¹⁵ Rackham's 'even to Antiochus' sounds gratuitously insulting, as if Antiochus had lower standards for stupidity than other people. The function of *ipsi* is to emphasize that for once Antiochus agrees with Carneades on something, namely, dispraise for Antipater's consistency claim.

¹⁶ A problematic stretch of text, for which various corrections are proposed.

sage has no other doctrine and can conduct his life without doctrines! But just as he holds his other doctrines as probable, not perceived ('*probabilia non percepta*'), so he does this itself ('*hoc ipsum*'), that nothing can be perceived. (*Luc.* 109-10)

Thus Antipater's suggestion is condemned on both sides of the debate, both by Carneades and by Antiochus. Antipater is a stupid dolt who hangs back from any close encounter with his opponent. This is caricature. We should not let it go unchallenged.

Antipater is the target of more rudeness at *Luc.* 17:

Some philosophers—philosophers, indeed, of no mean calibre—thought that one should not do what we are now about to do, namely, argue against the Academics. They held that there is really no sense in disputing with people who approve nothing. And they criticised the Stoic Antipater who had been much involved in doing that.

Whoever these philosophers are, they are distinct both from Carneades, whom they oppose, and from Antiochus, who does argue against the Academics. Since they believe in *κατάληψις*, the technical Stoic notion of perception or grasp (*Luc.* 17), they are probably Stoics themselves, distressed by the conduct of the head of their school. In any case, they are a third voice of censure, reproving Antipater for writing at length against Carneades. 'In so many volumes', adds a stray fragment from a lost section of the second edition of the *Academica*.¹⁷ If Antipater held back from live debate with Carneades, it was not for lack of interest in refuting the Academics. Attacking Carneades was a major project of his career.

To sum up: what distinguishes Antipater from other philosophers in the eyes of Cicero, Plutarch, Numenius, and the sources they are drawing on, is two things: he produced volumes to refute Carneades, and the refutation is done entirely in books. Now for the speculation to confound the caricature.

Could it be that the two things are connected? That the biographical caricature is based, like so much else in ancient biography, on something in its subject's own works? Suppose Antipater decided that the *correct* way to tackle Carneades was to withdraw from the give-and-take of live controversy and do it all in writing. In the philosophical culture of the period, that would be a most

The text I have chosen to translate is that of Reid's *editio minor* (1874): 'ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi'.

¹⁷ *Ac.* I fr. 1: 'Quid Antipater digladiatur cum Carneade tot voluminibus?'

unusual stance. Antipater would have to explain and defend his decision (in writing, of course), and by doing so he supplied the cue both for the biographical caricature and for the nickname 'Pen-shouter', which now acquires a double meaning: Antipater's pen shouts that the pen is mightier than the voice.¹⁸

I find it quite easy to imagine grounds for such a decision. Carneades is a slippery customer, difficult to catch and pin down. He argues for different positions on different days.¹⁹ Sometimes he argues the sage will opine, sometimes the opposite. One day he speaks in favour of justice, the next day against. In a book you can deal with him systematically, refuting every line of argument open to him. Better still, you can aspire to refute every *possible* line of argument for sceptical conclusions.

Independently of this speculation, we can be sure that Antipater had a good deal more to say on the topic of (A1) and (A2) than is reported by Cicero. (A1) is structured so as to climax in Antiochus' insistence that 'Nothing can be perceived' be treated as the Academics' doctrine (*decretum*), from which he can infer that it ought to be something they perceive.²⁰ The theme that the sage's *decreta* must be firm and certain was introduced in *Luc.* 27 and elaborated in the gap I left before the last sentence of (A1). But, Antiochus then argues, no doctrine can be firm and certain unless it is perceived. And this, Lucullus claims, is a better way than Antipater's to force the Academics to accede to Hortensius' demand.²¹ Poor Antipater! His entire function in the passage is to serve as a stepping stone to Antiochus, a pathetic example to magnify the power of Antiochus' critique.

The same rhetorical structure is carried over to (A2) so that Cicero in his reply can knock it down: as usual,²² Antiochus leaves out the Academic alternative, which is to say that 'Nothing can be perceived' is something the sage finds 'probabile non perceptum'. For Cicero, as for Lucullus before him, Antipater is just a pawn in

¹⁸ For βοῶν of a written text, cf. E. *Hipp.* 877, Phil. *Fug.* 84, Athen. XIII.76. Carneades, we are told (D.L. IV.63), had a voice so mighty that he had to be asked not to shout so loud (μὴ οὕτω βοῶν).

¹⁹ Cf. Allen, this volume pp. 217-54.

²⁰ The structure of (A1) is not chronological, because it starts with Hortensius, who speaks for Antiochus.

²¹ *potius* in (A2) repeats *potius* in the penultimate sentence of (A1); Lucullus uses the word in *oratio recta*, Cicero in *oratio obliqua* (treating Lucullus as spokesman for Antiochus).

²² Cf. 'saepe repudiatum'.

the battle over Antiochus' claims about *decreta*. But Antipater would not have thought of himself that way. He did not have Antiochus to reckon with. His job was to refute Carneades for his own day and age. If Antiochus devised a better way to attack Carneades, Antipater must already have supposed that his consistency claim presented a difficulty for Carneades. The claim was not meant to be conciliatory or kind to the Academics. Carneades' resistance confirms this. More speculation is in order. How might Antipater think his consistency claim would make trouble for Carneades?

Well, notice first that the demand made by Hortensius and Antipater is a response to the Academic's conclusion 'Nothing can be perceived'. That conclusion, then, is already on the table. It is the outcome of the familiar repertoire of Academic arguments against the Stoic criterion of truth.

Very likely, the Academic has also taken the next step, standard since Arcesilaus, viz. that the sage will suspend judgment about everything. I say this because Hortensius in (A1) demands that the *sage* be allowed to perceive that nothing can be perceived. How does the sage get into the act unless through the Academic going on to argue that, because nothing can be perceived, the (Stoic) sage will suspend judgment about everything? In this case, no doubt, all would be clear if we had Book I of the first edition (i.e. the *Catulus*), which must have supplied a context for Hortensius' demand. Since that is lost, it is worth noting that Antiochus' argument also insists that we are dealing with the *decreta* of a sage (*Luc.* 27, 29).

The justification for Hortensius' demand would be that the sage gives or withholds assent on the basis of how things are, epistemologically speaking, and if the way things are, epistemologically speaking, is that nothing can be perceived, the sage must have a correct appreciation of that fact (cf. *Luc.* 53). Once the Academics invoke the Stoic sage, they must accept that so ideally rational a person would not suspend judgment about everything unless they perceived that nothing can be perceived. And this, Hortensius will argue, is a self-refuting position to end up in.

The Academic will not dispute that the position, if there is no escape from it, is self-refuting. But escape is easy. Just say what Cicero says in (A2), that for the sage 'Nothing can be perceived' is 'probabile non perceptum'.

The reason I think Hortensius means to argue that it is self-refuting to have the sage perceive that nothing can be perceived is

that self-refutation is a form of inconsistency, and Antipater says it is *not* inconsistent to claim to perceive that nothing can be perceived. Carneades says it is inconsistent (A1), and on this point Antiochus agrees with him (A2). Antipater's distinctive contribution, then, is the claim that they are all wrong. One can consistently claim to perceive that nothing can be perceived. But how?

Look at the way Carneades resists Antipater: 'the person who denies there is anything that can be perceived makes no exception.' I infer that Antipater proposed that an exception is made, to wit: 'unum illud', the statement 'Nothing can be perceived' itself. Carneades says that 'nihil posse percipi' includes itself. Antipater denies that it includes itself. It claims only that *alia*, things other than itself, cannot be perceived. To which Carneades replies in (A1) that 'Nothing' means *nothing*, without exception.

This is where it gets interesting. Carneades' objection presupposes that Antipater really did make the same demand as Hortensius, viz. that the Academic accept that the sage perceives that nothing can be perceived. The proposition under discussion is 'Nothing can be perceived', not 'Nothing else can be perceived'. Otherwise it would be irrelevant for Carneades to insist that the person who denies there is anything that can be perceived makes no exception. Plainly, Carneades is talking about what it means to say 'Nothing can be perceived'; likewise Antiochus in (A2). But if so, the same must be true of Antipater; otherwise, there is no disagreement between them. Antipater proposes that the person who says 'Nothing can be perceived' does make an exception. We have reached the conclusion that in (A1) the clause 'alia non possent' [*scil.* 'percipi'] gives Antipater's account of what it means to say that 'nihil posse percipi': 'Nothing' means everything other than this statement itself. That is what Carneades and Antiochus resist.

I suggest that the scornful criticism to which Antipater was subjected is evidence, not of cowardice or stupidity on his part, but of other people's surprise at a rather original idea. Ancient self-refutation arguments standardly assume that any universal generalisation over statements will apply to itself:

[The Sceptic] supposes that, just as the phrase 'Everything is false' says that it too, along with everything else, is false (and similarly for 'Nothing is true'), so also 'In no way more' says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence it

cancels itself along with everything else. (S.E., P. I.14; tr. Annas and Barnes)²³

Again, if anyone thinks that nothing is known, he knows not whether that can be known either, since he admits that he knows nothing. (Lucr. I.469-70; tr. Bailey)²⁴

Two self-refutation arguments in Plato's *Sophist* go so far as to assume that a universal generalisation over anything will apply to itself if it makes sense for it to do so. Both the monists, who hold that only one thing exists, and the 'late-learners', who deny the possibility of predication, are refuted by the way they combine several words to formulate their thesis (244b-d, 252c). In none of these contexts is there any hint that someone might think to exempt the universal generalisation from including itself. Antipater's proposal, and the reaction it aroused, is the exception that proves the rule.

This is not the only logical topic on which Antipater had heterodox views. He also stood out against everyone else's opinion ('contra omnium sententiam') in defence of single-premise deductions (*collectiones*, συλλογισμοί) like 'You see, therefore you are alive'.²⁵ Let us salute his originality before raising the next question: What was Antipater's justification for exempting the universal generalization from applying to itself?

We do not know, any more than we know how he defended single-premise deductions. We have to speculate.

Gilbert Ryle once hoped to check the Liar paradox before it could get started by insisting that 'This statement' in 'This statement is false' must refer to some *other* statement. You say 'This statement is false'. Which statement do you mean? Until you cite a statement *other* than 'This statement is false', you have not yet said, of any statement, that it is false.²⁶ The Stoics certainly took a keen interest in the Liar paradox, and there were debates within the school about the correct solution. Might Antipater have been inspired by some Ryle-like contribution to discussion of the Liar to propose an analogous ruling for 'Nothing can be perceived'? If we recast the

²³ On self-refutation arguments in Sextus Empiricus and other ancient authors, see Burnyeat (1976).

²⁴ Lucretius proceeds to argue that it is equally self-refuting for a sceptic to admit they do *not* know that nothing can be known. But this is no longer on grounds of self-applicability: see Burnyeat (1978).

²⁵ Apuleius, *De Int.* 272 = SVF III Antip. 26 (cf. also 27-8).

²⁶ Ryle (1950 = 1971).

Academic conclusion in more overtly propositional form as the statement 'No statement can be grasped', the ruling would be that the quantifier ranges over every statement but this one. Then the statement does not entail that it itself cannot be grasped, only that *other* statements cannot. Hence it is perfectly coherent for the statement 'No statement can be grasped' to be prefixed by 'I grasp that ...'. Q.E.D.

Such a ruling could be defended independently of the Liar, and without any decision of principle about levels of discourse or the legitimacy of self-reference. Just attend to the context in which 'Nothing can be perceived' is found. Three paragraphs back I translated 'contra omnium sententiam' as 'against everyone *else's* opinion'. Did you object? Did you even notice? It often happens that a restriction on the range of a quantifier is imposed by the context.²⁷ When one person says to another, 'You can tell me your secret—no-one is listening', 'no-one' means no-one but you and me.

Now the context for 'Nothing can be perceived' is the Academic attack on the Stoic criterion of truth. 'Nothing can be perceived' is short for 'No true impression is such that it could not be false', where that in turn means 'Any true impression can be matched by one that is indistinguishable from it but false'. This last claim (ἀπαρλλαξία) has been argued for case by case, all the way through an elaborate classification of different types of impression (*Luc.* 42: 'in singulisque rebus, quas in minima dispertunt'). In other words, the support for ἀπαρλλαξία is at bottom inductive: it is a ramified ἐπαγωγή, on a vaster scale than Socrates ever dreamed of. But what of the impression, reached at the end of this extended reasoning, that any true impression can be matched by one that is indistinguishable from it but false? Has that impression been reviewed already? Clearly not, because it is the opponent who brings it up. Does it belong to a type which has been reviewed (e.g. impressions that result from reasoning, *Luc.* 42) and found generally wanting in the marks of certainty? If so, maybe this is the exception that shows the type was wrongly condemned. It would be entirely reasonable for Antipater to claim that, given the context, the range of the quantifier in 'Nothing can be perceived' does not include 'id ipsum', but only the *other* cases considered in the

²⁷ S.E., *P.* I.198-200, to be quoted in the next section, shows an ancient philosopher deliberately exploiting quantifier restriction.

arguments leading up to that controversial conclusion. And once the claim is made, we need to ask why Carneades should be troubled by its consequence, that 'The sage grasps that no statement can be grasped' is not self-refuting.

Again, I speculate. Not only because I enjoy speculating, but also because I think it important for us to keep reminding ourselves how allusive this text is. All we glean from Cicero is that Antipater made trouble for Carneades by saying it is not self-refuting to claim to perceive that nothing can be perceived. Antipater would have argued his case, probably at some length.

So here is my speculation. If the statement 'No statement can be grasped' does not entail that it itself cannot be grasped, there is at least one statement, viz. this one, which Carneades has not shown to be ungraspable. That would be the point of Antipater's saying it is consistent to claim to grasp that nothing can be grasped. If it is consistent, Carneades has not yet proved, for all statements whatsoever, that none of them can be grasped. And he will never be able to prove it. For however effectively he argues, each time he comes to the conclusion that nothing can be grasped, the conclusion itself, that nothing can be grasped, remains outside the scope of his argument. For all Carneades has shown, there is at least one statement that can be grasped, viz. the statement that nothing can be grasped. Carneades can never justify suspending judgment about *everything* (ἐποχή περὶ πάντων). There will always be one statement that eludes his argument. Antipater can sit content in his corner waiting for Carneades to finish proving that *everything* is ungraspable (πάντα ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι). Like Achilles trying to catch the Tortoise, he will never finish.

It goes some way to make my speculation at least a candidate for consideration that Antipater would be familiar with a rather similar pattern of argument known as the διαλεληθὼς λόγος, the Elusive Argument, on which Chrysippus wrote a whole book (D.L. VII.198 = SVF II.15). The argument is focussed at the other end of the cognitive scale. Instead of challenging the possibility of arriving at total ἀκαταληψία, it challenges the possibility of arriving at perfect wisdom. To be wise, one must know that one is wise. Lucullus in *Luc.* 27, speaking for Antiochus' Stoicizing reconstruction of the Old Academy, says that *sapientia* must not doubt either herself or her *decreta*, and in *Luc.* 24 that she does not deserve the name *sapientia* unless she knows that she is *sapientia*. Now you become

wise by getting to know everything you need to know for the good life. But no list of items you know, however long, entails the further knowledge that by knowing these you have become wise. The fact of your own wisdom eludes you the moment you get it.²⁸

Back, finally, to the Liar. The climax of Ryle's account of how to stop the paradox before it can get started comes when he writes as follows of someone who purports to assert 'The current statement is false':

If unpacked, our pretended assertion would run 'The current statement (namely, that the current statement [namely that the current statement (namely that the current statement ...)]. The brackets are never closed; no verb is ever reached; no statement of which we can even ask whether it is true or false is ever adduced.'²⁹

We know practically nothing about ancient solutions to the Liar.³⁰ The only certainty is the name of a procedure for dealing with the paradox: *τομή*, 'dividing'. Chrysippus wrote a work 'Against those who solve the Lying Argument by dividing' (D.L. VII.197 = *SVF* II.15). We can only guess at what was meant by this. So here goes.

There is a common pattern that connects Ryle's solution to the Liar with the Elusive Argument and with the procedure I imagined for Antipater to embarrass Carneades. First, the problematic self-applying statement is divided into two: 'This statement is false' *vs.* the statement which that says is false; 'He knows everything he needs to know to be wise' (the knowledge which is wisdom) *vs.* 'He knows that he is wise' (the knowledge that this is wisdom); 'id ipsum' *vs.* 'None of the other things can be perceived'. Secondly, the effect of this division is to postpone the conclusion the arguer was trying to reach. In a manner that recalls Zeno's paradoxes of motion, where *διχοτομία*, or division into two, constantly prevents the runners reaching their goal, each of the three examples leaves the argument always one step behind the conclusion it was aiming for.³¹

²⁸ *SVF* III.539-41; Plu., *S.R.* 1042F-43A, *C.N.* 1062B-E; discussion in Sedley (1977) 94-5, where note the inspiration from Ryle.

²⁹ Ryle (1971) 256.

³⁰ The best discussion I know of the difficulties, philological and philosophical, is M. Mignucci, 'The Liar Paradox and the Stoics' (forthc.)

³¹ For a different, but not entirely dissimilar guess about *τομή*, see Long and Sedley (1987) 1.229. Different again is the interpretation of Rüstow (1910) 65-6 with 50-3, who takes *τομή* to be Aristotle's solution to the Liar at *S.E.*

It has taken a fair number of pages to expound my speculations about what Antipater was up to. The only thing I would be dogmatic about is that some story of comparable length and complexity is presupposed as the background, not only to (A1) and (A2), but also to numerous other passages of the allusive, elusive text we are reading.

III. *Socrates*

An extra dimension to the debate we have been examining is the representation of Socrates, so important for Academics and Stoics alike.³² Socrates is hero to both. Would they wish him to claim to *know* that he knows nothing?

Anyone who thinks that 'I know that nothing can be known' is self-refuting, i.e. anyone but Antipater, will think that 'I know that I know nothing' is self-refuting too. The Epicurean argument quoted above (Lucr. IV.469-70) assumes it as obvious that 'He knows nothing' entails 'He does *not* know that he knows nothing'. I suggest that, if Socrates was represented as claiming to know that he knows nothing, he would seem to be at fault in a way your philosophical hero should never be.

Before looking through the *Academica* to check on its depictions of Socrates, we should remind ourselves of the background in the well-known passage of Plato's *Apology* (21b) where Socrates declares his ignorance: 'In no way, great or small, am I aware of being wise (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν)'. Scholars to this day debate whether Socrates' declaration can fairly be reported as 'I know that I know nothing'.³³ Not only are the verb phrases σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ and σοφὸς ὢν different from each other, but σύννοια ἐμαυτῷ may mean something less than 'I know' and σοφὸς ὢν may mean something more than 'I know', since σοφός usually indicates an expertise or specialised knowledge that most people do not have. There are plenty of reasons for thinking that in

25.180b2-7. Ps.-Alex., in *Ar. S.E.* 171.16-20, suggests, however, that the Liar is something one can read into Aristotle's text there, rather than the puzzle he actually has in view.

³² What follows may be compared with Long (1988), Annas (1994), and Ioppolo (1995). I am indebted to all three and think of my remarks as largely complementary to theirs.

³³ For a recent treatment of the issue, see Vlastos (1991) 82-6 with n. 4.

the *Apology* Socrates' declaration of ignorance is more nuanced than 'I know that I know nothing'.

Now for the *Academica*. In the text as we read it today, the first mention of Socratic ignorance is found in Book I of the second edition (*Ac. I*). Varro speaks on behalf of Antiochus:

(S1) In nearly all the conversations recorded in such variety and detail by those who heard him [*scil.* Socrates], his way of conducting a philosophical discussion ('ita disputat') is to affirm nothing himself, but refute others, and to say (i) that he knows nothing except this itself ('id ipsum');³⁴ (ii) that what makes him superior to others [*scil.* in wisdom]³⁵ is that they think they know things they do not know, whereas he knows this one thing ('id unum'), that he knows nothing; (iii) that he thinks this is why he was named the wisest of humans by Apollo, because human wisdom³⁶ is nothing but not thinking you know what you do not know. (*Ac. I*.16)

For once, the allusion is as clear to us as it would be to an ancient reader. Varro is summarising the well-known passage of the *Apology* in order to account for the elenctic character of Plato's and others' Socratic dialogues. But the nuances of the Greek verb phrases have been obliterated. The effect of using *scire* throughout is that at (ii) Socrates does unambiguously claim to know that he knows nothing.

But he claims this in the context of (i), where he explicitly makes an exception of 'id ipsum'. 'Id unum' in (ii) has the same effect. Read carefully, what Varro commits Socrates to is not the self-refuting claim to know that there is no proposition he knows:

$K_S((p) \sim K_S p)$.

It is the perfectly consistent assertion that there is just one thing he knows, namely, that he knows no *other* proposition than this itself:

$(\exists p) K_S p$, namely, $(q)((q \neq p) \rightarrow \sim K_S q)$.

³⁴ With Yonge and Rackham, I take *id ipsum* as the object of *scire*, *eoque* as the antecedent of *quod*. Reid (followed by Ioppolo (1995) 119) makes *id ipsum* the antecedent of *quod*, construing '*eoque praestare ceteris*' as parenthetical—with the unfortunate result that Socrates knows *two* things, (a) that he knows nothing, (b) that other people think they know things they do not know (Reid), or that he is thereby superior to others (Ioppolo).

³⁵ Never mind that Socrates is also superior to others at enduring cold or holding his drink. Varro is not remarking on a point of superiority, but, as becomes clear at (iii), explaining *the* point of superiority which everyone is familiar with, that Socrates is the wisest of all human beings.

³⁶ Accepting, with Plasberg, Lambinus' emendation of the mss. *omnis* to *hominis*.

Not only does the revered figure of Socrates not refute himself, on this account. He is neither a sceptic nor (I will suggest) a dogmatist. He is the paradigmatic practitioner of elenctic argument.

Scepticism in this debate is ἀκαταληψία, the thesis that nothing can be perceived, grasped, known. Every Academic since Arcesilaus has argued for that conclusion (*Luc.* 78 init.). This much should be uncontroversial. Not so the question which Academics, if any, were sceptics in the sense that they endorsed the conclusion themselves. I need not take sides on the question yet because (S1) makes no claim about what *can* or *cannot* be known, only about what Socrates personally does and does not know.

He claims to know only one thing, 'id ipsum'. Why so little? Since the claim is personal to Socrates, a personal explanation is in order. But remember that Varro is giving Antiochus' refutation of Philo's version of the history of philosophy. The personal explanation is designed to replace a rival, more epistemological explanation of Socratic ignorance, (S3), which in the text of the *Academica* we do not meet until later.

To explain the claim to know only one thing, Varro invokes Socrates' uniquely pious understanding of human wisdom.³⁷ Lucullus in the first edition had put it down to Socrates' well known irony:

(S2) Both Plato and Socrates should be removed from the list [*scil.* the list of predecessors allegedly cited by Arcesilaus as denying that anything can be known or perceived], the former because he bequeathed a most perfect system of philosophy. [...] As for Socrates, in philosophical discussion he would depreciate himself and assign more [*scil.* wisdom]³⁸ to the people he wanted to refute. In this manner, saying one thing and thinking another, he was fond of using the kind of dissimulation that the Greeks call εἰρωνεία. (*Luc.* 15)

These two 'Antiochean' accounts, (S1) and (S2), are usually thought to be incompatible with each other. Perhaps they derive

³⁷ In the *Apology*, Socrates' account of human wisdom is his eventual interpretation of what *the Delphic oracle* meant by calling him the wisest of human beings.

³⁸ As translations of *plus*, Rackham's 'greater weight' and Reid's 'too much importance' seem less pertinent than Yonge's 'more knowledge', which is true to the Socratic dialogues we know. Reid's edition aptly cites Quint. IX.2.46: 'Socrates ... was called εἰρων because he acted the ignoramus lost in wonder at the wisdom of others'.

from different sources, or different parts of Antiochus' writing.³⁹ I reply with a speculation to make Lucullus' story compatible with Varro's.

We tend to think of Socrates as talking ironically in a variety of ways, on a variety of themes.⁴⁰ But suppose the irony of which Lucullus speaks here is more specific. Suppose it consists in Socrates saying to his interlocutors 'I'm not wise like you are' while thinking 'I am much wiser than you'. He thinks this, however, not in the sense that he thinks he knows important truths about the subjects he discusses—the virtues and vices, and good and evil generally (*Ac.* I.15)—but in the sense of the definition ascribed to him by Varro at (S1)(iii). He says he is not wise, but he thinks he is, simply because he does not think he knows what he does not know.⁴¹

On this hypothesis neither Varro nor Lucullus portray Socrates as having doctrines of his own. Socrates showed the way, summoning philosophy to concern itself with the good life for human beings (*Ac.* I.15). But the answers to the questions the elenchus leaves you with, the answers that constitute the one true philosophy—these are due to Plato, not Socrates. On this Varro and Lucullus agree (*Ac.* I.17, 19, *Luc.* 15). They agree too that Socrates rejected the very idea of systematic, doctrinal philosophy ('ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio disciplinae').⁴² Varro adds that it was Plato's followers, especially Xenocrates and Aristotle, who wrote it all up in detail; they abandoned the practice of the elenchus in which everything is discussed *dubitanter*⁴³ and Socrates makes no positive assertions of his own (*Ac.* I.17). But Lucullus says nothing incompatible with this. His much briefer account focusses, like Varro's, on the way Socrates presents

³⁹ Cf. Glucker, this volume pp. 67-9, 71-5.

⁴⁰ For illustrations and discussion, see Vlastos (1991) ch. 1.

⁴¹ The idea that it is specifically on the subject of wisdom that Socrates goes in for ironic dissimulation is paralleled at *Brut.* 292: 'It shows cleverness and wit, when disputing about wisdom ('cum de sapientia disceptetur'), to disavow it for oneself and attribute it playfully to those who claim to have it, as Socrates in the writings of Plato praises to the skies Protagoras, Hippias, Prodicus, Gorgias, and the rest, but presents himself as ignorant of everything and quite without accomplishment.' Cf. also Quintilian n. 38 above and Cic., *Luc.* 74, with n. 58 below.

⁴² Lucullus' agreement is signalled by his ascribing the 'perfectissimam disciplinam' to Plato in contrast to Socrates.

⁴³ Baiter's emendation, accepted by Plasberg; the mss. readings *dubitantem* and *dubitationem* would not change the point.

himself in, and for the purposes of, philosophical discussion (*disputatio*). Both (S1) and (S2) are describing the Socratic method of discussion, the elenchus. The only opinion imputed to Socrates is his view about human wisdom—because that, as the *Apology* makes clear, is the one relevant to the elenchus. And this is not a doctrine in the technical sense that Antiochus is interested in (*δόγμα*, *decretum*), precisely because doctrine presupposes, what Socrates rejects, a systematic philosophy.⁴⁴

For Antiochus in fact, judging by *Luc.* 23-6, Socrates cannot be right to define wisdom in the way he does in (S1), as *nothing but* ('haec ... una') not thinking you know what you do not know. All the more reason to take Plato, rather than Socrates, as the philosophical exemplar.

But what of the Stoics? They will not rank Plato above Socrates. But nor can they accept Socrates' definition of human wisdom. Stoic wisdom is the knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) of things human and divine (*SVF* II.35-6), and Stoics cite Socrates (together with Diogenes the Cynic and Antisthenes) as proof that human nature is capable of progress (*προκοπή*) towards virtue and wisdom (*D.L.* VII.91). Certainly, he is not yet wise, but he is closer to it than the rest of us are likely to get.⁴⁵ It is worth wondering whether, for a Stoic, Socrates' understanding of wisdom, pious as it is, might not be his one deficiency. That would make Socrates a splendid illustration for the Elusive Argument. He knows everything he needs to know except 'unum illud', that what he does know constitutes wisdom.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ The word Varro uses at *Ac.* I.16 for Socrates' view of human wisdom is *sententia*: 'quae cum diceret constanter et in ea sententia' [*scil.* about his and others' wisdom] permaneret'. There follows (whether we read *tamen* or *tantum*) a description of Socrates' *oratio* as directed 'ad studium virtutis'. 'Ad studium' implies a protreptic purpose, not 'un imagine dogmatica del Socrate platonico' (Ioppolo (1995) 121). The elenchus is designed to make people realize they do not know what virtue is, and thereby (the protreptic aspect) to spur them on to make it their chief concern to find out. See Pl., *Ap.* 29d-30c.

⁴⁵ Any doubt that Socrates could be close to knowledge of things *divine* may be quelled by Antipater's massive collection of Socratic divinations (*Cic., Div.* I.123). The Stoic sage is the one true diviner (*Div.* II.129; *SVF* III.605).

⁴⁶ I can find no direct evidence to back up this speculation, which derives from a question by David Sedley. But for what it is worth, Sen., *Ep. Mor.* 75.9 describes people at the highest stage of progress as those who cannot lapse but are not yet aware of the fact: they do not know that they know ('scire se nesciunt'). This is not yet the *διαλεληθώς σοφός* of *SVF* III.539-41, but it is suggestively close.

Cicero's reply to Varro offers a different, more epistemological account of Socratic ignorance:

(S3) According to the traditions of our school ('ut accepimus'), it was entirely with Zeno [i.e. not with the Old Academy, as Varro has just charged] that Arcesilaus began his contest. He did this not out of obstinacy⁴⁷ or contentiousness, as it seems to me at least, but because of the obscurity of the things which had led Socrates to his confession of ignorance—and already before Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, nearly all the ancients in fact,⁴⁸ who said that nothing can be learned, nothing perceived, nothing known [...]. Accordingly, Arcesilaus denied there is anything that can be known, not even that very thing ('illud ipsum') which Socrates had left himself.⁴⁹ (*Ac. I.44-5*)

Here again Socrates is presented as claiming to know that he knows nothing *except* this claim itself. His consistency is maintained. One might speculate that this helped inspire Antipater to try the same tactic on 'I know that nothing can be known'. He could accuse the Academics of failing to live up to the example of their philosophical hero.

The consistency of this Academic Socrates should be underlined. It is relevant to Arcesilaus' reason for disavowing the one bit of knowledge Socrates had left himself. The reason should not be the idea that Socrates' position is self-refuting.⁵⁰ That would be both logically wrong and historically inappropriate to an Academic hero.⁵¹ Knowing one's own ignorance is inconsistent, not with

⁴⁷ For the accusation of *pertinacia*, cf. *Luc.* 18.

⁴⁸ As written, the sentence implies that the ancients were led to the same confession of ignorance as Socrates. I translate accordingly, even though Cicero goes on to ascribe to the ancients the much stronger conclusion that nothing can be known by anyone.

⁴⁹ Plasberg adds, with some mss. support, 'ut nihil scire se sciret'. Unlike Long and Sedley (1987) 68A(3), I follow Reid and Rackham, on the grounds that the idea has become so familiar that 'illud ipsum' can be used as a tag, without the need of explanation (cf. D.L. II.32); both here and in (A1) *illud* could import 'well known, famous'. But Rackham's translation has Arcesilaus' Socrates claim to know that nothing can be known, rather than that he himself knows nothing. Both Yonge and Reid (and whoever wrote the extra words 'ut nihil scire se sciret') see that *illud* looks forward to *quod*, not backwards to Arcesilaus' denial that anything can be known.

⁵⁰ Pace Ioppolo (1995) 116.

⁵¹ Contrast Aenesidemus *ap.* Photius, *Bibl.* 169b27-30 = Long and Sedley (1987) 71C(3): ὁ δὲ κατὰ Πύρρωνα φιλοσοφῶν τὰ τε ἄλλα εὐδαιμονεῖ, καὶ σοφός ἐστι τοῦ μάλιστα εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῷ βεβαίως κατεῖληπται· ἃ δὲ καὶ εἰδείη, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον αὐτῶν τῇ καταφάσει ἢ τῇ ἀποφάσει γενναῖός ἐστι συγκατατίθεσθαι. The followers of Pyrrho are happy in the wisdom of knowing that they personally have not grasped anything, and even with regard to the things they do know they

itself, but with Arcesilaus' generalised conclusion that nothing can be known by anyone.

Consistency is maintained earlier too, in (S3)'s remarks about the ancients. Unlike Socrates, they did assert that nothing can be known, but not that they knew this. (Lucullus in *Luc.* 14 tries to argue that they speak as if they did know it.)⁵² What Socrates and the ancients have in common, according to (Philo's account of) Arcesilaus, is that both are responding to 'the obscurity of things'. Socrates responds with a *confessio ignorationis* that is personal to himself, the ancients with the generalised conclusion that nothing can be known. Thus Socrates is *associated* with the sceptical thesis that nothing can be known, without the thesis being expressly ascribed to him.

This is important. Lucullus in (S2) spoke as if Arcesilaus cited Plato and Socrates as authorities for the sceptical thesis that nothing can be known. Perhaps Antiochus did insinuate as much.⁵³ But (S3) suggests that Arcesilaus (as represented by Philo) did not invoke Socrates and Plato in quite the same terms as he did the Presocratic ancients.⁵⁴ The Presocratics went in for pessimistic

very properly assent no more to their affirmation than to their denial. This Pyrrhonist version of Socratic ignorance (the allusion seems guaranteed by the word σοφός) does look paradoxical. A Pyrrhonist is one who says, 'I know I know nothing and I do not believe what I know'. But Pyrrhonists also make a point of refuting themselves (see the passage from S.E., *P.* I.14 quoted above). They relish self-refutation as the means of relief from dogma. Accordingly, rather than follow Long and Sedley (1987) 1.473, who try to soften the paradox by taking εἰδέναι as non-technical and weaker than κατείληπται, I would accept it as a deliberate ploy. Aenesidemus is here completing his explanation of the claim that neither the Pyrrhonists nor the other philosophers know (εἰδέναι) the truth in things. The opening δέ of my quotation responds to an earlier μέν clause dealing with the other philosophers. So εἰδέναι should have as strong a sense as those other philosophers would give it. By the same token, it is not safe to cite this passage as evidence that a Pyrrhonist is happy to use the verb 'to know' in the relaxed way people do in ordinary life: see Frede (1984) 266 = (1987) 219.

⁵² Where Rackham mistakenly translates 'omnes isti' as 'all your school'. Reid has it right: 'all the philosophers you name'.

⁵³ Note the order of names: 'et Plato et Socrates'. This picks up on *Luc.* 14, where 'Platonem etiam' may well reflect Antiochus' especial indignation at Plato's being included on the same list as the others. Cicero's back-reference to this passage in (S4) will restore the chronological order: 'et Socratem et Platonem'.

⁵⁴ Plu., *Adv. Col.* 1121E-22A is confirmation from contemporary voices ('the sophists of his day') that Arcesilaus did invoke Socrates, Plato, Parmenides and Heraclitus as predecessors in some sense or other. But polemicists like Colotes and Plutarch can be trusted to ride roughshod over any fine

epistemological generalisations which an Academic can cite, as happens in the gap I left in (S3) (cf. also *Luc.* 14, 72-4). Socrates bequeathed only his personal confession of ignorance. It is *by diagnosis* that Arcesilaus associates Socrates with scepticism. The best explanation of the *confessio ignorantis* is epistemological. Socrates was responding to the obscurity in things that led the ancients to their gloomy generalisations.

It is diagnosis again—presumably the same diagnosis—that aligns Plato with the sceptical Academy and with Arcesilaus' practice of arguing against the opinions of everyone he encountered. Rather than refer to Plato's numerous epistemological discussions, or to the aporetic ending of the *Theaetetus*, Cicero appeals to the dialectical character of the dialogues:

No philosophical positions are endorsed [*scil.* by the author] and many arguments are advanced on either side of the dispute;⁵⁵ everything is investigated and no certain result is declared.⁵⁶ (*Ac.* I.46)

Contrast Lucullus' claim in (S2) that Plato bequeathed a most perfect system of philosophy. This is the big disagreement in the debate we are reading. Systematic Plato *vs.* dialectical Plato—a disagreement that persists in Platonic scholarship today. Over Socrates, on the other hand, the only quarrel concerns his declaration of ignorance. Is it a response to the Delphic oracle or to the actual unknowability of things?

It would be nice to find the same Academic view of Socrates and Plato in the parallel passage of the first edition:

(S4) You [Lucullus] said that Socrates and Plato should be removed [*scil.* from the list of Arcesilaus' predecessors]. Why? Are there any I can speak about with more certainty? I seem to have actually

distinctions he might have made between Socrates or Plato and the Presocratics.

⁵⁵ For Plato's arguing on both sides of an issue as grounds for inferring that he favoured ἀκαταληψία, cf. *Anon. Proleg. in Plat. phil.* p. 205 Hermann = 10.17 ff. Westerink (1990).

⁵⁶ Compare the often cited passage, Cic., *De Orat.* III.67: 'Arcesilaus [...] from various of Plato's books and Socratic discussions derived this above all ('hoc maxime arripuit'), that there is nothing certain that can be perceived either by the senses or by the mind'. The verb *arripuit* shows Arcesilaus as an independent interpreter of the dialogues (rightly emphasized by Long (1988) = (1996) 13-4), but leaves it open whether *what* he is interpreting is their epistemological content or their dialectical method.

lived with them, so many are the conversations recorded⁵⁷ that put it beyond doubt 'quin Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse'. He made just one exception, to the effect that he knew that he knew nothing—that is all. What need to speak of Plato? He certainly would not have depicted these things [*scil.* conversations in which 'Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse' and he declared his knowledge of his own ignorance] in so many books unless he approved them. Otherwise there was no reason for the one to keep on depicting the irony of the other,⁵⁸ particularly since it was unremitting. (*Luc.* 74)

I have left the crucial clause in the obscurity of Latin, where the translations of Yonge, Reid and Rackham all make Cicero say it is impossible to doubt that Socrates held that nothing can be known.⁵⁹ If this rendering is correct, the Academic Socrates of the first edition, unlike his namesake in the second edition, was a thorough-going sceptic. He not only propounded the universal generalisation 'Nothing can be known'. He believed it to be true. But then he added, inconsistently, that he did know his own ignorance. This, surely, is not the way one's philosophical hero should behave.

Worse, a Socrates who openly declared that nothing can be known by anyone would have to give up irony. He could no longer praise others for their wisdom. Yet irony is as much a part of (S4)'s portrait of Socrates as it was in Lucullus' account at (S2).

With such difficulties in the offing, we should ask ourselves *how* Plato's dialogues could leave Cicero so certain that Socrates held that nothing can be known. Plato's Socrates never says anything like that, even at the aporetic ending of the *Theaetetus*. True, some later readers took this to be the implied moral of the *Theaetetus*.⁶⁰ But Cicero speaks of 'so many' dialogues. He must be drawing a moral from the aporetic endings of other dialogues besides the *Theaetetus*. But no other dialogue ends in aporia about

⁵⁷ 'sermones perscripti', as in (S1) *init.*, where Reid notes that the verb *perscribere* implies an assumption that the dialogues are the record of real conversations.

⁵⁸ In its context, this confirms from the Academic side that Socrates' irony has to do with his wisdom and ignorance.

⁵⁹ Rackham goes further. His translation of *Luc.* 74 is the basis on which he emends the text at *Luc.* 123: by changing *putat* to *putant* he makes Socrates as well as Aristo think that 'nihil istorum' can be known, where 'nihil istorum' according to Rackham means 'None of the things that you [*sc.* Lucullus] treat of'. But this is a mistranslation even if we do read *putant*. In its context, *istorum* plainly refers to the problems of physics just enumerated, and the idea that Socrates thought *caelestia* beyond human knowledge goes back to Xenophon, *Mem.* IV.7.6 (cf. *Cic.*, *Ac.* I.15).

⁶⁰ *Anon. Proleg. in Plat. phil.* p. 205 Hermann = 10.23 ff. Westerink (1990).

knowledge as such. The strongest moral Cicero can decently draw is that knowledge is unobtainable *on any of the subjects Socrates has investigated*. Can the Latin 'Socrati nihil sit visum sciri posse' mean what it ought to mean?

Of course it can. In this context the range of the quantifier *nihil* is quite naturally understood as restricted to the subjects Socrates investigates in 'so many' aporetic Platonic dialogues. But the Latin can also mean, and probably does mean, something weaker still. Give the verb *videor* the sense it had in the line before, where Cicero was certainly not giving it as his opinion that he did actually live with Socrates and Plato. Translate: '... put it beyond doubt that it *appeared* to Socrates that nothing [*scil.* nothing he investigated] can be known'.

There remains the modal clause 'can be known'. If this refers to what can be known *by anyone*, then it appeared to Socrates that scepticism is justified for all the matters he had investigated: on such matters knowledge is altogether unobtainable. Compare Sextus Empiricus' directions for understanding the sceptic formula 'All things are ungraspable'. Take 'are' as 'appears' (he says), supply 'to me', and restrict the quantifier 'all' to all the things you have examined among the non-evident matters investigated by the dogmatists. What the sceptic states by uttering the phrase πάντα ἑστὶν ἀκατάληπτα is 'All the non-evident matters of dogmatic inquiry which I have examined appear to me ungraspable' (P. I.198-200).

On the other hand, the modal clause might refer simply to what can be known *by Socrates*. In that case, what appeared to Socrates was not that knowledge is unobtainable in the matters he investigated, but that none of them could be known *by him*. He always ended in aporia. As an appraisal of the outcome of 'so many' Platonic dialogues, this is both more intelligent and more suited to the next sentence in (S4): the one thing Socrates does think he knows is that he himself (*se ...se*) knows nothing—*scil.* nothing else. Compare the ancient and learned thinkers described by Cicero in *Luc.* 7, who doubted *they* could ('se posse') discover what they desired to discover, but did not give up the search. Clearly, they did not doubt the possibility of knowledge, only their own ability to achieve it. As with his ignorance, if Socrates doubts his powers of discovery, this should be personal to himself. It should not lead him to the generalised sceptical thesis that nothing can be known by anyone.

I shall not try to decide this last problem about the scope of the modal clause 'can be known'. It might be a waste of effort.

If that sounds shocking, I ask you to reflect that the two passages which have caused trouble in this section of the present essay are (S2) and (S4), both from the first edition. The second edition parallels, (S1) and (S3), are so much more satisfactory in their clarity, precision, and detail, as to invite the speculation that, when Cicero revised the *Academica*, he did rather more than change the *dramatis personae*, make cuts and additions, and reorganise the work into four books instead of two (*Att.* XIII.13). He also did what anyone is likely to do when they rewrite something. He made it better.

The first draft had been written at great speed.⁶¹ The little word *posse* in that modal clause could easily be a slip. Cicero was now agonising about what the deeply learned and hypercritical Varro would think of the work in which he was to debate with the author (*Att.* XIII.23-5). This author had good reason to re-stage the debate about Socrates in the improved and more responsible presentation of (S1) and (S3).

IV. *Catulus*

The only character in the *Academica* who does plainly assert that a sage will *know* that nothing can be perceived is Catulus. But before he can be charged with refuting himself, there are tricky questions to face about what exactly he means.

When the debate is over at the end of the first edition, Catulus and Hortensius are asked what they make of it:

(C1) 'What do I think?', Catulus replied. 'I am coming back to my father's view, which indeed he used to say was Carneades' view, namely, I think (i) that nothing can be perceived, yet I also think (ii) (a) that a sage will assent to what is not perceived, that is, they will opine, but (b) that they will do this in such a way that they understand (*intellegat*) they are opining and know (*sciatque*) there is nothing which can be grasped and perceived. 'per epochen illam omnium rerum conprobans', I vehemently assent to that other (*alteri*) view, that there is nothing that can be perceived'. 'I get your view', said I [*scil.* Cicero], and I do not completely reject it'. (*Luc.* 148)

⁶¹ In two months at most, according to Lévy (1992) 129-30.

This time the untranslated Latin is due to textual corruption. The accusative *epochen illam* cannot be governed both by *per* and by the verb *conprobans*. *Per* must be emended. And maybe the corruption goes further. The only way to decide is by engaging with the philosophical content of the text.

We saw in (A2) that the Academic's own attitude to the universal generalisation 'Nothing can be known/grasped' is that it is 'probabile non perceptum'. But what that means is itself open to debate, in two ways.

For us today, there is the question whether to translate *probabile* as 'probable'. In the *Academica*, *probabile* renders the Greek *πιθανόν*, 'convincing' or 'persuasive'. But in *De Finibus* the same word renders *εὔλογον*, 'reasonable' (III.58), while in the youthful *De Inventione* it translates *εἰκός*, 'likely', which in turn subsumes *ἔνδοξον*, 'quod in opinione positum est' (I.44-9; cf. *Tim.* 3). Cicero wrote the *Academica* and *De Finibus* concurrently. He must have known what he was doing when he combined two such different Greek concepts as the Academic *πιθανόν* and the Stoic *εὔλογον* under the same Latin word as he had already used for *εἰκός* and *ἔνδοξον*. He links all of them to the verb *probare*, 'to approve', to adopt as a basis for decision and action. For better or worse, the resultant four-in-one notion of *probabilitas* makes it tempting to hail Cicero as 'the first probabilist'.⁶² At the very least, in an essay that tries not to treat Cicero merely as a source for various Greek philosophers, he is entitled to have his single word Anglicized by its single (but still multi-faceted) descendant, 'probable'. That has been my practice in translation, where it is Cicero's word that matters. When I am speaking directly about the Greeks and their use of *τὸ πιθανόν*, I shall put scare-quotes around 'probable'.

For the ancients, of course, the controversial issue was not the lexical meaning of *probabile* but what it means to treat something as 'probabile non perceptum'. Two answers were on offer, one associated with Clitomachus, the other with Metrodorus and Philo.

A paraphrase of Clitomachus' account is given in the course of Cicero's defence of the Academic cause:

(C2) After detailing these points [to clear away misunderstandings about the probable], he [*scil.* Clitomachus] adds that 'The sage withholds assent' is said in two ways: one when it means that a wise

⁶² Cf. Lévy (1992) 276-90.

person assents to nothing at all,⁶³ the other when [it means that] they check themselves from responding in such a way as to accept or reject something, the result being that they neither deny nor affirm anything. Given this distinction, he [Clitomachus] says that a sage adopts the former as their doctrine (*placere*),⁶⁴ namely, never to assent [or: so that they never assent],⁶⁵ while the latter is what they hold to in practice (*tenere*),⁶⁶ namely, [or: so] that following probability they can respond 'Yes' wherever it is present, or 'No' wherever it is missing. Since in fact we hold (*placeat*) that one who on all matters refrains from assent does still move and act, this person does not remove⁶⁷ such impressions as impel us to act, nor again the 'Yes' or 'No' answers we can give to questions merely by following what appears thus and so, provided we do this without assent. We do not hold, however, that all such impressions are accepted [*scil.* by the sage], but only those which are not hindered by anything, (*Luc.* 104)

The purpose of this difficult passage is best seen by going back to the stage in the long-running debate where the Academic has concluded that a sage will suspend judgement about everything. It is the whole sentence, 'The sage withholds assent', to which two meanings are ascribed, and everyone knows how that sentence gets into the debate and what happens next. The opposition brings up the ἀπραξία objection: if a sage suspends judgement about everything, he will be unable to act. Action requires assent, and, if nothing can be grasped, any assent will be opinion. For opinion, or δόξα as the Stoics define it, is assenting to something you have not grasped—either because it is ungraspable or because you, not being

⁶³ I follow Reid's translation, Rackham, and Long and Sedley (1987) 69 I (2) in taking *omnino* with *rei nulli*. Reid's note, by contrast, connects *omnino* with the more distant *adsentiri* to create a concept of 'absolute' as opposed to 'qualified' assent. This is strained, special pleading. Bett (1990) 15 with n. 32 proposes the same construal to support the translation 'not giving one's entire assent to anything'.

⁶⁴ The verb *placere* unavoidably suggests *placita*, ἀπέσκοντα; cf. 'Academicis placere' at *Luc.* 103 init. No doubt such 'doctrines' will be *probabilia*, as in (A2).

⁶⁵ Ambiguous *ut* again (cf. n. 10 above).

⁶⁶ So Yonge, Reid, and Rackham. Long and Sedley (1987) 69I(2), to whose translation of the passage I am in general much indebted, have 'but retains the latter [kind of assent]'; they enlarge on this at 1.460. I am about to object that the distinction just made is between two kinds of *non*-assent, two ways of understanding what it means to withhold assent. Frede (1984) 268-9 = (1987) 222 besides finding two kinds of assent in (C2), also finds a rival (Philonian) distinction between two kinds of assent in (C1). I challenge that later (n. 81 below), but will take the opportunity here to thank Frede for a helpful discussion of the evidence.

⁶⁷ The text I am translating is that of Long and Sedley (1987) 69I(3): 'etenim cum ... relinquat'. The subject of *relinquit* is the non-assenting sage.

wise, are weakly equipped to grasp it.⁶⁸ But it is the mark of a sage never to opine. Hence the sage is left unable to act in any way at all.

Clitomachus' distinction of meanings will block this argument at its first step. It is not true that action requires assent. The opposition has not thought hard enough about how a policy of non-assent might work out in practice. (C2) indicates how, even though nothing can be grasped, your sage may still act, be good, and enjoy their happiness, without opining. Just follow *probabilia* in a passive sort of way that does not involve assent. It does not involve assent even when 'Yes' and 'No' answers are given to questions. For what the sage is saying 'Yes' or 'No' to is 'It is probable that *p*' rather than '*p*',⁶⁹ and 'It is probable that *p*' is to be equated with 'It appears to me that *p*' ('ita visum sit'). Compare the next paragraph (*Luc.* 105):

Whereas you speak of things as being 'perceived' and 'grasped', we describe the same things (provided they are probable) as 'appearing' (*videri*).⁷⁰

This interpretation is at odds with two common ways of reading (C2). First, where some see a contrast between theory (*placere*) and practice (*tenere*),⁷¹ I see theory guiding practice. The point is not that to say 'Yes' to *probabilia* is to compromise a policy of not assenting to anything at all, but that to say 'Yes' *only to probabilia as probabilia* is to fulfil that policy each time action is required. Correspondingly, where some see the second meaning of 'The sage withholds assent' as allowing a kind of assent, namely assent to *probabilia*,⁷² I insist that the text twice describes saying 'Yes' to

⁶⁸ Texts and discussion in Long and Sedley (1987) 41. The second disjunct will not be relevant in a discussion of a *sage* who appreciates that *nothing* can be grasped.

⁶⁹ Apparently, the Stoics will agree that a sage can (and often must) follow *probabilia* which are not *adsensa* (*Luc.* 99). By contrast, in the anecdote at D.L. VII.177 Sphaerus does assent—but only to 'It is reasonable that these are pomegranates', not to 'These are pomegranates'.

⁷⁰ Tr. Rackham. Yonge's version is similar, but Reid misses disastrously: 'the "appearances" you say are perceived and "apprehended", are accepted by us if they are only probable'.

⁷¹ So Reid's notes *ad loc.* It would be a mistake to suppose that, when two meanings of something are distinguished, they must be opposed to each other. They may stand to each other as general to specific (κοινῶς to ἰδίως), as e.g. at S.E., P. I.192. This is the sort of distinction I am ascribing to Clitomachus here.

⁷² Reid again, Frede, Long and Sedley (n. 65 above). *Contra*, Striker (1980) 61 with n. 20 = (1996) 97, and Bett (1990), but Bett thinks that Carneades must

probabilia as a way of not assenting to anything ('qui de omnibus rebus contineat se ab adsentiendo ... dum sine adsensu'). A positive response to its appearing thus and so is not assent, on Clitomachus' account, not even a qualified assent. Assent would be saying, on the basis of how it appears, 'Yes, it *is* that way'. What Clitomachus offers is perhaps best described as qualified non-assent (ἐποχή).

This marks a difference between Clitomachean Academics and the Pyrrhonists. The latter follow appearances too, without saying 'Yes, it *is* that way', but as they describe their practice it involves assenting to what appears. The Pyrrhonists reply to the ἀπραξία objection that action is possible (indeed, unavoidable) because a certain type of assent, involuntary assent to appearances, is compatible with suspending judgement about everything (Sext., *P.* I.13, 192-3, 196).⁷³ The Academic tradition since Arcesilaus has been to argue that action is possible *without* the added extra of assent: the impression of something appropriate is enough to arouse an impulse towards it.⁷⁴ It seems likely that a version of Arcesilaus' argument was still going in Carneades' day, for Antipater, as well as Chrysippus, wrote at length against it.⁷⁵ (C2) as interpreted here is another way of arguing for action without assent.⁷⁶

Apply this to the sceptical thesis that nothing can be grasped. When a Clitomachean—for example, Cicero himself in (A2)—responds to Hortensius' demand by saying that the sage regards 'Nothing can be grasped' as 'probabile non perceptum', what that means is that it appears to the sage that nothing can be grasped. Rightly or wrongly, after years of debate this is how it strikes them.

be working with a narrower notion of assent than his Stoic opponent.

⁷³ Further references and discussion in Burnyeat (1980) 37-42. Note that what is contrasted with Pyrrhonian assent at S.E. *P.* I.229-30 is not Clitomachean non-assent but its rival, Philonian assent (on which see below). Hence the often remarked terminological parallels with (C1).

⁷⁴ See Plu., *Adv. Col.* 1122A ff.; Striker (1980) 67-9 = (1996) 102-4. *SVF* II.714 suggests that non-rational animals are carried along by their impressions, without deliberate assent. If so, the Academic might argue, even the Stoics must agree that action is possible without assent. Animals do it all the time, naturally.

⁷⁵ Plu., *S.R.* 1057A. Chrysippus' participation is the basis for ascribing the original to Arcesilaus.

⁷⁶ It is a nice question whether the difference between the Pyrrhonists' assent to appearances and Clitomachean non-assent is substantive or largely verbal. That is not a matter I can pursue here, since it would involve, among other things, considering whether both parties have the same understanding of what an appearance or impression is.

Contrast (C1). Here Catulus says at (i) that he thinks that nothing can be perceived, and later that he vehemently assents to this conclusion; at (ii)(a) he says he thinks that a sage will assent to something he does not perceive, and so will opine. Yet at (ii)(b) Catulus makes clear that this opining is something different from, and more responsible than δόξα as the Stoics conceive it. For he says the sage will opine, i.e. assent to something not grasped, but in a certain way: 'ita ut intellegat se opinari sciatque' that nothing can be grasped. If this is δόξα, it is δόξα aware of itself as δόξα and no more, δόξα aware that nothing better is available. And that, presumably, is as different from ordinary Stoic δόξα, which is always foolish and blameworthy, as it is different in its vehemence from Clitomachean non-assent.

What we have here, I believe,⁷⁷ is the fullest description left to us of the Metrodorus-cum-Philo interpretation of Carneades. Clitomachus and Philo march in step together through the standard moves until they reach the point where 'probability' is introduced. Then they begin to diverge, not indeed on the details of the Carneadean scheme, but on what it means to 'follow probability', i.e. to adopt that scheme and use it. Only then, and only on this issue, need Cicero, who is defending Philo against Antiochus, reveal his preference for the Clitomachean interpretation (*Luc.* 78 and 108; cf. 67). Catulus in (C1) recoils towards the very different interpretation of Carneades that his father had learned from Philo.⁷⁸ We would of course like to know more about Philo's rival account of Carneades. We undoubtedly would know more if Catulus' speech of the previous day in Book I of the first edition had survived (cf. *Luc.* 59). But it is clear enough that the basic choice is between the qualified non-assent described in (C2) and the qualified opinion described in (C1). Since this choice is so basic, it is appropriate that Cicero should close the dialogue with a reminder of the two versions, Clitomachus' and Philo's, of the Academic cause.⁷⁹

⁷⁷ With Long and Sedley (1987) 2.451.

⁷⁸ (C1) therefore bears no trace of Philo's 'Roman books', whose innovations (whatever they were) Catulus senior disapproved of (*Luc.* 12 and 18).

⁷⁹ For an earlier reminder, see the phrase 'et Clitomachum ... et Philonem' at *Luc.* 11: Heraclitus of Tyre knew both versions well. This is especially appropriate for those, like Long and Sedley (1987) 2.451, who are persuaded by Glucker (1978) 417-8, that Catulus' lost speech was based on a speech by Heraclitus in Antiochus' *Sosus*.

As for the options themselves, qualified non-assent and qualified opinion, I would speculate with some confidence that both Clitomachus and Philo are right to claim that they derive from Carneades. The wily dialectician developed two distinct ways to show the Stoics how the sage can act without lapsing into blameworthy opinion. One way is to act without assent, merely following appearances; the other is to assent responsibly, with a clear understanding that your opinion is only an opinion and may turn out to be wrong.⁸⁰ It is the second option that Catulus favours in (C1).

The best way into (C1) is through Cicero's reply. His incomplete rejection means he accepts some of what Catulus has said. It is an easy guess that, as a Clitomachean, Cicero is happy enough with (i), 'Nothing can be perceived'. What he rejects is the assent recommended at (ii). Cicero would not vehemently assent to (i). He would follow the appearance without assenting to it.

Conversely, Catulus' vehement assent to (i) implies his rejection of Clitomachean non-assent. This is confirmed by the word *alteri*. He vehemently assents to one of a pair of propositions. Since the proposition he assents to is (i), the corrupt clause ought to give Catulus' attitude to (ii). But we already know his attitude to (ii): positive. A positive attitude to (ii)'s endorsement of assent is equivalent to a negative attitude towards non-assent or *epochê*. Therefore, the emendation must yield a negative that contrasts with Catulus' very positive assent to (i).

The easiest of the solutions that have been proposed is to change *per* to *parum*: 'Little approving that non-assent about everything, I vehemently assent ...'. Alternatively, change *per* to *quare* and make *conprobans* a negative, *non probans* or *inprobans*: 'That is why, not approving that non-assent about everything, I vehemently assent ...'.⁸¹

⁸⁰ This story is offered as an alternative to Frede's, according to which Carneades distinguished two kinds of assent, while Clitomachus and Philo produced rival interpretations of Carneades' distinction, viz. (C2) and (C1) respectively: Frede (1984) 269 = (1987) 222.

⁸¹ See Long and Sedley (1987) 2.451. Frede (1984) 267 = (1987) 212-3, although he does not discuss the textual question, translates 'quare ... conprobans'. He stops Catulus falling into inconsistency, and at the same time lays the basis for finding two kinds of assent in (C1), by translating 'epochen illam' as 'this *kind* of withholding assent'. The whole sentence then reads: 'hence I approve of this kind of withholding assent in all matters, but I vehemently assent to this other view that there is nothing which can be known'. I have to say that I doubt the translation and have difficulty understanding

We are now ready for the challenge of (ii)(b). It is here in particular that we mourn the loss of Book I of the first edition, i.e. the *Catulus*. In the *Lucullus* we are reminded that Carneades would sometimes lapse into saying that a sage will opine (*Luc.* 59);⁸² that he would on occasion concede (*dabat*) that the sage will sometimes assent,⁸³ so as to conclude that the sage will opine (*Luc.* 67); that he argued for the conclusion that, even if a sage perceives nothing, he may legitimately (*licebat*) opine (*Luc.* 78); that he did not vehemently combat the claim that a sage will sometimes opine (*Luc.* 112). But without (C1)(ii)(b) we would not know that Carneades had a way of getting round the standard objection that opinion is always foolish, wrongful, blameworthy, and as such incompatible with being a sage. In his lost speech, Catulus would have explained the point more fully.⁸⁴ We can only speculate on the basis of what we do have: (ii)(b).

It is hardly a straightforward acceptance of Hortensius' demand. Catulus does not say, 'Yes, the sage does know that nothing can be perceived' when he has finished proving that nothing can be perceived. When he speaks of the sage knowing that nothing can be perceived, this is at a much later stage in the debate, when he is giving the Philonian account of responsible opining. I take it that one could not opine in this non-foolish, respectable way, unless and because one simultaneously assented to the conclusion that nothing can be grasped. That conclusion serves as the Academic's *decretum*, guiding and controlling their assent. Each time assent is given to something not perceived, this is done in full cognizance of the force of all those arguments for the conclusion that nothing can be perceived, and so with a clear understanding that the assent is no more than opinion. Even vehement assent, a strong opinion, can and should be responsibly aware of its own fallibility. For if nothing can be perceived, nothing better than opinion is possible. That is the message of (ii)(b).

the result.

⁸² *Delabi* has been variously rendered: 'descending to say' (Yonge), 'drift away so far as to say' (Reid), 'taking refuge in the assertion' (Rackham). I borrow 'lapse into saying' from Long and Sedley (1987) 69F(3). The pejorative term indicates the attitude of the speaker, Lucullus, who at once puts an adverse gloss on 'opinaturum: id est, peccaturum'. *Interdum* goes with *delabi* here (so Yonge and Reid against Rackham), but with *opinari* at *Luc.* 112.

⁸³ A dialectical concession to the Stoic who objects that a sage who never assents will never act.

⁸⁴ So Lévy (1980) 43, despite his casting Catulus as a Clitomachean.

If this is correct, Catulus' position is obviously not self-refuting. The verb *sciatque* does not ascribe to the sage what is denied to everyone by the subordinate clause 'nihil esse quod comprehendi et percipi possit'. Cognizance (the word I have just used) is not the same as the technical Stoic notion of grasping or perceiving. As happened already in (S1), the Latin *scire* obliterates the nuances of whatever Greek verb Philo originally used. It is in fact a tempting speculation that, as in (S1), *scire* in (C1) represents the Greek συνειδέναι.⁸⁵ Nothing would be easier than for Philo, starting from Arcesilaus' Socrates, to add further traits from the Platonic dialogues to make him out to be a model of responsible opining.⁸⁶

Many scholars now take the view, to which I subscribe, that once upon a time all these arguments about the sage had a dialectical function. They were *ad hominem* replies to show the Stoics how action, the good life, and happiness would still be possible for their much-vaunted sage, even if nothing could be perceived in the technical Stoic sense of the term. Carneades' scheme of 'probability' began that way.⁸⁷ The sage who was forced by ἀκαταληψία to suspend judgement and follow 'probability' was originally the Stoic sage. Only later did the Academy start to advocate in its own name a life guided by 'probability'. At this point the choice between the passivity of Clitomachean non-assent and the modesty of Philonian opinion would become something more than a dilemma thrust upon the hapless Stoic. It would be a choice the Academics had to make for themselves.

Philo's version won. I do not think this is to be explained simply by the fact that the switch to positive advocacy seems to have happened during his scholarship. The choice between a Clitomachean and a Philonian account of how the Stoic sage can follow 'probability' is a different issue from the question whether the Academics should endorse the outlook and conduct of this sage (in either version) as a model for themselves.⁸⁸ Different again is the

⁸⁵ Compare Reid's (unnecessary but acute) suggestion for emending *sciatque* to *sentiatque*.

⁸⁶ Notable examples of Socrates opining include Pl., *Cri.* 46b4-6, 49c-e; *Phd.* 114d; *R.* 424c, 506b-e and 509c with 517b6-7, 621c; *Th.* 185e.

⁸⁷ Here I vehemently agree with Frede (1984) 213 = (1987) 203-4, and Long and Sedley (1987) 1.457-60. The founding father of this way of reading Carneades was Couissin (1929).

⁸⁸ It follows, contrary to the impression one can easily get from the secondary literature, that evidence for Philo saying the sage will opine are not *eo ipso* evidence for Philo advocating opinion himself.

problem (perplexing already for the ancients) which of the two accounts, if either, met with approval from Carneades himself.⁸⁹ The explanation of Philo's victory should allow for the possibility that, once the Academy turned to preaching 'probability' in its own name, his version was found to be superior.

Consider the options. Would you rather be a passive follower of appearances or an opinionator responsibly aware of the fallibility of your best estimate of the truth? To my taste, Philo's version of what it means to follow 'probability' is easily the more attractive. And it gives Philo a much better right than Clitomachus (or Antiochus) to claim the heritage of both Socrates and Plato.⁹⁰

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⁸⁹ The approval of Carneades, discussed at *Luc.* 78, is itself ambiguous: did Philo claim that Carneades supported his account of how the Stoic sage will act, or that he supported his advocacy of the responsible opining of this sage as a model for us all?

⁹⁰ I am grateful to the members of the conference for their lively discussion in Utrecht, and to David Sedley for helpful criticism of successive drafts.

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INDEX NOMINUM ET RERUM

Readers should note that several topics and names which would be nearly ubiquitous have not been indexed; for example, entries for Cicero, for the New Academy, and for characters in the dialogue are not included. Further, philosophically important concepts often occur in quite different lexical forms. The Greek *pithanon*, for example, is rendered variously throughout the book as 'plausible', 'persuasive', 'probable', and so forth; it is also referred to by Cicero's Latin translations. This index attempts to group all allusions to a concept or theme under one heading; cross-references are used to point to the main entry. Such correspondences are subject to philosophical and historical interpretation and agreement is not always possible. In view of this uncertainty a policy of maximal aggregation has been pursued; hence the reader may have to form her or his own judgments about the proper classification of some of the passages listed in any one entry.

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